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OPENING REMARKS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS EVEN
  STOP WARS
HERNANDO DE SOTO*
From the rural farmer in Latin America who is struggling to pro-
tect his family and his possessions to the street vendor in Tunisia
whose wares are confiscated, the desire for property and property
rights is universal. While many scholars take a theoretical approach
to property rights, discussing and proposing what should be, I have
devoted my career to finding out what is and use that knowledge to
help bring peace, security, and stability. My research has taken me
around the world, consulting with governments in an effort to bring
stability. Time after time, I have discovered that property—in par-
ticular the legal protection of property—has been the key to unlock-
ing the value of people’s labor and creating economic, political, and
social stability.
As we consider the reality of the global terrorism originating from
the Arab world today, it is most often thought of as a religious issue
involving radical Islam to be solved by traditional warfare.1 But I have
consulted with seven heads of state in the Middle East, and time and
again my research has found that this is not an issue of religion, it is
an issue of property.2
When Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in Tunisia at the end of
2010, he didn’t do so because of religion—he did so because of property
* President, Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Lima, Peru and recipient of the 2016
Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize. This article is a summary of Mr. de Soto’s remarks
presented at the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference held in The Hague on
October 19–21, 2016. As the president of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Mr. de Soto
has made significant changes to the laws and the economic system of Peru and has influenced
similar economic programs in nations around the world. He is the author of several works in-
cluding The Mystery of Capital (2000) and The Other Path (1989).
1. See Hernando de Soto, This is How We Can Win the War on Terror, WORLD ECON. F.
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/this-is-how-we-can-win-the-war-on
-terror/?utm_content=buffer6ec7d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_cam
paign=buffer (noting the West’s traditional attempts to fight terrorism and its failure to create
and protect property rights in the Middle East).
2. Hernando de Soto, The Secret to Reviving the Arab Spring’s Promise: Property Rights,
DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/20/the-secret-to
-reviving-the-arab-springs-promise-property-rights/ (noting that the Arab Spring “was rooted
in a desire for . . . a market-based economy”).
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rights.3 He was a street vendor whose cart was confiscated by the po-
lice, and when the government refused to listen to him, he set him-
self on fire.4 That was the beginning of the Arab Spring—millions of
people went out into the streets, demonstrating for more freedom
and more rights, and four governments fell.5 In order to understand
the true cause of this uprising, I need to take you back to when I first
became interested in property rights, in my home country of Peru.
I became involved in property rights in large part because of the
Shining Path, the Marxist-Leninist terror organization that had
taken control of large portions of Peru.6 In Peru, a war had been ra-
ging between the government and the Shining Path rebels for de-
cades. The size of the active Shining Path army was a constant of
about fifteen thousand people7 that fought in drug-infested territory
and produced about 4,600 deaths from 1981–1983.8 The armed
government forces, dedicated to fighting the guerillas, numbered
about thirty thousand.9 Not coincidentally, we have seen a similar
war occurring in Colombia. Recently the government of Colombia
sought to negotiate with the local rebels in order to end a war that has
gone on for more than fifty years.10 However, the government ini-
tially lost the plebiscite for peace with the rebels, which has left the
question of lasting peace in Colombia still very much in doubt.11
In Peru we had a very similar war, similar in some aspects and dif-
ferent in others. We fought it in a different legal space. The Shining
3. Id. (explaining Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation due to merchandise expropriation
by the government).
4. Id.
5. De Soto, supra note 1.
6. Shining Path: Peruvian Revolutionary Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last
updated Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shining-Path.
7. Peru: Rebel Group Joining in Colombian Alliance, STRATFOR (Feb. 7, 2002), https://
www.stratfor.com/analysis/peru-rebel-group-joining-colombian-alliance-0.
8. HERNANDO DE SOTO, HOW PERU’S POOR DEFEATED TERRORISM 12 (2016) (Peru)
(noting that the Shining Path killed about 4,600 peasant between 1981 and 1983), http://ild
.org.pe/images/PDF/2016-11-04_r-WEB%20ILD%20How%20Peru’s%20Poor%20Defeat
ed%20terrorism.pdf.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Hernando de Soto, Colombia Between the FARC and the People, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/peru-shining-path-lessons-for
-colombia-by-hernando-de-soto-2016-11.
11. See Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject FARC Peace Deal, BBC (Oct. 3, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.
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Path appeared in 1980, and by 1995 it occupied a large portion of the
countryside.12 The leaders of the Shining Path were trained in Beijing
and dedicated to helping the rural poor.13 They achieved significant
popularity because they sympathized with the people.14 The main
message of the Shining Path to the rural poor focused on property,
initially stressing that the way to get power was to collectivize pro-
perty under control of central committees.15
However, the farmers rebelled against the notion of collective pro-
perty rights, which began the war.16 This prompted the government
to send in armed forces, and the farmers responded by creating an
illegal army with nothing more than homemade weapons.17 This even-
tually pushed the Shining Path out of the two main valleys in Peru
and into the mountains.18
It was at this point that the Shining Path realized that they could
control the countryside of Peru only if they became “protectors” of
private property.19 So they began to sell their protection services in
exchange for contributions from the rural farmers.20 And by 1987,
they were in control of sixty percent of Peru.21 The Rand Corpora-
tion estimated that, at their rate of growth, they would have taken
over Peru by 1992.22 Their strategy was to control the countryside
and encircle the urban areas, eventually clenching down and taking
control of the cities as well.23
12. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 8 (noting the Shining Path’s success in the countryside), 10–
11 (diagram).
13.  MATTHEW D. ROTHWELL, TRANSPACIFIC REVOLUTIONARIES: THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
IN LATIN AMERICA 23 (2013) (discussing the Beijing training course for Latin American com-
munist groups, including the Shining Path).
14. De Soto, supra note 10 (diagram noting that the Shining Path protected impoverished
people’s rights).
15. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 7 (noting the Shining Path’s attempt to collectivize rural
land).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7, 12.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 10 (diagram noting how the Shining Path proposed property reform).
20. Peter Passell, Economic Scene; Coca Dreams, Cocaine Reality, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/14/business/economic-scene-coca-dreams-cocaine-real
ity.html.
21. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 12.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id. at 12 (describing the Shining Path’s strategy of “dominating the countryside com-
pletely and then swooping in to take control of the capital”).
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The government of Peru, led by then-President Alan Garcia, real-
ized the difficulty of the situation: the Shining Path’s guerilla tactics
made it difficult for the army to distinguish between the armed farm-
ers and the real enemy.24 President Garcia was particularly con-
cerned that the situation in Peru would become like the American
situation in Vietnam, where the government soldiers did not know
who to shoot, and so they shot everyone.25 That would be a disaster
of near-unprecedented proportions, and one that the Peruvian
government—made up of coastal elites—wanted desperately to avoid.
So the Peruvian government sought to ally with and gain the sup-
port of the rural forces, which were easily able to identify members
of the Shining Path.26
I was called in by President Garcia to bridge the gap between the
farmers, who live inland and are culturally distinct, and the govern-
ment and its army, whose members come from the coast of Peru.27
The government wanted my involvement because its previous at-
tempts to make contact with the rural farmers had been repeatedly
opposed by human rights groups from Europe and the United States.28
At the outset, we learned that these human rights organizations
were confusing the situation in Peru with that in Colombia, where
the rebels were, essentially, a private army—unlike those fighting in
Peru, who were just poor farmers trying to protect their property.29
Only ten percent of them even had a gun,30 and they were being
killed by the thousands in this war.31
As the American philosopher George Santayana famously said,
“those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”32
24. See id. at 7.
25. See id. at 7–8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 10 (diagram noting that President Garcia invited the Institute for Liberty and
Democracy to the Cartagena summit).
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id. (noting the need to convince the international community that Peru’s peasant army
was informal and an “expression of the Peruvian Industrial Revolution[ ]”).
30. Cf. Mario Fumerton, Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-
defence Organisations in Ayacucho, BULLETIN OF LATIN AM. RES. 470, 487–88 (2001) (noting
the government’s issuance of shotguns to self-defense groups and the general lack of weaponry
in rural districts).
31. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 16.
32. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284
(1st ed. 1906).
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So I studied American history and found parallels to the Peruvian
situation in the United States of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies: Issues such “manifest destiny,” the Louisiana Purchase, the
gold rush, and rapid westward expansion all informed my under-
standing of what was occurring in Peru. In many ways, the farmers
of rural Peru were like the minutemen of the American colonies.
They were not a private army. They were just ordinary, poor citi-
zens fighting to protect themselves and their possessions.33 And the
members of the Shining Path were the Red Coats.34
This insight helped me relate the real story occurring on the
ground in Peru to the people in power in the United States. After
working in Washington, D.C. with the U.S. government and meeting
with President George H.W. Bush, his cabinet, and high-level con-
gressional officials, we formed a group of trusted individuals to circu-
late around Peru, meeting with the different indigenous groups.35
Although many U.S. government officials wanted to approach this
as a drug-enforcement issue, because of their concerns over cocaine
production, I persuaded the right officials to treat it not as an issue
about illegal drugs but as an issue of property rights.36
I enlisted the help of the United Nations, whose secretary-general
at the time, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was Peruvian.37 He understood
what we had uncovered in our research—that this was not about the
drug trade but instead about recognizing property rights. Because
we did not view this as primarily about stopping illegal drugs, we
were able to enter into a treaty that, at its core, changed the classifi-
cations for the rural farmers in Peru.38 Instead of calling them crim-
inals, we accepted their roles as minutemen, and we classified them
as such.39 In response to this treaty, Abimael Guzman, the leader of
the Shining Path, announced to his followers that I was an agent of
Yankee imperialism and the CIA.40
33. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 15.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. (noting the U.S. concerns of coca production and drug trafficking).
37. Id.
38. Id. (describing the “Drug Enforcement and Anti-Subversive Agreement” that acknowl-
edged the new classification of coca farmers).
39. See id. at 15.
40. Id.
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In order to show that our policies would work in converting the
rural farmers to the government’s side in the fight against the
Shining Path, we had to arm them. But that raised the problem of
how to arm people whose addresses you do not have—for if the
government was going to give them real weapons, the government
would expect cooperation.41 In order to provide the farmers with the
right incentive to support the Peruvian government, and to oppose
the Shining Path, it became clear that we had to offer them more
protection than the Shining Path.42
During our research, we learned that the Shining Path was apply-
ing important, fundamental property concepts in its activities. It
offered the farmers many different sticks in the bundle we call prop-
erty rights.43 It offered safety; it offered protection from a series of
social consequences; and it offered security to the farmers for their
possessions and their families.44 In order to win the loyalty of these
farmers, the government had to offer them more sticks from the
bundle of property rights.45 Ultimately, providing the Peruvian min-
utemen with governmental protection of their property and a formal
system of land titling enabled the government to win the loyalty of
the farmers against the Shining Path.46
As a result, the war in Peru was not won by military might; it was
won by property rights. The presence of the people in the country-
side became widespread and permanent, while the Shining Path
simply dwindled down to nothing.47 In the end, Guzman actually had
to leave the countryside and go to the city, where he was captured
by police.48 At his capture, he was unarmed and had no bodyguards,
because his movement had been defeated two years earlier.49 By
41. See id. (indicating that Legislative Decree 741 legitimized the informal peasant army
“under the strict supervision of the Armed Forces”).
42. Id. at 16 (noting the farmers’ access to formal property rights and credit), 21
(recognizing the need to “open and build doors that allow[ ] millions of Peruvians to move from
informality into the economic mainstream”).
43. De Soto, supra note 10 (noting how the Shining Path protected farmers’ rights).
44. Id.
45. Id. (recognizing the need to sever insurgent groups’ control over localities).
46. DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 15 (photograph of property committees establishing land
titles), 26 (indicating the establishment of mechanisms to allow Peruvian majorities “to move
from the informal to the formal sector”).
47. Id. at 16 (describing the Shining Path as they were “expelled from the countryside”). 
48. De Soto, supra note 10.
49. Id.
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forming property committees across Peru and using much of the
land-titling process that the Shining Path had implemented, we
were able to standardize and systematize property rights and win
the war.50
The same principles are at work in the Middle East. My organiza-
tion has been called in by seven heads of state in the Middle East,
and in each nation, our studies have revealed that the vast majority
of property is held without formal title. In Egypt, for example, just
eight percent of land is held in formal title, leaving ninety-two percent
of landholders with possessionary title only.51 Yet in many of those
nations, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are providing citizens
with their own land titles, just like the Shining Path did with the
rural farmers in Peru.52 We have copies of these documents and
have provided them to the governments for whom we are consulting.
So the way to counteract much of the violence that is occurring in
the Middle East is through property—creating formal, recognized
systems of land ownership which are protected by the government.
This gives people better title than groups such as the Muslim Broth-
erhood can provide, which in turn will win the people’s loyalty. We
are using technology, such as blockchain, a secure digital and easily
updatable database, to do this efficiently; we are also sensitive to
other legal protections, such as limited liability organizations that
encourage the development of property. But the central way to pro-
mote stability and encourage prosperity is for governments to recog-
nize and protect formal title to property, either in an individual or
in a group united by cultural heritage or common interests. It is a
message that applies as much in Egypt and Peru as it does in the
United States.53
50. See DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 15.
51. De Soto, supra note 2 (noting that ninety-two percent of land holdings in Egypt are
unrecorded).
52. Cf. The Call for Economic Liberty in the Arab World Before the H. Comm. on Foreign
Aff., 113th Cong. 40, 45 (2013) (statement of Hernando de Soto, President, Institute for
Liberty & Democracy) (acknowledging the Muslim Brotherhood’s role).
53. De Soto, supra note 2 (noting that the United States is “missing a chance” to learn
from the Arab Spring).

EXCERPTS FROM THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL
HERNANDO DE SOTO*
CHAPTER ONE
The Five Mysteries of Capital
The key problem is to find out why that sector of society of
the past, which I would not hesitate to call capitalist,
should have lived as if in a bell jar, cut off from the rest;
why was it not able to expand and conquer the whole of
society? . . . [Why was it that] a significant rate of capital
formation was possible only in certain sectors and not in
the whole market economy of the time?
—Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce
The hour of capitalism’s greatest triumph is its hour of crisis.
The fall of the Berlin Wall ended more than a century of political
competition between capitalism and communism. Capitalism stands
alone as the only feasible way to rationally organize a modern eco-
nomy. At this moment in history, no responsible nation has a choice.
As a result, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, Third World and
former communist nations have balanced their budgets, cut subsi-
dies, welcomed foreign investment, and dropped their tariff barriers.
Their efforts have been repaid with bitter disappointment. From
Russia to Venezuela, the past half-decade has been a time of economic
suffering, tumbling incomes, anxiety and resentment; of “starving,
rioting and looting,” in the stinging words of Malaysian Prime Minis-
ter Mahathir Mohamad. In a recent editorial, the New York Times
said: “For much of the world, the marketplace extolled by the West
in the afterglow of victory in the Cold War has been supplanted by
the cruelty of markets, wariness towards capitalism and dangers of
* Reprinted from HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000), with permission
of the author. The excerpts were shared with conference attendees at the 2016 Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Conference held in The Hague on October 19–21, 2016, where the author
received the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize.
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instability.” The triumph of capitalism only in the West could be a
recipe for economic and political disaster.
For Americans enjoying both peace and prosperity, it has been all
too easy to ignore the turmoil elsewhere. How can capitalism be in
trouble when the Dow Jones Industrial average is climbing higher
than Sir Edmund Hillary? Americans look at other nations and see
progress, even if it is slow and uneven. Can’t you eat a Big Mac in
Moscow, rent a Blockbuster video in Shanghai, and reach the Inter-
net in Caracas?
Even in the United States, however, the foreboding cannot be com-
pletely stifled. Americans see Colombia poised on the brink of a major
civil war between drug-trafficking guerillas and repressive militias;
an intractable insurgency in the south of Mexico; an important part
of Asia’s force-fed economic growth draining away into corruption
and chaos. In Latin America, sympathy for free markets is dwindling:
Support for privatization has dropped from 46 percent of the popula-
tion to 36 in May 2000. Most ominously of all, in the former commu-
nist nations capitalism has been found wanting, and men associated
with old regimes stand poised to resume power. Some Americans
sense too that one reason for their decade-long boom is that the more
precarious the rest of the world looks, the more attractive American
stocks and bonds become as a haven for international money.
In the business community of the West, there is a growing concern
that the failure of most of the rest of the world to implement capital-
ism will eventually drive the rich economies into recession. As millions
of investors have painfully learned from the evaporation of their
emerging market funds, globalization is a two-way street: If the Third
World and former communist nations cannot escape the influence
of the West, neither can the West disentangle itself from them. Ad-
verse reactions to capitalism have also been growing stronger within
rich countries themselves. The rioting in Seattle at the meeting of
the World Trade Organization in December 1999 and a few months
later at the IMF/World Bank meeting in Washington, D.C., regard-
less of the diversity of the grievances, highlighted the anger that
spreading capitalism inspires. Many have begun recalling the eco-
nomic historian Karl Polanyi’s warnings that free markets can
collide with society and lead to fascism. Japan is struggling through
its most prolonged slump since the Great Depression. Western
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Europeans vote for politicians who promise them a “third way” that
rejects what a French bestseller has labeled L’horreur économique.
These whispers of alarm, disturbing though they are, have thus
far only prompted American and European leaders to repeat to the
rest of the world the same wearisome lectures: Stabilize your cur-
rencies, hang tough, ignore the food riots, and wait patiently for the
foreign investors to return.
Foreign investment is of course a very good thing. The more of it,
the better. Stable currencies are good too, as are free trade and
transparent banking practices and the privatization of state-owned
industries and every other remedy in the Western pharmacopeia.
Yet we continually forget global capitalism has been tried before. In
Latin America, for example, reforms directed at creating capitalist
systems have been tried at least four times since independence from
Spain in the 1820s. Each time, after the initial euphoria, Latin Ameri-
cans swung back from capitalist and market economy policies. These
remedies are clearly not enough. Indeed, they fall so far short as to
be almost irrelevant.
When these remedies fail, Westerners all too often respond not by
questioning the adequacy of the remedies but by blaming Third
World peoples for their lack of entrepreneurial spirit or market ori-
entation. If they have failed to prosper despite all the excellent
advice, it is because something is the matter with them: They missed
the Protestant Reformation, or they are crippled by the disabling
legacy of colonial Europe, or their IQs are too low on the Bell Curve.
But the suggestion that it is culture that explains the success of
such diverse places as Japan, Switzerland, and California, and cul-
ture again that explains the relative poverty of such equally diverse
places as China, Estonia, and Baja California, is worse than inhu-
mane; it is unconvincing. The disparity of wealth between the West
and rest of the world is far too great to be explained by culture
alone. Most people want the fruits of capital—so much so that many,
from the children of Sanchez to Khruschev’s son, are flocking to
Western nations.
The cities of the Third World and the former communist countries
are teeming with entrepreneurs. You cannot walk through a Middle
Eastern market, hike up to a Latin American village, or climb into
a taxicab in Moscow without someone trying to make a deal with
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you. The inhabitants of these countries possess talent, enthusiasm,
and an astonishing ability to wring a profit out of practically noth-
ing. They can grasp and use modern technology. Otherwise, Ameri-
can businesses would not be struggling to control the unauthorized
use of their patents abroad, nor would the U.S. government be striv-
ing so desperately to keep modern weapons technology out of the
hands of Third World countries. Markets are an ancient and univer-
sal tradition: Christ drove the merchants out of the temple 2,000
years ago, and Mexicans were taking their products to market long
before Columbus reached America.
But if people in countries making the transition to capitalism are
not pitiful beggars, are not helplessly trapped in obsolete ways, and
are not the uncritical prisoners of dysfunctional cultures, what is it
that prevents capitalism from delivering to them the same wealth
it has delivered to the West? Why does capitalism thrive only in the
West, as if enclosed in a bell jar?
In this book I intend to demonstrate that the major stumbling
block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capital-
ism is its inability to produce capital. Capital is the force that raises
the productivity of labor and creates the wealth of nations. It is the
lifeblood of the capitalist system, the foundation of progress, and the
one thing that the poor countries of the world cannot seem to pro-
duce for themselves, no matter how eagerly their people engage in
all the other activities that characterize a capitalist economy.
I will also show, with the help of facts and figures that my re-
search team and I have collected, block by block and farm by farm
in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, that most of
the poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of
capitalism. Even in the poorest countries, the poor save. The value
of savings among the poor is, in fact, immense: forty times all the
foreign aid received throughout the world since 1945. In Egypt, for
instance, the wealth that the poor have accumulated is worth fifty-
five times as much as the sum of all direct foreign investment ever
recorded there, including the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam. In
Haiti, the poorest nation in Latin America, the total assets of the
poor are more than one hundred fifty times greater than all the
foreign investment received since Haiti’s independence from France
in 1804. If the United States were to hike its foreign-aid budget to
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the level recommended by the United Nations—0.7 percent of na-
tional income—it would take the richest country on earth more than
150 years to transfer to the world’s poor resources equal to what
they already possess.
But they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on
land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincor-
porated businesses with undefined liability, industries located where
financiers and investors cannot see them. Because the rights to
these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets can-
not readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of nar-
row local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be
used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against
an investment.
In the West, by contrast, every parcel of land, every building,
every piece of equipment, or store of inventories is represented in a
property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process
that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy. Thanks to
this representational process, assets can lead an invisible, parallel
life alongside their material existence. They can be used as collat-
eral for credit. The single most important source of funds for new
businesses in the United States is a mortgage on the entrepreneur’s
house. These assets can also provide a link to the owner’s credit
history, an accountable address for the collection of debts and taxes,
the basis for the creation of reliable and universal public utilities,
and a foundation for the creation of securities (like mortgage-backed
bonds) that can then be rediscounted and sold in secondary markets.
By this process the West injects life into assets and makes them
generate capital.
Third World and former communist nations do not have this
representational process. As a result, most of them are undercapi-
talized, in the same way that a firm is undercapitalized when it
issues fewer securities than its income and assets would justify. The
enterprises of the poor are very much like corporations that cannot
issue shares or bonds to obtain new investment and finance. Without
representations, their assets are dead capital.
The poor inhabitants of these nations—five-sixths of human-
ity—do have things, but they lack the process to represent their
property and create capital. They have houses but not titles; crops
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but not deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation. It is the
unavailability of these essential representations that explains why
people who have adapted every other Western invention, from the
paper clip to the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce
sufficient capital to make their domestic capitalism work.
This is the mystery of capital. Solving it requires understanding
why Westerners, by representing assets with titles, are able to see
and draw out capital from them. One of the greatest challenges to
the human mind is to understand and gain access to those things we
know exist but cannot see. Not everything that is real and useful is
tangible and visible. Time, for example, is real, but it can only be
efficiently managed when it is represented by a clock or a calendar.
Throughout history, human beings have invented representational
systems—writing, musical notation, double-entry bookkeeping—to
grasp with the mind what human hands could never touch. In the
same way, the great practitioners of capitalism, from the creators of
integrated title systems and corporate stock to Michael Milken,
were able to reveal and extract capital where others saw just junk
by devising new ways to represent the invisible potential that is
locked up in the assets we accumulate.
At this very moment, you are surrounded by waves of Ukrainian,
Chinese, and Brazilian television that you cannot see. So, too, are
you surrounded by assets that invisibly harbor capital. Just as the
waves of Ukrainian television are far too weak for you to sense them
directly but can, with the help of a television set, be decoded to be
seen and heard, so can capital be extracted and processed from
assets. But only the West has the conversion process required to
transform the invisible to the visible. It is this disparity that ex-
plains why Western nations can create capital and the Third World
and former communist nations cannot.
The absence of this process in the poorer regions of the world—
where two-thirds of humanity lives—is not the consequence of some
Western monopolistic conspiracy. It is rather that Westerners take
this mechanism so completely for granted that they have lost all
awareness of its existence. Although it is huge, nobody sees it, in-
cluding the Americans, Europeans and Japanese who owe all their
wealth to their ability to use it. It is an implicit legal infrastructure
hidden deep within their property systems—of which ownership is
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but the tip of the iceberg. The rest of the iceberg is an intricate man-
made process that can transform assets and labor into capital. This
process was not created from a blueprint and is not described in a
glossy brochure. Its origins are obscure and its significance buried
in the economic subconscious of Western capitalist nations.
How could something so important have slipped our minds? It is
not uncommon for us to know how to do things without understand-
ing why they work. Sailors used magnetic compasses long before
there was a satisfactory theory of magnetism. Animal breeders had
a working knowledge of genetics long before Gregor Mendel ex-
plained genetic principles. Even as the West prospers from abun-
dant capital, do people really understand the origin of capital? If
they don’t, there always remains the possibility that the West might
damage the source of its own strength. Being clear about the source
of capital will also prepare the West to protect itself and the rest of
the world as soon as the prosperity of the moment yields to the crisis
that is sure to come. Then the question that always arises in inter-
national crises will be heard again: Whose money will pay to solve
these problems?
So far, Western countries have been happy to take their system
for producing capital entirely for granted and to leave its history
undocumented. That history must be recovered. This book is an
effort to reopen the exploration of the source of capital and thus
explain how to correct the economic failures of poor countries. These
failures have nothing to do with deficiencies in cultural or genetic
heritage. Would anyone suggest “cultural” commonalities between
Latin Americans and Russians? Yet in the last decade, ever since
both regions began to build capitalism without capital, they have
shared the same political, social, and economic problems: glaring
inequality, underground economies, pervasive mafias, political in-
stability, capital flight, flagrant disregard for the law. These trou-
bles did not originate in the monasteries of the Orthodox Church or
along the pathways of the Incas.
But it is not only former communist and Third World countries
that have suffered all of these problems. The same was true of the
United States in 1783, when President George Washington com-
plained about “banditti . . . skimming and disposing of the cream of
the country at the expense of the many.” These “banditti” were
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squatters and small illegal entrepreneurs occupying lands they did
not own. For the next one hundred years, such squatters battled for
legal rights to their land and miners warred over their claims be-
cause ownership laws differed from town to town and camp to camp.
Enforcing property rights created such a quagmire of social unrest
and antagonism throughout the young United States that the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Joseph Story, wondered in 1820
whether lawyers would ever be able to settle them.
Do squatters, banditti, and flagrant disregard of the law sound
familiar? Americans and Europeans have been telling the other
countries of the world “You have to be more like us.” In fact, they
are very much like the United States of a century ago when it too was
an undeveloped country. Western politicians once faced the same
dramatic challenges that leaders of the developing and former com-
munist countries are facing today. But their successors have lost
contact with the days when the pioneers who opened the American
West were undercapitalized because they seldom possessed title to
the lands they settled and the goods they owned; when Adam Smith
did his shopping in black markets and English street urchins
plucked pennies cast by laughing tourists into the mud banks of the
Thames; when Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s technocrats executed 16,000
small entrepreneurs whose only crime was manufacturing and
importing cotton cloth in violation of France’s industrial codes.
That past is many nations’ present. The Western nations have so
successfully integrated their poor into their economies that they
have lost even the memory of how it was done, how the creation of
capital began back when, as the American historian Gordon Wood
has written, “something momentous was happening in the society
and culture that released the aspirations and energies of common
people as never before in American history.”1 The “something mo-
mentous” was that Americans and Europeans were on the verge of
establishing widespread formal property law and inventing the
conversion process in that law that allowed them to create capital.
This was the moment when the West crossed the demarcation point
that led to successful capitalism—when it ceased being a private
club and became a popular culture, when George Washington’s
1. Gordon S. Wood, “Inventing American Capitalism,” The New York Review of Books
(June 9, 1994), p. 49.
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dreaded “banditti” were transformed into the beloved pioneers that
American culture now venerates.
* * *
The paradox is as clear as it is unsettling: capital, the most essen-
tial component of Western economic advance, is the one that has
received the least attention. Neglect has shrouded it in mystery—in
fact, a series of five mysteries.
The Mystery of the Missing Information
Charitable organizations have so emphasized the miseries and
helplessness of the world’s poor that no one has properly docu-
mented their capacity for accumulating assets. Over the past five
years, I and a hundred colleagues from six different nations have
closed our books and opened our eyes—and gone out into the streets
and countrysides of four continents to count how much the poorest
sectors of society have saved. The quantity is enormous. But most
of it is dead capital.
The Mystery of Capital
This is the key mystery and the centerpiece of this book. Capital
is a subject that has fascinated thinkers for the last three centuries:
Marx said that you needed to go beyond physics to touch “the hen
that lays the golden eggs”; Adam Smith felt you had to create “a sort
of waggon-way through the air” to reach that same hen. But no one
has told us where the hen hides. What is capital, how is it produced,
and how is it related to money?
The Mystery of Political Awareness
If there is so much dead capital in the world, and in the hands of
so many poor people, why haven’t governments tried to tap into this
potential wealth? Simply because the evidence they needed has only
become available in the past forty years as billions of people through-
out the world have moved from life organized on a small scale to life
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on a large scale. This migration to the cities has rapidly divided
labor and spawned in poorer countries a huge industrial-commercial
revolution—one that, incredibly, has been virtually ignored.
The Missing Lessons of U.S. History
What is going on in the Third World and the former communist
countries has happened before, in Europe and North America. Un-
fortunately, we have been so mesmerized by the failure of so many
nations to make the transition to capitalism that we have forgotten
how the successful capitalist nations actually did it. For years, I
visited technocrats and politicians in advanced nations, from Alaska
to Tokyo, but they had no answers. It was a mystery. I finally found
the answer in their history books, the most pertinent example being
that of U.S. history.
The Mystery of Legal Failure: Why Property Law Does Not
Work Outside the West
Since the nineteenth century, nations have been copying the laws
of the West to give their citizens the institutional framework to
produce wealth. They continue copying such laws today, and, obvi-
ously it doesn’t work. Most citizens still cannot use the law to con-
vert their savings into capital. Why this is so and what is needed to
make the law work remains a mystery.
The solution to each of these mysteries is the subject of a chapter
in this book.
* * *
The moment is ripe to solve the problems of why capitalism is
triumphant in the West and stalling practically everywhere else. As
all plausible alternatives to capitalism have now evaporated, we are
finally in a position to study capital, dispassionately and carefully.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Mystery of Capital
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the
world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen.
In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no
value.
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside
all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-
so is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for
otherwise this would again be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Walk down most roads in the Middle East, the former Soviet
Union or Latin America, and you will see many things: houses used
for shelter, parcels of land being tilled, sowed and harvested, mer-
chandise being bought and sold. Assets in developing and former
communist countries primarily serve these immediate physical
purposes. In the West, however, the same assets also lead a parallel
life as capital outside the physical world. They can be used to put in
motion more production by securing the interests of other parties as
“collateral” for a mortgage, for example, or by assuring the supply
of other forms of credit and public utilities.
Why can’t buildings and land elsewhere in the world also lead
this parallel life? Why can’t the enormous resources we discussed in
Chapter 2—$9.3 trillion of dead capital—produce value beyond their
“natural” state? My reply is: Dead capital exists because we have
forgotten (or perhaps never realized) that converting a physical asset
to generate capital—using your house to borrow money to finance
an enterprise, for example—requires a very complex process. It is
not unlike the process that Einstein taught us whereby a single
brick can be made to release a huge amount of energy in the form of
an atomic explosion. By analogy, capital is the result of discovering
and unleashing potential energy from the trillions of bricks that the
poor have accumulated in their buildings.
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There is, however, one crucial difference between unleashing energy
from a brick and unleashing capital from brick buildings: Although
humanity (or at least a large group of scientists) has mastered the
process of obtaining energy from matter, we seem to have forgotten
the process that allows us to obtain capital from assets. The result
is that 80 percent of the world is undercapitalized; people cannot
draw economic life from their buildings (or any other asset) to
generate capital. Worse, the advanced nations seem unable to teach
them. Why assets can be made to produce abundant capital in the
West but very little in the rest of the world has become a mystery.
Clues from the Past (from Smith to Marx)
To unravel the mystery of capital, we have to go back to the
seminal meaning of the word. In Medieval Latin, “capital” appears
to have denoted a head of cattle or other livestock, which have
always been important sources of wealth beyond the basic meat they
provide. Livestock are low-maintenance possessions; they are mobile
and can be moved away from danger; they are also easy to count and
measure. But most important, from livestock you can obtain addi-
tional wealth, or surplus value, by setting in motion other indus-
tries, including milk, hides, wool, meat, and fuel. Livestock also
have the useful attribute of being able to reproduce themselves.
Thus the term “capital” begins to do two jobs simultaneously, cap-
turing the physical dimension of assets (livestock) as well as their
potential to generate surplus value. From the barnyard, it was only
a short step to the desks of the inventors of economics, who gener-
ally defined “capital” as that part of a country’s assets that initiates
surplus production and increases productivity.
Great classical economists such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx
believed that capital was the engine that powered the market econ-
omy. Capital was considered to be the principal part of the economic
whole—the preeminent factor (as the capital issues in such phrases as
capital issues, capital punishment, the capital city of a country). What
they wanted to understand was what capital is and how it is pro-
duced and accumulated. Whether you agree with the classical econo-
mists or not, or perhaps view them as irrelevant (maybe Smith never
understood that the Industrial Revolution was under way; maybe
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Marx’s labor theory of value has no practical application), there is
no doubt that these thinkers built the towering edifices of thought
on which we can now stand and try to find out what capital is, what
produces it, and why non-Western nations generate so little of it.
For Smith, economic specialization—the division of labor and the
subsequent exchange of products in the market—was the source of
increasing productivity and therefore “the wealth of nations.” What
made this specialization and exchange possible was capital, which
Smith defined as the stock of assets accumulated for productive pur-
poses. Entrepreneurs could use their accumulated resources to support
specialized enterprises until they could exchange their products for
the other things they needed. The more capital was accumulated,
the more specialization became possible, and the higher society’s
productivity would be. Marx agreed; for him, the wealth capitalism
produces presents itself as an immense pile of commodities.
Smith believed that the phenomenon of capital was a consequence
of man’s natural progression from a hunting, pastoral, and agricul-
tural society to a commercial one where, through mutual interde-
pendence, specialization and trade, he could increase his productive
powers immensely. Capital was to be the magic that would enhance
productivity and create surplus value. “The quantity of industry,”
Smith wrote, “not only increases in every country with the increase
of the stock [capital] which employs it, but, in consequence of that
increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater
quantity of work.”1
Smith emphasized one point that is at the very heart of the mys-
tery we are trying to solve: For accumulated assets to become active
capital and put additional production in motion, they must be fixed
and realized in some particular subject “which lasts for some time
at least after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a certain quantity
of labour stocked and stored up to be employed, if necessary, upon
some other occasion.”2 Smith warned that labor invested in the
production of assets would not leave any trace or value if not prop-
erly fixed.
1. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Everyman’s Library, 1977), former
Volume 1, p. 242.
2. Ibid., p.295.
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What Smith really meant may be the subject of legitimate debate.
What I take from him, however, is that capital is not the accumu-
lated stock of assets but the potential it holds to deploy new produc-
tion. This potential is, of course, abstract. It must be processed and
fixed into a tangible form before we can release it—just like the
potential nuclear energy in Einstein’s brick. Without a conversion
process—one that draws out and fixes the potential energy con-
tained in the brick—there is no explosion; a brick is just a brick.
Creating capital also requires a conversion process.
This notion—that capital is first an abstract concept and must be
given a fixed, tangible form to be useful—was familiar to other
classical economists. Simonde de Sismondi, the nineteenth-century
Swiss economist, wrote that capital was “a permanent value, that
multiplies and does not perish . . . Now this value detaches itself
from the product that creates it, it becomes a metaphysical and
insubstantial quantity always in the possession of whoever pro-
duced it, for whom this value could [be fixed in] different forms.”3
The great French economist Jean Baptiste Say believed that “capital
is always immaterial by nature since it is not matter which makes
capital but the value of that matter, value has nothing corporeal
about it.”4 Marx agreed; for him, a table could be made of something
material, like wood “but so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it
is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its
feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands
on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far
more wonderful than table-turning ever was.”5
This essential meaning of capital has been lost to history. Capital
is now confused with money, which is only one of the many forms in
which it travels. It is always easier to remember a difficult concept
in one of its tangible manifestations than in its essence. The mind
wraps itself around “money” more easily than “capital.” But it is a
mistake to assume that money is what finally fixes capital. As Adam
Smith pointed out, money is the “great wheel of circulation,” but it
3. Simonde de Sismondi, Nouveaux principes d’économic politique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy,
1827), pp. 81–82.
4. Jean Baptiste Say, Traité d’économie politique (Paris: Deterville, 1819), Vol. 2, p. 429.
5. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, (New York: International Publishers,
1996), Vol. 35, p. 82.
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is not capital because value “cannot consist in those metal pieces.”6
In other words, money facilitates transactions, allowing us to buy
and sell things, but it is not itself the progenitor of additional pro-
duction. As Smith insisted, “the gold and silver money, which circu-
lates in any country, may very properly be compared to a highway,
which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and
corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either.”7
Much of the mystery of capital dissipates as soon as you stop
thinking of “capital” as a synonym for “money saved and invested.”
The misapprehension that it is money that fixes capital comes about,
I suspect, because modern business expresses the value of capital in
terms of money. In fact, it is hard to estimate the total value of a
collection of assets of very different types, such as machinery, build-
ings, and land, without resorting to money. After all, that is why
money was invented; it provides a standard index to measure the
value of things so that we may exchange dissimilar assets. But as
useful as it is, money cannot fix in any way the abstract potential of
a particular asset in order to convert it into capital. Third World and
former communist nations are infamous for inflating their econo-
mies with money—without being able to generate much capital.
The Potential Energy in Assets
What is it that fixes the potential of an asset so that it can put ad-
ditional production into motion? What detaches value from a simple
house and fixes it in a way that allows us to realize it as capital?
We can begin to find an answer by using our energy analogy.
Consider a mountain lake. We can think about this lake in its im-
mediate physical context and see some primary uses for it, such as
canoeing and fishing. But when we think about this same lake as an
engineer would by focusing on its capacity to generate energy as an
additional value beyond the lake’s natural state as a body of water,
we suddenly see the potential created by the lake’s elevated posi-
tion. The challenge for the engineer is finding out how he can create
a process that allows him to convert and fix this potential into a form
that can be used to do additional work. In the case of the elevated
6. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, former Volume 1, p. 242.
7. Ibid., p. 286.
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lake, that process is contained in a hydroelectric plant that allows
the lake water to move rapidly downward with the force of gravity,
thereby transforming the placid lake’s energy potential into the
kinetic energy of tumbling water. This new kinetic energy can then
rotate turbines creating mechanical energy that can be used to turn
electromagnets that further convert it into electrical energy. As
electricity, the potential energy of the placid lake is now fixed in the
form necessary to produce controllable current that can be further
transmitted through wire conductors to faraway places to deploy
new production.
Thus an apparently placid lake can be used to light up your room
and power the machinery in a factory. What was required was an
external man-made process, which allowed us, first, to identify the
potential of the weight of the water to do additional work and sec-
ond, to convert this potential energy into electricity, which can be
used to create surplus value. The additional value we obtain from
the lake is not a value of the lake itself (like a precious ore intrinsic
to the earth) but rather a value of the man-made process extrinsic
to the lake. It is this process that allows us to transform the lake
from a fishing and canoeing kind of place into an energy-producing
kind of place.
Capital, like energy, is also a dormant value. Bringing it to life
requires us to go beyond looking at our assets as they are to actively
thinking about them as they could be. It requires a process for fixing
an asset’s economic potential into a form where it can be used to
initiate additional production.
Although the process that converts the potential energy in the
water into electricity is well known, the one that gives assets the
form required to put in motion more production is not known. In
other words, while we know that it is the penstock, turbines, gener-
ators, transformers, and wires of the hydroelectric energy system
that convert the potential energy of the lake until it is fixed in an
accessible form, we do not know where to find the key process that
converts the economic potential of a house into capital.
This is because that key process was not deliberately set up to
create capital but for the more mundane purpose of protecting
property ownership. As the property systems of Western nations
grew, they developed, imperceptibly, a variety of mechanisms that
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gradually combined into a process that churned out capital as never
before. Although we use these mechanisms all the time, we do not
realize that they have capital generating functions because they do
not wear that label. We view them as parts of the system that pro-
tects property, not as interlocking mechanisms for fixing the eco-
nomic potential of an asset in such a way that it can be converted to
capital. What creates capital in the West, in other words, is an im-
plicit process buried in the intricacies of its formal property systems.
The Hidden Conversion Process of the West
This may sound too simple or too complex. But consider whether
it is possible for assets to be used productively if they do not belong
to something or someone. Where do we confirm the existence of these
assets and the transactions that transform them and raise their
productivity, if not in the context of a formal property system? Where
do we record the relevant economic features of assets, if not in the
records and titles that formal property systems provide? Where are
the codes of conduct that govern the use and transfer of assets, if not
in the framework of formal property systems? It is formal property
that provides the process, the forms, and the rules that fix assets in
a condition that allows us to realize them as active capital.
In the West, this formal property system begins to process assets
into capital by describing and organizing the most economically and
socially useful aspects about assets, preserving this information in
a recording system—as insertions in a written ledger or a blip on a
computer disk—and then embodying them in a title. A set of de-
tailed and precise legal rules governs this entire process. Formal
property records and titles thus represent our shared concept of
what is economically meaningful about any asset. They capture and
organize all the relevant information required to conceptualize the
potential value of an asset and so allow us to control it. Property is
the realm where we identify and explore assets, combine them, and
link them to other assets. The formal property system is capital’s
hydroelectric plant. This is the place where capital is born.
Any asset whose economic and social aspects are not fixed in a
formal property system is extremely hard to move in the market.
How can the huge amounts of assets changing hands in a modern
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market economy be controlled, if not through a formal property
process? Without such a system, any trade of an asset, say a piece
of real estate, requires an enormous effort just to determine the
basics of the transaction: Does the seller own the real estate and
have the right to transfer it? Can he pledge it? Will the new owner
be accepted as such by those who enforce property rights? What are
the effective means to exclude other claimants? In developing and
former communist nations, such questions are difficult to answer.
For most goods, there is no place where the answers are reliably
fixed. That is why the sale or lease of a house can involve lengthy
and cumbersome procedures of approval involving all the neighbors.
This is often the only way to verify that the owner actually owns the
house and there are no other claims on it. It is also why the ex-
change of most assets outside the West is restricted to local circles
of trading partners.
As we saw in the previous chapter, these countries’ principal
problem is not the lack of entrepreneurship: The poor have accumu-
lated trillions of dollars of real estate during the last forty years.
What the poor lack is easy access to the property mechanisms that
could legally fix the economic potential of their assets so that they
can be used to produce, secure, or guarantee greater value in the
expanded market. In the West, every asset—every piece of land,
every house, every chattel—is formally fixed in updated records
governed by rules contained in the property system. Every incre-
ment in production, every new building, product, or commercially
valuable thing is someone’s formal property. Even if assets belong
to a corporation, real people still own them indirectly, through titles
certifying that they own the corporation as “shareholders.”
Like electric power, capital will not be generated if the single key
facility that produces and fixes it is not in place. Just as a lake
needs a hydroelectric plant to produce usable energy, assets need a
formal property system to produce significant surplus value. With-
out formal property to extract their economic potential and convert
it into a form that can be easily transported and controlled, the
assets of developing and former communist countries are like water
in a lake high in the Andes—an untapped stock of potential energy.
Why has the genesis of capital become such a mystery? Why have
the rich nations of the world, so quick with their economic advice,
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not explained how indispensable formal property is to capital forma-
tion? The answer is that the process within the formal property
system that breaks down assets into capital is extremely difficult to
visualize. It is hidden in thousands of pieces of legislation, statutes,
regulations, and institutions that govern the system. Anyone trapped
in such a legal morass would be hard-pressed to figure out how the
process actually works. The only way to see it is from outside the
system—from the extralegal sector—which is where my colleagues
and I do most of our work.
For some time now I have been looking at the law from an extra-
legal point of view, to better understand how it functions and what
effects it produces. This is not as crazy as it seems. As the French
philosopher Michel Foucault has argued, it may be easier to discover
what something means by looking at it from the opposite side of the
bridge. “To find out what our society means by sanity,” Foucault has
written, “perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the
field of insanity. And what we mean by legality in the field of illegal-
ity.”8 Moreover, property, like energy, is a concept; it cannot be
experienced directly. Pure energy has never been seen or touched.
And no one can see property. One can only experience energy and
property by their effects.
From my viewpoint in the extralegal sector, I have seen that the
formal property systems of the West produce six effects that allow
their citizens to generate capital. The incapacity elsewhere in the
world to deploy capital stems from the fact that most of the people
in Third World and former communist countries are cut off from
these essential effects.
Property Effect No. 1: Fixing the Economic Potential of Assets
The potential value locked up in a house can be revealed and
transformed into active capital in the same way that potential en-
ergy is identified in a mountain lake and then transformed into
actual energy. In both cases, the transition from one state to an-
other requires a process that transposes the physical object into a
man-made representative universe where we can disengage the
8. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics (Chicago: Harvester, University of Chicago, 1982), p. 211.
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resource from its burdensome material constraints and concentrate
on its potential.
Capital is born by representing in writing—in a title, a security,
a contract, and in other such records—the most economically and
socially useful qualities about the asset as opposed to the visually
more striking aspects of the asset. This is where potential value is
first described and registered. The moment you focus your attention
on the title of a house, for example, and not the house itself, you
have automatically stepped from the material world into the concep-
tual universe where capital lives. You are reading a representation
that focuses your attention on the economic potential of the house
by filtering out all the confusing lights and shadows of its physical
aspects and its local surroundings. Formal property forces you to
think about the house as an economic and social concept. It invites
you to go beyond viewing the house as mere shelter—and thus a
dead asset—and to see it as live capital.
The proof that property is pure concept comes when a house
changes hands; nothing physically changes. Looking at a house will
not tell you who owns it. A house that is yours today looks exactly
as it did yesterday when it was mine. It looks the same whether I
own it, rent it, or sell it to you. Property is not the house itself but
an economic concept about the house, embodied in a legal represen-
tation. This means that a formal property representation is some-
thing separate from the asset it represents.
What do formal property representations have that allows them
to do additional work? Are they not just simple stand-ins for the
assets? No. I repeat: A formal property representation such as a title
is not a reproduction of the house, like a photograph, but a represen-
tation of our concepts about the house. Specifically, it represents the
nonvisible qualities that have potential for producing value. These
are not physical qualities of the house itself but rather economically
and socially meaningful qualities we humans have attributed to the
house (such as the ability to use it for a variety of purposes that can
be secured by liens, mortgages, easements, and other covenants).
In advanced nations, this formal property representation func-
tions as the means to secure the interests of other parties and to
create accountability by providing all the information, references,
rules, and enforcement mechanisms required to do so. In the West,
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for example, most formal property can be easily used as collateral
for a loan; as equity exchanged for investment; as an address for
collecting debts, rates, and taxes; as a locus point for the identifica-
tion of individuals for commercial, judicial, or civic purposes; or as
a liable terminal for receiving public utility services, such as energy,
water, sewage, telephone, or cable services. While houses in advanced
nations are acting as shelters or workplaces, their representations
are leading a parallel life, carrying out a variety of additional func-
tions to secure the interests of other parties.
Legal property thus gave the West the tools to produce surplus
value over and above its physical assets. Property representations
enabled people to think about assets not only through physical
acquaintance but also through the description of their latent eco-
nomic and social qualities. Whether anyone intended it or not, the
legal property system became the staircase that took these nations
from the universe of assets in their natural state to the conceptual
universe of capital where assets can be viewed in their full produc-
tive potential.
With legal property, the advanced nations of the West had the key
to modern development; their citizens now had the means to dis-
cover, with great facility and on an ongoing basis, the most poten-
tially productive qualities of their resources. As Aristotle discovered
2,300 years ago, what you can do with things increases infinitely
when you focus your thinking on their potential. By learning to fix
the economic potential of their assets through property records,
Westerners created a fast track to explore the most productive aspects
of their possessions. Formal property became the staircase to the con-
ceptual realm where the economic meaning of things can be discov-
ered and where capital is born.
Property Effect No. 2: Integrating Dispersed Information into 
One System
As we saw in the previous chapter, most people in developing and
former communist nations cannot get into the legal property system,
such as it is, no matter how hard they try. Because they cannot in-
sert their assets into the legal property system, they end up holding
them extralegally. The reason capitalism has triumphed in the West
and sputtered in the rest of the world is because most of the assets
30 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 6:009
in Western nations have been integrated into one formal representa-
tional system.
This integration did not happen casually. Over decades in the
nineteenth century, politicians, legislators, and judges pulled to-
gether the scattered facts and rules that had governed property
throughout cities, villages, buildings, and farms and integrated
them into one system. This “pulling together” of property represen-
tations, a revolutionary moment in the history of developed nations,
deposited all the information and rules governing the accumulated
wealth of their citizens into one knowledge base. Before that mo-
ment, information about assets was far less accessible. Every farm
or settlement recorded its assets and the rules governing them in
rudimentary ledgers, symbols, or oral testimony. But the informa-
tion was atomized, dispersed, and not available to any one agent at
any given moment. As we know too well today, an abundance of
facts is not necessarily an abundance of knowledge. For knowledge
to be functional, advanced nations had to integrate into one compre-
hensive system all their loose and isolated data about property.
Developing and former communist nations have not done this. In
all the countries I have studied, I have never found just one legal
system but dozens or even hundreds, managed by all sorts of organi-
zations, some legal, others extralegal, ranging from small entrepre-
neurial groups to housing organizations. Consequently, what people
in those countries can do with their property is limited to the imagi-
nation of the owners and their acquaintances. In Western countries,
where property information is standardized and universally avail-
able, what owners can do with their assets benefits from the collective
imagination of a larger network of people.
It may surprise the Western reader that most of the world’s na-
tions have yet to integrate extralegal property agreements into one
formal legal system. For Westerners, there supposedly is only one
law—the official one. Yet the West’s reliance on integrated property
systems is a phenomenon of at most the last two hundred years. In
fact, in most Western countries, integrated property systems appeared
only about a hundred years ago; Japan’s integration happened a
little more than fifty years ago. As we shall see in detail later, di-
verse informal property arrangements were once the norm in every
nation. Legal pluralism was the standard in continental Europe until
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Roman law was rediscovered in the fourteenth century and govern-
ments assembled all currents of law into one coordinated system.
In California just after the gold rush of 1849, there were some
eight hundred separate property jurisdictions, each with its own
records and individual regulations established by local consensus.
Throughout the United States, from California to Florida, claim
associations agreed on their own rules and elected their own offi-
cers. It took more than one hundred years, well into the late nine-
teenth century, for the U.S. government to pass special statutes that
integrated and formalized U.S. assets. By enacting more than
thirty-five preemption and mining statutes, Congress gradually
managed to integrate into one system the informal property rules
created by millions of immigrants and squatters. The result was an
integrated property market that fueled the United States’ explosive
economic growth thereafter.
The reason it is so hard to follow this history of the integration of
widespread property systems is that the process took place over a
very long time. Formal property registries began to appear in Ger-
many, for example, in the twelfth century but were not fully inte-
grated until 1896, when the Grundbuch system for recording land
transactions began operating on a national scale. In Japan, the
national campaign to formalize the property of farmers began in the
late nineteenth century and ended only in the late 1940s. Switzer-
land’s extraordinary efforts to bring together the disparate systems
that protected property and transactions at the turn of the twenti-
eth century are still not well known, even to many Swiss.
As a result of integration, citizens in advanced nations can obtain
descriptions of the economic and social qualities of any available
asset without having to see the asset itself. They no longer need to
travel around the country to visit each and every owner and their
neighbors; the formal property system lets them know what assets
are available and what opportunities exist to create surplus value.
Consequently, an asset’s potential has become easier to evaluate
and exchange, enhancing the production of capital.
Property Effect No. 3: Making People Accountable
The integration of all property systems under one formal property
law shifted the legitimacy of the rights of owners from the politicized
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context of local communities to the impersonal context of law. Releas-
ing owners from restrictive local arrangements and bringing them
into a more integrated legal system facilitated their accountability.
By transforming people with property interests into accountable
individuals, formal property created individuals from masses. Peo-
ple no longer needed to rely on neighborhood relationships or make
local arrangements to protect their rights to assets. Freed from
primitive economic activities and burdensome parochial constraints,
they could explore how to generate surplus value from their own
assets. But there was a price to pay: Once inside a formal property
system, owners lost their anonymity. By becoming inextricably linked
to real estate and businesses that could be easily identified and lo-
cated, people forfeited the ability to lose themselves in the masses.
This option has practically disappeared in the West, while individ-
ual accountability has been reinforced. People who do not pay for
goods or services they have consumed can be identified, charged
interest penalties, fined, embargoed, and have their credit ratings
downgraded. Authorities are able to learn about legal infractions and
dishonored contracts; they can suspend services, place liens against
property, and withdraw some or all of the privileges of legal property.
Respect in Western nations for property and transactions is hardly
encoded in their citizens’ DNA; it is rather the result of having en-
forceable formal property systems. Formal property’s role in protect-
ing not only ownership but the security of transactions encourages
citizens in advanced countries to respect titles, honor contracts, and
obey the law. When any citizen fails to act honorably, his breach is
recorded in the system, jeopardizing his reputation as a trustworthy
party to his neighbors, utilities, banks, telephone companies, insur-
ance firms, and the rest of the network that property ties him to.
Thus the formal property systems of the West have bestowed
mixed blessings. While they provided hundreds of millions of citi-
zens with a stake in the capitalist game, what made this stake
meaningful was that it could be lost. A great part of the potential
value of legal property is derived from the possibility of forfeiture.
Consequently, a great deal of its power comes from the accountabil-
ity it creates, from the constraints it imposes, the rules it spawns,
and the sanctions it can apply. In allowing people to see the eco-
nomic and social potential of assets, formal property changed the
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perception in advanced societies of not only the potential rewards of
using assets but also the dangers. Legal property invited commitment.
The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in develop-
ing and former communist nations cannot make profitable contracts
with strangers, cannot get credit, insurance, or utilities services:
They have no property to lose. Because they have no property to
lose, they are taken seriously as contracting parties only by their
immediate family and neighbors. People with nothing to lose are
trapped in the grubby basement of the precapitalist world.
Meanwhile, citizens of advanced nations can contract for practi-
cally anything that is reasonable, but the entry price is commitment.
And commitment is better understood when backed up by a pledge
of property, whether a mortgage, a lien, or any other form of secu-
rity that protects the other contracting party.
Property Effect No. 4: Making Assets Fungible
One of the most important things a formal property system does
is transform assets from a less accessible condition to a more acces-
sible condition, so that they can do additional work. Unlike physical
assets, representations are easily combined, divided, mobilized, and
used to stimulate business deals. By uncoupling the economic fea-
tures of an asset from their rigid, physical state, a representation
makes the asset “fungible”—able to be fashioned to suit practically
any transaction.
By describing all assets in standard categories, an integrated
formal property system enables the comparison of two architectur-
ally different buildings constructed for the same purpose. This allows
one to discriminate quickly and inexpensively between similarities
and differences in assets without having to deal with each asset as
if it were unique.
Standard property descriptions in the West are also written to
facilitate the combination of assets. Formal property rules require
assets to be described and characterized in a way that not only
outlines their singularity but also points out their similarity to other
assets, thus making potential combinations more obvious. Through
the use of standardized records, one can determine (on the basis of
zoning restrictions, who the neighbors are and what they are doing,
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the square footage of the buildings, whether they can be joined, etc.)
how to exploit a particular piece of real estate most profitably, whether
as office space, hotel rooms, a bookshop, or racquetball courts and
a sauna.
Representations also enable the division of assets without touch-
ing them. While an asset such as a factory may be an indivisible
unit in the real world, in the conceptual universe of formal property
representation it can be subdivided into any number of portions.
Citizens of advanced nations are thus able to split most of their
assets into shares, each of which can be owned by different persons,
with different rights, to carry out different functions. Thanks to
formal property, a single factory can be held by countless investors,
who can divest themselves of their property without affecting the
integrity of the physical asset.
Similarly, in a developed country, the farmer’s son who wishes to
follow in his father’s footsteps can keep the farm by buying out his
more commercially minded siblings. Farmers in many developing
countries have no such option and must continually subdivide their
farms for each generation until the parcels are too small to farm
profitably, leaving the descendants with two alternatives: starving
or stealing.
Formal property representations can also serve as moveable
stand-ins for physical assets, enabling owners and entrepreneurs to
simulate hypothetical situations in order to explore other profitable
uses of their assets—much as military officers plan their strategy
for a battle by moving symbols of their troops and weapons around
a map. If you think about it, it is property representations that
allow entrepreneurs to simulate business strategies to grow their
companies and build capital.
In addition, all standard formal property documents are crafted
in such a way as to facilitate the easy measurement of an asset’s
attributes. If standard descriptions of assets were not readily avail-
able, anyone who wanted to buy, rent, or give credit against an asset
would have to expend enormous resources comparing and evaluat-
ing it against other assets—which also would lack standard descrip-
tions. By providing standards, Western formal property systems
have reduced significantly the transaction costs of mobilizing and
using assets.
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Once assets are in a formal property system, they endow their
owners with an enormous advantage in that they can be split up
and combined in more ways than an Erector set. Westerners can
adapt their assets to any economic circumstance to produce continu-
ally higher valued mixtures, while their Third World counterparts
remain trapped in the physical world of rigid, nonfungible forms.
Property Effect No. 5: Networking People
By making assets fungible; by attaching owners to assets, assets
to addresses, and ownership to enforcement; and by making infor-
mation on the history of assets and owners easily accessible, formal
property systems converted the citizens of the West into a network
of individually identifiable and accountable business agents. The
formal property process created a whole infrastructure of connecting
devices that, like a railway switchyard, allowed the assets (trains)
to run safely between people (stations). Formal property’s contribu-
tion to mankind is not the protection of ownership; squatters, hous-
ing organizations, mafias, and even primitive tribes manage to
protect their assets quite efficiently. Property’s real breakthrough
is that it radically improved the flow of communications about as-
sets and their potential. It also enhanced the status of their owners,
who became economic agents able to transform assets within a
broader network.
This explains how legal property encourages the suppliers of such
utilities as electricity and water to invest in production and distribu-
tion facilities to service buildings. By legally attaching the buildings
where the services will be delivered to their owners, who will be using
and paying for the services, a formal property system reduces the
risks of theft of services. It also reduces the financial losses from bill
collecting among people hard to locate, as well as technical losses from
incorrectly estimating the electricity needs of areas where businesses
and residents are clandestine and not recorded. Without knowing
who has the rights to what, and without an integrated legal system
where the ability to enforce obligations has been transferred from
extralegal groups to government, utilities would be hard-pressed to
deliver services profitably. On what other basis could they identify
subscribers, create utility subscription contracts, establish service
connections, and ensure access to parcels and buildings? How would
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they implement billing systems, meter reading, collection mecha-
nisms, loss control, fraud control, delinquent charging procedures,
and enforcement services such as meter shutoffs?
Buildings are always the terminals of public utilities. What trans-
forms them into accountable and responsible terminals is legal prop-
erty. Anyone who doubts this need only look at the utility situation
outside the West, where technical and financial losses plus theft of
services account for 30 to 50 percent of all available utilities.
Western legal property also provides businesses with information
about assets and their owners, verifiable addresses, and objective
records of property value, all of which lead to credit records. This
information and the existence of integrated law make risk more
manageable by spreading it through insurance-type devices as well
as by pooling property to secure debts.
Few seem to have noticed that the legal property system of an
advanced nation is the center of a complex web of connections that
equips ordinary citizens to form ties with both the government and
the private sector, and so to obtain additional goods and services.
Without the tools of formal property, it is hard to see how assets
could be used for everything they accomplish in the West. How else
could financial organizations identify trustworthy potential borrow-
ers on a massive scale? How could physical objects, like timber in
Oregon, secure an industrial investment in Chicago? How could
insurance companies find and contract customers who will pay their
bills? How could information brokerage or inspection and verifica-
tion services be provided efficiently and cheaply? How could tax
collection work?
It is the property system that draws out the abstract potential
from buildings and fixes it in representations that allow us to go be-
yond passively using the buildings only as shelters. Many title systems
in developing nations fail to produce capital because they do not
acknowledge that property can go way beyond ownership. These
systems function purely as an ownership inventory of deeds and maps
standing in for assets, without allowing for the additional mecha-
nisms required to create a network where assets can lead a parallel
life as capital. Formal property should not be confused with such
massive inventory systems as the English Domesday Book of nine
hundred years ago or a luggage check operation in an international
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airport. Properly understood and designed, a property system cre-
ates a network through which people can assemble their assets into
more valuable combinations.
Property Effect No. 6: Protecting Transactions
One important reason why the Western formal property system
works like a network is that all the property records (titles, deeds,
securities, and contracts that describe the economically significant
aspects of assets) are continually tracked and protected as they
travel through time and space. Their first stop is the public agencies
that are the stewards of an advanced nation’s representations.
Public record keepers administer the files that contain all the eco-
nomically useful descriptions of assets, whether land, buildings,
chattel, ships, industries, mines, or airplanes. These files will alert
anyone eager to use an asset about things that may restrict or
enhance its realization, such as encumbrances, easements, leases,
arrears, bankruptcies, and mortgages. The agencies also ensure that
assets are adequately and accurately represented in appropriate
formats that can be updated and easily accessed.
In addition to public record-keeping systems, many other private
services have evolved to assist parties in fixing, moving, and track-
ing representations so that they can easily and securely produce
surplus value. These include private entities that record transac-
tions, escrow and closings organizations, abstractors, appraisers,
title and fidelity insurance firms, mortgage brokers, trust services,
and private custodians of documents. In the United States, title
insurance companies further help the mobilization of representa-
tions by issuing policies to cover parties for specified risks, ranging
from defects on titles to unenforceability on mortgages and unmar-
ketability of title. By law, all these entities have to follow strict
operating standards that govern their document-tracking capabili-
ties, physical storage facilities, and staffing.
Although they are established to protect both the security of
ownership and that of transactions, it is obvious that Western sys-
tems emphasize the latter. Security is principally focused on produc-
ing trust in transactions so that people can more easily make their
assets lead a parallel life as capital.
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In most developing countries, by contrast, the law and official
agencies are trapped by early colonial and Roman law, which tilt
toward protecting ownership. They have become custodians of the
wishes of the dead. This may explain why the creation of capital in
Western property happens so easily, and why most of the assets in
developing and former communist countries have slipped out of the
formal legal system in search of mobility.
The Western emphasis on the security of transactions allows
citizens to move large amounts of assets with very few transactions.
How else can we explain that in developing and former communist
nations people are still taking their pigs to market and trading them
one at a time, as they have done for thousands of years, whereas in
the West, traders take representations of their rights over pigs to
the market? Traders at the Chicago commodities exchange, for ex-
ample, deal through representations, which give them more infor-
mation about the pigs they are trading than if they could physically
examine each pig. They are able to make deals for huge quantities
of pigs with little concern about the security of transactions.
Capital and Money
The six effects of an integrated property process mean that West-
erners’ houses no longer merely keep the rain and cold out. Endowed
with representational existence, these houses can now lead a paral-
lel life, doing economic things they could not have done before. A
well-integrated legal property system in essence does two things:
First, it tremendously reduces the costs of knowing the economic
qualities of assets by representing them in a way that our senses
can pick up quickly; and second, it facilitates the capacity to agree
on how to use assets to create further production and increase the
division of labor. The genius of the West was to have created a
system that allowed people to grasp with the mind values that
human eyes could never see and to manipulate things that hands
could never touch.
Centuries ago, scholars speculated that we use the word “capital”
(from the Latin for “head”) because the head is where we hold the
tools with which we create capital. This suggests that the reason
capital has always been shrouded in mystery is because, like energy,
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it can be discovered and managed only with the mind. The only way
to touch capital is if the property system can record its economic
aspects on paper and anchor them to a specific location and owner.
Property, then, is not mere paper but a mediating device that
captures and stores most of the stuff required to make a market
economy run. Property seeds the system by making people account-
able and assets fungible, by tracking transactions, and so providing
all the mechanisms required for the monetary and banking system
to work and for investment to function. The connection between
capital and modern money runs through property.
Today it is records of property ownership and transactions that
provide monetary authorities with the crucial evidence they need to
issue additional legal tender. As cognitive scientists George A. Miller
and Philip N. Johnson-Laird wrote back in 1976: “Paper currency
owes its origins to the writing of debt notes. [Therefore] money . . .
presupposes the institution of property.”9 It is property documenta-
tion that fixes the economic characteristics of assets so that they can
be used to secure commercial and financial transactions and ulti-
mately provide the justification against which central banks issue
money. To create credit and generate investment, what people
encumber are not the physical assets themselves, but their property
representations—the recorded titles or shares—governed by rules
which can be enforced nationwide. Money does not earn money. You
need a property right before you can make money. Even if you loan
money, the only way you can earn on it is by loaning or investing it
against some kind of property document that establishes your rights
to principal and interests. To repeat: Money presupposes property.
As the eminent German economists Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto
Steiger point out, “Money is never created ex nihilo from the point
of view of property, which must always exist before money can come
into existence.”10 Recognizing similarities between their work and
mine, they brought to my attention an unpublished draft of an article
stating “that interest and money cannot be understood without the
institution of property.”11 This relationship is obscured, they maintain,
9. George A. Miller and Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Language and Perception (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 578.
10. Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, “The Property Theory of Interest and Money,”
unpublished manuscript, second draft, October 1998, p. 22.
11. Ibid., p. 43.
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by the common misapprehension that central banks issue notes and
support the ability of commercial banks to make payments. In
Heinsohn and Steiger’s view, what escapes the naked eye is “that all
advances are made in good banking against securities,”12 or in my
terms, legal property paper. They agree with Harold Demsetz that
the property rights foundation of capitalism has been taken for
granted and note that Joseph Schumpeter already had an inkling
that it is property rights that secure the creation of money. As Tom
Bethell correctly states in his extraordinary book The Noblest Tri-
umph, “the many blessings of a private property system have never
been properly analyzed.”13
Capital, as I argued earlier, is therefore not created by money; it
is created by people whose property systems help them to cooperate
and think about how they can get the assets they accumulate to
deploy additional production. The substantial increase of capital in
the West over the last two centuries is the consequence of gradually
improving property systems, which allowed economic agents to
discover and realize the potential in their assets, and thus to be in
a position to produce the noninflationary money with which to fi-
nance and generate additional production.
So, we are more than squirrels who store food for winter and
engage in deferred consumption. We know, through the sophisti-
cated use of property institutions, how to give the things we accu-
mulate a parallel life. When advanced nations pulled together all
the information and rules about their known assets and established
property systems that tracked their economic evolution, they gath-
ered into one order the whole institutional process that underpins
the creation of capital. If capitalism had a mind, it would be located
in the legal property system. But like most things pertaining to the
mind, much of “capitalism” today operates at a subconscious level.
Why did the classical economists, who knew capital was abstract
and had to be fixed, not make the connection between capital and
property? One explanation may be that in Adam Smith’s or even
Marx’s day property systems were still restricted and undeveloped,
and their importance difficult to gauge. Perhaps more significantly,
the battle for the future of capitalism shifted from the book-lined
12. Ibid., p. 38.
13. Tom Bethell, The Noblest Triumph (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 9.
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studies of theoreticians into a vast web of entrepreneurs, financiers,
politicians, and jurists. The attention of the world turned from
theories to the real deals being made on the ground, day by day,
fiscal year after fiscal year.
Once the vast machine of capitalism was firmly in place and its
masters were busy creating wealth, the question of how it all came
to be lost its urgency. Like people living in the rich and fertile delta
of a long river, the advocates of capitalism had no pressing need to
explore upstream for the source of their prosperity. Why bother?
With the end of the Cold War, however, capitalism became the only
serious option for development. So the rest of the world turned to
the West for help and was advised to imitate the conditions of life
on the delta: stable currencies, open markets, and private busines-
ses, the objective of so-called macroeconomic and structural adjust-
ment reforms. Everyone forgot that the reason for the delta’s rich
life lay far upriver, in its unexplored headwaters. Widely accessible
legal property systems are the silt from upriver that permits mod-
ern capital to flourish.
This is one of the principal reasons macroeconomic reforms are
not working. Imitating capitalism at the level of the delta, by im-
porting McDonald’s and Blockbuster franchises, is not enough to cre-
ate wealth. What is needed is capital, and this requires a complex and
mighty system of legal property that we have all taken for granted.
Braudel’s Bell Jar
Much of the marginalization of the poor in developing and former
communist nations comes from their inability to benefit from the six
effects that property provides. The challenge these countries face is
not whether they should produce or receive more money but
whether they can understand the legal institutions and summon the
political will necessary to build a property system that is easily
accessible to the poor.
The French historian Fernand Braudel found it a great mystery
that at its inception, Western capitalism served only a privileged
few, just as it does elsewhere in the world today:
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The key problem is to find out why that sector of society of the
past, which I would not hesitate to call capitalist, should have
lived as if in a bell jar, cut off from the rest; why was it not able
to expand and conquer the whole of society? . . . [Why was it
that] a significant rate of capital formation was possible only in
certain sectors and not in the whole market economy of the
time? . . . It would perhaps be teasingly paradoxical to say that
whatever else was in short supply, money certainly was not . . .
so this was an age where poor land was bought up and magnifi-
cent country residences built, great monuments erected and
cultural extravagance financed. . . . [How do we] resolve the
contradiction . . . between the depressed economic climate and
the splendors of Florence under Lorenzo the Magnificent?14
I believe the answer to Braudel’s question lies in restricted access
to formal property, both in the West’s past and in developing and
former communist countries today. Local and foreign investors do
have capital; their assets are more or less integrated, fungible,
networked, and protected by formal property systems. But they are
only a tiny minority—those who can afford the expert lawyers,
insider connections, and patience required to navigate the red tape
of their property systems. The great majority of people, who cannot
get the fruits of their labor represented by the formal property sys-
tem, live outside Braudel’s bell jar.
The bell jar makes capitalism a private club, open only to a privi-
leged few, and enrages the billions standing outside looking in. This
capitalist apartheid will inevitably continue until we all come to
terms with the critical flaw in many countries’ legal and political
systems that prevents the majority from entering the formal prop-
erty system.
The time is right to inquire why most countries have not been able
to create open formal property systems. This is the moment, as Third
World and former communist nations are living through their most
ambitious attempts to implement capitalist systems, to lift the bell jar.
But before we answer that question, we have to solve the rest of
the mystery of why governments have been so slow to realize a bell
jar exists.
14. Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper and Row, 1982) p. 248.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Mystery of Political Awareness
Hark, hark! the dogs do bark,
The beggars are coming to town;
Some in rags and some in jags,
And some in silken gown.
—English Nursery Rhyme
The breakdown of population patterns and mandatory law has
been an unmistakable trend in developing countries for the past
forty years and in former communist countries for the past ten.
Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms began in 1979, 100 million
Chinese have left their official homes in search of extralegal jobs.
Three million illegal migrants besieging Beijing have created a
jumble of sweatshops on the outskirts of the city. Port-au-Prince has
grown fifteen times larger; Guayaquil eleven times larger, and Cairo
four times larger. The underground now accounts for 50 percent of
GDP in Russia and Ukraine and a whopping 62 percent in Georgia.
The International Labor Organization reports that since 1990, 85
percent of all new jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean have
been created in the extralegal sector. In Zambia, only 10 percent of
the workforce is legally employed.
What are these countries doing about this? Quite a lot. They have
rolled up their sleeves and gone to work, addressing each of these
problems individually. In August 1999, for example, Bangladesh
authorities demolished 50,000 shanties in the capital city of Dhaka.
Where demolition is impossible, governments have built schools and
sidewalks for the millions of squatters invading public and private
lands. At the same time, they have supported microfinance pro-
grams to assist the sweatshops that are transforming residential
areas into industrial zones throughout the world. They have im-
proved the stalls of sidewalk vendors clogging their streets; removed
hordes of drifters from their city squares and planted flowers in-
stead; tightened construction and safety codes to prevent buildings
collapsing as they did in Turkey during the 1999 earthquake. Gov-
ernments have tried to force the independent jitneys and shabby
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taxis that glut traffic to meet minimum safety standards; they are
cracking down on theft and loss of water and electricity and trying
to enforce patents and copyrights. They have arrested and killed as
many gangsters and drug traffickers as possible (at least the most
famous ones) and jailed them (at least for a while); they have tight-
ened security measures to control the influence of extreme political
sects among the uprooted and vulnerable multitudes.
Each of these problems has its own academic specialty to study it
and its own political program to cope with it. Few seem to realize
that what we have here is one huge, worldwide industrial revolu-
tion: a gigantic movement away from life organized on a small scale
to life organized on a large one. For better or for worse, people
outside the West are fleeing self-sufficient and isolated societies in
an effort to raise their standards of living by becoming interdepen-
dent in much larger markets.
What is understood all too rarely is that the Third World and
former communist societies are experiencing nearly the same indus-
trial revolution that arrived in the West more than two centuries
ago. The difference is that this new revolution is roaring ahead
much faster and transforming the lives of many more people. Brit-
ain supported just 8 million people when it began its 250-year
progression from the farm to the laptop computer. Indonesia is
making that same journey in only four decades and carrying a
population of more than 200 million. No wonder its institutions
have been slow to adapt. But adapt they must. A tide of humanity
has moved from isolated communities and households to participate
in ever-widening circles of economic and intellectual exchange. It is
this tide that has transformed Jakarta, Mexico City, São Paolo,
Nairobi, Bombay, Shanghai, and Manila into megacities of 10, 20,
30 million and overwhelmed their political and legal institutions.
The failure of the legal order to keep pace with this astonishing
economic and social upheaval has forced the new migrants to invent
extralegal substitutes for established law. Whereas all manner of
anonymous business transactions are widespread in advanced
countries, the migrants in the developing world can deal only with
people they know and trust. Such informal, ad hoc business ar-
rangements do not work very well. The wider the market, as Adam
Smith pointed out, the more minute the division of labor can be. And
as labor grows more specialized, the economy grows more efficient,
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and wages and capital values rise. A legal failure that prevents
enterprising people from negotiating with strangers defeats the
division of labor and fastens would-be entrepreneurs to smaller
circles of specialization and low productivity.
Entrepreneurship triumphed in the West because the law inte-
grated everyone under one system of property, giving them the
means to cooperate and produce large amounts of surplus value in
an expanded market. The advances of the West, right up to today’s
exponential growth of electronic information and telecommunica-
tions technology, could happen only because the property rights
systems required to make them work were already in place. Inte-
grated legal property systems destroyed most closed groups while
inviting the creation of a larger network where the potential to
create capital increased substantially. In this sense, property obeys
what is known as Metcalfe’s Law (named after Bob Metcalfe, the
inventor of the Ethernet Standard that commonly networks personal
computers). According to Metcalfe’s Law,
The value of a network—defined as its utility to a population—is
roughly proportional to the number of users squared. An exam-
ple is the telephone network. One telephone is useless: whom do
you call? Two telephones are better, but not much. It is only
when most of the population has a telephone that the power of
the network reaches its full potential to change society.1
Like computer networks, which had existed for years before any-
one thought to link them, property systems become tremendously
powerful when they are interconnected in a larger network. Only
then is the potential of a particular property right not limited to the
imagination of its owner, his neighbors, or his acquaintances, but
subject to a larger network of other imaginations. Only then will
people subject themselves to obeying one legal code because they
will realize that without that code they will cease to prosper. Only
then can government begin to administer development instead of
heroically rushing to plug each and every leak. A modern govern-
ment and a market economy are unviable without an integrated
formal property system. Many of the problems of non-Western
markets today are due mainly to the fragmentation of their property
1. “Survey the Internet,” Economist, July 1, 1995, pp. 4–5.
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arrangements and the unavailability of standard norms that allow as-
sets and economic agents to interact and governments to rule by law.
When migrants move from developing and former communist
countries to advanced nations, well-developed institutions eventu-
ally absorb them into a networked property system that helps them
produce surplus value. The people who migrate within their own
countries are not being accommodated in this way—at least not
quickly enough. Poorer countries lack the institutions to integrate
the migrants into the formal sector, fix their assets into fungible
forms, make their owners accountable agents, and provide them
with connecting and leveraging devices which allow them to inter-
face productively and generate capital within a large legal market.
So the migrants invent, at the expense of the legal order, a variety
of extralegal arrangements to substitute for the laws and institu-
tions they need to cooperate in an expanded market.
Political blindness, therefore, consists of being unaware that the
growth of the extralegal sector and the breakdown of the existing
legal order are ultimately due to a gigantic movement away from
life organized on a small scale towards one organized in a larger
context. What national leaders are missing is that people are spon-
taneously organizing themselves into separate, extralegal groups
until government can provide them with one legal property system.
The fundamental problem for non-Western nations is not that
people are moving to urban centers, that garbage is piling up, that
infrastructure is insufficient, or that the countryside is being aban-
doned. All of that happened in advanced nations. Nor is the problem
simply urban growth. Los Angeles has grown faster than Calcutta
in this century, and Tokyo is three times bigger than Delhi. The
primary problem is the delay in recognizing that most of the disor-
der occurring outside the West is the result of a revolutionary
movement that is more full of promise than of problems. Once the
potential value of the movement is harnessed, many of its problems
will be easier to resolve. Developing and former communist nations
must choose to either create systems that allow their governments
to adapt to the continual changes in the revolutionary division of
labor or continue to live in extralegal confusion—and that really
isn’t much of a choice.
Why has everyone missed the real problem? Because there are
two blind spots. First, most of us do not see that the surge in the
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world’s extralegal populations over the past forty years has gener-
ated a new class of entrepreneurs with their own legal arrange-
ments. Government authorities see only a massive influx of people
and illegal workers and the threat of disease and crime. So while
the housing ministry deals with its own issues and the ministries of
health and justice focus on theirs, no one notices that the real cause
of the disorder is not population, or urban growth, or even a poor
minority, but an outmoded system of legal property.
Most of us are like the six blind men in the presence of an ele-
phant: One grasps the animal’s searching trunk and thinks an
elephant is a species of snake; another finds its tail and thinks the
elephant is a rope; a third is fascinated by the large, sail-like ears;
another embraces its leg and concludes that the elephant is a tree.
No one views the elephant in its totality, and thus they cannot come
up with a strategy for dealing with the very large problem at hand.
As we have seen, the poor in developing and former communist
countries constitute two-thirds of the world’s population—and they
have no alternative but to live outside the law. As we also saw, the
poor have plenty of things, but their property rights are not defined
by any law. The millions of enterprising people who fill 85 percent
of all new jobs in Latin America, those 3 million Chinese outside
Beijing operating illegal sweatshops, and those Russians who gener-
ate half of their nation’s GDP are doing so on the basis of extralegal
arrangements. More often than not, these grassroots property
arrangements openly contradict the official, written law. That is the
elephant before us.
I do not believe the appearance of small enclaves of prosperous
economic sectors in the midst of large undeveloped or informal
sectors marks the dawn of an uneven but nevertheless inevitable
transition to capitalist systems. Rather, the existence of prosperous
enclaves in a sea of poverty conceals an abysmal retardation in a
nation’s capacity to create, respect, and make available formal
property rights to the majority of its citizens.
The second blind spot is that few recognize that the problems they
face are not new. The migration and extralegality plaguing cities in
the developing and former communist world closely resemble what
the advanced nations of the West went through during their own
industrial revolution. They too focused on trying to solve their prob-
lems one by one. The lesson of the West is that piecemeal solutions
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and stopgap measures to alleviate poverty were not enough. Living
standards rose only when governments reformed the law and the
property system to facilitate the division of labor. With the ability
to increase their productivity through the beneficial effects of inte-
grated property systems, ordinary people were able to specialize in
ever-widening markets and to increase capital formation.
Blind Spot I: Life Outside the Bell Jar Today
Why didn’t we see this new industrial revolution coming? Back in
the 1980s, when my colleagues and I in Peru began our work, most
officials assumed that our part of the world was to a great extent
controlled by law. Latin America had a long, refined, and well-
respected legal tradition. To be sure, there were poor people holding
jobs and property outside the law, but this extralegal sector was
considered relatively small and thus a “marginal” issue. Advanced
nations had their share of poverty, unemployment, and black mar-
kets, and we had ours. Dealing with them was a job mainly for the
police or the handful of academic sociologists who had devoted their
careers to studying homegrown exotica. At best, the poor made good
copy for National Geographic and the Discovery Channel.
But no one had any exact data. No one even knew how to measure
what the poor were actually doing or precisely how much they
owned. And so my colleagues and I decided to put away our books
and academic journals, not to mention our reams of government
statistics and maps, and visit the real experts on this problem: the
poor themselves. Once we went into the streets to look around and
listen, we began stumbling across surprising facts. For instance:
The Peruvian construction industry was in a slump. Building was
down, workers were being laid off. Curiously, however, at outlets for
construction materials the cash registers were still ringing. In fact,
sales of cement were up. Bags of cement, that is. After further
investigation, we discovered that the poor were buying more cement
than ever for their construction projects—houses, buildings, and
businesses that were not legally registered or titled and therefore
never made it onto the computer screens of the government econo-
mists and statisticians. We began to sense a vibrant, independent,
officially invisible extralegal economy buzzing in the cities through-
out the developing world. In Brazil, for example, the construction
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industry reported a mere 0.1 percent growth in 1995; yet cement
sales during the first six months of 1996 soared by nearly 20 per-
cent. The reason for the apparent anomaly, according to a Deutsche
Morgan Grenfell analysis is that 60 to 70 percent of the region’s
construction never gets into the records.2
The extralegal sector, we realized was hardly a small issue. It was
enormous.
Growing Cities
The movement towards the cities ballooned in the 1960s for most
developing countries, and in the 1980s for China. For various rea-
sons, self-reliant communities abandoned their isolation and began
trying to integrate in and around cities. Since the 1980s, millions of
Chinese peasants have been illegally clustering around cities to the
point where the Beijing Youth Daily proclaimed that “the manage-
ment of the migrant population is out of control.”3
The phenomenon is also familiar to countries around the Mediter-
ranean. According to Henry Boldrick, after World War II, rural
immigrants in Turkey headed towards the cities, building their own
dwellings on government land. These spontaneous settlements,
known as gecekondus, now house at least half of Turkey’s urban
population. Though some gecekondus have been at least partly legal-
ized and consequently have been able to gain some municipal ser-
vices, the majority are still informal.4
In the Philippines, the newspaper Business World called on the
government “to stem the tide of humanity that is congesting our city
to bursting point. . . . You see barong-barongs made of concrete and
hollow blocks—and you begin to wonder. What is the government
doing about the growing problem of homelessness, of squatters in
our cities?”5
In South Africa, some observers (including myself) believe the
extralegal real estate sector is on the verge of its second major
expansion. In 1998, Newsweek reported that “more and more [South
2. Jeb Blount, “Latin Trade,” News Finance, January 20, 1997.
3. Tony Emerson and Michael Laris, “Migration,” Newsweek, December 4 1995.
4. Henry Boldrick, “Reaching Turkey’s Spontaneous Settlements,” World Bank Policy,
April–June 1996.
5. “Solving the Squatter Problem,” Business World, May 10, 1995.
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African blacks] are filling the squatter camps and shantytowns that
surround every South African city. Under apartheid, racial pass
laws confined many blacks to rural areas. Now they travel freely—
but hardly in comfort.”6 The Economist confirmed the trend: “Though
anti-white political violence never really materialized, the end of
racial segregation made it easier for poor blacks to wander into rich
white areas.”7
In Egypt, intellectuals and technocrats seem to have been aware
of the issue for some time. According to one recent report, between
1947 and 1989 “Egypt’s total urban population has . . . increased . . .
from 6.2 million to 23.46 million.”8 Figures compiled by Gerard
Barthelemy show that the population in the metropolitan area of
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, rose from 140,000 in 1950 to 1,550,000 in 1988
and is now approaching 2 million. Barthelemy estimates that about
two-thirds of these people live in shantytowns, or what the Haitians
call bidonvilles.9
In Mexico, the private sector has become increasingly conscious
of the extralegal phenomenon and actively involved in doing some-
thing about it. According to one news report:
A 1987 study by the Center for Private Sector Economic Studies
(CPSEIS) estimated that the extralegal informal sector gener-
ated economic activity worth between 28% and 39% of the official
Mexican GDP, and a 1993 study . . . put the number of people in
the “non-registered informal sector” at 8 million out of a total
work force of 23 million. . . . “For every formal business, there
are two informal businesses,” says Antonio Montiel Guerrero,
president of the Mexico City Small Business Chamber of Com-
merce (CANACOPE), a group representing 167,000 small, regis-
tered formal businesses. “In the Federal District (Mexico City)
there are about 350,000 small, informal businesses for a total
population of roughly 8 million.” What that translates into for
the whole 20-million-person Mexico City metropolitan area is
6. Newsweek, March 23, 1998.
7. Economist, June 6, 1998.
8. Manal El-Batran and Ahmed El-Kholei, Gender and Housing in Egypt (Cairo: Royal
Netherlands Embassy, 1996), p. 24.
9. Gerard Barthelemy, “L’extension des lotissements sauvages à usage populaire en
milieu urbain ou Paysans, Villes et Bidonvilles en Haiti: Aperçus et reflexions,” June 1996,
Port-au-Prince, offprint, June 1996.
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anybody’s guess, especially when the unregulated and growing
shantytowns are concentrated outside the central core of the city.10
Extralegal zones in developing countries are characterized by
modest homes cramped together on city perimeters, a myriad of
workshops in their midst, armies of vendors hawking their wares on
the streets, and countless crisscrossing minibus lines. All seem to
have sprung out of nowhere. Steady streams of small crafts workers,
tools under their arms, have expanded the range of activities carried
out in the city. Ingenious local adaptations add to the production of
essential goods and services, dramatically transforming certain
areas of manufacturing, retail distribution, building, and transpor-
tation. The passive landscapes that once surrounded Third World
cities have become the latest extensions of the metropolis, and cities
modeled on the European style have yielded to a more noisy, local
personality blended with drab imitations of suburban America’s
commercial strip.
The sheer size of most of these cities creates its own opportuni-
ties. New business owners have emerged who, unlike their predeces-
sors, are of very humble origins. Upward mobility has increased.
The patterns of consumption and exclusive luxuries of the old urban
society have been displaced by other, more widespread ones.
The March to the Cities
Migration is, of course, the key factor in urban growth in most
developing and former communist nations. Its causes, however, are
hard to pinpoint. Commentators in each country offer various expla-
nations: a war, an agrarian reform program, the lack of agrarian
reform, a foreign embargo on international trade, the opening of
international trade, terrorism and guerrillas, moral decay, failed
capitalism, failed socialism, even bad taste (It is so much prettier in
the countryside, why don’t they just stay there?).
Lately, however, opinion has been converging around a few gen-
eral causes. The most visible explanation for the wave in migration
throughout the developing world is better roads. The building of
roads and bridges and the transformation of unconnected paths into
10. Blount, “Latin Trade.”.
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proper highways awakened the rural population to the possibility
of travel, and they began moving to the cities. New means of commu-
nication provided an additional incentive. Radio, in particular, aroused
expectations of increased consumption and income. From thousands
of miles away came radio broadcasts publicizing the opportunities,
amenities, and comforts of urban life. Modernity sounded within
reach of anyone with the courage to head down the road after it.
There is also now fairly widespread agreement that agricultural
crises in many countries were also decisive factors. The moderniza-
tion of agriculture and the uncertain market for some traditional
crops following World War II triggered massive layoffs of farm
laborers on traditional estates and unleashed vast contingents of
people prepared to search for new horizons.
There was also the problem of property rights in the countryside.
The long, complex process of agrarian reform only compounded—
and ultimately exacerbated—the traditional difficulties of acquiring
land suitable for farming. Unable to own land or find work in the
countryside, many people came to the cities.
Another powerful attraction was the lower infant mortality rate
in most principal cities. This gap between infant mortality in the
cities and rural areas widened as medical services in the cities
began improving after World War II. Better wages were also an
important incentive. In Latin America, for example, by 1970, people
leaving the countryside to take up semiskilled employment in capital
cities could double or triple their monthly income. A salaried job
might quadruple their previous income, and professionals or techni-
cians could earn six times as much. Higher pay offset the risk of
unemployment: A migrant who had been unemployed for a year
could recoup the lost income in two and a half months in the city.
Life in the far-off cities not only seemed better; it was better.
Even the growth of national bureaucracies became an incentive
for migration. The centralization of power in the hands of govern-
ment officials meant that most of the government offices competent
to provide advice, answer requests, issue permits, or provide jobs were
located in the cities. And any migrant seeking a better future for his
children knew that the opportunities for education were much better
in the cities. To underemployed peasants with little in the way of
resources other than their own ingenuity, education was an increas-
ingly valuable and productive investment. Cities contained most of
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the secondary school graduates as well as students enrolled in
vocational training centers, schools and institutes of higher educa-
tion, and university applicants and entrants.
Migration, therefore, is hardly an irrational act. It has little to do
with “herd instinct.” Its it the product of a calculated, rational as-
sessment by rural people of their current situation measured against
the opportunities open to them elsewhere. Rightly or wrongly, they
believed that migrating to larger markets would benefit them. The
move, however, was not an easy one.
Poor People Go Home
Migrants to the cities encountered a hostile world. They soon
realized that although urban people had a romantic, even tender
image of the farmers and were quick to acknowledge that all citi-
zens had a right to happiness, they preferred that the good farmers
pursue their happiness at home. Peasants were not supposed to
come looking for modernity. To that end, virtually every country in
the developing and former communist world maintained develop-
ment programs to bring modernity to the countryside.
The greatest hostility toward migrants came from the legal sys-
tem. At first, the system could easily absorb or ignore them because
the small groups who had arrived were hardly likely to upset the
status quo. As their numbers grew, however, to the point where they
could no longer be ignored, newcomers found themselves barred
from legally established social and economic activities. It was tre-
mendously difficult for them to get access to housing, enter formal
business, or find a legal job. The legal institutions of most Third
World countries had been developed over the years to serve the
needs and interests of certain urban groups; dealing with the peas-
ants in rural areas was a separate matter. As long as the peasants
stayed put, the implicit legal discrimination was not apparent. Once
they settled in the cities, however, they experienced the apartheid
of formal law. Suddenly, the bell jar was visible.
Some of the nations of the former Soviet Union also face disarray
in their property systems, and at least some elites are recognizing
the economic benefits of sorting it out. According to a 1996 report,
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Mechanisms . . . to protect land rights are in their infancy in
Russia. . . . In many regions land must be registered with an
agency distinct from the one that registers buildings. Moreover,
the legal protections that registration provides are unclear. . . .
Procedures and customs for protection and use of land rights
must be created from scratch. . . . Land is probably Russia’s most
valuable resource, a resource upon which an entire economy and
a democratic society can be based.11
We have found that throughout the Third World, extralegal
activities burgeon whenever the legal system imposes rules that
thwart the expectations of those it excludes. As we saw in Chapter
2, many countries make the obstacles to entering the legal property
systems so daunting and expensive that few migrants could ever
make their way through the red tape—as many as fourteen years
and seventy-seven bureaucratic procedures at thirty-one public and
private agencies in Egypt, and nineteen years and 176 bureaucratic
steps to legalize the purchase of private land in Haiti.
If there are costs to becoming legal, there are also bound to be
costs to remaining outside the law. We found that operating outside
the world of legal work and business was surprisingly expensive. In
Peru, for example, the cost of operating a business extralegally
includes paying 10 to 15 percent of its annual income in bribes and
commissions to authorities. Add to such payoffs the costs of avoiding
penalties, making transfers outside legal channels, and operating
from dispersed locations and without credit, and the life of the
extralegal entrepreneur turns out to be far more costly and full of
daily hassles than that of the legal businessman.
Perhaps the most significant cost was caused by the absence of
institutions that create incentives for people to seize economic and
social opportunities to specialize within the marketplace. We found
that people who could not operate within the law also could not hold
property efficiently or enforce contracts through the courts; nor
could they reduce uncertainty through limited liability systems and
insurance policies or create stock companies to attract additional
capital and share risk. Being unable to raise money for investment,
they could not achieve economies of scale or protect their innova-
tions through royalties and patents.
11. Leonard J. Rolfes, Jr., “The Struggle for Private Land Rights in Russia,” Economic
Reform Today, No. 1, 1996.
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Blocked from entering the bell jar, the poor could never get close
to the legal property mechanisms necessary to generate capital. The
disastrous economic effects of this legal apartheid are most strik-
ingly visible in the lack of formal property rights over real estate. In
every country we researched, we found that some 80 percent of land
parcels were not protected by up-to-date records or held by legally
accountable owners. Any exchange of such extralegal property was
therefore restricted to closed circles of trading partners, keeping the
assets of extralegal owners outside the expanded market.
Extralegal asset owners are thus denied access to the credit that
would allow them to expand their operations—an essential step
towards starting or growing a business in advanced countries. In the
United States, for example, up to 70 percent of the credit new busi-
nesses receive comes from using formal titles as collateral for mort-
gages. Extralegality also means that the incentives for investment
provided by legal security are missing.
Cut off from the legal system, the migrants’ only guarantee of
prosperity lay in their own hands. They had to compete not only
against other people but against the system as well. If the legal
systems of their own countries were not going to welcome them,
they had no alternative but to set up their own extralegal systems.
These extralegal systems, in my opinion, constitute the most impor-
tant rebellion against the status quo in the history of developing
countries since their independence, and in the countries of the
former Soviet bloc since the collapse of communism.
Growing Extralegality
The populations of most major Third World cities have increased
at least fourfold in the past four decades. By 2015, over fifty cities
in developing countries will have 5 million or more people,12 with
most living and working extralegally. The extralegal sector is omni-
present in the developing and former communist countries. New
activities have emerged and gradually replaced traditional ones.
Walk down most streets and you are bound to bump into extralegal
shops, currency exchange, transport, and other services. Even many
of the books for sale have been printed extralegally.
12. Official journal of the National Geographic Society (Millennium in Maps), No. 4.,
October 1998.
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Entire neighborhoods have been acquired, developed, and built on
the fringes of, or in direct opposition to, government regulations by
extralegal settlements and businesses. For every one hundred
homes built in Peru, only about thirty have legal title; seventy have
been built extralegally. Throughout Latin America, we found, at
least six out of eight buildings were in the undercapitalized sector
and 80 percent of all real estate was held outside the law. According
to most estimates, the extralegal sectors in the developing world
account for 50 percent to 75 percent of all working people and are
responsible for one-fifth to more than two-thirds of the total eco-
nomic output of the Third World.
Consider Brazil: Thirty years ago, more than two-thirds of hous-
ing construction was for rent; today rentals constitute scarcely 3
percent of Brazil’s construction. Most of that market has moved to
the informal parts of Brazilian cities—the favelas. According to
Donald Stewart,
People are not conscious of the volume of economic activity that
exists in a favela. These informal economies were born of the
entrepreneurial spirit of peasants from the North East of Brazil
who were attracted by urban centers. They operate outside the
highly regulated formal economy and function according to supply
and demand. In spite of the apparent lack of resources, this in-
formal economy functions efficiently. In the favelas there are no
rent controls, rents are paid in US dollars and renters who do
not pay are rapidly evicted. The profitability of investment is good
and as a result there is an abundance of supply of housing.13
The Wall Street Journal reported in 1997 that according to the
group Friends of the Land, only 10 percent of land occupied in the
Brazilian Amazon jungle is covered by property titles.14 In other
countries, extralegality is on the rise.
Unlike the situation in advanced nations, where the “underclass”
represents a small minority living on the margin of society, in some
countries extralegality has always been the mainstream. For exam-
ple, in most countries we have surveyed, the value of extralegal real
estate alone is many times greater than total savings and time
13. Donald Stewart, AIPE, December 1997.
14. Matt Moffett, “The Amazon Jungle Had an Eager Buyer, but Was It for Sale?” The
Wall Street Journal, January 30, 1997.
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deposits in commercial banks, the value of companies registered in
local stock exchanges, all foreign direct investment, and all public
enterprises privatized and to be privatized all put together. This
should not, on reflection, be surprising. Real estate accounts for
some 50 percent of the national wealth of advanced nations; in
developing countries, the figure is closer to three-quarters. Extrale-
gal settlements are often the only avenue for investment in develop-
ing and former communist countries and therefore represent an
important part of the savings and capital formation process. More-
over, the growing contribution of cities to GNP suggests that a great
deal of potential capital and technological know-how is being accu-
mulated mainly in urban areas.
The Extralegals Have Come to Stay
This explosion of extralegal activity in the Third World, the
massive squatting in rural areas, and the sprawling illegal cities—
Peru’s pueblos jóvenes, Brazil’s favelas, Venezuela’s ranchos, Mexico’s
barrios marginales, and the bidonvilles of the ex-French colonies as
well as the shantytowns of the former British ones—are much more
than a surge of population, or poverty, or even illegality. These
waves of extralegals crashing up against the bell jars of legal privi-
lege could very well be the most important factor forcing authorities
to welcome the industrial and commercial revolution that is upon
them.
Most governments in most nations are in no condition to compete
with extralegal power. In strictly physical terms, extralegal ven-
tures have already overtaken government efforts to provide housing
for migrants and the poor. In Peru until the end of the 1980s, for
example, government investment in low-income housing hovered
around 2 percent of the housing investment in the extralegal sector.
Including middle-class housing raised the government share to only
10 percent of total informal investments. In Haiti in 1995, the value
of extralegal real estate was nearly ten times greater than all the
holdings of the Haitian government.
This extralegal sector is a gray area that has a long frontier with
the legal world, a place where individuals take refuge when the cost
of obeying the law outweighs the benefit. The migrants became
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extralegals to survive: They stepped outside the law because they were
not allowed inside. In order to live, trade, manufacture, transport, or
even consume, the cities’ new inhabitants had to do so extralegally.
The extralegal arrangements they cobbled together are explicit
obligations between certain members of society to provide security
for their property and activities. They represent combinations of
rules selectively borrowed from the official legal system, ad hoc
improvisations, and customs brought from their places of origin or
locally devised, and they are held together by a social contract sup-
ported by the community as a whole and enforced by authorities the
community has selected. The disadvantage to extralegal arrange-
ments is that they are not integrated into the formal property
system and as a result are not fungible and adaptable to most
transactions; they are not connected into the financial and invest-
ment circuit; and their members are not accountable to authorities
outside their own social contract.
These arrangements are run by a large variety of organizations,
including urban development associations, farming conventions,
small merchant associations, small business organizations, micro-
entrepreneurial communities, transport federations, miners’ claim
clubs, agrarian reform beneficiaries, private housing cooperatives,
settlement organizations, residential boards, communal committees,
beneficiary committees in state-built housing, native communities,
small farmers’ associations, and village organizations. These organi-
zations also run building extensions on desert land, building exten-
sions on agricultural land, special arrangements for historic parts
of the cities, subdivisions of public housing, settlements with private
contracts, settlements with public contracts, appropriations through
subleasing with owner’s consent, state housing with incomplete
titling, illegal tenancy contracts declared before a notary and not
recorded, settlement contracts recorded but not declared before a
notary, settlements recognized by “national peace processes,” relo-
cated settlers, and settlements recorded with suppliers of basic
services or tax authorities but not recorded with the official property
custodians.
Extralegality is rarely antisocial in intent. The “crimes” extra-
legals commit are designed to achieve such ordinary goals as build-
ing a house, providing a service, or developing a business. Far from
being the cause of disarray, this system of extralegal law is the only
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way settlers have to regulate their lives and transactions. As a re-
sult, nothing could be more socially relevant to the way the poor live
and work. Although their “laws” may be outside formal law, they
are, by and large, the only laws with which these people are com-
fortable. This is the social contract by which they live and work.
The extralegal settlements the migrants inhabit may look like
slums, but they are quite different from the inner-city slums of
advanced nations. The latter consist of once-decent buildings falling
apart from neglect and poverty. In the developing world, the basic
shelters of the poor are likely to be improved, built up, and progres-
sively gentrified. Whereas the houses of the poor in advanced na-
tions lose value over time, the buildings in the poor settlements of
the developing world become more valuable, evolving within decades
into the equivalent of working-class communities in the West.
Above all, the extralegal settlers, contrary to their lawless image,
share the desire of civil society to lead peaceful, productive lives. As
Simon Fass wrote in the eloquent conclusion of his book about the
economy of Haiti,
These ordinary people are extraordinary in only one respect.
Their incomes are very low, so low that one serious error of judg-
ment or one unfortunate act of providence can often threaten
survival of a household as a corporate entity, and sometimes also
threaten survival of its members as corporeal entities. What is
extraordinary is not so much the poverty itself, but rather the
ability of these people to survive in spite of it. . . . Nothing they
do in this process is anything but a productive contribution to
survival and growth, and the simple items they obtain have
concrete functions as factor inputs to the production process.15
As the economic activities with which they are associated have
grown and diversified, these extralegal organizations have also
begun to assume the role of government. To varying degrees, they
have become responsible for the provision of such basic infrastruc-
ture as roads, water supply, sewage systems, electricity, the con-
struction of markets, the provision of transport services, and even
the administration of justice and the maintenance of order.
15. Simon Fass, Political Economy in Haiti: The Drama of Survival (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1988), pp. xxiv–xxv.
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In the face of the extralegals’ advance, governments have re-
treated. But they are inclined to consider each concession temporary
“until the crisis has passed.” In reality, however, this strategy is
only a way of delaying the inevitable defeat. In some cases, govern-
ments have created exceptions for some extralegal enterprises, legal
enclaves as it were, where originally illegal enterprises can operate
without persecution—but without integrating them so that they
enjoy the protection and benefits of the entire legal system. These
arrangements avoid open confrontation and as such can be consid-
ered a sort of transitory legal peace treaty. In Egypt, for example,
experts are already talking about “semi-formal housing”:
Such housing not only increases the housing stock within the
country and provides relatively cheap housing but also provides
a large proportion of the urban population with an asset in which
they can invest. This kind of housing does have some degree of
illegality. The housing structures are not developed through
established, regulated procedures and those who construct them
do not use the recognized institutions of housing. They are
usually constructed on agricultural areas which were illegally
sub-divided into small plots by the private developers. . . .
The government is usually involved in the process of land
acquisition within semi-informal housing. In the semi-formal
housing areas where the research was undertaken, it was gov-
ernment bodies that initiated their development and this en-
couraged private developers to sub-divide the land illegally into
small plots at a later stage. Land use was changed from agricul-
tural to residential use through a covert role from the govern-
ment. The inhabitants within such areas usually acquire their
land through an informal process of sub-division and informal
land commercialization. Hager El Mawatayah, Exbet Abou
Soliman, and Ezbet Nadi El Sid are the best examples of such
areas in the city of Alexandria.16
Even in the most unlikely places, there is evidence that govern-
ments are recognizing that their legal institutions have not adapted
to today’s economic conditions. In 1992, Reuters News Service
16. Ahmed M. Soliman, “Legitimizing Informal Housing: Accommodating Low-Income
Groups in Alexandria, Egypt,” Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1996), pp.
190–191.
2017] EXCERPTS FROM THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 61
reported that Libyan leader Mu’ammar Gadhafi had incinerated
Libya’s land titles. “All records and documents in the old land
register, which showed that a land belonged to this or that tribe,
have been burned,” Colonel Gadhafi reportedly informed a meeting
of his justice ministry. “They were burned because they were based
on exploitation, forgery, and looting.”17
In some countries, the extralegal sector is now at the very root of
the social system. The people of Touba, Senegal, who can be seen
hawking their wares on the sidewalks of New York and other big
U.S. cities, are often part of a sophisticated Islamic-African sect that
funnels millions of dollars of profits back to their home city.
Newsweek describes Touba as
a state within a state, largely exempt from Senegal’s laws, . . .
[and] the country’s fastest growing city. Entire villages have
relocated here, setting up tin shacks among the walled villas of
the rich. . . . The duty free city is the hub of Senegal’s transpor-
tation and real estate empires, the booming informal sector, and
the peanut trade, the nation’s main source of foreign exchange.18
In other parts of the world, extralegals’ concerns about losing
their property can ignite open conflict. A case in point is Indonesia
whose problems have been much in the news in recent years. As far
back as six years ago, the Economist was warning:
Poor people are edgy about losing their property because urban-
ization and industrialization are creating demand for land, in a
country in which land ownership is an extremely murky busi-
ness. Only 7% of the land on the Indonesian archipelago has a
clear owner.
Inevitably, there is a large trade in both genuine and forged
certificates. People trying to buy parcels of land sometimes find
numerous apparent owners. And banks are very wary of accept-
ing land as collateral for loans.19
Elsewhere extralegality is closely associated with misery: “In
Bombay . . . two-thirds of the city’s 10 million residents live in either
17. Reuters, Financial Review, May 11, 1992, p. 45.
18. Mavery Zarembo, Newsweek, July 7, 1997.
19. Economist, March 5, 1994.
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one-room shacks or on the pavement.”20 Yet extralegals in other
countries are moving up the economic ladder. According to the
Technical Evaluations Organization of Peru (Cuerpo Técnico de
Tasaciones del Perú), the value of land in the formal sector of Lima
averages some US$50 per square meter, whereas in the area of
Gamarra, where a great deal of Peru’s informal manufacturing
sector resides, the value per square meter can go as high as
US$3,000. In Aviación, another extralegal center in Lima, land is
worth US$1,000 per square meter; and in Chimú of the Zárate
section, it is US$400. By contrast, Miraflores and San Isidro, Lima’s
most prestigious addresses, the value of legal, titled property ranges
from US$500 to US$1,000 per square meter.21
It Is an Old Story
Once governments understand that the poor have already taken
control of vast quantities of real estate and productive economic
units, it will become clear that many of the problems they confront
are the result of the written law not being in harmony with the way
their country actually works. It stands to reason that if the written
law is in conflict with the laws citizens live by, discontent, corrup-
tion, poverty, and violence are sure to follow.
The only question that remains is how soon governments will
begin to legitimate these extralegal holdings by integrating them
into an orderly and coherent legal framework. The alternative is
perpetuating a legal anarchy in which the existing property rights
system continually competes with the extralegal one. If these coun-
tries are ever to achieve a single legal system, official law must
adapt to the reality of a massive extralegal push toward widespread
property rights.
The good news is that legal reformers will not be stepping into an
abyss. The challenge they are up against, though enormous, has
been met before in many countries. Developing and former commu-
nist countries are facing (albeit in much more dramatic proportions)
the same challenges the advanced nations dealt with between the
eighteenth century and World War II. Massive extralegality is not
20. Economist, May 6, 1995.
21. “Terrenos de Gamarra valen tres veces más que en el centro de Lima,” El Comercio,
25 April 1995.
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a new phenomenon. It is what always happens when governments
fail to make the law coincide with the way people live and work.
When the Industrial Revolution began in Europe, governments
were also plagued with uncontrollable migration, growth of the
extralegal sector, urban poverty, and social unrest. They, too, ini-
tially addressed these problems piecemeal.
Blind Spot II: Life Outside Yesterday’s Bell Jar
The Move to the Cities
Most writers link the coming of the great industrial and commer-
cial revolution in Europe to the mass migrations to its cities, the
growth of the population as a result of a decline in plagues, and a
reduction in rural incomes compared with urban incomes.22 In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, workers in the cities began
to receive higher wages than those in rural areas for carrying out
construction projects ordered by the ruling classes. Inevitably, the
more ambitious peasants migrated to the cities, enticed by the
prospect of higher wages.
In England, the first wave of migration began late in the six-
teenth century. Disconcerted by the growing numbers of migrants
in the cities and the resulting unrest, authorities tried to keep the
peace with various stopgap measures such as distributing food among
the poor. There were also persistent measures to persuade people to
return to the countryside. A series of laws enacted in 1662, 1685,
and 1693 required that citizens return to their place of birth or their
previous fixed residence as a condition of receiving relief. The aim
was to prevent more families and laborers from migrating to the
cities in search of employment. In 1697, a law was passed allowing
migrants to move about England only if they obtained a certificate
of settlement from the authorities in their new place of residence.
Although these laws did discourage migration among families and
the infirm, young, able-bodied, and ambitious unmarried men devised
22. Jan De Vries, Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976); D. C. Coleman, Revisions in Mercantilism (London: Methuen, 1969);
J. H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815–1914 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1963); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, ed. E. F. Soderland (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1934).
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ways of returning to the cities. They were also the sort who made
successful entrepreneurs—or violent revolutionaries.
Most migrants did not find the jobs they expected. Restrictive
regulations, particularly difficulties in obtaining permission to ex-
pand or diversify activities, limited the capacity of formal businesses
to grow and provide jobs for new laborers. Some found temporary
work or entered domestic service.23 Many were forced to settle
precariously on the outskirts of Europe’s cities, in “suburbs,” the
extralegal settlements of the day, awaiting admission to a guild or
a job in a legal business.
Social unrest was inevitable. No sooner did the migration to the
cities begin than the existing political institutions fell behind a
rapidly changing reality. The rigidity of mercantilist law and custom
prevented migrants from realizing their full economic potential. The
overcrowding of an increasing urban population, disease, and the
inevitable difficulties of country people adapting to life in the city
further aggravated social conflict. D. C. Coleman observes that as
early as the sixteenth century there were complaints in the English
Parliament about the “multitude of beggars” and the great increase
in “rogues, vagabonds, and thieves” in the cities.24
Instead of adapting to this new urban reality, governments cre-
ated more laws and regulations to try to stamp it out. More regula-
tions brought more infringements—and soon new laws were passed
to prosecute those who broke the old ones. Lawsuits proliferated;
smuggling and counterfeiting were widespread. Governments re-
sorted to violent repression.
The Emergence of Extralegality
Gradually, European migrants who did not find legal employment
began to open illegal workshops in their homes. Much of this work
“consisted of the direct processing, with little capital equipment
beyond simple hand tools.”25 Longtime city dwellers despised the
work done outside the guilds and the official industrial system.
23. Joseph Reid, Respuestas al primer cuestionario del ILD (Lima: Meca, 1985).
24. D.C. Coleman, The Economy of England, 1450–1750 (London: Oxford University Press,
1977), pp. 18–19.
25. Ibid., pp. 58–59.
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The migrants, of course, could not afford to be choosy; extralegal
work was their only source of income, and the extralegal sector of the
economy began spreading rapidly. Eli Heckscher quotes a comment
by Oliver Goldsmith in 1762: “There is scarcely an Englishman who
does not almost every day of his life offend with impunity some
express law . . . and none but the venal and the mercenary attempt
to enforce them.”26 Two French decrees (of 1687 and 1693), also cited
by Heckscher, recognized that one reason why production specifica-
tions were not being complied with was that the workers, then even
more illiterate than in developing countries today, could not meet
even the simple legal requirement that textile manufacturers put
their names on the fore-pieces of their cloth. Still, these migrant
workers were efficient. Adam Smith once remarked, “If you would
have your work tolerably executed, it must be done in the suburbs
where the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but
their character to depend on, and you must then smuggle it into the
town as well as you can.”27
Authorities and legal businessmen were not as impressed with
the competition as Adam Smith. In England, during the decades
following the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, some traditional-
ists began to complain about the growing numbers of peddlers and
street vendors, the disturbances that took place in front of estab-
lished shops, and the appearance of new shopkeepers in many small
cities. Formal traders tried in vain to get rid of the newcomers. In
Paris, the legal battle between tailors and secondhand-clothes
dealers went on for more than three hundred years. It was stopped
only by the French Revolution.
The preambles to laws and ordinances of this era frequently refer
to noncompliance with previous laws and regulations. According to
Heckscher, printed calicoes imported from India were prohibited in
1700 in order to protect England’s woolen industry. Enterprising
English manufacturers produced their own calicoes, always manag-
ing to find exceptions or loopholes in the law. One way around the
ban on printing cotton-based fabrics was to use fustians—English
calicoes made with a linen warp. Spain also prosecuted and pun-
ished its extralegal entrepreneurs. In 1549, Emperor Charles I
promulgated twenty-five ordinances aimed at extralegal businesses.
26. Heckscher, Mercantilism, Vol. 1, p. 323.
27. Ibid., p. 241.
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One law called for authorities to mutilate fabric samples by cutting
off the selvedges containing the manufacturer’s mark so that buyers
would know they were purchasing extralegal goods. This was in-
tended to humiliate distributors.
Government repression of extralegals was plentiful, harsh, and,
in France, deadly. In the mid-eighteenth century, laws prohibiting
the French public from manufacturing, importing, or selling cotton
prints carried penalties ranging from slavery and imprisonment to
death. The extralegals remained undeterred. Heckscher estimates
that within one ten-year period in the eighteenth century the French
executed more than 16,000 smugglers and clandestine manufactur-
ers for the illegal manufacture or import of printed calicoes. An even
larger number were sentenced to the galleys or punished in other
ways. In the town of Valence alone, 77 extralegal entrepreneurs
were hanged, 58 were broken on the wheel, and 631 were sentenced
to the galleys. Authorities found it in their hearts to set free only
one extralegal.
According to Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison, the reason the
authorities prosecuted extralegals so harshly was not only because
they wanted to protect established industries; multicolored prints
also made taxes more difficult to collect.28 Although it was easy to
identify manufacturers of single-colored textiles and thus verify
whether they were paying all their taxes, calicoes, due to a new
printing system, could be made with a variety of colors, making it
much more difficult to identify their origin.
The state relied heavily on the guilds—whose main function was
to control access to legal enterprise—to help identify lawbreakers.
But by making the laws more stringent instead of adjusting them
to include extralegal manufacturing, the authorities simply forced
entrepreneurs to the extralegal suburbs. When the English Statute
of Artificers and Apprentices of 1563 fixed wage rates for workers
and required that they be adjusted annually according to the prices
of certain basic necessities, many of the earliest extralegals moved
their businesses to outlying towns or established new suburbs where
state supervision was less strict and regulations more lax or simply
inapplicable. Retreating to the suburbs also allowed extralegals to
28. Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert Tollison, Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981), Chapter 1.
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escape the watchful eye of the guilds, whose jurisdiction extended
only to city boundaries.
Eventually, extralegal competition increased to the point that
formal business owners had no alternative but to subcontract part
of their production to suburban workshops—narrowing the tax base
and causing taxes to rise. A vicious circle set in: Higher taxes exac-
erbated unemployment and unrest, prompting greater migration to
the suburbs and more subcontracting to extralegal manufacturers.
Some extralegals did so well that they won the right to enter formal
business—though not without paying their share of bribes and
applying political pressure.
The guilds fought back. Under the Tudors, numerous laws in
England prohibited extralegal workshops and services in the sub-
urbs. But the sheer number of extralegals and their skill at avoiding
detection thwarted these efforts. Among the most notable failures
were the hat and coverlet makers’ guilds in Norwich, which, after a
protracted and highly publicized campaign against extralegal opera-
tors, were unable to enforce their exclusive legal right to manufac-
ture hats and coverlets.29 Competition had left the guilds reeling.
Coleman attributes their decline to the “increasing labor supply,
changing patterns of demand, and expanding trade; [and] the growth
of new industries and the considerable extension of rural industry
organized on the putting-out system.”30
The Breaking Down of the Old Order
European governments were gradually forced to retreat in the
face of growing extralegality—as governments in developing and
former communists countries are doing today. In Sweden, unable to
stop the establishment of extralegal settlements, King Gustavus
Adolphus had to visit each settlement and give it his blessing to
maintain an appearance of government control. In England, the state
was forced to recognize that new industries were developing primar-
ily in places where there were no guilds or legal restrictions; indeed,
extralegals had created their own suburbs and towns specifically to
avoid control by the state and the guilds. Moreover, the extralegal
29. Heckscher, Mercantilism, Vol. 1, pp. 239–244.
30. Coleman, The Economy of England, p. 74.
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industries were more efficient and successful. It was widely ac-
knowledged that the cotton textile industry had boomed because it
was not regulated as strictly as the woolen industry. People soon
began noticing that the extralegal settlements were producing better
goods and services than their legal competitors inside the bell jars.
In 1588, a report to Lord Cecil, minister to Queen Elizabeth I, de-
scribed the citizens of Halifax, one of the new extralegal settlements:
They excel the rest in policy and industry, for the use of their
trade and grounds and, after the rude and arrogant manner of
their wild country, they surpass the rest in wisdom and wealth.
They despise their old fashions if they can hear of a new, more
commodious, rather affecting novelties than allied to old ceremo-
nies. . . . [They have] a natural ardency of new inventions an-
nexed to an unyielding industry.31
Extralegals also began building within the cities. In Germany,
where it was necessary to pass a test and obtain legal approval in
order to build, according to one historian, “whole districts could be
found in which plenty of houses were being built, though there was
no one in the district legally qualified to build them.”32
The extralegals’ numbers, persistence, and success began to under-
mine the very foundations of the mercantilist order. Whatever success
they had, it was won in spite of the state, and they were bound to view
the authorities as their enemies. In those countries where the state
outlawed and prosecuted extralegal entrepreneurs instead of adjusting
the system to absorb their enterprise, not only was economic prog-
ress delayed, but unrest increased, spilling into violence. The best-
known manifestations were the French and Russian revolutions.
Those countries that adapted quickly, however, made a relatively
peaceful transition to a market economy. As soon as the state real-
ized that a working extralegal sector was socially, politically, and
economically preferable to a growing number of unemployed mi-
grants, authorities began withdrawing support from the guilds. The
result in England was that fewer and fewer people applied for
admission to the guilds, thereby setting the stage for the state to
alter drastically the way in which business was conducted.
31. Heckscher, Mercantilism, Vol. 1, p. 244.
32. Clapham, Economic Development of France and Germany, pp. 323–325.
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The power of the state also declined. Any legal system as rigid as
the one that preceded the Industrial Revolution was bound to be rife
with corruption. A 1692 ordinance in England stated that tax in-
spectors in many areas visited workshops and factories merely to
collect agreed-upon tax payments without ever examining the goods
to see how much the producers really owed. Most production super-
visors, whether they belonged to the guilds or were appointed by the
state, were continually accused of corruption and neglect of duties,
a situation that was attributed to lack of civic respect for the law.
Even members of Parliament, which by the end of the seven-
teenth century had the power to authorize the establishment of
businesses, were known to receive bribes for special favors. Local
authorities were worse. In 1601, a speaker in the House of Com-
mons defined a justice of the peace as “a living Creature that for
half a Dozen of Chickens will Dispense with a whole Dozen of Penal
Statutes.” Public officials sought to blame legislative failures not on
bad laws but on inadequate enforcement. “I conclude better laws in
these points cannot be made, only there wants execution,” concluded
one pamphlet in 1577. Joseph Reid argues that the old order broke
down because widespread corruption permeated all its institutions
and divided the population into those who could outwit the system
and those who could not. He also notes that a legal system that
encouraged some people to break the law and made others suffer
from it would inevitably lose prestige among both constituencies.33
Suburban justices of the peace had little incentive to enforce laws
that had been drafted in the cities and were unacceptable to subur-
ban residents. By the end of the eighteenth century, the entire legal
apparatus had been weakened and in some countries was com-
pletely corrupt.
At a time when government controlled everything, people placed
all their economic expectations in the state. This gave rise to a
pattern typical of precapitalism: When wages went up faster than
food prices, merchants called for wage ceilings; when food prices
went up faster than wages, workers demanded a minimum wage
and a price ceiling on foodstuffs. Prices, incomes, and wages were
fixed by political pressure and action, a situation that discouraged
33. Joseph Reid responds to the second questionnaire submitted by the Institute of Liberty
and Democracy. Typewritten memoranda, ILD Library, 1985; Heckscher, Mercantilism, Vol. 1,
pp. 247, 251.
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industrial and agricultural production and hiring. Neither minimum
nor maximum prices, therefore, could solve the problems of scarcity,
food shortages, and unemployment. “The age,” writes Charles Wilson,
“was one of violence, when the pursuit of economic ends constantly
demanded the backing of force.”34 It was a time ripe for ideological
and partisan battle, in parliaments and in the streets.
As early as 1680, a kind of fatalism had emerged in the face of the
apparent impossibility of substantial economic progress: “The gener-
ality of poor manufacturers believe they shall never be worth ten
pounds . . .; and if it so be they can provide for themselves sufficient
to maintain their manner of living by working only three days in the
week, they will never work four days.”35
Amidst such economic crises and social unrest, the strongest and
most self-confident people chose to emigrate or join revolutionary
movements. Between the seventeen and nineteenth centuries,
hundreds of thousands of Italians, Spaniards, French, and other
Europeans emigrated to other lands in search of a better future. In
France, the persecution of the Huguenots and the extralegals in the
textile sector prompted many entrepreneurs and skilled workmen
to leave, mainly for England and Holland, where they and their
hosts managed to prosper.
Finally—After Three Hundred Years
As badly structured regulations stifled formal businesses and as
extralegals openly defied the law and voiced their dissatisfaction at
being pushed to the margins, the stage was set for politicians to
adapt to the facts on the ground. The law had ossified at about the
same rate as the migrant settlements encircled the cities. And as
peddlers, beggars, and thieves invaded the streets, as extralegally
manufactured or smuggled goods glutted the markets, official cor-
ruption became rampant, and violence disrupted civil society.
Law began adapting to the needs of common people, including
their expectations about property rights, in most West European
countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By
that time, the Europeans had concluded that it was impossible to
34. Charles Wilson, Mercantilism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 27.
35. Coleman, The Economy of England, p. 105.
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govern the Industrial Revolution and the presence of massive
extralegality through minor ad hoc adjustments. Politicians finally
understood that the problem was not people but the law, which was
discouraging and preventing people from being more productive.
Although the picture of precapitalist society and the circumstances
of its decline are quite similar in most European countries, the out-
come was not always the same. Countries that made legal efforts to
integrate extralegal enterprise prospered more quickly than the
countries that resisted change. By easing access to formal property,
reducing the obstacles engendered by obsolete regulations, and
allowing existing local arrangements to influence lawmaking, Euro-
pean politicians eliminated the contradictions in their legal and
economic systems and allowed their nations to carry the Industrial
Revolution to new heights.
The past of Europe strongly resembles the present of developing
and former communist countries. The fundamental problem that the
latter face is not that people are invading and clogging the cities,
that public services are inadequate, that garbage is piling up, that
ragged children beg in the streets, or even that the benefits of macro-
economic reform programs are not reaching the majority. Many of
these difficulties existed in Europe (and also the United States) and
were eventually overcome. The real problem is that we have still not
recognized that all these difficulties constitute a sea change in ex-
pectations: As the poor flow into cities and create extralegal social
contracts, they are forcing a major redistribution of power. Once the
governments of developing and former communist countries accept
that, they can begin to catch the wave instead of being engulfed by it.
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INTRODUCTION
Discussions on economic development have lately focused on the
role of institutions in protecting property rights and reducing trans-
action costs. In particular, the idea has taken root that development
would benefit from facilitating access to legality. It is thought that,
if those in possession of even small buildings and plots of land have
good titles, they will enjoy better incentives to invest and can use
these real assets as collateral for credit. Similarly, if business entre-
preneurs are able to “formalize” (for our purposes, publicly register)
their firms easily, they will benefit from operating them as legal
entities. For instance, they will have access to the courts for enforc-
ing contracts and settling disputes, and will also be able to obtain
credit and invest more. Consequently, firms will grow faster and be
more productive.
These simple ideas, inspired by the works of Ronald Coase,
Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson, and reminiscent of wide-
spread arguments in the most advanced economies of the nineteenth
century, have motivated thousands of reform and aid programs in
developing countries, where the state of legal institutions is often
considered to be inadequate. Some authors have even held that pro-
viding better institutions would in itself lead to greater development.
Similar ideas have also influenced reform policy in developed coun-
tries, where some of the institutions for registering property and
businesses have become outdated or captured by private interests.
In both cases, simplifying administrative procedures was expected
to have considerable impact on economic activity.
However, outcomes from these efforts in institutional building and
reform have often been disappointing, failing to fulfill their promise
of economic growth or even improve the institutional environment.
Common mistakes have often been committed, such as seeing regis-
tries’ controls as mere entry barriers to legality, forgetting that they
must be reliable to be socially useful. This has often led to reforms
that emphasize quantity and speed, thereby sacrificing quality and
making registries speedy but useless. Of course, registries, like any
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other institution, can be used to capture rents and deter competition.
This possibility must be considered and avoided, but it only imposes
one more policy and organizational constraint—it does not define
registries’ function and should not, therefore, be treated as their only
design factor.
In other cases, the error comes from mixing up cause and conse-
quence when assuming that informality is causing poverty instead
of the other way around. This has led, for instance, to the building
of universal land titling systems that spend huge amounts to little
effect, as they usually miss key objectives, such as the use of land as
collateral for credit. In fact, given that formalization incurs fixed
costs, informality may be appropriate for low-value assets and small,
incipient firms. Registries are not silver bullets for development. Deci-
sions on the creation and coverage of registries must be guided by
considerations of costs and benefits, which depend on the particular
circumstances of each country.
The article is structured as follows. Its main parts critically exam-
ine titling policies, focusing on the costs and benefits of their two
main decisions. First, Part I ponders whether to create a public titling
system or to rely exclusively on private titling. Part II analyzes the
choice between selective (i.e., voluntary) and universal (often man-
datory) titling. It concludes that universal titling is seldom optimal.
Based on the costs and benefits analyzed to examine these ques-
tions, the paper then concludes by suggesting that lack of titling is
more a consequence than a cause of poverty.
I. PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC TITLING
I will use a simple graphic model to structure the analysis. Fig-
ure 1 represents the social value of land under different institutions,
assuming that prices of titling services are set optimally and owners
are free to choose between keeping their land claims “private” and
using a more “public” titling system built by the government based
on a public register.1 Following Arruñada and Garoupa, the social
1. By “private” I am referring to arrangements such as customary solutions, often based
on ceremonial conveyancing, possession, or even privately kept chains of title deeds. There-
fore, in purity, they are not fully private, and most of them have substantial public elements.
For instance, possession plays a substantial titling function when either its exercise or its deliv-
ery is public, as I argued in a related work (Benito Arruñada, The Titling Role of Possession,
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value of a parcel of land or any other real estate asset (represented
on the vertical axis) depends on the probability that claimants with
better legal rights may appear and is thus a fraction of its value in
an ideal world with no conflicting claims (represented on the hori-
zontal axis).2 This fraction will depend on the available institutions
and will likely be lower if, whatever such institutions, the land re-
mains under private titling—privacy, for short. To simplify matters,
I am assuming that the figure represents all land in an area to be
served by only one registry that costs an amount F to put in place.
Titling a parcel of land means that, by incurring a given additional
cost, the probability of success falls for a conflicting claim on that
parcel. I thus assume that, by titling, the value of the land increases
by a certain percentage: with respect to the privacy line, the titling
line has a negative intercept but is steeper.
If the government creates the registry, it must also choose between
voluntary and universal titling. Under voluntary titling (i.e., selec-
tive titling, often dismissively referred to as “sporadic” titling3), land
rights are formalized at the request of individuals claiming to be
owners. If owners must pay a fixed fee for publicly titling their land,
they will choose not to title the less valuable parcels: those below
the indifference point in the figure. Social gains arising from public
in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 207–33 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015)). Moreover, many
of those arrangements are often complemented with specific judicial solutions to purge title
when needed, somewhat similar to the U.S. quiet title suit. All of them are, however, less public
than the alternative titling solutions consisting, paradigmatically, of creating a register. We
have analyzed elsewhere the choice between particular systems of registries, including not
only land recordation of deeds and registration of rights (Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa,
The Choice of Titling System in Land, 48 J.L. & ECON. 709 (2005)), but also the related choice
about business formalization (Benito Arruñada, Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory
of Business Registries, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 525 (2010) [hereinafter Institutional Support of
the Firm]). See also Benito Arruñada, The Institutions of Roman Markets, in ROMAN LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ed.) (forthcoming Oct. 2016), for a deeper analysis of the
choice between privacy and public titling in a historical context, focusing on classical Rome.
2. See Arruñada & Garoupa, supra note 1, at 713.
3. See, e.g., PETER F. DALE & JOHN D. MCLAUGHLIN, LAND ADMINISTRATION (1999); U.N.
Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Land Administration in the UNECE Region: Development Trends and
Main Principles, U.N. Doc. ECE/HBP/140 (2005) [hereinafter Land Administration in the
UNECE Region], http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/documents/Publications/landadmin
.devt.trends.e.pdf; JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: FROM CONCEPTS
TO ASSESSMENT (2007) [hereinafter FROM CONCEPTS TO ASSESSMENT]; and JOHN W. BRUCE ET
AL., LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION FOR LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR (2007) [herein-
after LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION]. The term “sporadic” suggests randomness, wrongly,
because, in fact, it results from rational value-maximizing decisions by owners.
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titling are therefore represented by the area G. Under universal
titling, often referred as “systematic” titling, all land in an area is
publicly titled, and social gains fall to G–L.
Focusing now on voluntary titling and forgetting momentarily
about area L, the decision to introduce public titling should be based
on comparing titling gains G to the fixed costs of establishing the
titling system, F. I now explore the main determinants of these
gains and costs, while addressing universal titling later.
Figure 1. Titling options (I): Choosing between private and
public titling to maximize social value of land4
4.  Figure 1 represents how the social value of land (vertical axis) is a function of the
theoretical value of land without title conflict (horizontal axis) and the type of titling insti-
tutions available, which incur different costs. Social choice of titling institutions will be driven
by these costs and the statistical distribution of the value of land parcels in the economy along
the horizontal axis. Area G represents the potential gain from titling high-value land and area
L, the potential loss from overtitling low-value land. Adapted from Arruñada & Garoupa,
supra note 1, at fig. 2.
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A. Determinants of the Gains from Titling
Title uncertainty reduces incentives to invest and increases the
adverse selection suffered by potential acquirers of land rights,
whether buyers or mortgage lenders. Public titling should improve
the incentives to invest and reduce adverse selection.5 In terms of
Figure 1, the greater the value of potential investment and trade
opportunities, the more the indifference point will be positioned to
the left, and, for a given statistical distribution of the value of land
parcels in the economy, the larger the social gains from public ti-
tling, represented by area G.
These gains, however, depend on the true existence of such oppor-
tunities, which therefore has to be confirmed before embarking on
the costly introduction of public titling. Unfortunately, the effects of
public titling on investment and trade are hard to estimate even after
titling has been introduced.6 And estimating the demand for public
titling is even harder before a titling system is introduced: the little
information available is dispersed and specific, and participants do
not necessarily reveal their true valuations. A main drawback is that
those who know the level of demand best are likely to benefit the most
from formalization projects, because they will either be subsidized
users or privileged suppliers, and thus tend to exaggerate demand.
1. Difficulties for Truthful Demand Revelation
In particular, proponents of reforms and suppliers of services for
new formalization systems often commit two types of misrepresenta-
tion to exaggerate the demand for formalization. On the one hand,
they tend to promote land titling and business formalization as sil-
ver bullets for growth, while disregarding that underdevelopment
and poverty are mainly a cause, not a consequence, of informality.7
In addition, they tend to present the demand for security of tenure
as a demand for public titling capable of facilitating transfer and
credit transactions. In this, they are often helped by owners, who,
in expectation of subsidized titling, are also prone to disguise their
5. See Arruñada & Garoupa, supra note 1, at 721–23.
6. BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THE
THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 125–38 (2012).
7. See id. at 125–31.
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demand for greater security of tenure—which could be easily satis-
fied without creating expensive registries—as a demand for titles
enabling land transfer and secured credit transactions—which do
need such registries.
Security of tenure can indeed be provided more cheaply by sim-
pler legislative and administrative measures, such as lessening the
legal requirements for prescription and adverse possession, or explic-
itly recognizing the legality of some contracts or the property rights
of some squatters.8 In part, this reflects a difference between which
institutions are required for supporting investment and which for
supporting trade. Security of tenure often suffices to support invest-
ment, whereas trade in land tends to require public titling. However,
when titling is subsidized, both land tenants and suppliers of titling
services have an interest in exaggerating the demand for titling by
presenting the demand for security of tenure as demand for titling.
Consequently, the expectation of obtaining rents from titling may
distort the opinions voiced in surveys and reports, making it more
necessary for benevolent prospective reformers to rely on contrac-
tual and market signals as a source of information. Through these
signals, individual transactors are more likely to reveal their true
valuations because, unlike surveys and mere opinions, they result
from real transactions and are backed by the real expenditures that
transactors incur to carry them out.
Several types of signals meet these requirements for truthful de-
mand revelation: use of inefficient contracts, confused and unreli-
able jurisprudence, and, especially, market prices. In the same vein,
benevolent prospective reformers should also consider whether some
components of titling projects must be interpreted as implicit recogni-
tions that socially valuable demand is lacking. This is often the case
when information campaigns are thought to be necessary to pub-
licize the value of titling. In principle, as discussed below, owners
should know better than reform suppliers. It is also the case with two
other measures that are designed to palliate the bad consequences
of titling, such as expropriation abuses and improvident sales. When
8. David A. Atwood, Land Registration in Africa: The Impact on Agricultural Production,
18 WORLD DEV. 659, 666–68 (1990), analyzes different alternatives, pondering their suitability
and costs. See also GEOFFREY PAYNE, LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE
SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR 18 (2002).
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such damage control is deemed necessary, reformers should start by
asking themselves why titling is a good idea in the first place.
2. Role of Market Signals for Appraising Titling Demand
Paying attention to actual contractual and organizational behavior
and to market prices will help identify fake claims in titling demands,
as people reveal their preferences more faithfully in their conduct.
In particular, the presence of costly private contracting that would be
effectively facilitated by public titling could be taken as an indication
that investment in public titling is needed. For example, substantial
demand for using land as collateral for credit would be signaled by
the widespread use of vicarious contractual solutions, such as includ-
ing repurchase agreements in contracts for the sale of land, and by
the use of mortgages safeguarded by depositing the chain of written
deeds with the creditor. If such arrangements or other functionally
similar ones are frequent, demand for public titling or for better
registries is more likely to be real. A similar market signal in busi-
ness formalization would be the presence in business contracting of
unincorporated companies, such as in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century England and currently in, for example, Bolivia.
A second source of hard evidence on the demand for change is
provided by the inputs used and the consistency shown by judicial
decisions. If judges rely on secret documents for deciding on conflicts
involving third parties, this reliance often signals a lack of proper
institutions. (Although judges are involved in these cases, their reli-
ance on secret documents can still be considered a market signal be-
cause it is based on existing contracts.) In more developed countries,
the subordinate role of the law of impersonal transactions can be in-
ferred from the prevalence of law that is full of exceptions and contra-
dictory jurisprudence. Some of the palliative organizational solutions,
such as the creation of the private registry of mortgages in the United
States (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”)),9 can
9. In the last decade of the twentieth century, participants in the U.S. secondary mort-
gage market created the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) as a way of
avoiding the costs and delays of local recordation of mortgage loan assignments, by decoupling
the local and national sides of the market. At the local level, MERS was to be the lender’s repre-
sentative, holding the rights in rem, enforced through the recording offices. The limitations of
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also be taken as evidence of institutional demand. Their existence
is a strong signal, since they require substantial investment and over-
coming a collective action problem among market participants.
Lastly, market prices are also especially revealing for detecting the
need to reform existing, but dysfunctional, registries. This is the case,
in particular, of the spread or difference in interest rates between
secured and unsecured (i.e., personal) credit. When this difference
is small, as in even some developed countries, it is a definite indicator
that registries and likely land law need a radical upgrade, because
they are unable to realize the collateral value of land. Some other
prices are also informative, but they are noisier signals and thus need
closer scrutiny, such as the market price of shelf companies. The same
happens with other indicators of the need for stronger contractual
registries, such as mandatory intervention (both legally or de facto) by
conveyancers; the relative price paid to conveyancers and registries;
the use, cost, and legal complexity of lawyers’ title reports; and the re-
liance on extensive legal opinions for ordinary company transactions.
3. Risk of Titling Abuse
When deciding to introduce public titling, the encouragement of pri-
vate investment and contracting might be offset by enhanced possi-
bilities of exploitation, rooted in land grabbing, fraud, and political
failure. In terms of Figure 1, these effects would move the indifference
point to the right, thereby reducing the social gains from public titling.
First, individuals might take advantage of public titling to grab
land and devise frauds. In particular, initial titling opens new op-
portunities for the powerful to grab land,10 a risk that is especially
dangerous with respect to communal land. Community involvement
is often proposed to reduce this danger,11 but it is costly to operate
and its results highly uncertain. Occasionally, artificial demand for
titling is generated by the threat of the land being titled to someone
else, often to elites or officials. Titling may also tend to degrade the
this solution became clear with the foreclosure crisis (see, e.g., Adam Levitin, The Paper Chase:
Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637 (2013)).
10. Gershon Feder & Akihiko Nishio, The Benefits of Land Registration and Titling:
Economic and Social Perspectives, 15 LAND USE POL’Y 25 (1998).
11. See, e.g., LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION, supra note 3.
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rights of some specific classes of claimants, such as women, youths,
and seasonal users.12 Moreover, even if these frauds have been more
common in connection with land, all registries are prone to suffer
them, as exemplified by the European Trading Scheme, the world’s
biggest market in carbon emissions, which closed for several weeks
in January 2011 after fraudsters stole about sixty-two million USD
in carbon credits from several of its national registers.13
Similarly, information in the public records can also be used for
planning various frauds and extortions, from the proverbial pursuit
of wealthy heiresses by dowry-seeking bachelors that Victorian fa-
thers feared14 to the present-day identity theft15 or the sale of vacant
houses after learning the identities of their owners in the public
record.16 And this possibility of fraud is not exclusive of property
registries, as shown by the company registry created in Bulgaria in
2008, which provided free access to the personal data of company
owners, giving not only their names and various personal identifiers
but also scanned copies of their identity cards.17 These risks of pri-
vate abuse can be reduced by filtering the data to be disclosed (e.g.,
excluding personal identification numbers) or limiting access to the
public record to those authorized by owners and those with a legiti-
mate interest, which casts serious doubt on the current fashion of
open registers (twenty-eight of the forty-two jurisdictions surveyed
by the UN-ECE were wholly open to the public).18
12. Ruth Meinzen-Dick & Esther Mwangi, Cutting the Web of Interests: Pitfalls of Formal-
izing Property Rights, 26 LAND USE POL’Y 36 (2009).
13. This fraud was seemingly caused by lenient registration of market participants, so that
after opening accounts, fraudsters then took advantage of lax security to transfer credits from
companies’ accounts into their own accounts from which they were immediately sold to third
parties (Carbon Trading: Green Fleeces, Red Faces—A Theft of Carbon Credits Embarrasses
an Entire Market, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2011, at 70).
14. J. STUART ANDERSON, LAWYERS AND THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAND LAW 1832–1940
46–47 (1992).
15. James P. Sibley, Is the Door to Public Records Slowly Closing?, 85 TITLE NEWS,
May–June 2006, at 9, http://www.hbwtitle.com/news/newsletter_09-2006.pdf.
16. PETER SPARKES, A NEW LAND LAW 14 (1999).
17. Petar Kostadinov, Corporate ID Worries: Managers Still Fear Losing Their Property
Through Fraud, THE SOFIA ECHO, Nov. 28, 2008, http://sofiaecho.com/2008/11/28/665096_cor
porate-id-worries.
18. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., STUDY ON KEY ASPECTS OF LAND REGISTRATION AND
CADASTRAL LEGISLATION (2000), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/documents/Publi
cations/wpla_inv2_p1.pdf.
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Lastly, in a political vein, there might be a risk that public titling
could facilitate bad government. In principle, titling should facilitate
law enforcement that includes, most prominently, the collection of
taxes. But this may have positive or negative social effects depend-
ing on citizens’ capacity to control their own government and impede
excessive taxation. If citizens do not trust their government, they
will tend to avoid public registries that might be used for collecting
taxes. This holds two consequences. First, the weaker the political
institutions, the less sensible it is to introduce public titling because
it would be less likely to succeed. Second, it makes sense for the
public titling system to be independent of the tax authority, even at
the price of some duplication.
In all these cases, there are reasons to be doubly cautious in re-
gard to the risks of abuse. To avoid such risks may require preventive
measures, but their presence should also alert policymakers that
there might not be enough demand for titling.
4. Risk of Titling Facilitating Improvident Sales and
Indebtedness
Studies of land titling have also often discussed the possibility that,
by facilitating the sale and mortgage of land, titling efforts may lead
the poor to improvidently lose their land. To avoid this risk, experts
have advised that land marketability should be limited by different
means, such as requiring the consent of spouses and administrative
agencies19 or introducing sales moratoria during which the poor would
receive education. According to the United Nations’ Commission on
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (“CLEP”), for instance, “ceilings on
ownership and sales moratoria are considered a reasonably success-
ful protective practice, provided that they are limited in time and
that time is used for legal and financial education.”20 However, my
previous analysis suggests that such advice is misguided.
So far, I have implicitly assumed that owners are capable of maxi-
mizing their individual utility and hold consistent preferences across
19. See, e.g., LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION, supra note 3, at 37.
20. 1 COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR
EVERYONE 67 (2008) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT].
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time. The improvident sales argument denies this assumption and
therefore presumes some degree of irrationality, with owners being
unable to look after themselves. However, this view is incomplete, be-
cause such allegedly irrational behavior is induced by exogenous inter-
ventions that may be destroying the institutional basis of rationality.
The lack of marketable titles—whatever its rationale—might perform
a self-controlling function, committing owners to act in a manner
consistent with their (or their families’) long-term interests. This
may be a valuable institutional arrangement to achieve rational self-
control in an environment of extreme hardship. When family members
are dying of hunger, being precluded from selling the land may guar-
antee the long-term survival of some whereas being free to sell it now
might mean that all will perish. The deep reluctance that farmers feel
in most societies about selling their land probably serves a similar
long-term rationalizing purpose.
So, the question becomes why should such land be titled in the first
place. One may think that a reasonable policy would have been to not
introduce titling in that area or to introduce it on a voluntary, fee-for-
service basis that would encourage only efficient titling, that is, titling
by those deciding to be free of the commitment arrangement. (An
argument along these lines could be made based on the “libertarian
paternalism” promoted by Thaler and Sunstein.)21 However, the
government often decides, first, to free the poor and then to introduce
new constraints to prevent them from making mistakes and to teach
them how to behave in the new environment. In a sense, it is replacing
a simple legal constraint—the impediment to sell—with a hard-to-
produce and harder-to-maintain education constraint. Titling efforts
may well be premature in such life-threatening circumstances.
In sum, poor people may be led to desperate sales, which titling
may well facilitate. However, the best way of protecting them is not
to constrain their behavior with moratoria and education just after
granting them full titles. In a similar manner to the risk of titling
abuse analyzed in the previous section, the expectation of improvi-
dent sales should instead alert us to the risk that the whole titling
effort might be premature or its universal nature inappropriate.
21. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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B. Determinants of the Fixed Cost of the Titling System: Making
Fixed Costs Variable
The fixed costs of introducing a titling system include legislative
and administration costs. New legislation and judicial decisions will
be necessary to reform land law, at least to solidly establish the legal
effects of public titling (mainly, priority of filing in recordation and
the contract rule in registration). It will be necessary not only to adapt
the statute law, often in a new way, but also to train judges in the
new law and to develop jurisprudence accordingly. Administration
costs are involved in putting in place a titling service, which will re-
quire not only one or several registry offices but also a regulatory or
managerial structure. Neither of these tasks is easy, and they are
related: judges are often reluctant to enforce new principles of prop-
erty law. Understandably, they are even more reluctant when the
registries function imperfectly.22
1. Interactions Between Legislative Decisions and
Administration Costs
Furthermore, legislative and administration costs interact with
each other. For example, defining by law a numerus clausus and elim-
inating the fragmentation of property rights in order to reduce admin-
istration costs will often be useful. However, this may conflict with
the recognition of customary rights, thus providing another reason
for voluntary titling. When such conflict is important, titling should
22. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). Rose
summarizes this tendency graphically when she points out the repeated failed attempts at
clarifying property law: “[L]egislatures pass new versions of crystalline record systems—only
to be overruled later, when courts once again reinstate mud in a different form.” Id. at 580.
For history and references, see id. at 585–90. The resistance of judges to apply contract rules
appears in many forms and contexts. For instance, New Zealand (and, to a lesser extent,
Australian) courts have constructed a fraud exception with apparently little justification in
the statute when judging that a right holder has registered an interest with the intention of
defeating an unregistered interest. Peter Blanchard, Indefeasibility under the Torrens System
in New Zealand, in TORRENS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (David Grinlinton ed., 2003). A
further example is provided by the position held by the Paris courts regarding seventeenth-
century company registers. José Girón Tena, Las Sociedades irregulares, 4 ANUARIO DE
DERECHO CIVIL 1291 (1951) (Spain), reprinted in JOSÉ GIRÓN TENA, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO
MERCANTIL 125 (1955) (Spain).
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be introduced only for those parcels or in those areas where keeping
such customary rights as in rem rights has become inefficient, so they
should be legally debased to mere contract rights.23
The solution adopted in England since the seventeenth century
to transform the paralyzing property rights system inherited from
feudal times can be understood in this way. At the start of the
Industrial Revolution, owners had limited rights, as they could not
mortgage, lease, or sell; many other people held property in rem
rights on the same land; and land uses were often predetermined.
These constraints made it impossible to use land in the most pro-
ductive way, missing the valuable opportunities that were becoming
increasingly available in a context of rapid economic change and
growth. To be safe and avoid paying twice, acquirers had to gather
the consent of all right holders, but this was often impossible be-
cause only sellers knew about many of the rights.
Between 1660 and 1830, the English Parliament enacted numer-
ous acts restructuring property rights by relaxing such constraints.24
With these estate acts, sales, leases, and mortgages became legal,
and all interests were recorded in a way that was accessible to the
public. This eliminated information asymmetries, making it possible
to transact impersonally. Statutory authority acts made construction
of infrastructure possible by, among other measures, organizing pro-
cedures for expropriating land. And enclosure acts mainly served to
transform common property into individual property.
23. After decades of ignoring customary rights, their recognition has become common in
development programs. For example, CLEP advises the “recognition of a variety of land tenure,
including customary rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, group rights, certificates, etc., including
their standardisation and integration of these practices into the legal system.” COMMISSION ON
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 60. Recognizing such customary rights may or may
not be efficient, but it seems contradictory with other recommendations made by the same
commission, especially those for universal titling and for establishing “simplified procedures
to register and transfer land and property.” Id. Customary rights are complex, and recognizing
them as property rights makes titling less simple and more costly. In the vein of the preceding
section, the need for such recognition could also be understood as a sign that the titling effort
is premature.
24. Gary Richardson & Dan Bogart, Institutional Adaptability and Economic Development:
The Property Rights Revolution in Britain, 1700 to 1830 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13757, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13757.pdf; Dan Bogart & Gary
Richardson, Making Property Productive: Reorganizing Rights to Real and Equitable Estates
in Britain, 1660 to 1830, 13 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 3 (2009).
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The experience is interesting in terms of both efficiency and fair-
ness. Consonant with my argument for voluntary titling, right holders
or communities had to apply for such restructurings, which led to
these transformations occurring where they were most valuable.
Moreover, damage to right holders was minimized by procedures that
granted them ample scope for opposition in several layers of review.
Generally, right holders who lost property rights received monetary
compensation. The case therefore shows that it is possible to radi-
cally transform property rights in a manner that is fair, at least from
the procedural point of view. But it also teaches a sad lesson, as
England was the only European country able to achieve this trans-
formation peacefully. Other countries had to endure their own ver-
sions of the French or Russian revolutions.
These English solutions required parliamentary acts but relied on
specific administrative commissions. In general, purely legislative
costs are mostly fixed with respect to the establishment of public
titling. However, most administration costs can be made fixed or
variable—and therefore, when variable, avoidable—depending on
the titling policy being adopted. For example, considering only a
given geographical area, voluntary titling allows for smaller registry
offices and therefore incurs less fixed costs than universal titling.
(Under voluntary titling, some titling costs are conditional on the
decision by owners as to whether to title their land, a solution that,
in combination with pricing decisions, helps to select which land
should be titled first.) Conversely, under universal titling, all costs
are fixed and unavoidable and are not conditional on owners’ deci-
sions. Similarly, fixed costs are smaller when titling is introduced
only in the most promising areas. Imagine for a moment that the
horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the land in a region that would
be served by multiple registry offices, each incurring a fixed cost F.
In this case, if land parcels of similar values are geographically con-
centrated in different areas within the region, it would make sense
to introduce titling selectively, starting from the areas where the
most valuable land is located, which should reduce the total fixed
costs. In reality, this is the solution adopted when registry offices
are opened only in urban areas or in the biggest cities. This was, for
example, the soluion chosen in England in 1897, which introduced
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compulsory registration following property transactions only in cen-
tral London. It was as late as 1990 that the system was applied to all
counties in England and Wales.25 Therefore, both selective demand
and selective supply of titling services may reduce fixed costs.26
2. Variable Nature of Most Mapping, Surveying, and
Similar Costs
The fixed or variable nature of costs also hinges on other policy
options. First, establishing boundaries by surveying each land parcel
is often considered to be a requirement for good titling27 and has been
included in many titling programs. Investment to demarcate land
by mapping the area and identifying parcel boundaries has there-
fore been treated as a fixed cost. But most of it can be transformed
into a variable cost by allowing parcel identifications of different
quality, made on a voluntary basis, so that greater precision would be
demanded either by owners for whom such precision in defining
boundaries is really valuable or by the registry office in special cir-
cumstances in which it is deemed indispensable for titling. (The issue
is important because at least 53.45 percent of the unit costs of land
titling projects are being spent on physically identifying parcels.28)
25. SPARKES, supra note 16, at 1–3.
26. Similarly, colonial powers such as France and the United Kingdom in Africa and
Ireland (ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 56 (2001)), as well as the United States
in the Philippines (Lakshmi Iyer & Noel Maurer, The Cost of Property Rights: Establishing
Institutions on the Philippine Frontier Under American Rule, 1898–1918 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14298, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14298.pdf), in-
troduced land registration in their colonies while keeping more traditional systems of privacy
and recordation in their homelands.
27. See, e.g., Jürg Kaufmann & Daniel Steudler, Cadastre 2014: A Vision for a Future
Cadastral System, Int’l Fed’n of Surveyors (1998), https://www.fig.net/resources/publications
/figpub/cadastre2014/presentation/2002-05-kaufmann-granada-cad2014-paper.pdf.
28. The unit costs incurred for physical identification in the seven projects on which suf-
ficient detail is given in Burns amount to 38.74 percent of total costs, whereas costs are 37.17
percent for other activities and 24.09 percent for administration and management. Tony Burns,
Land Administration Reform: Indicators of Success and Future Challenges 94–95 (The World
Bank Working Paper No. 41893 2007). Allocating the proportional share of administration and
management, the costs for physical identification increase to 53.45 percent. Physical identi-
fication includes the following tasks: building a geodetic network, developing cartography,
investigating boundaries, surveying and marking, and preparing cadastral maps and plans.
The remaining 46.55 percent is spent on compiling existing records, publicity, acquiring gov-
ernment equipment, collecting claimant information, mediating in conflicts, controlling quality,
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Centrally demarcating land in homogeneous, easy-to-measure
units has been claimed to facilitate enforcement, reduce conflict and
transaction costs, and produce positive externalities, increasing land
value in a context of land allocation without preexisting property
rights.29 Some of these benefits may also accrue to surveying and 
legal validation, publicly displaying field results, resolving conflicts, preparing land records,
designing cadastral and registry databases, entering data, registering property rights, and
issuing titles to beneficiaries.
29. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds.,
2011). Their seminal empirical work on land demarcation systems compares the value of ad-
jacent land in thirty-nine counties of Ohio that, due to a historical accident, were demarcated
by metes and bounds (“MB”) or the rectangular survey (“RS”) around 1784–85. Gary D.
Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property
Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 (2011). They find that, for otherwise identical land, the RS
system is associated with higher land values, more roads, more land transactions, and fewer
legal disputes. However, it is unclear to what extent these significant and persistent differ-
ences can be attributed to physical land demarcation. In fact, the two sets of parcels differ not
only in the demarcation technique but also in the way the land was allocated to settlers.
The processes for demarcating and claiming land in Ohio were different for RS
and MB lands. For farmers to obtain RS land, the federal government first sur-
veyed parcels into square 640-acre sections, as the law required, and then made
them available to individuals at the local land office, often the county seat. Indi-
viduals located a square parcel or collection of squares and obtained title
through purchase and registration of the transaction . . . . Under MB there was
no presurvey by the government and no external constraint on individual plot
demarcation. Claimants first located a plot of land of any shape, marked its
perimeter on trees or other natural or human monuments, filed the claim or
“entry” at the local land office (again at the county seat), hired a surveyor to
formally measure the boundaries, and then recorded the surveyed plot at the
land office and received title.
Id. at 433 (emphases added).
Therefore, it seems that, where land was demarcated by the RS, settlers were granted spe-
cific parcels, guaranteeing no overlaps or conflicting claims. But, where land was demarcated
by MB, settlers were given a right to appropriate a certain area, which then was freely chosen
by each settler, privately surveyed and recorded, without, in principle, undergoing any purging
procedure to avoid overlaps and clear the title. Consequently, whether the differences observed
by Libecap and Lueck capture the effects of the different demarcation systems or those of alter-
native allocation and titling procedures is unknown. To isolate both effects, it would have been
necessary for the land under MB to have been divided using MB before being granted to settlers,
like the land divided under the RS. Therefore, the results obtained by Libecap and Lueck
probably overestimate the relative importance of physical demarcation by including those of
the different allocation procedures used in that case for RS and MB lands. In particular, such
results might reflect the fact that the boundaries of plots under MB have not been purged and
are therefore likely to overlap with those of neighboring plots. In this case, both contracted
and reported acreage under MB would systematically overestimate the legal acreage really
sold, as parties would try to keep their boundary claims alive. Therefore, the acre prices that
they observe under MB would underestimate real prices. This hypothesis is consistent with
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mapping efforts in a steady-state context with preexisting rights.
Furthermore, systematic mapping generally enjoys economies of scale
and does not collide with vested interests. It is therefore under-
standable that titling projects tend to include or be preceded by
mapping and surveying of land parcels. However, the value of this
physical demarcation (as opposed to nonphysical, more purely legal
demarcation) depends on the nature of the land. It is greater for
rural, uniform land in areas lacking fixed boundaries,30 as well as,
given the fixed costs of surveying, for more valuable land. The latter
explains why surveying and other due diligence studies are custom-
ary for commercial transactions in the United States but are rare for
residential ones.31 Mapping is also costly and slow so that, above a
certain frequency of transactions, even in developed economies it be-
comes almost impossible to keep the physical representation of the
land universally updated at the speed needed today for economic ac-
tivity, especially if the registry of rights is supposed to check bound-
aries before registration, to require neighbors’ consent in case of
collision, and to indemnify claimants for boundary errors.
Scotland provides an interesting example of these difficulties. The
1979 Scotland Land Registration Act created a new registry of rights,
the Land Register, to replace the old register of deeds, the General
Register of Sasines, which had been created in 1617. The act bur-
dened the new registry with a duty to maintain a physical description
of each parcel of land, based on the Ordnance Survey map. More than
thirty years later, only 19 percent of the landmass of Scotland and
55 percent of its titles had been transferred into the new registry.32
the fact that they observe such value differences in farmland but not in urban land, whose
boundaries are usually more precise. It is also consistent with their finding that most 19th cen-
tury litigation in metes and bounds areas is not related to boundaries (1.46 by 1,000 parcels,
about 4 times more than in rectangular survey areas) or to the validity of the survey (2.48‰,
31 times more) but to the validity of the entry/patent (8.61‰, 33 times more). Id. at 453. Lack
of clarity in the title seems to have been more important as a driver of litigation and, possibly,
of transactions costs and value.
30. Libecap, Lueck, and O’Grady use a similar contextual argument to explain the variation
in the land demarcation systems adopted in various British colonies. Gary D. Libecap, Dean
Lueck & Trevor O’Grady, Large-Scale Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation within the
British Empire, 54 J.L. & ECON 295 (2011).
31. MICHAEL T. MADISON, ROBERT M. ZINMAN & STEVEN W. BENDER, MODERN REAL
ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 14 (2d ed. 1999).
32. REGISTERS OF SCOTLAND, LAND REGISTRATION (SCOTLAND) BILL CONSULTATION PAPER
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Mapping had caused frequent refusals and delays in registration,
often because of discrepancies between the plan in the deed and the
Ordnance Survey map; it had also been the largest category of error
in terms of indemnities33 and had been a major cause of the slow
transition into the new registry, which suffered from long turnaround
times and the accumulation of a considerable backlog, in which map-
ping issues figured prominently.34 The Scotland Law Commission
advised in 2010 to give discretion to the registry to replace the
Ordnance Survey base map with some other system.35
3. Danger of Focusing on Average Costs for Making Sensible
Technological Choices
Besides mapping, other policy options affecting the mix of fixed and
variable costs are computerization and online registration, which are
also often argued to reduce costs. For instance, CLEP claims that
the “costs of property certification can be considerably reduced and
transparency improved by computerization and GPS systems, espe-
cially where comprehensive records do not yet exist.”36 This is partly
true. Not only computers but also, in general, capital-intensive tech-
nologies achieve lower average costs. Formalization enjoys substan-
tial economies of scale, as suggested by data such as those depicted
in Figure 2. However, these economies depend on the relative prices
of capital to labor and, in any case, can only be reached at high levels
of output. As it happens, most poor countries have plenty of labor,
and their demand for formalization is limited to the most valuable
urban land and corporate firms.37 Therefore, extensive investments
in computers and information technologies are often inappropriate.
Because average cost does not measure efficiency, it should be
treated with extreme caution for comparisons and probably never
5 (2010) [hereinafter LAND REGISTRATION (SCOTLAND)], https://www.ros.gov.uk/__data/assets
/pdf_file/0007/16837/lr_bill_consultation.pdf.
33. REGISTERS OF SCOTLAND, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009–2010 26 (2010), https://
www.ros.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/5836/rosannualreport_09-10.pdf.
34. Id. at 10, 16.
35. LAND REGISTRATION (SCOTLAND), supra note 32, at 16.
36. COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 66.
37. Individual proprietorships do not need contractual registration, as shown in Institutional
Support of the Firm, supra note 1.
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set as an objective for reform efforts. Unfortunately, using average
cost carelessly has been promoted by the popularity of international
indicators that narrowly focus on them. In terms of the bottom panel
of Figure 2, they pay attention only to the vertical axis instead of
considering the whole cost function. Consequently, when comparing
such indicators across countries, institutions in countries with lower
figures are seen as more efficient. However, countries at different
levels of development have different demands for formalization and
their optimum average costs should also differ. Therefore, a higher
average cost in a country whose system functions at a lower scale
does not necessarily mean that its institutions are less efficient. They
may be functioning efficiently, at precisely the frontier of productive
possibilities, but at a lower scale and perhaps with different, more
labor-intensive technology. And vice versa, a richer country may show
lower average costs only as a result of the scale, even though its
system is inefficient.
Comparing average costs cannot resolve these doubts and may
also lead reformers to pursue inefficient reductions in average costs
(affecting, in fact, only part of them, as most indicators only measure
expenses directly paid by users, therefore producing only a partial
estimate of variable average costs). This is yet another case of modern
public management falling into an old trap of poorly applied mana-
gerial accounting, which for years had led industrial firms to choose
capital-intensive technologies and to produce excessively large batches
of products.38 It may help to explain why many formalization projects
underestimate the fixed costs involved in building institutions.39
Coming back to the main theme and considering that poor countries
often have more labor than capital and limited demand for formal-
ization, choosing labor-intensive technologies with higher average
costs but little investment in fixed costs might be optimal. However,
many have invested large amounts of capital while simultaneously
trying to inflate demand and output by choosing a strategy of uni-
versal titling. I will now explore why this is generally a bad idea.
38. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific Knowledge and Divisional
Performance Measurement, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 49 (2009).
39. Daniel Wachter & John English, The World Bank Experience with Rural Land Titling
(World Bank Pol’y and Res. Division, Envtl. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 35, 1992); LYNN C.
HOLSTEIN, REVIEW OF BANK EXPERIENCE WITH LAND TITLING AND REGISTRATION (1993).
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Figure 2. Possible economies of scale in
formalization processes40
40. Figure 2: Top, Average total cost index of property registries in Spain as a function of
their volume of activity, measured by the number of annual entries in 1998 (based on data from
Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado [DGRN], ANUARIO DE LA DIRECCIÓN
GENERAL DE LOS REGISTROS Y DEL NOTARIADO [YEARBOOK OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF
REGISTRIES AND NOTARIES] (1998) (Spain)). Bottom, Income per head (in USD) and cost of busi-
ness formalization (in percentage of income per head) in 2003 across countries worldwide (based
on data from Doing Business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth, THE WORLD BANK (2004)).
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II. VOLUNTARY VERSUS UNIVERSAL TITLING
Under universal titling, where all land in an area is publicly titled,
social benefits fall to the difference between the gains from titling
high-value land (area G in Figure 1) and the losses from overtitling
low-value land (area L). Universal titling thus would be inferior to
voluntary titling in the absence of positive externalities. I examine
the causes of this inferiority before analyzing a possible justification
of universal titling via externalities and discussing the real case of
land titling in Peru. I close by questioning the direction of causality
between informality and poverty.
A. Causes of “Overtitling” Low-Value Land
The negative effect, L, arises under universal titling because low-
value land—that below the indifference point—is now titled, even if
the cost of titling is higher than the resulting increase in land value.
(Observe in Figure 1 that for these parcels of land the value of land
under the privacy line is above the value of land under the titling
line.) In practice, this situation normally results not from mandatory
but from subsidized titling. Individual titling decisions are driven by
the individual value of titling in terms of enhanced security of titles
minus the price of titling services. Arruñada and Garoupa conclude
that, in the absence of externalities, optimal titling fees should be
above cost when social costs are lower than private costs.41 The reason
41. Arruñada & Garoupa, supra note 1. Nonconsensual transfers of property generate not
only private but also social costs because they trigger rent seeking and, generally, transaction
costs, especially to make future consensual transactions possible and to protect against fraud.
For instance, real resources are spent on fabricating frauds and litigating disputes on current
ownership. In addition, future land sales become more difficult when titles are unclear. The situ-
ation poses the typical problem of excessive care when private benefits are higher than social
benefits (see, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision
of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. ECON & ORG. 306 (1992); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental
Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 575 (1997)), characterized in a wider context as “excess measurement” by Barzel.
Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27 (1982).
GERSHON FEDER ET AL., LAND POLICIES AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY IN THAILAND (1988), suggest
several reasons why the private value of formalization is greater than the social value. Stewart
E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property Rights, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1285 (2008), explains along these lines several exceptions in the application of prop-
erty rules to both real and intellectual property, exemplified by the tendency of courts to deny
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is that optimizing individuals tend to purchase too much title assur-
ance, given that in their titling decisions they consider not social but
individual losses, which are assumed to be larger.
However, many development programs subsidize public titling by
setting titling fees at nil or nominal levels and spending resources
on informing owners about the benefits of public titling.42 Most de-
veloping countries seem to follow the prescriptions of CLEP that
“new and small landowners [should be] exempted from registration
fees and taxes.”43 It coherently recommends institutionalizing “an
efficient property rights governance system that systematically and
massively brings the extralegal economy into the formal economy and
that ensures that it remains easily accessible to all citizens.”44 Al-
though it also aims for efficiency, CLEP’s overarching goal seems to
be a peculiar version of equality of results: “To ensure that a nation’s
property is recognized and legally enforceable by law, all owners must
have access to the same rights and standards. This would allow bring-
ing the extralegal economy into the formal economy systematically
and massively.”45
Under registration, first titling of land previously held under pri-
vacy is in fact even more heavily subsidized because, given that un-
registered titles are unclear, first registration is both more costly
and more valuable.46 Understandably, individuals are happy to go
injunctive relief in cases of good faith boundary encroachments and to limit such relief in patent
and copyright cases.
42. According to the responses to the Doing Business in 2005 survey, user fees accounted
for an average of 32.12% of the cost of public titling in 113 countries, with governments financing
63.90% and other sources (mostly aid agencies) the remaining 3.98%. Moreover, user fees fi-
nanced the whole costs of titling systems in only 23 countries. Doing Business in 2005: Removing
Obstacles to Growth, THE WORLD BANK (2004), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en
/883691468152697311/Doing-business-in-2005-removing-obstacles-to-growth.
43. COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 67.
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 66. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has proposed an inter-
mediate approach whereby the initial establishment of the registry would be mainly financed
from general taxation while user fees would provide for the cost of maintaining the registry
in the future (e.g., U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., LAND ADMINISTRATION GUIDELINES WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION at 8, U.N. Doc. ECE/HBP/96, U.N. Sales No.
E.96.11.E.7 (1996)). But even this intermediate solution is not necessary under voluntary titling
when most of the fixed costs of setting up the registry are made variable, as discussed above.
46. The inclination to register shown by holders of less secure titles when both registration
and recordation are available in the same jurisdiction suggests that the value of titling is gen-
erally greater the less clear the title.
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to the trouble of first registration, but they often do not file subse-
quent transactions and successions, even if the cost is less. They
instead keep their titles private:
Frequently, the record of land rights established in mass titling
is not kept up-to-date, and the system falls into disuse. Keeping
the system vital and current depends upon those who hold regis-
tered rights in land and those who acquire them registering their
transactions and successions. Failure to do so is frequent and
occurs for a number of reasons. The costs imposed, for instance,
by fees or by taxing transactions, may be too high. The system
may have become corrupt, driving away beneficiaries with heavy
illegal charges. The landholders may not understand the system
and its potential benefits to them or, if they do understand, they
may not consider them worthwhile. They may simply be more
comfortable with customary practices.47
Titling therefore seems to be of so little value for these people that,
even if they pay close to zero for it, it is not worth the time, trouble,
and perhaps the possibility of being taxed, which are all associated
with registration. When this happens for the majority of subsequent
transactions, despite subsidized prices, it is reasonable to ask if most
of this land which returns to privacy after a subsequent transaction
lies, in Figure 1, to the left of the indifference point and therefore
should not have been titled in the first place.
B. How Real Are the Positive Externalities of Universal Titling?
The above analysis assumes that the cost and value of titling each
parcel of land is independent of whether other parcels are titled. In
contrast, proponents of universal titling claim that there are sub-
stantial interdependencies, for instance, in clarifying boundaries and
avoiding corruption, which should reduce the fixed cost of titling, F.
For example, according to the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe:
The systematic [i.e., universal] approach . . . . is in the longer
term less expensive because of economies of scale, safer because
it gives maximum publicity to the determination of who owns
47. LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION, supra note 3, at 42.
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what within an area, and more certain because detailed investi-
gations take place on the ground with direct evidence from the
owners of adjoining properties.48
Universal titling of an area might also produce positive externalities
if the value gains produced by titling a parcel are not fully captured
by its owner. Mainly, to the extent that titling encourages invest-
ments in building and renovation, some benefits of these investments
will accrue to neighboring parcels.49 Many other benefits are also
possible. For instance, titling could modify in a promarket direction
the beliefs of those receiving them, as observed by Di Tella, Galiani,
and Schargrodsky.50 Such a change might help stabilize political out-
comes, even though this outcome has been questioned, considering
that titling poor owners may be bad for the poorest tenants who lack
ownership claims in slums: the poorest are often exploited not by the
rich but by the poor.51 Lastly, titles could also ease contracting for
utilities, as emphasized by de Soto.52
All these positive externalities would add to the benefits repre-
sented by the area G in Figure 1. However, as often happens with
externalities, their importance remains open to question. First, cost
externalities are clear in mapping and surveying work, but both
activities may be unnecessary. They are also unsustainable, as “no
48. Land Administration in the UNECE Region, supra note 3, at 35.
49. For the same reason, diluting property rights may cause negative externalities. For
example, a number of foreclosures above a certain threshold reduces the value of all houses
in a neighborhood (Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of
Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 306 (2008)), potentially triggering
a snowball effect when reduced home values lead to additional foreclosures. John P. Harding,
Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URBAN
ECON. 164 (2009), estimate that each foreclosure reduces the value of neighboring family homes
between 0.6 and 1.3 percent, an effect that decreases with distance and is caused by the visual
impact of deferred maintenance and neglect; and Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak estimate that
in Massachusetts a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of a house by about
1 percent. John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 2108 (2011). Accumulated average reductions may reach up to $159,000.
Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-
Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57 (2006).
50. Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, The Formation of Beliefs:
Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters, 122 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 209 (2007).
51. See, for example, PETER N. WARD, MEXICO CITY: THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION
OF AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT 193 (1990), and, more generally, MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS
79–82 (2006).
52. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 58–61 (2000).
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project in the developing world has been able to implement and sus-
tain high-accuracy surveys over extensive areas of their jurisdiction.”53
Second, positive externalities disappear when owners who have been
given public titles decide to keep their titles private in subsequent
transactions and successions. To this extent, universal titling is only
universal for the initial first titling effort, and all titling systems are
de facto selective and voluntary. Lastly, there might be negative as
well as positive externalities such as jeopardizing untitled custom-
ary rights to land.
Moreover, the empirical evidence on the effects of titling broadly
supports applying voluntary instead of universal titling. Titling is
more effective in areas where there are substantial investment op-
portunities, most commonly in cities, and when financial services
have already developed.54 Also, the benefits of titling, especially those
related to the use of land as collateral for credit, accrue mostly to
large landholders.55
This evidence adds to the regularities observed in both the intro-
duction of titling and the design of titling institutions, throwing some
doubts on their real aims. With respect to the introduction of titling,
it is common to find a symmetric failure to make sure, before the
reforms, that a real demand exists, as has been admitted by CLEP;56
and to check, after them, that such a demand has actually material-
ized. For example, most projects do not bother to monitor if subse-
quent transactions are being titled.57 With respect to the structure of
titling institutions, it is equally disturbing that most efforts rely on
subsidized pricing, and policymakers are advised to continue relying
on it.58 No proper consideration is given to whether the need for subsi-
dies is signaling a lack of demand for titling.59 Instead, policymakers
53. See Burns, supra note 28.
54. SEARCHING FOR SECURITY OF LAND TENURE IN AFRICA (John W. Bruce & Shem E.
Migot-Adholla eds., 1994); Feder & Nishio, supra note 10.
55. Gershon Feder, Tongroj Onchan & Tejaswi Raparla, Collateral, Guaranties and Rural
Credit in Developing Countries: Evidence from Asia, 2 AGRIC. ECON. 231 (1988); Michael
Carter & Pedro Olinto, Getting Institutions “Right” for Whom? Credit Constraints and the
Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment, 85 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 173 (2003).
56. 2 COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 84.
57. FROM CONCEPTS TO ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 42.
58. COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 60, 67.
59. The recommendation to subsidize first registration and mapping but to recover recur-
rent operating costs (as in Land Administration in the UNECE Region, supra note 3, at 25)
is hardly viable unless titling triggers a substantial increase in land values.
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are advised to educate beneficiaries on the benefits of titling and pro-
tect them from bad decisions even though it is unclear who knows
best.60 Proposed policy changes share this disregard for demand. For
instance, since credit does not evolve automatically from what are
often supply-driven systems of property rights, CLEP advises the pro-
vision of “targeted credit,” without considering whether demand (i.e.,
investment opportunities) for such credit really exists.61 Yet, after all
these subsidies and advertising efforts, titling projects still fail to get
subsequent transactions titled.62 In principle, all these features are
consistent with the troubling hypothesis that, in spite of their em-
powering-the-poor rhetoric, these projects in fact serve the interests
of the using-the-poor industry; mainly, the suppliers of titling and
complementary services.
C. Land Titling in Peru: An Example
Peru has spent hugely on formalizing property—over 214 million
dollars between 1991 and 2002 alone, in an effort financed with
loans from the World Bank since 1998.63 Positive effects on invest-
ment and on the supply of labor have been found by Field,64 as ti-
tling supposedly allows squatters not to rely exclusively on physical
possession to enforce their rights. However, a large proportion of the
formalized properties leave the formal system when the land is sold
again, and hardly any commercial mortgages have been registered,
despite many years of subsidized prices for registration.
Furthermore, several studies have concluded that titling has pro-
duced little, if any, security or value. Webb, Beuermann, and Revilla
judge that formal titles add little security, and the difference has
60. COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 20, at 67.
61. 2 id. at 82.
62. 2 id. at 84.
63. INSTITUTO LIBERTAD Y DEMOCRACIA [INSTITUTE FOR LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY], LA
GUERRA DE LOS NOTARIOS 65 (2007) (Peru) [hereinafter LA GUERRA DE LOS NOTARIOS], http://
www.ild.org.pe/images/books/la_guerra_de_los_notarios_2.pdf. In 2006, the World Bank granted
an additional loan of twenty-five million dollars, subsequent to a previous one of thirty-eight
million that ended in 2004. COFOPRI al día, COFOPRI (COMISIÓN PARA LA FORMALIZACIÓN
DE LA PROPIEDAD INFORMAL) at 1 (Nov. 28, 2006) (Peru).
64. Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods and Household Time Allocation
in the Urban Squatter Communities, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837 (2004); Erica Field, Property
Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 279
(2005); Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru, 122
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1561 (2007).
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become smaller over time from the perspective of owners.65 Kerekes
and Williamson find that titling rural land has no effect on access
to credit, even from public banks.66 Several reports conclude that “it
is not clear that beneficiaries place greater value on a registered
title than on other ownership documents, such as municipal certifi-
cates or sale and purchase contracts, which have not necessarily been
purged and registered.”67 A report made for the promoters of the re-
form argues that “to some extent this can be explained by the wide-
spread culture of informality among the population and also by the
lack of knowledge of the benefits of having a registered title.”68 This
argument is behind its observation that “a large percentage of the
formalized population would not be placing any additional value on
the fact that their ownership title has been properly purged and
registered.”69 Also in line with this ignorance argument, the titling
agency (Comisión para la Formalización de la Propiedad Informal
(“COFOPRI”)) has been carrying out an extensive information cam-
paign with the aim of “preventing the great effort at formalization
from being wasted because a register that is not updated is of little
use and everything seems to indicate that, once the COFOPRI title
has been registered, a large proportion of the beneficiaries have not
registered second transactions.”70
It is, however, doubtful whether it is owners who underestimate
the value of titles or, rather, title suppliers who overestimate it. It
is hard to estimate true values in a dynamic context with possible
collective-action effects, but data on credit suggest the latter:
No important differences are noted for each type of title certifi-
cate, except for a slightly higher degree of approval of Cofopri
applications (96%). . . . [nor] a higher use of the ownership title
in access to credit, because this seems to be linked more to the
applicant’s payment capacity than to the holding of guarantees
for the financial institution. The results show that the probability
65. RICHARD WEBB, DIETHER W. BEUERMANN & CARLA REVILLA, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL
DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD: EL CASO DE LOS ASENTIMIENTOS HUMANOS EN EL PERÚ (2006) (Peru).
66. Carrie B. Kerekes & Claudia R. Williamson, Propertyless in Peru, Even with a
Government Land Title, 69 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1011 (2010).
67. FELIPE MORRIS GUERINONI, LA FORMALIZACIÓN DE LA PROPIEDAD EN EL PERÚ:
DESVELANDO EL MISTERIO 20 (2004) (Peru), http://www.urbe.edu/UDWLibrary/InfoBook.do
?id=53228.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 21.
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of approval of applications for loans is similar for those having a
Cofopri title as for those having no ownership document as the two
groups gained access to formal sources in the same proportion.71
What did increase slowly was the number of mortgages registered
(between 4.18 and 5.59 percent, a tiny percentage considering that
only 76,272 mortgages had been registered by the end of 2003 out
of a total of 1,824,087 formalized parcels, for which 1,364,434 titles
had been granted).72 But it is unknown whether these mortgages ef-
fectively reduced the interest rate on the loans. More importantly,
most of their lenders were public firms. According to Miranda:
[A]fter six years work and more than one million registered land
titles, . . . [most credit] is from the Banco de Materiales, a gov-
ernment credit system that provides credit to those with secure
incomes and which is not based on those who have formal titles.
There is not one private bank giving mortgage credit warranted
by the titles registered.73
These failures in subsequent transactions and mortgages have been
blamed on the rising prices of notarial intervention.74 However, even
if notaries do make formalization more expensive, the problems with
subsequent transactions and mortgages arose prior to the reintro-
duction of notarial privileges in 2002 and 2004. To make things
worse, in later years, COFOPRI managers resigned amid allegations
of prevalent corruption, including the hiring of thousands of political
cronies and the sale of public land to friends at nominal prices.75
CONCLUDING REMARKS: DOES INFORMALITY CAUSE
POVERTY, OR IS IT A CONSEQUENCE?
Policies promoting titling and formalization efforts have become
part of the conventional wisdom for fighting poverty. These efforts are
grounded on the dual assumptions that the poor are poor because
71. Id. at 23–24.
72. Id. 98–99.
73. Óscar Miranda, Cofopri fue infectado por la corrupción, PERÚ 21, Aug. 31, 2010, at 263
(Peru), http://laantorchaeducativa2010.blogspot.com.es/2011/10/.
74. LA GUERRA DE LOS NOTARIOS, supra note 63.
75. Miranda, supra note 73.
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they are informal and that their informality is caused by high for-
malization costs. The argument goes that, as the poor cannot afford
the fees required to register their land and their businesses, they lose
economic opportunities. In particular, they are unable to use their
land as collateral for credit, and their businesses cannot rely on courts
to enforce their contracts. The solution is simple: provide the poor with
affordable—often meaning free or at least subsidized—formalization
services, in the hope that this will increase the value of their land,
allow them to use it as collateral, and expand their businesses.
However, these universal and affordable formalization policies may
be misguided if causation between poverty and informality runs in
the opposite direction—that is, the poor remain informal because they
are poor. This might well be the case because their assets are of low
value and their economic activities are of a personal nature; there-
fore, for most poor people the benefits of formalization are below its
cost. According to this argument, informality is prevalent among the
poor because formalization processes are costly, which makes access
to all dimensions of legality—including the definition of property
rights, written contracts, and litigation—less efficient for those who
own fewer assets or subscribe smaller contracts. These costs of for-
mality are real social costs, not arbitrary fees, and may well be higher
than the benefits that the poor and society as a whole would obtain
with formalization if the poor lack the impersonal trade opportunities
for which formalization is really valuable. Individuals thus tend to
formalize their activity more or less fully depending on their wealth:
very poor people are not even registered as individuals; poor people
are registered as individuals, but their assets are not valuable enough
for their rights or titles to figure in a public record; and wealthier
people have more valuable assets that are recorded in a more formal
way. If registries in developing countries mainly serve the elite, far
from being a problem, this is often an efficient outcome. Even though
it does not justify their high costs and low quality, it is consistent with
the priority of demand and value over costs. (Moreover, it might also
be fairer than spending scarce tax or aid money on useless titling or
formalization efforts.)
Consequently, focusing formalization efforts on the poor may well
be inefficient, and governments and international aid organizations
often invest too much in formalization projects and structure them
badly, aiming for simple but, in the end, useless solutions. In fact,
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some formalization efforts may be no more than another way of ex-
ploiting the poorest—for example, those without land to entitle—for
the benefit, not of those who have some land, but mainly of the sup-
pliers of formalization solutions. It is also inevitable that many of
these projects become unsustainable: more often than not it is effi-
cient not to sustain them and their inefficiency may even have been
clear from the beginning.76
Even if in many countries improving formalization institutions
and lowering formalization costs is often a worthy objective, when
properly based on costs and benefits, formalization policies should
not focus on the poor. They should instead aim to improve registries
for those already using them, focusing on improving the value of
their services. And user fees should be levied so that charging bene-
ficiaries at least part of the cost of formalization from the very be-
ginning will provide a test on the social balance of costs and benefits
and ensure sustainability.77 Such policies would benefit the poor by
achieving more efficient formalization, via lower costs or greater
benefits, which would increase economic growth and lead some of
the poor to formalize.
This argument is applicable to both land and businesses. Firms
tend to be informal when they are small and not the other way
around. To the extent that some formalization costs are fixed with
the size of the firm, it will be socially optimal that smaller firms re-
main informal and choose simpler contractual structures. This may
be especially important when considering that formalization deci-
sions influence the costs of public enforcement. For example, to the
extent that incorporation facilitates tax evasion, easing the adminis-
trative burden of very small companies therefore increases the fixed
costs of tax enforcement on the activities now channeled through
these companies. From this perspective, policies that focus on reduc-
ing the regulatory burden (not mainly the initial but the recurrent
costs) of smaller companies are misguided to the extent that, rela-
tive to their size, at least the smallest ones may impose greater costs
on society.
Furthermore, protecting the poor by legal means often conflicts
with developing the institutions needed for a market economy. In par-
ticular, a legal foundation for a market economy is equal treatment
76. LAND AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION, supra note 3, at 42.
77. As argued in ARRUÑADA, supra note 6, at 193–97.
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for all citizens, yet policies that “empower the poor” often include laws
targeted to favor them.78 For instance, governments are encouraged
not only to provide land registration but also to recognize land occu-
pants as owners, as well as provide advice and support to new small
businesses, which distorts competition between firms of different
sizes and promotes production at an inefficiently low scale. Govern-
ments are even advised to encourage workers’ unionization efforts,
as if unions did not have a dubious record in helping the really poor.
And this is not to argue against redistribution to the poor in society.
The criticism goes against implementing this redistribution by estab-
lishing unequal legal rights that at best benefit the poorest owners
and not the poorest citizens.
78. FROM CONCEPTS TO ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 5–6.
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FORMALIZATION, POSSESSION, AND OWNERSHIP
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
This paper is a comment on the work of Hernando de Soto, who has
done so much to highlight the importance of property rights, espe-
cially in the context of what I will call migrant communities within
developing countries. These are the shantytowns of Peru, the favelas
of Brazil, and the bidonvilles of Haiti. De Soto characterizes these com-
munities as “extralegal zones.” They consist, in his words, of “modest
homes cramped together on city perimeters, a myriad of workshops
in their midst, armies of vendors hawking their wares on the streets,
and countless crisscrossing minibus lines.”1 I am interested in de
Soto’s work on these migrant communities for two reasons, which
are related.
First, de Soto’s work sheds important light on a problem in prop-
erty theory with which I have been concerned for several years. This
has to do with the distinction between two different ways for allocating
resources among humans living together in some kind of organized
society—possession and ownership.2 There is a broad divide among
property scholars between “Humeans” who see informal possessory
rights as the origins of property, and “Hobbesians” who see the State
as the critical institution that gives rise to claims of property.3 De
Soto’s migrant communities are organized according to claims of pos-
session that are extra-legal, that is, they are not sanctioned by the
State. So they provide an important piece of data bearing on the
causal debate about the origins of property.
Second, de Soto’s work has spawned a worldwide reform effort that
seeks to jump start economic growth in developing countries by
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School
1. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 78–79 (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, MYSTERY].
2. Thomas Merrill, Ownership and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 13–21 (2014).
3. The distinction is often expressed in terms of whether property emerges “bottom up”
(evolving out of social norms) or “top down” (is imposed by the State). See James E. Krier, Evo-
lutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009); Thomas W.
Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S331 (2002).
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formalizing the informal possessory rights that exist in migrant com-
munities, that is, by transforming extra-legal possessory rights into
legal property rights.4 The primary rationale for such formalization
programs is to make these claims eligible for use as collateral for
loans, which in turn will provide the capital needed to build struc-
tures, obtain equipment and inventory, and enter the world of modern
capitalism. This idea has been tremendously influential with inter-
national aid agencies and the World Bank and has been adopted, in
one form or another, by a large number of developing countries
throughout the world.5 The results have largely been disappointing.6
Once we pinpoint the key information-cost distinction between sys-
tems that allocate resources by possession and those that use own-
ership, we can come to an understanding of why the formalization
projects have largely failed in their stated objectives. This under-
standing also points toward alternative reforms that may have greater
chances of success.
I. THE THEORETICAL ISSUE
Possession is a social concept. It refers to a claim by a person of ex-
clusive control of a physical object. It is grounded in actual control.
One cannot gain possession simply by pointing to an object or taking
a picture of it. Once actual control is obtained, however, possession
does not require continuous control. It is sufficient to mark the object
in such a way as to signal to others that one intends to retain con-
trol of the object.
The institution of possession is a universal feature of all known
human societies, including hunter-gatherer bands. The objects eli-
gible for claims of possession vary considerably from one society to
another, as do the marks that signal to others that an object is pos-
sessed. No matter how claims of possession are communicated, in
reasonably stable human societies there is a strong disposition to
respect possession established by others. To be sure, there is varia-
tion here too, as some societies have higher rates of thievery than
4. Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and Development:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 24 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 233 (2009).
5. For further discussion of the formalization projects, see infra Part II.
6. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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others and there is often, unfortunately, a marked fall-off in respect
for possession by out-groups relative to in-groups. But respect for
possession exists, to some degree, even within bands of thieves.7
Ownership is a legal concept. Like possession, it refers to control
over things. Ownership, however, refers to a legally enforceable right
to exclusive control of a thing. In a society with a functioning legal
system, ownership trumps possession. Ownership is also broader
than possession because it is not limited to physical objects. One can
own intellectual property rights, shares in companies, security in-
terests, money, and lots of other things that are intangible.
The main point I would emphasize for present purposes is that
every moderately sophisticated society with a functioning legal sys-
tem will rely on both possession and ownership in allocating rights
to resources. It is a mistake to think of possession as some rudimen-
tary state of affairs that prevails in primitive societies but which is
eventually replaced by ownership as development takes off. Even in
the most advanced societies, possession is by far the most frequently
used basis for allocating claims to resources.
In navigating through everyday life, for example, we make thou-
sands of judgments about whether particular resources are claimed
or unclaimed. Think of our response to cars in a parking lot, houses
along a street, coats on a coat-rack, and goods piled up on the side-
walk in front of a shop. We make judgments about whether these
objects are claimed or unclaimed based on perceptions about whether
someone has signaled an intention to retain possession of the object
in question. We do not ponder whether they are owned, and if so, by
whom and in what sort of title. Even when we engage in transac-
tions, most of the time we rely on possession as a sufficient basis for
the right to engage in exchange. This applies to nearly all transac-
tions in relatively low-valued goods, like food, clothing, books, and
so forth. When you buy a bottle of water from a street vendor, you
do not stop to ponder whether the vendor owns the bottles of water.
You assume, based on his possession of the bottles, that he has the
right to sell them.
Ownership, in contrast, comes into play only in relatively special-
ized contexts. These are typically high-stakes situations, such as
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, Possession as a Natural Right, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 345,
356–63 (2015) (and sources cited).
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resolving a boundary dispute over land, establishing whether the
seller has good title when buying a house or car, or determining
whether to loan money to someone secured by collateral.
The reason why possession is used most of the time and ownership
comes into play only exceptionally is primarily a matter of informa-
tion costs. Determinations of possession are based on physical cues
about objects that are processed by our brains almost instanta-
neously and unconsciously. They exist in the realm of cognition that
Daniel Kahneman has called “system 1” or “thinking fast.”8 Some-
how we learn these cues at a very young age, just by observing how
people interact with objects of value.
Determinations of ownership, in contrast, entail much higher
information costs. In order to identify someone as the “owner” of a
thing it is necessary to trace its provenance in order to ascertain that
the relevant rights (paradigmatically to exclude others) have not
previously been transferred to someone else.9 Such a determination
may entail commissioning a survey, finding documents memorializ-
ing past transactions, figuring out what these documents mean,
perhaps consulting some kind of registry of rights, possibly hiring
a lawyer to sort all this out, and maybe even filing a lawsuit. Even
the most streamlined of these enquiries requires a conscious effort
to gather information and decide what it means. Determining owner-
ship is a quintessential example of what Kahneman calls “system 2”
cognition or “thinking slow.”10
Once we see that possession is an informationally cheap way of
allocating rights to resources, whereas ownership is an information-
ally expensive way of allocating resources, we can see why possession
remains the predominate principle for most everyday purposes. And
this is true in even the most sophisticated societies with the most
elaborate systems of property rights and enforcement of those rights.
What remains controversial about this account of possession and
its relation to ownership is a question of causation. My view, which
you could call neo-Humean or perhaps a sociobiological view, is that
there is something we can call the “possession instinct” which is
8. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
9. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
401 (2003).
10. KAHNEMAN, supra note 8.
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hard wired in human psychology.11 People everywhere have a natu-
ral proclivity to identify certain objects as being possessed by others,
and a natural proclivity to respect possession established by others.
Obviously, it is not all biological; the possession instinct is signifi-
cantly mediated by culture and by individual learning. But if a group
of strangers, each from a different culture, were stranded on a desert
island, they would quickly develop a normative understanding of
which objects or places on the island belong to whom, and there
would be widespread respect for this understanding.
The opposing view, which has been informally advanced on sev-
eral occasions in response to my views, can be called neo-Hobbesian.
This is the view that possession only works as a basis for allocating
resources because it is backstopped by the power of the State. Take
one of my favorite examples of the use of possession in the modern
world—the luggage carousel at an international airport. People from
all over the world and all sorts of cultural backgrounds understand
that they are entitled to take only the suitcase uniquely marked as
their own; they understand they are not to interfere with suitcases
marked as belonging to someone else. The process works the same
at airports all over the world and most of the time operates without
any official checking of claim tags, once bags are retrieved.
To which the neo-Hobbesians respond: The system of suitcase
allocation works only because everyone understands that someone,
somewhere, is the legal owner of each of these suitcases. Particular
suitcases may be borrowed, or may even be stolen. But each is owned
by someone. We learn in our youth that taking property owned by
someone else is a crime, punishable by the State. So we desist from
taking a suitcase that we perceive is not our own, because we fear
the power of the State. In this particular example, possession may
serve up the cues as to who is entitled to what, but it is functioning
simply as a proxy for ownership. Ownership supplies the underlying
explanation for the respect for possession.12
What I like about de Soto’s account of the migrant communities in
the developing world is that it presents a kind of natural experiment
for testing these rival theories. As he describes the circumstances of
11. Merrill, supra note 7.
12. Cf. Carol M. Rose, The Law is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its
Head, in 40 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Change ed., 2015) (arguing that
possession is best explained by “acting like an owner”).
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these communities, they are essentially outlaws from the perspec-
tive of the formal system of property rights. The people living in
these communities inhabit handmade structures built on land they
do not own. They operate businesses they are not licensed to oper-
ate. They commute on minibuses that have no franchises authoriz-
ing them to provide service. Yet, as de Soto makes emphatically clear,
these are bustling communities, filled with entrepreneurship and
energy.13 They constitute a major part of the wealth of the countries
in which they operate. De Soto’s point is that they could do even
better if they had formal property rights; if they could join the sys-
tem of private property from which they have been excluded.14
From my perspective, the migrant communities that de Soto
describes operate on the principle of possession—they allocate re-
sources based on perceptions of possession and respect for posses-
sion established by others. Moreover—and this is the critical point
in terms of the causation debate—they do so in a context where
everyone knows they do not have ownership rights. The principle of
possession here cannot be explained as a proxy for ownership, be-
cause everyone knows these communities are not grounded in formal
property rights. They are a real world instantiation of my hypothe-
sis about a group of people marooned on a desert island. There can
be no claim that the millions of people living in these migrant com-
munities respect possession because it is backstopped by law and
the power of the State. They respect possession because it is the
natural human thing to do.
II. THE FAILED FORMALIZATION PROJECT
The distinction between possession and ownership, and the recogni-
tion of the radical difference in the information costs associated with
these two ways of allocating resources, also has important implica-
tions for the fate of de Soto’s key policy proposal, which is to formalize
the informal rights to resources that people have in migrant commu-
nities in developing nations. A major reason for formalizing these
rights of possession, de Soto argues, is to create a foundation for
13. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 17–127 (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER
PATH].
14. See DE SOTO, MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 15–37.
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secured lending based on the collateral in these resources. This in-
jection of capital, he argues, would allow the occupants of these
migrant communities to start or expand a business, or otherwise
improve these resources, which would jump start economic growth
and promote greater equality.15
The evidence to date indicates that this formalization project, where
it has been carried out, has generally failed to achieve its announced
objective. A number of country-specific case studies suggest that the
urban poor who receive these formalized rights do not use them to
obtain secured loans. Instead, once formalization occurs, they fre-
quently cash out by selling to larger landholders or developers.16
Perhaps most critically, in light of the argument de Soto advanced
in support of formalization, a comprehensive review of the literature
by two World Bank researchers reports that evidence of improved
access to credit “is scant.”17
There are undoubtedly a variety of explanations for why formal-
ization projects have failed to achieve economic lift-off in developing
countries. For example, if formal titles are distributed in such a way
that they conflict with customary rights, this can give rise to conflict
between indigenous populations and formal rights holders.18 Or, if
state institutions are too weak or corrupt to enforce formal titles ef-
fectively, control over resources may revert to informal rights hold-
ers.19 These sorts of explanations, however, do not seem to account
for the failure of formalization to stimulate secured lending in the
migrant communities that have emerged in and around major cities
in developing countries. With respect to these communities, there
is no conflict between the person in possession and the person with
newly formalized title—they are one and the same. And as de Soto
15. See id. at 153–205.
16. BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY
AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 148–50 (2012); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Leaving the
Body of Property Law? Meltdowns, Land Rushes, and Failed Economic Development, in
HERNANDO DE SOTO AND PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 90–91 (B. Barros ed., 2010); John
Gravois, The De Soto Delusion, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/01/the_de_soto_delusion.html.
17. Deininger & Feder, supra note 4; see also NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY
278 (2008) (citing evidence that only four percent of squatters given formalized title in Quilmes,
Argentina managed to secure a mortgage).
18. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World
Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1038–42 (2006).
19. Id. at 1042–45.
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points out, most of the countries where these migrant communities
are located have already established systems of land title registra-
tion and enforcement—which work tolerably well for the elite who
own and trade in conventional property rights.20
There is an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for
the failure of formalization to stimulate secured lending in migrant
communities. Once we understand the distinction between posses-
sion and ownership, and the information-cost reasons for making
possession the general default principle in allocating resources, the
failure of formalization to induce secured lending should not be
surprising. The most general explanation is that the rights in ques-
tion are not sufficiently valuable to justify the higher information
costs associated with determining ownership of property. More
specifically, the failure of these formalized rights to stimulate se-
cured lending can be pinpointed to two factors.
First, a bank or other lender will enter into a secured loan only if
the expected return on the loan exceeds the costs of establishing
that the borrower has the relevant ownership rights to provide col-
lateral for the loan. From de Soto’s account of migrant communities,
it seems clear that the original value of the individual formalized
rights—to a small plot of land improved by a homemade shack for
example—will be small. Thus, at least initially, lenders may con-
clude that the return on entering into a secured loan will be too
small to justify the costs of verifying title to the collateral.
Let me elaborate. One can characterize the decision by a bank or
other lender to engage in secured lending with a simple formula.
The bank makes money by charging interest on loans that is higher
than its cost of capital. This is known as the interest rate spread.
The amount of money the bank will make on any particular loan is
a function of the spread times the principal value of the loan. Sup-
pose the spread is two percent and the principal value of the loan is
ten thousand dollars. The expected return is .02 times $10,000 or
$2,000. (I ignore the complication of discounting the expected return
over time and so forth.) In deciding whether to enter into the loan,
the bank will compare this expected return to various costs it will
incur in making the loan, such as origination costs, collection costs,
20. See DE SOTO, MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 73–74, 153.
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the risk of loss on default, and so forth. For present purposes, I will
focus on only one cost—the cost of doing a title search.
Suppose, to continue my hypothetical, the cost of a title search is
three thousand dollars. On this assumption, the loan, which will
generate expected revenue of two thousand dollars, will not be made.
Clearly this will be true if the bank bears the cost of verifying title
to the collateral. It is also not likely to be made if the bank shifts the
cost of verifying title to the collateral onto the borrower, through an
origination fee. The borrower would have to earn a very high rate of
return on the borrowed funds, above and beyond the interest pay-
ments on the loan, in order to cover the cost of the title search,
which I have posited to be three thousand dollars.
The lesson we derive from this simple example is that the deci-
sion to engage in secured lending is critically dependent on the
principal value of the loan. At a minimum, the principal value of the
loan must be large enough to exceed the costs of a title search and
the other costs of originating and managing the loan. If the cost of
a title search is positive, as it always will be, then the principal value
of the loan must be large enough to cover the title search costs.
Neither the bank nor the owners of newly formalized plots of land
who are the target of the formalization reform effort will be interested
in participating in securing lending if the principal value of the loan
is too small to cover the costs of verifying title to the collateral.
Some indirect confirmation of this observation is provided by
looking at a relatively unusual market for secured lending in the
United States—where the collateral takes the form of a lease. There
is no conceptual reason why a tenant cannot use her lease as collat-
eral for a loan. Obviously this is uncommon. I have never heard of
a residential tenant with a year-to-year lease securing a loan by
posting the tenancy as collateral. There are examples of leases being
used as collateral in the commercial lending context. Grocery stores,
for example, commonly enter into twenty to twenty-five-year leases
for the buildings in which they operate, and they have used these
leases as collateral for securing revolving lines of credit. Typically,
multiple leases are bundled together in a single package of collat-
eral. This makes sense—the more leases that are bundled, the
larger the collateral and the bigger the principal amount of the loan.
Owners of cooperative apartments are another example. Persons
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who buy cooperative apartments today can obtain mortgages to
purchase their apartment unit. Technically the assets that secure
the mortgage are the shares the unit owner holds in the cooperative
corporation. But the only reason the shares have any economic value
is because they come with a long-term lease of a particular apart-
ment unit, which is often worth one million dollars or more in a
market like New York City.21
These examples of leasehold mortgages show that secured lending
is nonexistent when the lease has a relatively small value, as would
be the case for a short-term residential lease. When the value of the
leasehold is large, either because it is a major commercial lease or
because it is a very long-term residential lease, we see that secured
lending, like magic, appears. I take this as confirmation that se-
cured lending is feasible only when the value of the collateral, and
hence the principal amount of the loan, is sufficiently large to justify
the costs of performing a title search and the other costs associated
with originating and managing the loan.
Second, secured lending works only if there is a credible threat by
the lender to foreclose on the collateral if the loan is in default. This
is not because lenders have any desire to take possession of the col-
lateral. Taking possession of the collateral is usually a losing propo-
sition for the lender.22 The reason lenders prefer to make loans secured
by collateral is that this gives them enhanced leverage to persuade
borrowers to continue making payments on the loan. Such leverage
will exist only if the lender has a credible threat to foreclose and
take possession of the collateral. And the threat to foreclose will be
credible only if the costs of foreclosure process are less than the
value the collateral will obtain on a sale once it is seized.23
Foreclosure of real estate in the United States is expensive, often
entailing a judicial hearing and, if the mortgagor does not volun-
tarily relinquish possession, an eviction procedure carried out by the
sheriff’s office. Because of various statutory redemption rights, foreclo-
sure is also value destroying—reducing the price the foreclosed-upon
21. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An
Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 281 (2007).
22. Ronald Mann, The Concept of Collateral, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
FINANCE (2017).
23. By “costs of the foreclosure process” I refer to the costs of gaining possession of the
collateral and selling it to recover some or all of the principal value of the loan.
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property can obtain in a sale by as much as forty percent.24 Foreclo-
sure on delinquent auto loans—it’s called repossession in this
context—is less costly. Still, it entails using “repo” men to find the
vehicle and tow it away in the dead of night, which can lead to
conflict or litigation.
In contrast, when we consider a third type of secured lending, the
costs of foreclosure are very small. Pawnshops loan money to indi-
viduals secured by collateral in the form of personal property, like
jewelry, musical instruments, guns, and so forth. The unique aspect
of pawnshops is that possession of the collateral is transferred to the
shop for the duration of the loan. There are a variety of explanations
for this practice, but surely one is that the costs of foreclosure are
dramatically reduced when the collateral is already in the hands of
the lender. If the borrower defaults, the pawnshop just takes the
collateral off the shelf and sells it. If the collateral remains with the
borrower, it would be prohibitively expensive, relative to the value
of the collateral, to hire a repo man to seize possession of the guitar or
engagement ring that secures the loan, even assuming the repo man
could gain entrance to the dwelling where these objects are kept.
We can again see that the value of the collateral is critical by
comparing the practice of pawnshop lending to other forms of se-
cured lending using personal property as collateral. Various forms
of personal property, such as autos, airplanes, and boats, serve as
collateral for secured loans. Like guitars and engagement rings, and
unlike land, they are moveable and concealable. Yet for these high-
valued forms of personal property, the collateral stays with the
borrower. The costs of repossession are sufficiently low, relative to
the value of the collateral, to make this feasible. The fact that pawn-
shops insist on a transfer of possession to the lender as a condition
for making the loan reflects the relatively high costs of foreclosure
relative to the value of the collateral. So the historical experience of
pawnshops provides some confirmation that low-valued collateral
will not support a robust system of secured lending—unless posses-
sion of the collateral is transferred to the lender before the loan is
made. And of course, in the case of the plots of land and the fixtures
described by de Soto, transfer of possession to the lender in advance
24. Mann, supra note 22 (citing statistics on commercial real estate loans indicating that “a
typical foreclosure sale results in a loss to the lender of about 40% of its original loan amount”).
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of the loan would defeat the very purpose of generating a market in
secured credit to jump start economic growth.
There is another, cultural reason why the threat of foreclosure is
unlikely to be credible with respect to newly formalized land. Fore-
closure entails a willingness to allow ownership rights to trump
possessory rights. If the dominant ethos of the squatter community
is possession, it may be difficult to accept the idea that a lender can
oust a possessor for nonpayment of a loan. There is a parallel here
to the behavior of the so-called claims associations in the United
States in the nineteenth century, which refused to allow squatters
to be displaced by persons who had purchased land in formal land
sales.25 Over time, it is reasonable to think that the ethos of the
squatter community will give way to a sensibility that recognizes
the necessity of periodic foreclosures of debtors who, for whatever
reasons, cannot repay the loan. But it is likely to take some time and
experience with the process of secured lending and periodic foreclo-
sure to develop such an ethos.
III. OTHER PATHS
I am highly sympathetic to the basic reform strategy outlined by
de Soto, which is to bring migrant communities into the world of
modern capitalism by enhancing the security of their rights to ma-
terial possessions, and giving them access to credit markets so that
they can engage in small scale entrepreneurial enterprises. If for-
malization of possessory rights does not work to yield these results,
are there other ideas that might work better?
Perhaps the most widespread proposal for creating enhanced op-
portunities for access to capital among the world’s poor goes by the
name microfinance. Although there are many variations, the root
idea is to establish nonprofit entities, which obtain funding from
developed countries or international organizations and then make
small unsecured loans to individuals in developing countries for
purposes of improving land, starting businesses, and so forth.26 These
have achieved mixed success. The literature about the promise and
25. DE SOTO, MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 108–48.
26. See generally Katherine Hunt, The Law and Economics of Microfinance, 33 J. L. &
COM. 1 (2014).
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perils of microfinance is vast. There have been some ingenious pro-
posals for using social pressure to encourage repayment of loans.
But because these proposals generally do not entail any modification
of property institutions, I have little to say about them.
An alternative that would entail modification of property institu-
tions would be to pursue a formalization strategy, along the lines
proposed by de Soto, but on a much more modest basis. Perhaps the
central flaw in de Soto’s formalization project is that it seeks to leap
from possessory rights to property rights in one large bound. A more
promising approach might be to start more modestly with formaliza-
tion of possessory rights, rather than trying to transform possessory
rights into property rights. De Soto himself has shown that in some
of the shantytowns and favelas he describes, the possessors post
signs on their holdings attesting to their possessory rights. He has
also developed evidence that possessory rights are transferred within
these communities.27
This suggests that a more modest reform, with arguably greater
prospect of success, would be to create a system of documentary
proof of possession. The possessors of small plots of land and fixtures
would be given official pieces of paper describing and attesting to
their possession of a particular plot of land and associated fixtures.
Persons having the relevant certificate of possession could call on
the State to repel trespassers. Transfers of the certificates would
signify a transfer of possession. The State of Minnesota has adopted
a program of certificates of possessory title which could serve as a
potential model for such a reform.28
Legalization of possessory rights in this fashion should enhance
the security of these claims by allowing disputes over possession to
be resolved through a legal process rather than relying solely on
self-help or social pressure. Among other benefits, this would allow
household members to leave the family plot during the day to seek
employment, rather than require at least one member to remain on
the premises to stand guard against usurpers.29 It would also facili-
tate the transfer of possessory rights from one claimant to another.
27. See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 13, at 25–26.
28. Kimball Foster, Certificates of Possessory Title: A Sensible Addition to Minnesota’s
Successful Torrens System, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 112 (2013).
29. See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru,
122 Q.J. ECON. 1561 (2007).
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One could envision such a system of formalized possessory rights
evolving into the basis for secured lending, at least on a neighborhood
level. Perhaps over time it would evolve into something like full-blown
property. At least a Humean can imagine that this would be possible.
Another potential reform would be to encourage the development
of firms devoted to compiling credit scores of individuals who partic-
ipate in the informal economies of migrant communities. Histori-
cally, the primary forms of personal lending were based either on
the reputation of the borrower as known to the lender or on the
posting of collateral to secure the loan. Modern economies (like the
United States) have developed a third form: what can be called
algorithmic lending. The basic idea here is to gather data on the
past behavior of the potential borrower and process it through an
algorithm that predicts the probability of repayment of a loan. The
most familiar example is credit card borrowing, where the issuance
of the card and determination of the credit line is based on an algo-
rithmic analysis of the borrower’s historical pattern of behavior in
participating in financial transactions, most prominently as distilled
through a so-called credit score. Similar techniques are widely used
in assessing applicants for purchase money loans for autos, homes,
and the like. Recent studies suggest that even peer-to-peer lending,
which was originally conceived as an alternative form of finance
that would break free of conventional forms of lending, has largely
been subsumed by institutions that rely heavily on credit scores and
algorithmic analysis of borrower characteristics.30
All of which suggests that developing economies might do much
to enhance access to finance capital by promoting (or even subsidiz-
ing) the emergence of firms devoted to compiling the data needed to
develop algorithmic lending. The development of such an industry
requires that there be some method of compiling information about
the past behavior of the borrower in paying off various obligations,
which in turn can be synthesized into a credit score. If a person has
a history of consistent repayment of obligations, their credit score
goes up, resulting in greater access to credit from various sources.
The system works only if information can be shared among lenders
about the past performance of borrowers, which requires some
30. Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer
Lending and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603 (2015).
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assurance of confidentiality. This in turn requires the enactment
and enforcement of appropriate legislation allowing sharing of infor-
mation while protecting against unauthorized disclosure. If appro-
priate legislation providing these assurances can be adopted, the
information can be distributed digitally, at much lower cost than is
associated with verifying ownership of collateral and engaging in
the process of foreclosure.
The trick in extending algorithmic lending to the urban poor in
developing countries lies in getting them into the system of making
purchases using credit. Obviously, a legal infrastructure must be in
place, which permits the assembly of information about individual
behavior with respect to credit along with appropriate assurances
of confidentiality. If this is established, then perhaps the poor could
start with simple debit cards, based on prepaid credit balances.
Once individuals have established a history of proper usage of such
debit cards, banks might be willing to offer them credit cards with
small lines of credit. Successful management of the credit card would
lead to larger and larger credit lines, to the point where the bor-
rower would be able to finance a small shop or other entrepreneurial
venture. None of this will be easy for developing countries to achieve.
But the information-cost demands should be much lower than that
associated with secured lending, at least when the value of the
collateral is relatively small relative to the value of the loan.
CONCLUSION
Hernando de Soto’s pioneering work on migrant communities in
developing countries provides important insights into the relation-
ship between possession and ownership. His studies help us see that
an extensive system of allocating resources by possession occurs on
a widespread basis in contexts where possessory rights cannot be
regarded as proxies for ownership. His advocacy of formalization of
possessory rights into ownership, in order to jump-start secured lend-
ing to the individuals living in these migrant communities, has largely
failed. Once we understand that the roots of this failure lie in the
very high information costs associated with systems of ownership,
we are in a better position to identify alternative strategies for mak-
ing capital more widely available to persons in these communities.

FREEDOM IN PROPERTY: FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO
LAND REFORM IN JAMAICA
JANET BUSH HANDY*
INTRODUCTION
The Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference provides a unique
opportunity for members of the practicing bar and academia to ex-
plore recent developments in the laws that affect property rights. In
2016, this opportunity was expanded to consider international themes
with the joint sponsorship of William & Mary Law School and the
Grotius Centre of International Legal Studies at the Thirteenth
Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the Peace
Palace in The Hague. The recent law developments herein addressed
concern the continuing evolution of land reforms in Jamaica and the
lessons that they provide about the continuing importance of the
work of this year’s Brigham-Kanner Prize winner, Hernando de
Soto. This essay attempts to place those land reform efforts in a
historical context. A short essay can only skim the surface of a his-
tory of people who have faced untold challenges, but it is offered as
a tribute to those who end their national pledge with an invocation
of hope, asking that Jamaica may “increase in beauty, fellowship and
prosperity, and play her part in advancing the welfare of the whole
human race.”1
* Deputy Counsel to State Highway Administration, Assistant Attorney General, Mary-
land Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland. I am grateful to the Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference for the invitation to share reflections on the connection
of property rights and freedom in the International City of Peace and Justice, The Hague. The
continued strength of our property rights as Americans is dependent upon our commitment
to the ideals that resulted in our Bill of Rights. Those ideals must be taught; thank you to
those who have dedicated their careers to teaching our history. Those ideals must be pro-
tected; thank you to those who have dedicated their legal careers to upholding our Constitution.
Those ideals must be lived; thank you to my husband, Robert A. Handy, Ed. D., and my
children, Lynn Handy, Gregory Handy, and Beth Handy, who live their lives with dedication
to the ideals of freedom, liberty, and justice for all.
1. The Jamaican National Pledge in its entirety:
Before God and all mankind, I pledge the love and loyalty of my heart, the wis-
dom and courage of my mind, the strength and vigour of my body in the service
of my fellow citizens; I promise to stand up for Justice, Brotherhood and Peace,
to work diligently and creatively, to think generously and honestly, so that
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***
In August 2016, a celebration was held on the lawns of Jamaica
House, Saint Andrews in honor of two hundred Jamaicans being pre-
sented with titles to land under a program administered by the Land
Administration and Management Programme and the Development
Bank of Jamaica.2 Except for the lack of formal title, the lands being
conveyed were lands which “belonged” to these long-term residents
of the land. Long before the titles were delivered, the homes and
yards were distinguished by their individually selected combinations
of fruit trees and other expressions of the families within. Even
strangers walking in their neighborhoods would have been able to
distinguish the boundaries of the different home parcels.
This ability to identify the boundaries of homesites in areas where
those sites were not delineated in formal land registries is a world-
wide phenomenon. The pioneering economist, Hernando de Soto,
illustrates this reality by his much repeated story of how he was
able to distinguish the property boundaries during a walk in Bali,
because each time he “crossed from one farm to another, a different
dog barked.”3 If in July of 2016, de Soto had walked past the homes
of these two hundred Jamaican citizens, he would have recognized
that Jamaica, like Bali, was “one of the most beautiful places on
earth” and that even without titles, the people of both islands had
created spaces which were uniquely their own, which even the
neighborhood dogs could differentiate.4 Until the title celebration,
these two hundred people of Jamaica had operated with only loose
extralegal property arrangements. Under such loose controls, the
Jamaica may, under God, increase in beauty, fellowship and prosperity, and play
her part in advancing the welfare of the whole human race.
National Pledge, Anthem & Pledge, JAM. INFO. SERV., http://jis.gov.jm/information/anthem
-pledge/ (last visited July 10, 2017).
2. Holness Tells Land Title Owners to Build ‘Bigger Houses,’ JAM. GLEANER (Aug. 24,
2016), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20160824/holness-tells-land-title-owners
-build-bigger-houses [hereinafter Bigger Houses].
3. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 163 (2000).
4. Hernando de Soto, Listening to the Barking Dogs: Property Law Against Poverty in the
Non-West, CATO INST. (originally appearing in Hernando de Soto, Listening to the Barking
Dogs: Property Law Against Poverty in the Non-West, 41 FOCAAL-EUROPEAN J. OF ANTHRO-
POLOGY (2002)), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/listening-barking-dogs-prop
erty-law-against-poverty-nonwest1.
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land was an asset without “the fungibility, bureaucratic machinery
and network required to produce capital.”5
During the celebration, Prime Minister Andrew Holness of Ja-
maica recognized the limitations of this loose extralegal system when
he proclaimed:
Your title is an asset that can be used to secure your future, and
that of your children . . . . In fact, it (land title) changes the
whole profile of a family and provides a foundation on which to
build dreams and goals of a better, more prosperous life. Your
title can be used as collateral for a loan, it can be used in helping
you to start a business . . .
The Prime Minister then encouraged the participants, “build a
house—build a bigger house.”6
This celebration of two hundred titles was a recognition that
these two hundred properties were an achievement, but they were
only a miniscule potion of Jamaica’s land ownership issues.
This has resulted at times, in the lack of security with respect to
tenure, low productivity, inability to access credit, abandonment
and illegal sale/mortgage of whole or part of the holdings in sev-
eral instances. It is estimated that there are as many as 50,000
parcels of land in Housing Schemes and Land Settlements for
which titles have not been issued.7
Jamaica’s current attempts at land reform began in 2000 with the
creation of the National Land Agency through the Land Administra-
tion and Management Programme (“LAMP”). LAMP’s objective was
to streamline the administration and management of land and to
create a land-titling system. A key component of this program was
the formation of adjudication committees created for the resolution
5. DE SOTO, supra note 3, at 182.
6. Bigger Houses, supra note 2.
7. Jacqueline daCosta, Land Policy, Administration and Management: Case Study Jamaica,
Conference Paper at the Learning Workshop on Land Policy, Administration and Manage-
ment in the English Speaking Caribbean 21 (Mar. 19–21, 2003), http://www.terrainstitute.org
/carib_workshop/pdf/jamaicaces.pdf (supported in part by the Inter-American Development
Bank (“IDB”); the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”); the Department for
International Development (“DFID”); and the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine
Resources, Government of Trinidad and Tobago).
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of disputes. Despite the formation of these committees, for the next
decade there were numerous disputes, and some even became vio-
lent. Most people were still reluctant to participate.8
In 2010, LAMP II was implemented to improve the time frame in
which titles can be perfected from several years to six months, to
reduce the cost, and to establish registries to prevent fraud by pro-
viding notification when someone is placing a claim on property that
is possessed by someone else.9 These changes reflect efforts to reform
the existing law to better mirror the unique culture and relationship
to the land.
The titles for Jamaica’s beautiful resort areas and the best agri-
cultural land can be traced from the colonial planters to today’s
landholders, including international corporations. Those titles can
be traced through sales, inheritances, and other formal property
transfers, which when challenged could be defended through litiga-
tion pursuant to traditional English concepts of land ownership.
Apart from these large holdings, much of the land in Jamaica is with-
out the protection of legal title, being held as “family land” or “Treaty
Lands”—two distinct categories of land held in common.10
Even without titles, certain families have lived and farmed for
generations on their family land or Treaty Lands. The Jamaican
immigrants who now reside around the world have maintained their
ties to this land, usually by sending remittances to ensure that the
land is protected and maintained for their families.11
While the government sees the land title process as a way to im-
prove life for Jamaican people, many whose lands were held collec-
tively by their family consider the process to be a way to foster the
8. Munsung Koh and Garfield Knight, LAMP II: A Land Registration in Jamaica, Paper
at the Twenty-fifth FIG Congress: Engaging the Challenges—Enhancing the Relevance
(June 17, 2014), https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2014/papers/ts
01c/TS01C_koh_7075.pdf.
9. Garfield Myers, LAMP Faster, Cheaper Means of Getting Titles, JAM. OBSERVER, July 25,
2010, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/LAMP-faster,-cheaper-means-of-getting-titles.
10. Jean Besson, History, Land and Culture in the English-Speaking Caribbean, Keynote
Paper, Conference on Land Policy, Administration and Management for the English-Speaking
Caribbean, held by the Land Tenure Ctr., Univ. of London & Dev. Alternatives, Inc. 15–16
(April 24, 2003), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadc122.pdf.
11. Jean Besson, Maroons, Free Villagers and ‘Squatters’ in the Development of Inde-
pendent Jamaica, Conference Paper at Fifty Years of Jamaican Independence: Developments
and Impacts, held by the Inst. for the Study of the Americas, Univ. of London (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/6506/1/Jamaica%2050th%20FINAL%20VERSION%20for%20ISA%
20Besson.pdf.
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breaking of family ties to the land and to each other. In undertaking
the current adjustments to the initial efforts of land reform, the
Jamaican people are attempting to find ways to allow a new system
of titles to recognize these collective forms of ownership. A first step
in this process is to recognize the history of how these collective
ownerships developed. While the history of each form of title is vital
to the current process, the history of the Treaty Lands provides im-
portant insights into how the concepts of freedom and property
ownership reflected in the Magna Carta and the Charter of the
Forest have developed into a framework unique to Jamaica.
The Spanish were the first European culture to exert dominion
over the island of Jamaica. The Spanish initially attempted to utilize
indigenous people as forced laborers. When Christopher Columbus
visited the island in 1494, native peoples, with both Arawak and
Tainos heritage, populated the island. It is estimated that there
may have been as many as five hundred thousand to six hundred
thousand living on the island.12 Over the next one hundred and fifty
years, the Arawaks were decimated; many died as a result of the
Spanish efforts to enslave the native peoples, and survivors were
killed by European diseases.13
As the numbers of Arawaks diminished, the Spanish began to en-
slave people in West Africa to be imported for slave labor on Jamaica.
It is important to acknowledge “that no African slaves were removed
from Africa, only African people were removed. They were black-
smiths, farmers, fishers, priests, members of royal families, musicians,
soldiers, and traders. They were captured against their wills and
then enslaved in the Caribbean and Americas.”14 Some of these peo-
ple were able to escape the brutal life of slavery by fleeing to the
remote mountains and establishing communities. The Spanish re-
ferred to these people as cimarrones.15
12. TAINO: PRE-COLUMBIAN ART AND CULTURE FROM THE CARIBBEAN (Fatima Bercht et al.
eds., 1997).
13. History of Jamaica, EMBASSY OF JAM.: WASH, D.C., http://embassyofjamaica.org/ABOUT
history.htm (last visited July 10, 2017).
14. Molefi Kete Asante, The Ideology of Racial Hiearchy [sic] and the Construction of the
European Slave Trade (May 14, 2009), http://www.asante.net/articles/14/the-ideology-of-racial
-hiearchy-and-the-construction-of-the-european-slave-trade/ (first delivered in Lisbon, Portugal
on December, 1998 at an international conference sponsored by UNESCO).
15. ALVIN O. THOMPSON, FLIGHT TO FREEDOM: AFRICAN RUNAWAYS AND MAROONS IN THE
AMERICAS 47–48 (2006) (“The Spanish word cimarrón, from which the English term Maroon
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In 1655, an English force led by Admiral William Penn and Gen-
eral Robert Venables began a conquest of Jamaica. “[F]ollowing the
British invasion of the island, Jamaica witnessed a combination of
Spanish and African guerrilla forces fighting to expel the invaders.
However, the Blacks were not fighting for the Spanish cause; rather,
they were fighting to assert and maintain their independence from
the British.”16 As the Spaniards realized that their defeat was immi-
nent, they escaped to Cuba, abandoning their property and leaving
behind most of the enslaved people. Many of these remaining people
joined the previously established cimarrone communities as they
fled the victorious English taking control of the coastal settlements
and towns. Ultimately, the name of these people who had escaped
their bondage to live in the mountains of Jamaica evolved from
cimarrone to Maroons.17
After the Spanish were vanquished, English people began to
arrive as settlers. In accordance with English law, the settlers con-
sidered all of Jamaica to be English land and as such was owned by
the Crown. In order to promote the settlement of the remote island,
the Crown soon began to identify portions of land which were sold.
“The transplantation of such English land law to the British West
Indies not only served as an instrument of domination and control
but also defined the identity of the colonists as ‘English’ and, after
1707, as ‘British.’”18 As each area was apportioned and sold, the
English title system was imposed, allowing the tracking of titles
through sales and other legal exchanges. The Maroons ignored this
process and lived in remote areas of the island practicing suste-
nance farming and hunting.
is derived, is translated in the Collins Spanish Dictionary as ‘wild’, ‘rough’, ‘uncouth’, and its
historical origin is given (wrongly) as ‘negro—(Hist) runaway slave, fugitive slave’. Likewise,
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (third edition) defines Maroon as ‘wild, untamed run-
away slave’.”). See also Kathleen Wilson, The Performance of Freedom: Maroons and the
Colonial Order in Eighteenth-Century Jamaica and the Atlantic Sound, 66 WM. & MARY Q.
45, 50 (2009).
16. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at 82 (citation omitted).
17. The term “Maroon” is used in this article to refer specifically to the people of the
specific Jamaican communities, herein discussed, even though “[m]aroonage (escaping slavery
and establishing autonomous maroon communities, sometimes in association with slave
revolts) typified the entire span of New World slavery and was widespread throughout African
America.” Besson, supra note 10, at 6.
18. Id.
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The English renewed the importation of slaves for work on the
newly acquired land. By the late 1600s the economy was transition-
ing from the original small farms to rapidly expanding plantations.
These plantations were dependent on the work of a continually
growing number of enslaved workers. These workers were the sur-
vivors of the Middle Passage, who arrived in Jamaica after being
captured in Africa and “packed aboard the slave ships, in spaces not
much bigger than coffins, chained together in the dark, wet slime of
the ship’s bottom, chocking in the stench of their own excrement.”19
The enslaved workers were a key component in the colonial Eng-
lishmen’s development of the lands of Jamaica. During that process
of development, the English colonial people maintained their con-
nections to England and their allegiance to their king. In the laws
passed by the legislature of Jamaica and their entreaties to the Crown,
these English colonial people recognized the importance of their con-
trol of the land and objected to the Crown’s strengthening of its rights
to the lands of the intestate as a “manifest violation of their rights
as Englishmen, depriving them of so essential a part of their liber-
ties.”20 Although they were in Jamaica, they could not “forget that we
are Englishmen, and the subjects of our good and gracious prince,”
thereby claiming the liberties granted by the Magna Carta.21
These loyal subjects used the same arguments made in defending
their ownership of land in making their claims to “ownership” of the
enslaved laborers so vital to the plantation economy. Most of the
commonwealth countries used the property rights of the Magna
Carta to justify the enslavement of human beings. “One of the fun-
damental principles of British colonial slave laws was that slaves
were regarded as chattels. They could be bought, sold, mortgaged,
bequeathed, or liable to be impounded in satisfaction of a debt. This
was provided in the laws of the West Indies and in English statu-
tory law.”22
The characterization of enslaved people as chattel proved prob-
lematic in Jamaica, as chattel could be easily separated from the
19. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (2003).
20. Lee B. Wilson, A “Manifest Violation” of the Rights of Englishmen: Rights Talk and the
Law of Property in Early Eighteenth-Century Jamaica, 33 L. & Hist. Rev. 543 (2015).
21. Id. at 565.
22. Colin Bobb-Semple, English Common Law, Slavery, and Human Rights, 13 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 659, 662 (2007).
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land, and plantations without the enslaved workforces were worth-
less. To promote the connection of the plantation with those who
were forced to work there, the early planters of Jamaica character-
ized the enslaved people not as chattel but as “real property.” By law
in 1696, they created a legal construct to define these men, women,
and children as subject to the same rules of ownership as land,
including escheat.23
By 1722, the plantation economy was entrenched, and the popula-
tion consisted of eleven slaves for each white colonist.24 The Ma-
roons lived separately from this system, but their interaction with
the enslaved population terrified the English living on Jamaica. The
English reported that Maroons were infesting the roads to the east
and cutting off communications, enticing slaves to give them food
and shelter, and infiltrating the Sunday markets to buy provisions
and gunpowder. By the 1730s,
as the winds of slave revolt blew elsewhere in the Caribbean and
desertions, military defeat, and rumors of Cuban aid to the rebels
punctuated British efforts to stamp out their “Dangerous Spirit
of Liberty,” local governors resorted to sending frantic requests
for troops to the king, claiming that the “Negroes’ rebellion” had
proved impossible to quell: “wee [sic] are not in a condition to
defend ourselves, the teror [sic] of them [the Maroons] spreads
itself everywhere and the ravages and barbarities they commit,
have determin’d [sic] several planters to abandon their settle-
ments.” . . . Maroons engaged the British “in continuall [sic] and
open war . . . . Confident in their great Number and elated their
not only resisting but even worsting us they kept no bounds.”25
Despite increasing numbers of troops sent from England, the
situation escalated and the English waged war against the Maroons
for five years. The Maroons utilized the mountainous areas of Ja-
maica to fight from unseen locations, perfecting the art of the am-
bush (before the word was even known). “After such assaults, Ma-
roon men and women carried off slaves, moveable livestock, ammu-
nition, and people and left behind the carcasses of cattle and pigs,
23. Lee B. Wilson, supra note 20, at 568.
24. Id. at 568.
25. Kathleen Wilson, supra note 15, at 56.
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fired sugar mills, and fields.”26 Finally, the English realized that
they could not defeat the Maroons, who had perfected the ambush
technique to such an extent that survivors complained they never
saw their attackers.
In the end the Maroons proved impossible to quell militarily.
Philip Thicknesse’s opinion was widely shared: “all the regular
troops in Europe, could not have conquered the wild Negroes, by
force of arms; and if . . . not wisely given . . . what they con-
tended for, Liberty, they would, in all probability have been, at
this day, masters of the whole country.”27
Recognizing the difficulties of continued warfare, negotiations com-
menced and the representatives of the Crown met with the repre-
sentatives of two sets of Maroons. Like the barons at Runnymede,28
the Maroons met the Crown’s representatives in a forest and de-
manded that their rights be recognized. The Maroons did not have the
written heritage that the barons brought to their field. Still they were
able to negotiate treaties that recognized the same concepts of free-
doms that were fundamental to the Magna Carta. These negotiations
were compelled as a result of the military success of the two Maroon
Groups, the Leeward Maroons led by Cudjoe and the Winward
Maroons led by Grandy Nanny.29
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id.
28. “The terms of the Magna Carta were negotiated on or near the battlefront during a
cessation in an English civil war between King John and rebellious barons. The barons had
been driven to the breaking point by John’s abusive practices and similar actions by his
predecessors.” Vincent R. Johnson, The Ancient Magna Carta and the Modern Rule of Law,
1215–2015, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4 (2015).
As one Maroon captain politely explained to planter J. B. Moreton in the 1780s,
“king Cudjo . . . very candidly told me, that when the island was taken by the
Spaniards, his ancestors would not surrender themselves, but resolved to be
free, or perish; and held out so long in the woods, that having killed several of
the English, and tired the rest, a treaty of peace was concluded upon; since
which time they have been loyal subjects.”
Kathleen Wilson, supra note 15, at 57.
29. On March 31, 1982 the Right Excellent Nanny of the Maroons was conferred the Order
of the National Hero as per Government Notice 23 Jamaica Gazette . . . .” Nanny of the Maroons,
JAM. INFO. SERV., http://jis.gov.jm/heroes/nanny-of-the-maroons/ (last visited July 10, 2017).
Her picture is part of the Jamaican five-hundred-dollar note.
National heroine, Nanny, stands out in history as the only female among
Jamaica’s national heroes. She was a leader of the Maroons at the beginning of
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At the conclusion of negotiations, a treaty with the Leeward
Maroons in 1738 and a treaty with the Windward Maroons in 1739
were consummated by blood oaths. The officer who signed one of the
treaties explained he was:
“obliged to tye myself up, by a Solemn Oath . . .” According to
later Maroons, this consisted of the White officer and the Ma-
roon chief mixing their blood with rum in a calabash, from which
they both then drank. The treaty thus became for Maroons a
“blood treaty” that could not be broken.30
Echoing the Magna Carta, the treaties included the following lan-
guage:
That the said Captain Cudjoe, the rest of his captains, adher-
ents, and men shall for ever hereafter [live] in a perfect state of
freedom and liberty . . . .
. . . That they shall enjoy and possess, for themselves and poster-
ity for ever, all the lands situate and lying between Trelawney
Town and the Cockpits . . . .
. . . That they shall have liberty to plant the said lands with
coffee, cocoa, ginger, tobacco, and cotton, and to breed cattle, hogs,
goats, or any other flock, and dispose of the produce or increase
of the said commodities to the inhabitants of this island.31
And echoing the terms of the Charter of the Forest, which history
has diminished by frequently overlooking its fundamental relation-
ship to the Magna Carta, the treaty provided “that they have liberty
to hunt where they shall think fit,” and when groups of hunters meet
“then the hogs [were] to be equally divided between both parties.”32
the 18th century and was known by both her people and the British settlers as
an outstanding military leader. She became a symbol of unity and strength for
her people during times of crisis and was particularly important to them in the
fierce fight with the British during the First Maroon War from 1720 to 1739.
The Rt. Excellent Nanny of the Maroons, Bank Notes, BANK OF JAM. http://www.boj.org.jm
/currency/currency_banknotes.php.
30. Barbara Klamon Kopytoff, Colonial Treaty as Sacred Charter of the Jamaican
Maroons, 26 ETHNOHISTORY 45, 49 (1979).
31. Articles of Pacification with the Maroons of Trelawney Town, Concluded March the
first, 1738, HARV. BUS. SCH., https://cyber.harvard.edu/eon/marroon/treaty.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Articles of Pacification].
32. Id.
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The treaty acknowledged the authority of the king over Jamaica,
and the Maroons agreed to join in the defense of Jamaica under
British leadership when needed.
The Magna Carta was revoked by the Pope within a year and
needed to be reestablished additional times,33 but despite the efforts
of the British to negate the treaties, the Maroons’ invocation of the
treaties has been continuous.
For the next one hundred years the treaties continued in force.
The treaties “enhanced the Maroons’ distinctive place for them in
the island society, thus emphasizing their uniqueness.”34 During
these years, the Jamaican plantation economy continued to be re-
liant upon the horrors of slavery. Always fearful of a slave revolt,
the English developed economic incentives for the armed Maroon
community to remain separated from the much larger number of
enslaved peoples. The English provided the Maroons with “a source
of income in tracking runaway slaves.”35 The treaties “transformed
rebels into subjects, allies of the plantation system, and turned
former allies—the enslaved—into enemies.”36 Even though a small
group of free former enslaved people lived away from plantations, the
only people of African descent whose ownership in land on Jamaica
was legally recognized were the Maroons. That legal recognition was
through the treaties. The land was held collectively by the Maroon
community and became known as the Treaty Lands.
When the emancipation process began in 1832, the planters
searched for ways to keep the formerly enslaved workers economi-
cally dependent on the plantations for work. The Jamaican Maroons
continued the collective ownership of their Treaty Lands, providing
a model for former slaves who began to assert claims to land,
through continued occupation of the lands adjacent to the planta-
tions formerly used by the slaves for sustenance.37
33. Paul Babie, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter: Two Stories of Property What Will
You Be Doing in 2017?, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1431, 1455 (2016).
34. Kopytoff, supra note 30, at 52.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Kathleen Wilson, supra note 15, at 61.
37. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory
of Black West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 27, 66 (2014) (“In 1672,
only seventeen years after the English takeover of Jamaica, an early English governor issued
a decree with the force of formal law: Any plantation owner who acquired a new plantation
was obligated to allocate individual plots of land to slaves so that the slaves could feed them-
selves and their families.”).
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While the communities recognized these lands as belonging to indi-
vidual families, there were no titles or legally enforceable ownership
rights. The first Jamaican people of African descent with individual
and legally enforceable titles were those who were able to purchase
land in defiance of the law, through the assistance of church groups.
In that way, “the missionaries (especially the Baptists) acted as covert
intermediaries on the land market between planters and ex-slaves,
establishing church-founded village communities.”38
The Jamaican planters saw any ownership of land by people of
African descent as a threat to their ability to continue the plantation
economy. Efforts to continue the forced work after emancipation,
through a system of forced “apprenticeship,” failed and was ended
early in 1838.39 While fighting with the former slaves over squatting
and avoidance of title law, they no longer needed the Maroons to play
their previous role as slave catchers. The separation of the Maroons
from the population of the newly freed slaves no longer served the
planters’ economic interests. After emancipation, the primary focus
was on a separation of classes based primarily on race. The enforce-
ment of this racial separation was undermined by the continuation
of a separate Maroon society, free from control of the British, with
a proud historic legacy revolving around the continued joint owner-
ship of the Maroon Treaty Lands.
Using the logic that would be repeated throughout the world, the
white establishment decided it was time to force the Jamaican
Maroons to integrate into the Jamaican society.
In 1842, “[t]he Maroons Land Allotment Act, as it was called, de-
clared all prior Maroon legislation, including the acts ratifying the
treaties, to be null and void . . . . and revested the Maroon common
lands in the Crown, to be reallocated to individual Maroons.”40
The Act in 1842 attempted to negate the Maroons’ identification
of themselves as a people defined by the rights granted in the trea-
ties finalized in the woods of Jamaica. It was this definition as a free
people that made the treaties so unacceptable to the establishment
that was struggling to establish a post-slavery society based upon
the supremacy of a white English class, which was far outnumbered
by the people of African descent. Officials justified the unilateral
38. Besson, supra note 10, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Kopytoff, supra note 30, at 53 (citation omitted).
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cancellation of the treaties explaining: “[A]n arrangement between
a Sovereign and one of his subjects in the shape of a treaty or ar-
rangement (like the celebrated Magna Carta between King John
and his Barons) is always liable to such changes as the Sovereign
Authority may hereafter from time to time enact . . . .”41
The planters failed to recognize that the revocation of the treaties
and the revesting of the Treaty Land to the king was no different
than an order divesting the English land owners of all of their
Jamaican land and revesting it to the king. It is unlikely than any
British subject would have presented a similarly cavalier response
to such an outrageous rejection of longstanding rights. Responding
to such an attack on the rights to their land, white Englishmen
would have set forth their grievances in writing.42
The lives of the Maroons did not afford the luxury necessary for
such learned missives. Instead their response to being advised of the
attempted revocation of what they had come to see as their sacred
charter was to refuse to believe that such an outrageous act could
have taken place. Hearing of the 1842 Act, Maroons protested, view-
ing the Act “with suspicion and dread, an attempt to injure them, by
breaking up their establishment, and taking from them the lands
which they hold by the pledge of a treaty, lands on which they were
born, and which contain the bones of their ancestors.”43 Instead of
following the typical colonial response of continuously pleading for
recognition of their rights as Englishman from Parliament or the
Crown, the Maroons took another approach to this Allotment Act;
they simply refused to comply.
The new law did not force the Maroons to go along with the
division of their lands; rather, it tried to elicit their cooperation.
Individual Maroons were themselves to arrange and pay for
surveys marking out their small plots. The division was begun,
but not completed, in three of the Maroon villages, Charlestown,
Moore Town, and Scotts Hill; in the fourth, Accompong Town, it
was not even begun. When the Accompong Maroons showed
themselves reluctant, and others had not completed the division,
the only action the Government took was repeatedly to extend
41. Id. at 54.
42. See, e.g., John Dickenson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, in A FARMER (1767).
43. Kopytoff, supra note 30, at 56.
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the deadline for complying and eventually to drop the matter
entirely. The land not allotted to individuals was then techni-
cally revested in the Crown, but the government did not provoke
the Maroons by attempting to interfere with their use of it; the
Maroons continued to live on the land undisturbed.44
Deadlines for the division of the Treaty Land into the forced
individual parcels passed without the Maroons taking any steps to
comply. Surveyors were chased away by people with machetes.
Resistance prevented attempts in 1862 and 1868 to force the cre-
ation of individual titles and the payment of taxes. In 1870 mules
were confiscated to cover unpaid taxes. Instead of a confrontation,
the Maroons allowed the mules to be confiscated. Within days, the
Maroons located the livestock and were met with no resistance when
they took the mules back to their Treaty Land.45
The refusal of the Maroons to acknowledge the validity of the
Allotment Act in 1842 and the continuation of that refusal through
the twentieth century is understandable as they have continued to
believe that “[t]he treaty is not just any treaty . . . It was signed in
human blood. To break that treaty they could not just tear up a
paper; they would have to tear up human bodies. It just could not
happen that the treaty could be broken.”46 Just as the Maroons have
resisted the efforts of the Allotment Act, today they resist any effort
of the land reform to divide the Treaty Lands.47
The 2012 celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of Jamaica’s in-
dependence began with a commemoration of the signing of the 1738
treaty in the Maroon area of Accompong Town, Saint Elizabeth.
Speaking on behalf of the government of Jamaica, Governor General
Sir Patrick Allen explained,
Cultural identity is essential for the peaceful cooperation of civil-
isations [sic]. When people have a strong sense of self-identity
through culture, they are more likely to interact peacefully with
other cultures, with respect for the diversity of value systems
and religious beliefs as well as the tangible aspects of culture.48
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id. at 57.
46. Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
47. See supra notes 2–3, 5–7, 11 and accompanying text.
48. Horace Hines, Maroon celebrations kick starts ‘Jamaica 50’, JAM. OBSERVER, (Jan. 19,
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the Maroon treaty was to acknowledge the unique importance of the
demand of a people to be recognized as free. It was also an acknowl-
edgement that the treaties retain their relevance in a free Jamaica.
The treaties would be historical relics if it were not for the contin-
ued recognition of the Treaty Lands. The land reform of 2000 did not
recognize that the treaties continued to define a free people and
their relationship to their communal property. Even though the
Treaty Lands are a small percentage of all of the land in Jamaica,
their importance to all of the people of Jamaica is greater than that
percentage. These lands are considered “sacred space and a cultural
site in the global networks of modern migrant maroons who return
to visit and participate in the annual Myal ritual.”49
Increasing the number of people of Jamaica having title to their
own land and reducing the number of squatters throughout the coun-
try are goals which can coexist with the continued communal owner-
ship of the Treaty Lands. The 2010 LAMP II land reform amendments
will strengthen the efforts to reach these goals while recognizing the
freedom inherent in the continued existence of the Treaty Lands.
The improvements reflected in these amendments seek to achieve
the results from land ownership that Hernando de Soto has recog-
nized. That impact can be measured by indicia of economic vitality.
The continued importance of the recognition of freedom inherent
in the Treaty Lands, however, cannot—and should not—be defined
in economic terms alone. The value of that freedom as being greater
than economic parameters was recognized by Governor General Sir
Patrick Allen’s commencement of the independence celebrations
with the recognition of the importance of the treaties. Just as the
celebration of fifty years of Jamaican independence included recog-
nition of the fundamental freedoms reflected in the treaties, the
eight hundredth anniversary of the Magna Carta should have in-
cluded respect for the fact that 278 years ago (thirty-eight years before
a group of affluent white Englishmen gathered in Philadelphia to
assert “certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
2012), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/westernnews/Maroon-celebrations-kick-starts--Ja
maica-50-_10588223.
49. Besson, supra note 10, at 19 (citation omitted).
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and the pursuit of Happiness”50—freedoms which Americans con-
tinue to trace to the Magna Carta) a group of Jamaicans of African
descent who had previously escaped the bonds of slavery asserted
their freedom to “live in a perfect state of freedom and liberty and
That they shall enjoy and possess, for themselves and posterity for
ever, all the lands situate and lying between Trelawney Town and
the Cockpits.”51
50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
51. Articles of Pacification, supra note 31.
PROPERTY’S ROLE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL
STRUCTURE OF NATIONS: THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN
EXPERIENCE
HEINZ KLUG*
INTRODUCTION
There is a dominant assumption that private property is a funda-
mental element in the protection of “all other rights” and serves as
a bulwark against oppressive government.1 Yet, we also recognize
that historically there has been an intimate relationship between
the power of the State and property, including private property. As
the prominent legal realist, Felix S. Cohen, famously argued in his
Dialogues on Private Property, private property may best be described
by the statement:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may
grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The State2
While this statement reflects a core element of the relationship
between property and the State, its focus is on the relations between
people over access to resources. It does not address how the relation-
ship between the State and citizens might be complicated by the
State’s endorsement of any particular claims to property. This essay
will reflect on the case of southern Africa—Botswana, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe in particular—to consider the relationship between the
State, property, and the fundamental political structure of nations.
Legitimacy—both democratic and constitutional—is a key re-
source for a State. If the relationship between king and subject was
* Evjue-Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Honorary Senior
Research Associate, University of the Witwatersrand Law School.
1. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (Kermit L. Hall ed., 3d ed. 1992).
2. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogues on Private Property, IX RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).
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mediated by the recognition of independent rights to property from
the Magna Carta onwards, the relationship between the State and
different forms of tenure in the post-colonial context—including
indigenous, communal, colonial, as well as private ownership and
a range of new forms—becomes crucial. In his seminal book, Citizen
and Subject, Mahmood Mamdani describes the link between land
rights and governance in colonial Africa and how the distinction
between different forms of property recognized by the State has
perpetuated colonial forms of domination in the post-colonial era.3
Mamdani argues that this distinction gives the colonial State a par-
ticular essence—one that lies in its institutional segregation, creat-
ing what he terms a “bifurcated state,” reflecting the dynamics of
direct and indirect rule.4 In southern Africa this bifurcation was
reflected initially in a distinction between private property and com-
munal land and later as a justification, during the colonial period,
for the exclusion of the African majority from political participation.5
While racist ideology would later come to predominate as a rationale
for political exclusion, it was the initial exclusion from political
citizenship, based on the holding of private property, that served as
a rationale for the bifurcated colonial State in the settler colonies of
the Cape and Southern Rhodesia.
The relationship between political structure and property is thus
embedded in the history of southern Africa. From the dawn of the
colonial era, a process of violent dispossession began. It took over two
hundred fifty years and culminated in South Africa with the adop-
tion of the Natives Land Act of 1913.6 That Act created a legal struc-
ture that sought both to legitimize the history of dispossession and
to prevent the African majority’s future access to land. While the
pattern of colonial settlement and the creation of African reservations
3. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
4. MAMDANI, supra note 3, at 16–18.
5. See SOL (SOLOMON TSHEKISHO) PLAATJE, NATIVE LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA (Longman
African Classics 1987) (1916); Sam Moyo, The Land Question in Southern Africa: A Com-
parative Review, in THE LAND QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (Lungisile Ntsebeza & Ruth Hall
eds., 2007); BETHUEL SETAI, THE MAKING OF POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998).
6. Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 (S. Afr.). See William Beinart & Peter Delius, The Native
Land Act of 1913: A Template But Not a Turning Point, in LAND DIVIDED, LAND RESTORED:
LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Ben Cousins & Cherryl Walker eds.,
Jacana Press 2015).
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(later called “bantustans” and “homelands” in apartheid South Africa)
was repeated in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia), the rela-
tionship between land and people in Botswana followed a slightly dif-
ferent pattern because the former British Protectorate, Bechuanaland,
was not a settler colony. As a result, most of the arable, rural land
in Botswana remained under the control of traditional authorities
until after its independence in 1966. At that time the new govern-
ment began to introduce a series of tenure reforms that both changed
the relationship between traditional authorities and land and ex-
panded the area of land available for private ownership. While there
are clear differences in these three cases, the fundamental distinction
lies in the level of dispossession that distinguishes the settler colonies
of South Africa and Rhodesia from the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
In order to explore the relationship between property and the
structure of the State, this essay will first address the connection
between land tenure, sovereignty, and legitimacy. This will be
followed by a brief outline of the general history of land reform
before focusing more directly on the relationship between land and
the State in southern Africa. Finally, the essay will look at tenure
diversity as a basis for restructuring the relationship between
democratic legitimacy and the post-colonial State in southern Africa.
I. LAND TENURE—SOVEREIGNTY, LAND, AND LEGITIMACY
While property extends far beyond the idea of land ownership,
and wealth is no longer based primarily on landholdings, the focus
of this essay will be on property in land. This requires recognition
of the fact that in southern Africa, at least, the manner in which
property in land is held varies greatly from fee simple tenure (the
notion of full, private ownership) to a range of other tenure forms
including common ownership, leasehold, public ownership, and vari-
ous indigenous forms of landholding and control. This diversity means
that it is important to understand that when considering rights to
land, we are really looking at a range of land tenure arrangements
and not simply full private ownership of property. In addition to the
variety of tenure forms, it is also necessary to recognize that many
of these forms may be held by completely different social and legal
entities including the state, legal entities such as corporations or
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trusts, private individuals, or even communities. While these differ-
ent forms of tenure are often determined by the history, location,
and use of the relevant parcels of land, another broad and signifi-
cant distinction is between rural and urban land. Although this is
an artificial distinction, it maps the forms of tenure onto geographic
and use distinctions that fundamentally impact the nature of tenure
at various times and locations. Furthermore, the distinction between
rural (or agricultural) land and urban (or housing) property is a dis-
tinction of fundamental importance to understanding the relation-
ship between the State and property in southern Africa.
The particular histories of different countries in the region and
the evolution of property relations within each State had significant
consequences for the nature of each State during the colonial period.
In the post-colonial era, it is the legacy of these histories—and how
they have shaped relations between public authorities and the gov-
erned—that is of central concern to the future of democracy in the
region. Democratic legitimacy is, in this sense, tied to the processes
of land reform and restitution that have been undertaken in the
post-colonial era. Where these processes have stalled, or failed, there
remains a sense of betrayal and a belief that the country still is not
fully decolonized or returned to the people. In other contexts the
types of land reform or the transfer of property through illegitimate
means has led to impoverishment and even international isolation.
In this sense, it may be argued that the political structure of the
post-colonial states of southern Africa have indeed been fundamen-
tally shaped by the nature of property relations. This is especially
so in the cases of Zimbabwe and South Africa, where the dispossession
of land was a central grievance of the liberation struggles. However,
it is also significant to the structure of post-colonial Botswana, where
the relationship between communal land and public authority re-
mained a key area of contestation in shaping local governments,
particularly in the rural villages of the country.
Dispossession and forced removals were central to the colonial and
apartheid projects. These processes were not only the basic means of
colonization but continued late into the twentieth century, as the dark-
est face of apartheid policy,7 justifying the international community’s
7. See COSMAS DESMOND, THE DISCARDED PEOPLE: AN ACCOUNT OF AFRICAN RESETTLE-
MENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (1971).
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designation of apartheid as a crime against humanity.8 It is this
legacy—in which millions were forced from their homes and declared
pariahs in the land of their birth;9 in which communities were dis-
mantled brick by brick and their members scattered across the most
barren wastelands of the country;10 in which people clung to the
land and refused to give up their claims11—that set the stage for the
recognition and shaping of property rights in post-apartheid South
Africa. In Zimbabwe, the liberation movement’s struggle was pre-
mised on the demand for land, and the history of post-independence
Zimbabwe has been shaped by shifting struggles between the gov-
ernment and white farmers that culminated, at the turn of the cen-
tury, in fast-track land reform and the subsequent collapse of the
economy. While dispossession of land was not a direct driver of the
relationship between the colonial State and the communities in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, the different Tswana chiefdoms that
made up the Protectorate all experienced conflict over land as a result
of state formation and colonial expansion throughout the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries.
In South Africa, the history of land dispossession, primarily of rural
land, now defines the relationship between the State and property. In
addition to the legacy of dispossession, the framework of land law in-
herited by post-apartheid South Africa has been characterized by a
number of elements which have undermined its legitimacy and have
had profound consequences for the establishment of a functional
system of land law. These elements include a hierarchy of land ten-
ures in which freehold title was privileged; the fragmentation of land
law in different parts of the country; the lack of an adequate system
for recording all land rights; the prevalence of bureaucratic discre-
tion over the land rights of many landholders (particularly in the
former Bantustans); and the need to establish new laws and forms
8. See generally G.A. Res. 2202 (XXI), The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 2396 (XXIII), The Policies of Apartheid of
the Government of South Africa (Dec. 2, 1968); G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), United Nations
General Assembly resolution: International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid (Nov. 30, 1973).
9. See PLAATJE, supra note 5, at 6.
10. See 1–5 SURPLUS PEOPLE PROJECT, FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE SURPLUS
PEOPLE PROJECT REPORTS (1983).
11. See TRANSVAAL RURAL ACTION COMMITTEE, A TOEHOLD ON THE LAND: LABOUR TENANCY
IN THE SOUTH EASTERN TRANSVAAL (1988).
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of regulation to address this history.12 In the period since 1994 there
have been major efforts to address this legacy. Although the degra-
dation and pain of the communities and individuals who had these
policies of dispossession and forced removal thrust upon them can
never be adequately documented, there is an intimate link between
these struggles and the shaping of property rights in South Africa
today.13 As a result, the legacy of dispossession and forced removals
has become as central to building justice in post-apartheid South
Africa as these processes once were in perpetuating the original
injustices of apartheid.
A. History of Land and Agrarian Reform
The history of agrarian reform in the twentieth century reveals
a range of circumstances giving rise to a diverse pattern of rural
struggles, government interventions, and legal reform. The most
far-reaching processes of land redistribution take place at moments
of extreme political change, whether in the context of violent revolu-
tions or post-war contexts. Beginning with the Mexican revolution
and continuing through the Russian and Chinese revolutions, agrar-
ian reform was characterized by the appropriation of land and its
transfer into different forms of collective land tenure, from village-
based holdings to massive state-run collective farms. After the Second
World War, agrarian reform played a major role in the reconstruc-
tion of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; but in these cases the land was
transferred to the existing individual land users with compensation
paid to former landlords. Processes of wide-scale land reform in
post-colonial settings, such as the million-acre campaign in Kenya14
and the left-wing electoral victory in Chile,15 were pursued in legal
12. See UNTITLED: SECURING LAND TENURE IN URBAN AND RURAL SOUTH AFRICA (Donna
Hornby et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter UNTITLED].
13. See DESMOND, supra note 7; LAURINE PLATZKY & CHERRYL WALKER, THE SURPLUS
PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1985).
14. The million-acre campaign in Kenya involved the transfer of one million acres of land
held by white settlers in the “white” highlands to twenty-five thousand Africans in a large
land reform and resettlement scheme. See CHRISTOPHER LEO, LAND AND CLASS IN KENYA
(1984); John W. Harbeson, Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954–70, 9(2) J. OF MOD. AFR.
STUD., 231 (1971).
15. The election of Salvador Allende in Chile saw a dramatic expansion of the existing
land reform program. See Joseph R. Thome, Law, Conflict, and Change: Frei’s Law and Allende’s
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environments that dramatically limited the pace and depth of the
reform process. One limiting factor was the process of resettlement
in cases where land was obtained for purposes of redistribution, and
communities or individuals were required to uproot and move to the
newly acquired lands. Not only was this a costly and often conflicted
process, but the beneficiaries of such reforms often lacked local
knowledge of the land or the capacity to place it into production
without major inputs of capital or government aid. Despite payment
of compensation according to the agrarian-reform laws, the reaction
of landed interests, often allied with conservative domestic and inter-
national forces, led to the reversal of agrarian reforms, or counter-
reforms in which land was returned to the previous owners.16
Since the end of the Cold War, the impetus for agrarian reform
has come less from demands for land redistribution than from
demands for reparation or restitution for past injustices. In former
state-socialist countries, there was pressure for the privatization of
state-owned land as part of the market reform process.17 At the
same time, land hunger and social movements representing the
rural landless in countries such as Brazil and South Africa have
continued to raise questions of redistribution and tenure reform. In
the United States, claims for restitution were first recognized by the
Indian Claims Commission (“ICC”); however, the ICC, which at-
tempted to resolve claims by Native American tribes against the
United States government, could only grant monetary compensa-
tion.18 Today, First Nation and Native American land claims repre-
sent both the demand for the recognition of past injustice and the
demands for political recognition and the right to governmental
authority over communities and natural resources. United Nations
Agrarian Reform, in SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 188 (ed. William
C. Thiesenhusen ed., 1989).
16. After both the military coup in Chile in 1973 and the defeat of the Sandinista govern-
ment in Nicaragua in 1990, there were significant reversals of the prior land reforms. See
Lovell S. Jarvis, The Unraveling of Chile’s Agrarian Reform, 1973–1986, in SEARCHING FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 240; LAURA J. ENRÍQUEZ, HARVESTING
CHANGE: LABOR AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN NICARAGUA, 1979–1990 (1991).
17. See RENEE GEOVARELLI & DAVID BLEDSOE, U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG., LAND RE-
FORM IN EASTERN EUROPE, WESTERN CIS, TRANSCAUCUSES, BALKANS, AND EU ACCESSION COUN-
TRIES, U.N. Job No. AD878 (2001), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/AD878E/AD878E00.pdf.
18. U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1979), http://www.narf.org/nill/docu
ments/icc_final_report.pdf.
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recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples has also raised ques-
tions about the territorial claims of indigenous communities around
the world.19 The South African land-claims process, initiated by the
first post-apartheid constitution in 1994, explicitly recognized the
need to return the land and—only in exceptional circumstances—to
substitute monetary compensation to those who lost their land as a
consequence of racially discriminatory laws between 1913 and the
first democratic elections in 1994.20 In contrast to the steady but
constrained process of land reform in South Africa, the conflict over
land and its fast-track land reform in neighboring Zimbabwe has
highlighted the continued salience of agrarian reform in the twenty-
first century.
B. The Role of the Law in the Protection of Property and Land
Reform
Law is central to the definition and protection of property rights,
but it is also a key element in the processes of agrarian reform. While
all significant reforms have usually accompanied major shifts in
political and social power, the role of law has been central to the
justification and stabilization of changes in ownership and tenure
relations. Land commissions and special land courts have enabled
restitution processes and mediated conflicts between tenants and
landlords from South Africa to Eastern Europe. However, courts
have also played a major role in resisting land reform efforts in post-
independence India21 and, under the government of President Frei,
in Chile.22 Whether through statutory change or constitutional man-
date, the law has, in some places, fundamentally altered the exist-
ing gendered relations to land access, particularly under indigenous
or customary law as well as in circumstances where traditional
authorities have retained or regained control over the allocation of
19. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Sept. 13, 2007); see also U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, at 6, Fact Sheet No. 9/Rev 2
(2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/fs9Rev.2.pdf.
20. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993; Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (S. Afr.).
21. See John Murphy, Insulating Land Reform from Constitutional Impugnment: An
Indian Case Study, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 362 (1992).
22. Thome, supra note 15.
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land and the adjudication of disputes.23 At the other end of the legal
spectrum, law plays a central role in creating and securing a market
in land rights as well as resolving conflicts between land owners.
Another important role of law in agrarian reform has been in the
regulation of agricultural markets, production, and financing, which
are central to the reshaping of a rural economy as it responds to the
needs and opportunities created by new tenure relations and partici-
pants on the agrarian landscape.
The State’s power of eminent domain has historically been the
most effective means of achieving agrarian reform. At the same
time, the use of this power to expropriate private property, whether
from landlords in India and Chile or large landowners in Nicaragua
and Zimbabwe, has led to heightened social and legal conflict. It was
only under the umbrella of military occupation or war—for example,
in Japan,24 South Korea,25 and Taiwan26—that the transfer of large
amounts of land from landlords to tillers and the mass redistribu-
tion of property rights, with government compensation used to stim-
ulate industrial investment, was swiftly and effectively achieved. In
other contexts, government use of expropriation has faced costly
legal challenges, including constitutional challenges to the taking
of property for the purpose of redistribution and endless litigation over
the use of related legal mechanisms (such as ceilings on landhold-
ings, effective use requirements, and other measures designed to force
the owner to relinquish control over significant portions of their
landholdings). Challenges to the amount and form of compensation
23. The tension between traditional authorities, “customary” law, and the recognition of
gender equality in many new constitutions in Africa and across the developing world has
produced ongoing debates and legal struggles over women’s rights to land in these contexts.
See Sindiso Mnisi Weeks, Women Seeking Justice at the Intersection Between Vernacular and
State Laws and Courts in Rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, in 2 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM:
STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY 113 (Heinz Klug & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2016).
24. See RONALD DORE, LAND REFORM IN JAPAN (2013); Toshihiko Kawagoe, Agricultural
Land Reform in Postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues (The World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. WPS2111, 1999).
25. See Inhan Kim, Land Reform in South Korea Under the U.S. Military Occupation,
1945–1948, 18(2) J. COLD WAR STUD. 97, 97–129 (2016); Yong-Ha Shin, Land Reform in Korea,
1950, 5 BULL. POPULATION AND DEV. STUD. CTR. 14 (1976), http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream
/10371/84988/1/2.LAND_REFORM_IN_KOREA__1950%5dYong-Ha%20Shin.pdf.
26.  See CHEN CHENG, LAND REFORM IN TAIWAN (1961); Li Duan, Land Reform, Its Effects
on the Rice Sector, and Economic Development: Empirical Case Study in Taiwan (May 2015)
(unpublished thesis, University of California-Berkeley), https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites
/default/files/Li%20Duan%20%281%29.pdf.
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offered by the government after expropriation have also tied up land
reform programs. In the most recent wave of land reform, the em-
phasis—often encouraged by multilateral financial institutions—has
shifted from expropriation to the privatization of state property,
market-assisted land reform, and the principle of “willing-buyer-
willing-seller.”27
A central feature of these most recent processes of agrarian re-
form has been the reassertion of individual land titling as the goal
of agrarian reform. Despite a long history of ineffective and ulti-
mately failed land-titling processes, such as the million-acre pro-
gram in Kenya just after independence, an enormous amount of
resources have been poured into new titling regimes in Eastern
Europe and Africa, particularly post-1989.28 Once again, however,
the question of using traditional forms of communal title, rooted in
indigenous systems of landholding and governance, has raised
questions about the sustainability of individual titling, particularly
in Africa. At the same time, it has been recognized that even under
“traditional” systems of land tenure, there exists a spectrum of rights
and duties, for individuals and communities, that were not recog-
nized in the colonial codification of “customary law.” Demands for
the recognition of different forms of land tenure have become most
acute in debates over land restitution and the reform of land tenure
arrangements imposed by colonial, post-colonial, and, in the case of
South Africa, apartheid authorities. Both as a result of the recogni-
tion of legal pluralism and because of greater democratic participa-
tion, there has emerged a deeper understanding of different forms
of land tenure and the need, even outside of systems of legal plural-
ism, to formally recognize a range of tenure forms and not just
private property.
27. A willing buyer and a willing seller have traditionally been assumed to be the basis
for a fair market transaction, which will produce a fair market value. In the southern-African
context, this concept is presumed to be the basis of fair compensation according to South
Africa’s Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, and the concept also served as the basis for com-
pensation in the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and, through the implementation of this
agreement, in Zimbabwe’s first post-independence constitution.
28. See Solomon Bekure, 3 Benefits and Costs of Rural Land Titling: The International
Experience, Documentation from the Event on Standardization of Rural Land Registration
and Cadastral Surveying Methodologies: Experiences in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(March 20–24, 2006), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265099679_3_Benefits_and
_Costs_of_Rural_Land_Titling_The_International_Experience.
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Struggles over land—whether over access to arable land in rural
areas, between agrarian and pastoral communities, or over land use
and the needs of people for housing in urban areas—have continued
to play an important role in political conflicts, particularly in Latin
America and Africa. Recognizing the need to address these issues,
the World Bank has affirmed that future economic stability requires
that land claims be settled and tenure security guaranteed.29 Debate
continues, however, over the impact of land reform in releasing rural
capital for development and over the exact parameters of tenure
security. Outside of their policy departments, the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, in particular, continue to push for
market-related strategies such as individual land titling and are
less open to demands for recognition of diversity in land tenure
systems, including communal and indigenous tenure forms.30 This
emphasis on the market fails to recognize that access to land in
many developing countries serves a range of purposes: the formation
and maintenance of identity for indigenous communities; providing
a home of last resort for many rural/urban migrants; encouraging
the diversification of economic opportunity and risk among rural
families; and finally, and possibly most importantly, providing a
form of social security in times of economic hardship and old age.
Market-led reform was the mantra of the World Bank in the 1990s,
as it attempted to mediate between claims for restitution, demands
for redistribution, and the need to resuscitate and stabilize markets
in countries emerging from state socialism, authoritarian dictator-
ships, apartheid, and civil conflict.31 However, these policies have
faltered in countries, such as Zimbabwe, where the post-colonial
settlement dictated a willing-buyer-willing-seller process yet failed
to provide the resources required to address the vast and colonially
derived inequalities in land ownership.32 In South Africa, there has
29. See FRANK F. K. BYAMUGISHA, SECURING AFRICA’S LAND FOR SHARED PROSPERITY: A
PROGRAM TO SCALE UP REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS (2013), http://documents.worldbank
.org/curated/en/732661468191967924/pdf/780850PUB0EPI00LIC00pubdate05024013.pdf.
30. See Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land
Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges, 14(2) WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 247
(August 1999); e.g., IMF Recommends Land Reforms, IRIN, Nov. 9, 2012, http://reliefweb.int
/report/swaziland/imf-recommends-land-reforms.
31. See Elizabeth Fortin, Reforming Land Rights: The World Bank and the Globalization
of Agriculture, 14(2) SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 147 (2005).
32. See HENRY V. MOYANA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND IN ZIMBABWE (1984); JOSEPH
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thus far been less economic and political disruption, with the process
of restitution providing some relief and promise of change. Yet the
process remains extremely slow and the overall disparities continue
to stimulate agrarian tension and, at times, violent disruption. In
other circumstances the process of privatization and individual
titling continues apace; however, there is little evidence that this
has significantly stimulated agrarian economies and lives. Faced with
persistent rural poverty, developing countries and international non-
government organizations, such as Oxfam,33 have pointed to the
farm subsidies of developed countries and the unequal access to land
and capital as causes for the continued marginalization of agrarian
economies in developing countries.34 As a result, the Doha Develop-
ment Round (the most recent international trade negotiations of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”)) has focused on the need to ad-
dress these disparities in the context of the WTO.35 Yet the WTO
seems unable to achieve its goals because domestic interests in the
developed world continue to resist changes to agricultural policies
that would inevitably lead to significant changes and agrarian
reforms in their own countries.36
1. Land Reform in Southern Africa
If, today, land reform in southern Africa is immediately equated
with the economic travails of Zimbabwe, a more nuanced history
HANLON ET AL., ZIMBABWE TAKES BACK ITS LAND (2013), http://www.openbooks.tig.org.za
/Mugabe/Zimbabwe_Takes_Back_its_Land_book_pages_1-11.pdf.
33. Oxfam is an international confederation of charitable organizations initially founded
in 1942 by a group of Quakers, social activists, and Oxford University academics. See Oxfam,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxfam (last visited Aug. 9, 2017).
34. See Patricia Amat et al., Make Trade Fair for the Americas: Agriculture, Investment and
Intellectual Property: Three Reasons to Say No to the FTAA (Oxfam, Briefing Paper No. 37, 2003),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/trade.pdf; The Global Food Crisis and Fair-
trade: Small Farmers, Big Solutions? (Fairtrade Found. Report, 2009), http://www.fairtrade.org
.za/uploads/files/Research/Research_papers/2009_Feb_The_global_Food_Crisis_and_FT.pdf.
35. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01
_e/mindecl_e.htm.
36. See Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2012, http://www.economist.com
/node/21562196?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e; cf., World Trade Organiza-
tion, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15) /DEC, https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm; World Trade Organiza-
tion, Export Competition, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/45
(2015)—WT/L/980, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/l980_e.htm.
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will recognize that the first experience of post-colonial land reform
was undertaken by the Republic of Botswana after it gained inde-
pendence in 1966.
a. Botswana
The first case of post-colonial land reform in southern Africa saw
the reform of indigenous processes of land distribution and conflict
resolution in Botswana. With nearly half of the land formally desig-
nated as tribal reserves and about eighty percent of the nation
living on those lands, the Botswana government adopted the Tribal
Land Act in 1968, fundamentally transforming the existing tenure
relations. At independence, Botswana’s land mass was divided into
three forms of tenure: state lands (formerly crown lands), freehold
lands, and tribal lands (native reserves). While freehold tenure was
limited to a few areas of the former “white” settlements, comprising
about six percent of the land, the colonial division between crown
lands and native reserves was never as clear. Some estimated that
up to seventy percent of the land area was under tribal authority
rather than the forty-eight percent that was formally designated
native reserves. It was in this context that land reform in Botswana
proceeded: first, with the adoption of the Tribal Land Act in 1968;
second, with the State Land Act of 1970; and finally, with both the
Tribal Grazing Land Policy, introduced by President Sir Seretse
Khama in 1975, and its counterpart, the Arable Lands Development
Programme in 1980.37
This process of land reform in Botswana has had a profound im-
pact on both access to land and the political structure of the country.
Instead of traditional authorities having the power to allocate land,
the Tribal Land Act placed all tribal land under the jurisdiction of
twelve land boards, which began operation in 1970.38 While initially
the land boards continued to be dominated by local, traditional
authorities, amendments to the Tribal Land Act in 1989 removed
37. See BOTSWANA, 1 NATIONAL POLICY ON TRIBAL GRAZING LAND, GOVERNMENT PAPER NO.
1 OF 1975 (Republic of Botswana 1975).
38. B. Machacha, Botswana’s Land Tenure: Institutional Reform and Policy Formulation,
in LAND POLICY AND AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (J. W. Arntzen et al.
eds., 1982), http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80604e/80604E00.htm.
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both chiefs and councilors from membership, ensuring that broader
interests gained greater influence on the boards—particularly the
national government through appointments by the Minister of Local
Government, Lands, and Housing, as well as the appointments of two
ex-officio members by the Minister of Commerce and Industry and
the Minister of Agriculture.39 Five of the twelve members of the
main land boards are still elected in the local Kgotla—the tradi-
tional court of the chief—while the remaining seven are appointed.
The main roles of the boards continue to be the allocation of land,
land use planning, and the adjudication of land disputes.40 In larger
districts, subordinate land boards were created to address applica-
tions for land use and to hear local disputes, although their deci-
sions have remained subject to appeal to the main land boards
under which they were created. The operational difficulties of the
land boards have been well documented—including the continued
influence of local traditional authorities as well as problems of self-
allocations and pre-allocations, involving applicants who would
justify their requests based on a claim that they had been granted
the land prior to the creation of the land boards. Despite these dif-
ficulties, the system has continued to evolve and represents a unique
feature of governance in Botswana.41
While resisting the formal expansion of freehold tenure, Botswana’s
land reform process has fundamentally transformed the traditional
land tenure system. Through the implementation of both the Tribal
Grazing Land Policy in 1975 and the Arable Lands Development
Programme in 1980, the land boards have granted individualized
rights based on the demarcation and fencing off of land. Introduced
in response to the problem of overgrazing and in recognition of the
fact that forty-five percent of Batswana owned no livestock at all,
these policies have produced a diversity of tenure forms within the
39. B. M. Mathuba, Paper Presented at the DFID Workshop on Land Rights and Sustain-
able Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons and Way Forward in Land Tenure Policy:
Land Boards and Customary Land Administration in Botswana (Feb. 16–19, 1999), cited in
Boipuso Nkwae, Botswana’s Experience on Recognizing Traditional Land Rights on a Large
Scale (World Bank Paper), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Resources/475495-1202
322503179/NKwae_Paper2008WB.doc_2_.pdf (last visited April 9, 2017).
40. Id.
41. JOHN L. COMAROFF, THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN BAROLONG:
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1977).
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former tribal lands.42 Even as critics have described the grazing pol-
icies’ creation of individual ranches as synonymous with the historic
highlands enclosure and as inequality in access to land has contin-
ued to grow, the political impact of land reforms has been profound.
If, before the Tribal Land Act, a “strong chief enjoyed . . . sole control
over the distribution of fields, pasturage, and residential plots . . .
and a monopoly over the creation of new political constituencies,”
the introduction of land boards diffused local power and gave more
authority to the national post-colonial state institutions.43 At the
same time, the retention of tribal lands and the role of the Kgotla
and traditional authorities within the political system have provided
what Jean and John Comaroff describe as a “civic culture that
specifie[s] the means of producing a certain kind of participatory
politics, a politics grounded in an articulate popular ideology of good
government.”44 In the case of Botswana, the retention of the forms
of land tenure that are rooted in the historic forms of governance
has had a profound impact on the nature of the post-colonial State
and what the Camoroffs’ identify as a form of “popular sovereignty
and direct state accountability” in post-independence Botswana.45
b. Zimbabwe
In contrast to Botswana, the history of post-independence Zimba-
bwe has seen a chaotic process of land reform that is considered the
direct cause of the country’s economic collapse and subsequent
erosion of democracy. Understanding the origins of this process pro-
vides another important lens with which to view the relationship
between property rights and state formation in southern Africa.
Unlike Botswana, Zimbabwe was a settler colony, and at independ-
ence, six thousand white farmers owned forty-two percent of the
arable land while four and a half million black Zimbabweans lived
in the overcrowded communal areas, the former “native reserves.”46
42. Machacha, supra note 38.
43. JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY FROM THE SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-
AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA 104 (2014).
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 113.
46. Robin Palmer, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980–1990, 89 AFR. AFF. 163 (1990).
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It was in this context that the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement
which ended the war and led to democratic elections in Zimbabwe
in 1980 included, in summary form, the text of Zimbabwe’s first
post-independence constitution.47 The summary of the constitution
included a guarantee of a specific number of seats for white settlers
in the new Parliament until 1987,48 as well as a clause in the Decla-
ration of Rights that protected existing property rights and specified
that the new government could only expropriate land for specific
purposes and under very stringent conditions.49 It also provided that
there could be no amendment to the Declaration of Rights, and hence
the property clause, except by unanimous agreement for the first
ten years of independence.50 As a result, the Zimbabwe Constitution
Act of 1979, which came into force as the Constitution of Zimbabwe
at independence in April 1980, prevented the government from
obtaining land for the purpose of land reform except under circum-
stances in which the land was obtained in conformity with the
willing-buyer-willing-seller principle.51 While this principle refers in
the common law to the idea of market value, in this context it in-
cluded a limitation on the ability of the new government to exercise
its inherent power of eminent domain rather than merely defining
the measure of compensation that would be due in the aftermath of
expropriation. However, this settlement was effectively limited by
the terms of the independence constitution to ten years.52 After this
time period, the Parliament, which remained sovereign in the tra-
dition of parliamentary sovereignty inherited from Britain, would
be free to amend the constitution.
However, when it came to land, the policies of the Zimbabwean gov-
ernment, freed from the Lancaster House constitutional limitations,
were at first unexpected. While the Zimbabwean legislature moved
fairly quickly in 1990 to remove the willing-buyer-willing-seller
47. SOUTHERN RHODESIA: REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE (Sept.–Dec. 1979),
http://www.rhodesia.nl/lanc1.html (presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs in January 1980).
48. Id., annex C, § E, ¶ 29.
49. Id., annex C, § C, ¶ V(1)–(3).
50. Id., annex C, § E, ¶ 30.
51. Zimbabwe Act, U.K.-Zimb., ch. 60, Dec. 20, 1979, http://legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979
/60/pdfs/ukpga_19790060_en.pdf.
52. ZIMB. CONST. art. 52(4) (1979).
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limitations in the constitution,53 the government in practice contin-
ued to promote economic stability and foreign investment by pursu-
ing a policy of willing-buyer-willing-seller as it purchased land from
white farmers for purposes of resettlement and related land reform
efforts. It was only when the ruling ZANU–PF (Zimbabwe African
National Union–Patriotic Front) party and President Robert Mugabe
began to face a serious electoral challenge in the late 1990s that the
slow pace of land redistribution became a focus of government
rhetoric.54 It was in this context that Zimbabwe adopted ever more
aggressive policies of land acquisition, which after 2000 led to a
wave of farm invasions and a subsequent collapse of the economy.55
While the conditions that led to the economic collapse are multiple
and complex, it was the adoption of constitutional changes that
revoked the government’s duty to pay compensation altogether—by
tying it to the unfulfilled promises of the former colonial power to
offer financial aid to cover the costs of compensation—that has been
the focus of attention.56 These provisions of the constitution re-
mained a core element of contestation in the process of constitu-
tional amendment, or constitution-making, that ultimately produced
a new constitution in 2013 but failed to resolve the political crisis in
Zimbabwe. As Muna Ndulo has argued, “[t]he Lancaster House
Constitution itself failed to serve as a framework for local political
and economic actors to negotiate the transformation from a colonial
state with great economic disparities to a more equitable Zimba-
bwe,” and thus it “failed to gain legitimacy or provide a framework
for the democratic governance of Zimbabwe.”57
c. South Africa
Not unlike Zimbabwe, the South African system of land ownership
historically functioned effectively for only a very small percentage of
53. ZIMB. CONST. amend. 16, § 16A (1980) (inserted by Section 3 of Act 5 of 2000).
54. See HANLON ET AL., supra note 32.
55. See LAWRENCE HOBA, THE TREK AND OTHER STORIES (2009). But cf. IAN SCOONES ET
AL., ZIMBABWE’S LAND REFORM: MYTHS & REALITIES (2011).
56. ZIMB. CONST. amend. 16, § 16A(1)(i)–(ii) (1980) (inserted by Act 5 of 2000).
57. Muna Ndula, Zimbabwe’s Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order,
in U.S. INST. OF PEACE, FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTION MAKING 182 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010).
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the South African population. Primarily, this was the result of the
racial division of land that predated formal apartheid and was legally
enshrined in the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 (Black Land Act) and
the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (Development Trust and
Land Act). The 1913 Land Act denied the land rights of black South
Africans and established the spatial distribution of land use that be-
came the basis of the apartheid system, in which the human dignity
of the majority of South Africans was denied. It has been “estimated
that some 3.5 million black South Africans had been uprooted from
their homes and relocated in furtherance . . . of the apartheid agenda
between 1960 and 1982.”58 In addition to this often violent dispos-
session, the effects of the Land Acts were twofold: first, they created
a land market from which nearly eighty percent of the population was
excluded; and second, they privileged freehold tenure—denied to all
but “white” South Africans—over other forms of tenure.59 In time
this distinction would not only determine the racialized socio-economic
conditions of wealth and poverty but also the distribution of political
rights, leading to a system of racial oppression under apartheid.
Unsurprisingly the issue of property was, and remains, a signifi-
cant point of contention in South Africa. While the internationally
endorsed process for the democratic transition from apartheid in-
cluded a commitment to the rule of law and the inclusion of a justi-
ciable bill of rights, there was no clarity on the contents of these
commitments. Just prior to the beginning of substantive constitu-
tional negotiations in early 1993, the two major participants,60 the
African National Congress (“ANC”) and the apartheid government,
presented dramatically different proposals for how they wished to
see property addressed in a post-apartheid constitution. On the one
58. CHERRYL WALKER, LAND-MARKED: LAND CLAIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION IN SOUTH
AFRICA 2 (2008).
59. See Cherryl Walker & Ben Cousins, Land Divided, Land Restored: Introduction, in
LAND DIVIDED, LAND RESTORED: LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 6; see also Andries Johannes Van der Walt, Introduction, in LAND REFORM AND THE
FUTURE OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA (Andries Johannes Van der Walt ed., 1991).
60. At this time, the two major participants in the negotiations were the African National
Congress, which was a liberation movement, and the government, which was controlled by the
National Party. While the ANC would later contest elections and govern as a political party,
the only political parties legally recognized before the 1993 Interim Constitution was adopted
were those that worked within the apartheid system, including the “white” political parties,
the “Indian” and “Coloured” parties recognized under the 1983 Tricameral Constitution, and
the different political parties recognized in the various “bantustans,” or black “homelands.”
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hand, the ANC was willing to protect the undisturbed enjoyment of
personal possessions; however, all property entitlements were to be
determined by legislation, and provision was to be made for the resto-
ration of land to people dispossessed under apartheid. On the other
hand, the apartheid government’s proposals were aimed at protecting
all existing property rights and would only allow expropriation for
public purposes, subject to cash compensation determined by a court
of law according to the market value of the property. In response,
the ANC suggested that no property clause was necessary at all.61
As the negotiations progressed, the conflict over the property
clause focused on specific issues. The apartheid government insisted
that property rights be included in the constitution and that the
measure of compensation include specific reference to the market
value of the property. In contrast, the ANC insisted that the prop-
erty clause should not frustrate efforts to address land claims and
that the State must have the power to regulate property without ob-
ligation to pay compensation unless there was a clear expropriation
of the property. The conflict soon focused on whether provisions for
land restitution should be included within the property clause or
whether they should be limited to the corrective action provisions of
the equality clause. The 1993 Interim Constitution resolved these
conflicts by providing a separate institutional basis for land restitution
which was guaranteed in the corrective action provisions of the equal-
ity clause and by compromising on the question of compensation by
including a range of factors the courts would have to consider in
determining just and equitable compensation. Despite predictions
that there would be very little change in the constitution during the
second phase of the constitution-making process, particularly on
such sensitive issues as the property clause and the Bill of Rights,
in fact the property issue once again became one of the lightening-
rod issues in the Constitutional Assembly.62
Although the committee charged with reviewing the Bill of Rights
was at first reluctant to change the formulation of the 1993 compro-
mise, challenges that centered on questions of land restitution and
61. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S PO-
LITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 125–138 (2000).
62. Id.; Matthew Chaskalson, Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Pro-
tection of Property Rights in the Interim Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 222 (1995).
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reform forced open the debate once more.63 In this case the impetus
came from the Workshop on Land Rights and the Constitution orga-
nized by one of the Constitutional Assembly’s subcommittees, Theme
Committee 6.3.64 The subcommittee’s task was to resolve issues
related to specialized structures of government such as the Land
Claims Commission and Land Court that had been created by the
Interim Constitution. The focus on the land issue once again raised
the problem of property rights in the constitution. While some
participants asked whether there should be any property protection
at all, the most significant change since the 1993 Interim Constitu-
tion was negotiated, was that the participants in this workshop, even
those representing long established interests like the National Party
and the South African Agricultural Union, now agreed on the need
“to rectify past wrongs” and on the need for land reform.65 Disagree-
ment here was over the means. The South African Agricultural Union,
for example, continued to assert that land reform “should be done
in a way that did not jeopardize the protection of private owner-
ship,” while the National Party now embraced the World Bank’s pro-
posals, arguing that land reform should “be accomplished within the
parameters of the market and should be demand-driven.”66
The outcome of this workshop and the written submissions to
Theme Committee 6.3 was a report to the Constitutional Assembly
that both challenged the existing 1993 formulation of property rights
and called for a specific land clause to provide a “constitutional frame-
work and protection for all land reform measures.”67 While Theme
Committee 4, which was responsible for the Bill of Rights, had simply
adopted a property clause that incorporated the 1993 constitution’s
restitution provisions, the Report on Land Rights threw the prover-
bial cat among the pigeons. Some objected to Theme Committee 6.3’s
very discussion of property rights, while others sensed an opportunity
to reopen the debate on property rights and to once again question
their inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the draft Bill of Rights
63. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE STORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
ASSEMBLY, MAY 1994 TO DECEMBER 1996 (Paul Bell ed., 1997).
64. Report from the Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Subcommittee Theme
Committee 6.3: Report on Land Rights (Oct. 9, 1995) (currently unavailable; copy on file with
Heinz Klug) (S. Afr.).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
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published by the Constitutional Assembly on October 9, 1995 included
an option that the “final” constitution contain “no property clause”
at all.68 It was in this context that an alternative option, a property
clause including specific land rights as well as a subclause insulat-
ing land reform from constitutional attack, began to gain momen-
tum. While a strategy to insulate land restitution and land reform
from constitutional attack had been implicit from early on in the
debate, it was the inclusion of a specific subclause—insulating state
actions aimed at redressing past discrimination in the ownership
and distribution of land rights—that enabled the negotiators to
reach a compromise between those demanding the removal of the
property clause and those, like the Democratic Party, who remained
opposed to even the social democratic formulation that was modeled
on the German Basic Law.69 Still the debate raged on and the draft
formulations of the property clause continued to evolve. Political
agreement on the property clause was finally reached at midnight
on April 18, 1996,70 when Subsection 25(8)—the “affirmative action,”
or insulation subclause of the property clause71—was modified so as
to make it subject to Section 36(1), the general limitations clause of
the constitution.72
Despite final agreement in the Constitutional Assembly, a number
of opposition parties and civil society groups argued that the property
clause violated the constitutional principles contained in Schedule 4
68. Special Edition, CONST. TALK: OFFICIAL NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY, WORKING DRAFT
EDITION (S. Afr. Const. Assembly 1990–1999), at 7 (undated) (on file with author) (describing
option one of the options suggested for then-section 24 of the Bill of Rights, adopted as S. AFR.
CONST., 1996 ch. 2 § 25).
69. See 2A Land Rights, Constitutional Comm. Constitutional Assemb., 13–41 (Sept. 15,
1995) (S. Afr.). The ANC’s conception of constitutional property was intellectually modeled
on the property provision of the German Basic Law, which in conformity with a social-demo-
cratic vision recognizes that property ownership involves both rights as well as obligations to
society—what is referred to as the social function of property. See KARL RENNER, THE INSTI-
TUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (1976).
70. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 63.
71. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(8).
72. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 63. Concerns that the new “insulation”
clause would completely exempt all land reform policies from constitutional review were an-
swered by the inclusion of the phrase, “provided that any departure from the provisions of this
section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).” This is the general limitations
clause and provides that the “rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,” taking into account
a range of designated factors. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1).
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of the negotiated 1993 ‘interim’ Constitution. Since the newly estab-
lished Constitutional Court was required by the constitution-making
clauses of the Interim Constitution to certify that the Constitutional
Assembly had abided by these principles, they argued that certifica-
tion of the “final” constitution should be denied. Two major objections
were raised: first, that unlike the Interim Constitution, the new clause
did not expressly protect the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of
property; second, that the provisions governing expropriation and
the payment of compensation were inadequate.73 The Constitutional
Court rejected both of these arguments. First, the court noted that
the test to be applied was whether the formulation of the right met
the standard of a “universally accepted fundamental right” as required
by Constitutional Principle II (“CPII”). Second, the court surveyed
international and foreign sources and observed that “[i]f one looks
to international conventions and foreign constitutions, one is imme-
diately struck by the wide variety of formulations adopted to protect
the right to property, as well as by the fact that significant conven-
tions and constitutions contain no protection of property at all.”74
Furthermore, the court held that it could not “uphold the argument
that, because the formulation adopted is expressed in a negative
and not a positive form and because it does not contain an express
recognition of the right to acquire and dispose of property, it fails to
meet the prescription of CPII.”75 The second objection—the argu-
ment that the provisions for expropriation and compensation were
inadequate—met the same fate, with the court concluding that an
“examination of international conventions and foreign constitutions
suggests that a wide range of criteria for expropriation and the
payment of compensation exists,” and thus the “approach taken in
NT 25 [New Text Section 25] cannot be said to flout any universally
accepted approach to the question.”76
As a result the final property clause guarantees not only the
restitution of land dispossessed after the adoption of the 1913 Land
Act77 and a right to legally secure tenure for those whose tenure
73. Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para. 70.
74. Id. at para. 71.
75. Id. at para. 72.
76. Id. at para. 73.
77. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(7).
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remains insecure as a result of racially discriminatory laws or prac-
tices,78 but also obligates the State to promote citizens’ access to
land on an equitable basis.79 Furthermore, the State is granted a
limited exemption from the protective provisions of the property
clause so as to empower it to take “legislative and other measures
to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the
results of past racial discrimination.”80 At the same time, it protects
the rights of property holders, stating in Section 25(1) that “[n]o one
may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general appli-
cation, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”
While the clause does recognize the State’s power to expropriate
property “[for] a public purpose or in the public interest”81 and “sub-
ject to compensation,”82 there is a clear attempt to both protect land
reform from constitutional challenge and to ensure that the pay-
ment of compensation is tied to a recognition of the history and use
of the relevant property.83
This constitutional response to the legacy of apartheid land law
led to the establishment of a land-claims process that in its first iter-
ation saw sixty-four thousand claims based on the constitutional right
of “a person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” to claim
either “restitution of that property or . . . equitable redress.”84 The
property clause also gave a right to secure tenure85 and imposed a
duty on the State to “take reasonable legislative and other measures
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable
78. Id. § 25(6).
79. Id. § 25(5).
80. Id. § 25(8).
81. Id. § 25(2)(a).
82. Id. § 25(2)(b).
83. Id. § 25(3). The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must:
be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public
interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to the relevant
circumstances, including:
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and,
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
84. Id. § 25(7).
85. Id. § 25(6).
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citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.”86 By the end
of the first process of land restitution, nearly eighty thousand claims
(mostly to urban land) were received by regional land claims com-
missions and adjudicated in some cases by a Land Claims Court, a
system specifically designed to implement the constitutionally man-
dated process of restitution.87 When combined with the additional
processes of land redistribution and land tenure reform that were
introduced by statute, the land reform process redistributed over 3.4
million hectares—although this remains far short of the redistribu-
tion target of thirty percent of 82 million hectares of white-owned
farmland initially set by the new government in 1994.88
Another major challenge facing the post-apartheid land system
was the effective incorporation of the existing nonfreehold rights
into the legal system.89 Despite the adoption of a number of laws to
address this legacy as well as laws designed to reduce insecurity of
tenure, the task of providing security of tenure through formal pro-
cesses of survey, titling, and registration remains daunting. Even
reducing the levels of accuracy required for traditional modes of land
survey is unlikely to bring about reduced costs because, although
the technology is readily available to surveyors, professional control
of the process and a reluctance to abandon past practices prevents
significant reductions in cost.90 The new legal regime designed to
increase tenure security includes: a provision for securing tenure
rights to persons occupying land with the owner’s permission in rural
86. Id. § 25(5).
87. Cherryl Walker, Sketch Map to the Future: Restitution Unbound, in LAND DIVIDED,
LAND RESTORED: LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 323.
88. See HJ Kloppers & GC Pienaar, The Historical Context of Land Reform in South Africa
and Early Policies, 17(2) POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L. J. 677 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.43
14/pelj.v17i2.03.
89. This is particularly true regarding the rights in Schedule 2 of the Upgrading of Land
Tenure Rights Act 113 of 1991 (S. Afr.), and the occupation and site permits referred to in the
conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988 (S.Afr.).
90. The average surveying fee in four Independent Development Trust–capital subsidy
upgrading projects represents a mere 2.6% of the total costs of the projects. Section 7 of the
Land Survey Act 71 of 1927 (S. Afr.), provides that regulations may be made prescribing the
fees which a land surveyor shall charge for the survey of land. Regulation 67 of the Land
Survey Regulations, GN R1814 (11 Feb. 1962) (S. Afr.), provides that the tariff for services
shall be in accordance with the tariff prescribed in Annexure A to the Regulations. Provision
is made for charges to be agreed upon at a higher rate. Although the contrary is not stated,
it is understood that surveys are also undertaken at rates lower than the tariff.
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and peri-urban areas;91 legislation protecting and allowing labor
tenants to gain permanent rights to the use of land held as tenants;92
laws providing temporary protection to those who might gain land
rights as a result of land and tenure reform;93 and new legislation
prohibiting unlawful evictions, which fundamentally changed the
legal and practical relationship between occupiers and title holders.94
Despite these attempts to protect existing occupiers, the future
legitimation of all landholdings was understood to rest on the recog-
nition of historic land claims and the creation of a restitution pro-
cess for those who had already been denied possession of their lands.
Despite this focus on rural land, urban land and housing is today
the most significant form of property for the majority of individual
South Africans who live in a country that has seen massive urban-
ization since the collapse of the apartheid’s internal pass system95
in the mid-1980s. A separate constitutional provision states that
“everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing”96 and
imposes the same duty on the State to ensure this right within its
available resources.97 This provision also guarantees that “no one
may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court.”98 Constitutional Court jurisprudence has
subsequently interpreted the right to housing to include a tenant’s
right not to be evicted unless provided with alternative accommoda-
tion and only after “meaningful engagement” by the relevant gov-
ernmental authority.99 In its attempts to address the vast urban
91. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (S. Afr.).
92. Labour Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
93. Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
94. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998
(S. Afr.).
95. The pass laws provided for a system of “internal passports” used to control the move-
ment of the African majority during the apartheid era, although pass laws have a long history
in South Africa and were used to establish a migrant labor system, control urbanization, and
generally to segregate the society. See Pass Laws in South Africa 1800–1994, SOUTH AFRICAN
HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/pass-laws-south-africa-1800-1994 (last
updated Mar. 21, 2011).
96. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 26(1).
97. Id. § 26(2).
98. Id. § 26(3).
99. The requirement of meaningful engagement was introduced into South African
jurisprudence in Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). See
generally Lucy A. Williams, The Right to Housing in South Africa: An Evolving Jurisprudence,
45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 816 (2014).
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housing shortage created by apartheid and post-apartheid urbaniza-
tion and immigration, the government first adopted a housing policy
under its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (“RDP”),
which produced over 3.3 million low-cost housing units in the first
twenty years of democracy.100 Over the same period, the population
grew by approximately 13 million (to over 53 million), and only about
fifteen percent of the country’s approximately 14.5 million households
earned enough income to secure financing in the formal banking
system. With changing economic policies, the government’s housing
policy shifted in the first decade of this century towards a bifurcated
policy, which, on the one hand, promoted a rental-housing sector
under a social-housing policy and law101 and, on the other hand,
sought to promote a more market-based housing policy, in which the
granting of title would facilitate private investments and improve-
ments in housing.102
Recent government policies focus heavily on helping the poor gain
formal title to their property, largely because of the influence of
Hernando de Soto’s notion that granting title will unleash capital
already held by the poor.103 De Soto’s claims rely on the notion of the
housing ladder—that property values increase, enabling those who
hold property to gain wealth through ownership, which they can use
to work towards a better home in the future, until they sell their
final home to fund their retirement and live somewhere smaller and
simpler.104 The Breaking New Ground housing policy started in 2004
100. See NAT’L DEP’T OF HOUS., WHITE PAPER: A NEW HOUSING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR
SOUTH AFRICA (1994) (S. Afr.), http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/16178_0.pdf; FIN. &
FISCAL COMM’N, RP303/2013, EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE FINANCE AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR
EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DELIVERY OF HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA: STATEMENT BY THE
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION, (Oct. 21, 2013) (S. Afr.), http://www.gov.za/exploring
-alternative-finance-and-policy-options-effective-and-sustainable-delivery-housing-south.
101. Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 (S. Afr.).
102. DEP’T OF HUM. SETTLEMENTS, “BREAKING NEW GROUND”: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (2004) (S. Afr.), http://abahlali.org
/files/Breaking%20new%20ground%20New_Housing_Plan_Cabinet_approved_version.pdf.
103. See Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the
Witwatersrand, Are Hernando de Soto’s Views Appropriate to South Africa? (University of the
Witwatersrand, Occasional Paper Series No. 1, Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Hernando de Soto’s
Views], http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Publications/Documents/De%20Soto%20Colloqui
um%20FINAL.pdf.
104. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); see also, ROSALIE KINGWILL ET AL., MYSTERIES AND
MYTHS: DE SOTO, PROPERTY AND POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA (Int’l Inst. for Env’t & Dev.
Gatekeeper Ser. No. 124, 2006).
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closely resonates with de Soto’s ideas. Its primary goal is to deliver
housing, with secondary goals that include realizing the value of as-
sets and “reducing duality in the housing sector” by enhancing access
to title.105 Key policies for reducing the duality included supporting
demands for subsidies for secondary market transactions, reducing
the prohibition on the sale of government subsidized property from
eight to five years, stimulating the transfers of free-standing public
housing stock, and accelerating the registration of transfer for sub-
sidized homes. However, the de Soto–thesis relies on four factors
other than title deeds that are not present in South Africa: (1) a
functioning secondary housing market, (2) sufficient affordable hous-
ing, (3) affordable mortgage finance, and (4) mortgage lenders willing
to lend to low-income people. The case of Joe Slovo Park in Cape
Town illustrates some of the problems with inserting formal title
regimes into an area without regard for the cultural institutions
there.106 Individual ownership actually reduced tenure security for
many, especially women.107 Tenure rights and responsibilities that
were formally linked to kinship were now registered in the name of
one member of the household, usually male.108 The process itself was
slow, and there were allegations of bias, with some community lead-
ers receiving more than one house.109 Many of the sales were infor-
mal. Sometimes people who legally owned their houses were unable
to use them because street committees decided who should be the
owner, or the houses had been rented out by people who were not
the owners.110 The process upended well-established informal mar-
kets and tore apart social networks, which in the informal economy
105. Lauren Royston, Snakes and Ladders: A Housing Perspective on de Soto and the First
and Second Economy Debate in South Africa, in Hernando de Soto’s Views, supra note 103,
at 35–36. The idea of “duality” in the housing sector refers to the existence on the one hand
of a regular housing market in which properties are regularly bought and sold, and on the
other hand of a separate “market” in which houses are traded informally or under the table
so as to avoid either the legal restrictions on their transfer or the costs of transfer in the
regular market. This duality is reflected, too, in the location of houses since properties in the
former “white” areas generally make up the “regular” market, while those in the former
“black” townships and in informal settlements make up the second “irregular” market.
106. Rosalie Kingwell et al., Mysteries and Myths: De Soto, Property and Poverty in South
Africa, in Hernando de Soto’s Views, supra note 103, at 58.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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were vital to doing business.111 The houses were also too small for
large families, a fact that many had relied on in order to make pay-
ments.112 Informal sales have continued to be a significant element
of South Africa’s titling program with a study conducted for the Cape
Metropolitan Council in 2000 finding a “significant incidence of
buying and selling of subsidized residential properties” either “im-
mediately as people acquire their houses . . . [or] more gradually as
people run into difficulties in paying the municipal service charges.”113
The study concluded that “the urgent need for cash [was] forcing some
subsidised homeowners to sell their houses illegally” and the in many
cases prices were “almost 50% less than the replacement cost[s].”114
II. LAND REFORM AND THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE
Different patterns of land tenure and reform efforts have pro-
duced very different impacts on the structure of governance across
these three southern African countries: Botswana, Zimbabwe, and
South Africa. The outcome and continuing conflict are products of
both the inherited pattern of colonial land relations as well as the
choices made by the post-colonial State in these different circum-
stances. In Botswana the limited amount of freehold tenure and the
political strength of traditional authorities at the time of independ-
ence saw land policies focus on the “Tribal Areas.” It was the slow,
evolving process of national intervention and the continued vitality
of the political culture of the Kgotla that has produced a gradual
transformation in land rights as well as a stable political regime. In
this structure, the dominant political party—the Botswana Demo-
cratic Party—has relied on rural support to continue to win national
elections, even as the major urban areas have seen local govern-
ments controlled by the political opposition. The net result has been
the emergence of a particular form of democratic State where na-
tional and local politics are quite distinct. Even if there are ques-
tions about the exact form of local democracy, there is recognition
that national elections are free and fair.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. BRUCE BOADEN & ALY H. KARAM, THE INFORMAL HOUSING MARKET IN FOUR OF CAPE
TOWN’S LOW-INCOME SETTLEMENTS 24 (2000).
114. Id. at 35.
2017] THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 173
This is in stark contrast to developments in Zimbabwe where the
failure to engage in an ineffective land reform in the immediate post-
independence era saw a perpetuation of inequality and land hunger
reminiscent of the colonial era. This continuing inequality produced
first a political crisis and then economic collapse when Robert
Mugabe’s government responded by adopting what became known
as “fast track land resettlement” and land invasions from 2000 to
2003.115 While there is increasing evidence that this process has
seen black Zimbabweans gain more access to land, the government’s
failure to uphold the rule of law and their undermining of the courts
has had a long-term impact on the structure of the State. After
flawed elections and increasing authoritarianism, there has been an
attempt to reconstitute the State through a process of constitutional
renewal. The failure of both the democratic process and the many
constitutional reforms has produced “a government which lacks both
national and international legitimacy.”116 It is in this context that
we might compare developments in South Africa and ask what effect
the process of land reform might have on the future structure of the
new South African constitutional State that emerged from apartheid
in the mid-1990s.
After more than twenty years of democratic governance, the de-
bate over South Africa’s land reform program has become an argu-
ment over whether the glass is half full or half empty. The promise
of the 1994 ANC election manifesto—to transfer thirty percent of the
land—has clearly not been met. Even so, thousands of families and
individuals from the most marginalized sections of society have been
beneficiaries of the government’s threefold land reform strategy—
land restitution, land redistribution, and land tenure reform—as
well as the country’s massive subsidized housing program.117 Despite
these slow gains, it remains the fact that the clearest indicator of
poverty in South Africa, even after twenty-three years of democracy,
115. See HANLON, ET AL., supra note 32.
116. Ndula, supra note 57, at 177.
117. See EDWARD LAHIFF, LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: A STATUS REPORT 2008 (Pro-
gramme for Land and Agrarian Stud., Res. Rep. No. 38, 2008), http://www.plaas.org.za/sites
/default/files/publications-pdf/RR38_0.pdf; see also Report Presented at Istanbul+5, Reviewing
and Appraising Progress Five Years After Habitat II: The South African Housing Policy: Opera-
tionalizing the Right to Adequate Housing (June 6–8, 2001), http://www.un.org/ga/Istanbul+5
/1-southafrica.doc.
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is being black, female, and a resident of a rural area. Unfortunately,
after a change in land reform policy in the early 2000s when the
government decided to target black commercial farmers instead of
marginalized rural communities to be the beneficiaries of land re-
form, these indicators of poverty seem even less likely to change.
These developments did not solve the underlying problem of un-
equal access to land, and issues of legitimacy and the slow pace of
land reform soon resurfaced in the political realm.118
As the ANC moved towards its national conference at the end of
2012, there were repeated calls for greater government intervention
in the distribution of property, particularly land. In the lead-up to
the organization’s mid-year policy conference, which produced a draft
policy document for the national conference, there were repeated
calls from various ANC constituencies, the ANC Youth League and
trade unions in particular, for a constitutional amendment. These
organizations wished to remove what they understood to be the
constitutional requirement of willing-buyer-willing-seller that they
blamed for the slow pace of economic transformation and land reform
in particular. In response to these calls, the official opposition, the
Democratic Alliance, issued a press statement warning that the ANC
government was “contemplating dramatic changes to the Constitu-
tion . . . which threatens the very foundation of our constitutional
state.”119 Responding to these demands and concerns, the Minister
of Rural Development and Land Reform, Gugile Nkwinti, said the de-
bate about changing the constitution might be irrelevant as “the ANC
had come up with four proposals to transform land ownership in
South Africa without changing the Constitution.”120 But at the same
time the ANC Youth League called for “changing . . . the Constitu-
tion to do away with land expropriation with compensation.”121
118. For a critical assessment of South Africa’s land reforms and related programs see, BEN
COUSINS, LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA IS SINKING. CAN IT BE SAVED? (2016) (A provocation
commissioned by the Nelson Mandela Foundation.), https://www.nelsonmandela.org/uploads
/files/Land__law_and_leadership_-_paper_2.pdf. See also FRED HENDRICKS ET AL., THE PROMISE:
UNDOING A CENTURY OF DISPOSSESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2013).
119. Dene Smuts, Press Release, Democratic Alliance: Property a Basic Right, Not a Sunset
Clause (Cape Town, Mar. 4, 2012).
120. Gillian Jones, Changing Constitution Not the Answer, IOL, June 11, 2012, http://www
.iol.co.za/news/politics/changing-constitution-not-the-answer-1316513.
121. Id.
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While the constitution may not include a willing-buyer-willing-
seller standard, the apartheid-era Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 does
in fact include this standard as a basis for determining the compen-
sation to be paid in the event of expropriation.122 Although the Con-
stitution is supreme in South Africa and explicitly provides criteria
for determining compensation in the event of expropriation, in
application the State may only exercise its power of eminent domain
within the terms granted by the legislature in the Expropriation Act.
This explains in part why the willing-buyer-willing-seller standard
has some resonance in the South African debate over expropriation.
However, a broader view of the debate, including an understanding
of the conflict over land in the southern African region more gener-
ally, provides a much clearer perspective on why this standard has
such resonance in the political debates over land and in the possibil-
ity of constitutional change specifically. Only once the history of
land struggles and the pattern of constitutional amendment and crisis
in Zimbabwe are taken into account, does it become clear why the
willing-buyer-willing-seller language has such power and relevance.
In an attempt to address the inconsistency between the statutory
law and what is arguably a more permissive constitutional require-
ment, the South African government first introduced a bill to reform
the Expropriation Act in April 2008. In its explanation for the bill
the government argued that the new law would create a “framework
to give effect to the Constitution” and in particular the State’s
“constitutional obligation to take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.”123 The
new statute would also require the recognition of unregistered
rights as well as provide new institutional mechanisms to regulate
expropriations. Significantly, the draft law also revised the stan-
dards for compensation, including the range of factors that had been
negotiated during the democratic transition. Reaction to the bill was
vociferous, particularly from those who had fought so hard to protect
their property interests during the transition from apartheid. In the
face of these objections, the bill has been repeatedly withdrawn and
122. Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 § 12(1)(a)(i).
123. Publication of Explanatory Summary of the Expropriation Bill 2008, GN 440 of GG
30963 § 2, at 3 (11 Apr. 2008) (S. Afr.).
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revised. It was eventually passed by the Parliament in 2016. How-
ever, it was returned by President Zuma, who is concerned that it
might be unconstitutional, and it remains yet again in limbo.
CONCLUSION
This brief comparison between three post-colonial states in south-
ern Africa provides a clear demonstration of the relationship be-
tween the particular history and nature of property rights and the
fundamental political structures of these nations. In each case the
structure of the post-colonial State has been or is still being formed
around the history and nature of tenure relations—whether these
relations are based on indigenous and colonial relations to the land
or are being forged through claims of historical dispossession and
restitution. In each of these cases it has been the history of land
reform post-independence that has had a profound impact on the
structure of democratic politics and legal institutions—whether at
the local level in Botswana or at multiple levels in Zimbabwe and
South Africa. Where land reform has failed or has been inadequate
in addressing the legacies of colonialism, there have been profound
political consequences. In Zimbabwe, these early failings have put
the very structure of the State in jeopardy. In South Africa, the
inability to address economic inequality has led politicians to in-
creasingly point to land distribution and reassert the claim that the
land must be returned to the people. While often serving as a proxy
for a more general claim for wealth redistribution, it is the continu-
ing inequality in access to land, both urban and rural, that enables
these claimants to increasingly question the legitimacy of the post-
apartheid constitutional order.
The distinction between marketable and nonmarketable land, as
well as its racial character, was reflected in the relationship be-
tween the State and land in most southern African countries—
including Botswana and Zimbabwe—prior to independence, although
not to the same extent or with the same consequences as experi-
enced during the apartheid period in South Africa. The continued
vitality of this distinction, even outside of southern Africa, may be
seen in the new plurinational constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia;
in the recognition of different forms of tenure for tribal and First
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Nation sovereignties in North America; and in the multitude of tenure
forms that exist across Africa, Asia, and other regions of the world.
From this perspective, it is no longer possible to ignore the diversity
of tenure forms or to impose a simple one-size-fits-all notion of prop-
erty on the world. Recognizing these alternate realities and working
out how these different forms may coexist means that we may begin
to benefit from local recognition and legitimacy of governmental
institutions that must interact and manage these different forms of
property.124 In fact, different forms of tenure—private ownership,
different types of co-ownership and tenant arrangements, as well as
condominiums and community land trusts—already exist and are
acknowledged in most western legal systems. The task now is to
improve the interactions of these different forms of tenure in rural
and urban contexts in the developing world in order to secure the
benefits for those holding property and to promote the legitimacy of
those institutions of good governance that are so essential to ensur-
ing an effective and legitimate political structure in these post-
colonial nations.
124. See UNTITLED, supra note 12.

PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL
JAMES BURLING*
INTRODUCTION—A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EROSION OF RESPECT
FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY
Traditional Anglo-American law always considered property rights
nearly sacrosanct, with the giants of the legal field equating private
property with liberty and an area that was best not molested by
government.1 A central purpose of government was seen to be a pro-
tector of private rights and liberties, including and especially, rights
in property.2 And, so great was the regard for private property, that
not even actions for “the common good” could violate it.3 Of course,
the practical necessity of condemnation was recognized by early
theorists such as Blackstone, who cautioned government to use that
* Director of Litigation, Pacific Legal Foundation. A version of this article was dis-
tributed to the ALI-CLE Conference on Eminent Domain and Land Valuation held in San
Diego on January 26–28, 2017.
1. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“There is nothing which so
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of prop-
erty; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”);
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 222 (Peter Laslett, ed., student ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689) (“Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and
destroy the Property of the People . . . they put themselves into a state of War with the People,
who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience.”). This understanding was not
confined to Great Britain. In the prior century, Hugo Grotius wrote, “Thus property, as now
in use, was at first a creature of the human will. But, after it was established, one man was
prohibited by the law of nature from seizing the property of another against his will.” HUGO
GROTIUS & ARCHIBALD COLIN CAMPBELL, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW
OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 21 (1901) (translation of HUGO GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE,
ch. 1, § X (1625)).
2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 49 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“The diver-
sity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable
obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government.”); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed., 2007). Of course, there are contrary views.
See, e.g., David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a “Nega-
tive Citizenship” Regime, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 47–48 (1996) (“property less and less the
‘guardian’ of other rights, and more transparently a form of individual and class domination”).
3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135 (“So great moreover is the regard of the
law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community.”).
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power sparingly—noting that it is not the sort of power that an indi-
vidual man, or even a “set of men,” can exercise.4
But there is also a critical reality to the nature of government
that is common to all forms of government not run by angels: those
in power take advantage of those who are not. And in the context of
eminent domain, the advantage taken is often private property. To
avoid abuse of any power wielded by the government—either by the
executive or the legislature—the judiciary is supposed to mediate.
The judiciary is given the authority to act as a neutral arbiter be-
tween government and individuals. This judicial power to interpose
between individuals and their government is key to liberty. It was
an essential epiphany to those involved in the struggles for power
between the monarchy, the parliament, and the judiciary of seven-
teenth century England that not even the king could command his
subjects or pass judgment upon them without the law adopted by
Parliament and the interpretation of that law by independent judges.5
With the elimination of the monarchy’s own prerogative courts such
as the Star Chamber, an independent court system—with the ability
to say “no” to the Crown—became an essential element of the British
Constitution, and ultimately many state constitutions and the Con-
stitution of the United States.6 Thus, the courts have had a long and
storied tradition of protecting the liberties of the people against all
manner of attempted usurpations. And the liberty of property is no
different. Indeed, one of the first great attempts to assert the liber-
ties of the American colonists against British usurpations came in
the famous challenge by James Otis in 1761 to the Crown’s writs of
4. Blackstone continues that only the legislature can “interpose and compel”:
If a new road . . . were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it
might perhaps by extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no
man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. . . . the
legislature alone, can [compel only] . . . . by giving him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. . . . All that the legislature does is
to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even
this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and
which nothing but the legislature can perform.
Id.
5. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
6. Id. at 279. “[T]he cardinal achievement of the English in their constitutional struggles
was to subdue the Crown under the law, particularly under the English constitution.” Id. at
493–94.
2017] PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL 181
assistance,7 an event considered by John Adams to have given birth
to the American independence movement.8
Private property rights deserve an equally forceful protection by
the judiciary from the government’s power of eminent domain. In the
case of eminent domain, government officials are not just entering and
“break[ing] locks, bars, and everything in their way.”9 They are taking
the locks, bars, and everything in their way, as well as the house it-
self and the very land upon which the house sits. The Constitution
limits such power only to instances where the taken property is to
be put to public use, and it tasks the judiciary with ensuring that
government power, including the power of eminent domain, is exer-
cised only within constitutional limits. And yet, in the context of the
forced transfer of property from those without power to those with
it, that process fails because the judiciary defers too much to those
who are doing the taking. And in recent times that process has failed
badly because “judicial deference” has taken on an exalted status in
the nation’s courthouses.10
The United States, however, was not founded upon principles of
deference. The structure of the government was instead designed to
establish vigorously competing branches of government. Moreover,
each branch is imbued with an interest in preventing the undue ar-
rogation of power by the other branches. Such a check on the amassing
of power was seen to be the best guarantor of liberty, and property,
for the people.11 But this fundamental vision of the proper role of
7. See James Otis, Oral Argument Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761), in 1 CLAS-
SICS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 151, 152 (Scott J. Hammond et
al. eds., 2007):
A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally an-
nihilate this privilege. Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they
please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial servants may
enter, may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and whether they
break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire. Bare suspicion
without oath is sufficient.
This wanton exercise of this power is not a chimerical suggestion of a heated
brain.
8. See generally JOHN ADAMS & WILLIAM TUDOR, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS:
OR POLITICAL ESSAYS (1819).
9. See Otis, supra note 7, at 152.
10. See ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 55–61 (2015).
11. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 246 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)
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government began to metamorphose over a century ago. Govern-
ment power, instead of being the chief protector of the liberties and
property of the people, transformed into the chief guarantor of the
general welfare of the people, even if that meant that liberty and
property had to step aside.12
It has been argued by some that the institution of private prop-
erty, and the protections given to private property, serve only to
protect the haves against the have-nots.13 But when employed as
designed, the institutions of private property really serve to protect
the interests of the working and middle classes as much as anyone
else. Nowhere is that seen more clearly than with eminent domain.
If constrained to its constitutional limits, the power of eminent do-
main would pose only a limited risk to the rights of individuals.
It is not a coincidence that the expansive notions of state power
espoused by the Progressives came into prominence at the same
time as the constraints on the power of eminent domain were loos-
ened.14 A government that sees the individual rights in property as
an obstacle to good government is not one that will be shy about
(“[T]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or body of magistrates.” (quoting CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 171 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1748)). It should also be quite clear that
liberty and property were seen as coextensive by the Founders. See, e.g., James Madison, A
Property in our Rights, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174 (“In a word, as a man is said to
have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”).
12. Thus, for example, President Roosevelt put the “freedom from want” and “freedom from
fear” on an equal footing with the freedom of speech and religion. See Franklin D. Roosevelt,
State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1941) (transcript available at http://www.americanrhet
oric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm). With that, the freedoms in the Bill of Rights
requiring government to refrain from infringing upon our liberties (e.g., “[c]ongress shall
make no law,” or “the right . . . shall not be infringed,” or “nor shall . . .”) become mandates
for government to provide positive benefits to its people.
13. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 2; KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY 22 (1884), transcribed from 1 MARK/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS (Samuel
Moore trans.,Progress Publishers1969), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/down
load/pdf/Manifesto.pdf (“[M]odern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete
expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class
antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.”).
14. See Somin, supra note 10, at 47–54; Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective
on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public
Use”, 32 SW.U. L. REV. 569, 635 (2003) (“[W]hereas private contracts and private property had
once been seen as fundamentally different than projects having a special public nature, like
railroads—and consequently, free from government interference—now all behavior was seen
as having public ramifications justifying government control, to serve the ‘popular will.’”).
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using the power of eminent domain. That the ideals of progressivism
and individual liberty were seen as mutually incompatible can be
seen, for example, in the writings of Woodrow Wilson. In 1887, as a
professor at Princeton University, he wrote:
[A]ll idea of a limitation of public authority by individual rights
be put out of view, and that the State consider itself bound to stop
only at what is unwise or futile in its universal superintendence
alike of individual and of public interests. The thesis of the state
socialist is, that no line can be drawn between private and public
affairs which the State may not cross at will; that omnipotence
of legislation is the first postulate of all just political theory.
. . . .
. . . must not government lay aside all timid scruple and boldly
make itself an agency for social reform as well as for political
control?15
Later, while campaigning for the presidency, he said, “that property
as compared with humanity, as compared with the vital red blood
in the American people, must take second place, not first . . . .”16 With
the rise of progressivism in the United States and the concomitant
understanding that government should play a much larger role in
promoting collective action for the public good, fealty to principles
of individual rights, and especially economic and property rights,
began to wane.17
Under progressive thought of the sort espoused by Wilson, notions
of individualism and private property were seen as impediments to
social improvement.18 But the reformers were badly mistaken if they
believed that the lessening of restraints on government interference
with individual rights and property would inure solely to the benefit
of the poor and working classes. The result was quite the opposite.
The regulation of property under the Progressives evolved from regu-
lations designed to protect health and safety to regulations designed
15. Woodrow Wilson, Socialism and Democracy (1887) (unpublished essay), http://www
.origin.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/woodrow-wilson-on-socialism
-and-democracy.
16. AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 260 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 731 (2004); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
18. This is still thought, apparently, by some today. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 2.
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to protect established and privileged neighborhoods from excessive
development—and infiltration by the poor. Justice Sutherland’s tirade
against parasitic apartment buildings in Euclid v. Ambler was a
harbinger of much more to come.19
As private property has become more and more malleable in the
hands of government actors, it has become more of a target of the
entrenched political class for the benefit of that class. The owners
of private property, and the general public, have suffered. And, as will
be shown, the property owners who have suffered the most have been
those with the least—the working class, the poor, and minorities.
Put simply, the erosion of rights in property has hurt those with the
least property far more than those with the most.20
I. THE RISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The use of the sovereign power of eminent domain to condemn
private property has been the most visible manifestation of the ten-
dency of government to harness private property for the private good
of government-favored special interests. While often couched in terms
of improving the lives of the poor, the reality has been a dispossession
of the poor from their homes and neighborhoods. Thus, working-
class homes are condemned for shopping centers and factories for
the ostensible purpose of creating jobs or increasing tax revenues,
but in reality condemnation is for the purpose of enriching favored
developers and multinational business enterprises.21 Even today,
19. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (upholding zoning
laws, noting “the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying
the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment
house is a mere parasite”).
20. Or, as Professor Kanner puts it, redevelopment means using the “coercive power of
government to redistribute wealth from the deserving middle class and the few poor who own
modest dwellings . . . to the undeserving rich.” Gideon Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or
Strengthen Property Rights in Order to “Fulfill Their Unique Roll”? A Response to Professor
Dyal-Chand, 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 423, 447 (2009).
21. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (destruction of working-class neighborhood for General Motors plant); Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (The ostensible purpose of the redevelopment (or de-
struction) of a middle-class neighborhood was to facilitate jobs. In reality, the project was for
the benefit of the Pfizer corporation.); see also ILYA SOMIN, supra note 10, at 6 (“Documents
obtained by The Day . . . show that the . . . condemnations were undertaken in large part as
a result of extensive Pfizer lobbying of state and local officials.”). For a longer list of cases
where private property has been taken for the benefit of industrial and corporate interests,
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middle-class private businesses can be taken for the benefit of other—
and wealthier—private businesses. It is the Motel 6 being condemned
for the Ritz.22 And even entire neighborhoods of undesirables—the
poor, the ethnic minorities, and those least able to mount meaning-
ful political resistance—can be condemned in order to “revitalize”
their neighborhoods. But this sort of “revitalization” simply disperses
and displaces the powerless for the benefit of the powerful. The poor
are shunted elsewhere, out of sight and out of mind. Once vibrant
neighborhoods can become sterile office parks while new highways
can tear asunder the social fabric of communities of color.23 After
decades of such marginalization of the poor for the public good, the
broader public has had an epiphany: condemnation can happen any-
where to anyone. It is not only the blighted neighborhoods of the
urban poor, but also the blight-free neighborhoods like Mrs. Kelo’s,
that can be targeted.24
Of course, “blight” has never really been much of an impediment
to any sort of redevelopment taking because just about anything can
be declared blighted due to factors as varied as “diversity of owner-
ship” to peeling paint.25 And even with many post-Kelo reforms, not
much has changed with blight justifications for eminent domain,
because the chasm between what the public considers to be blight and
what the takers consider to be blight is vast. After all, if the reader
lives in a single family suburban home surrounded by other individ-
ually owned homes, there is diversity of ownership. And heaven forbid
see Kanner, supra note 20, at 467 nn.185–203.
22. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Nothing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with
a factory.”). For a rare instance of a court beating back such an attempt, see, for example, 99
Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130–31 (C.D.
Cal. 2001), holding a government condemnation in order to retain Costco and stop “future
blight” unlawful.
23. See, e.g., ERIC AVILA, THE FOLKLORE OF THE FREEWAY: RACE AND REVOLT IN THE
MODERNIST CITY 14 (2014) (“[I]f future anthropologists want to find the remains of people of
color in a postapocalypse America, they will simply have to find the ruins of the nearest
freeway.”). Avila argues that the growing resistance to urban highways that began in the
1960s still pitted the white elites against poor minority communities.
24. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
25. See generally James S. Burling, Blight Lite, American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Eminent Domain and
Land Valuation Litigation, January 9–11, 2003, at 3, 43, 2003 WL SH053 ALI-ABA 3, 43 (noting
that one of the standard factors for determining blight is “diversity of ownership” and general
dilapidation); SOMIN, supra note 10, at 84 (discussing expansion of meaning of “blight”).
186 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 6:179
a neighbor has too many leaves on her tennis court, even if that neigh-
bor is a member of Congress from an upscale San Jose neighborhood.26
There is in the United States something of a backlash. Once seen
as a benevolent tool of social improvement, resistance to eminent do-
main is growing. Long-simmering resentments by minority commu-
nities have become more visible and have spilled into nonminority
territory. Judicial and legislative skepticism of the motivations of
condemning authorities is growing. With the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kelo, sporadic efforts to contain the abuses of eminent do-
main became a movement.27 But will that movement last? Despite
reforms, there is an inexorable tendency of condemning authorities
and their allies to seek again the power to take.28 The role of private
property as a bulwark of individual liberty is not yet secure.
The Fifth Amendment in the United States Constitution says: “No
person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.”29 In theory, confining the use of con-
demnation to those projects that serve a public use, combined with
the payment of just compensation, should limit the ability and in-
centives of government actors to abuse the power of eminent domain.
In practice, a potent combination of ambitious government actors,
politically connected developers, and a willingly complicit judiciary
has called into question the effectiveness of these constitutional
limitations. As will be shown, the term “public use” has been trans-
formed into a mere aphorism that has little to do with the “public”
and sometimes not even much to do with “use.” And government
condemnors have striven mightily to put the prefix “un-“ in front of
“just compensation.”30
26. See RANDAL O’TOOLE, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: HOW GOVERNMENT PLANNING HARMS
YOUR QUALITY OF LIFE 80 (2007).
27. See, e.g., SOMIN, supra note 10, at 135–80 (summarizes political responses to Kelo); see,
e.g., Jennifer Zeigler, et al., 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform
Litigation Since Kelo, INST. FOR JUST. (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.ij.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/03/50_State_Report.pdf. But see Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Ameri-
cans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709 (2006) (arguing
that the legislative response has often been ineffectual and coopted).
28. See, e.g., Brad Kuhn, It’s Baaacckkkk. . . . Redevelopment Returns to California, CAL.
EMINENT DOMAIN REPORT (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.californiaeminentdomainreport.com
/2015/09/articles/redevelopment/its-baaacckkkk-redevelopment-returns-to-california/
(chronicling the return of redevelopment in California).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. For numerous examples of undercompensation for taken property, search for blog
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The stories are legion of eminent domain being used to destroy
working-class neighborhoods to make way for everything from auto-
mobile factories to undefined support for a pharmaceutical company
to a baseball stadium to a Hollywood museum to a parking area for
an upscale casino.31 Sometimes after the neighborhoods are destroyed,
the projects fail or never even get built in the first place.32 These
condemnations lead to a vexing question: where is the public use in
privately owned factories, stadia, and museums, especially those that
never get built?
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF “PUBLIC USE” INTO “POLITICALLY
USEFUL”
The Kelo decision ten years ago did not signal the Supreme Court’s
evisceration of the “public use” limitation on the power to condemn.
That happened many years prior.33 But it was the most visible
posts with the title, Lowball Watch, in Gideon Kanner’s blog, GIDEON’S TRUMPET [hereinafter
Kanner, Lowball Watch], http://www.gideonstrumpet.info/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
31. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (undefined support facilities for
pharmaceutical company); County of Los Angeles v. Anthony, 224 Cal. App. 2d 103, 105, cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964) (Condemnation of homes for Hollywood museum; the landowner
tried “to prove that the Hollywood Museum [was] merely a front of some kind under the guise
of eminent domain and under the guise of a public body to put up a private enterprise . . .” The
proof was not allowed. Although the land was condemned and the owner removed by alleged
trickery, the museum was never built.); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d at 459 (Mich. 1981_ (automobile factory); Hector Becerra, Decades Later, Bitter
Memories of Chaves Ravine, LA TIMES (April 5, 2012), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2012
/apr/05/local/la-me-adv-chavez-ravine-20120405 (Mexican-American community removed for
public housing that never materialized on the site of a future Dodger Stadium); see Wendy
Horowitz, Here Lies Liberty: Steve Anthony and His Fight Against Eminent Domain, CENTRAL
LIBRARY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.lapl.org/collections-resources/blogs/central-library
/here-lies-liberty-steven-anthonys-fight-against-eminent. Lastly, Vera Coking fought the
condemnation of her home by then-real estate mogul, Donald Trump, so it could be razed for
a casino limousine parking area. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, The Time Donald Trump’s Empire
Took on a Stubborn Widow—and Lost, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/lifestyle/style/the-time-donald-trumps-empire-took-on-a-stubborn-widow--and-lost
/2015/09/09/f9cb287e-5660-11e5-b8c9-944725fcd3b9_story.html?utm_term=.0a08259f3930; see
also Kanner, supra note 20.
32. See Gideon Kanner, Eminent Domain Projects that Didn’t Quite Work Out, American
Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation, Jan. 8–10, 2009, at 17, 2009 WL
SP006 ALI-ABA 17.
33. See Ilya Somin, Putting Kelo in Perspective, 48 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (sym-
posium on Kelo), https://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2850695##.
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manifestation of the phenomenon and one that managed to capture
the public’s attention when the press discovered the plight of elderly
widows and pensioners who were being thrown out of their homes
for some vaguely defined benefit of a multinational pharmaceutical
conglomerate. The public was justifiably outraged at a practice that
many of us in the business of defending landowners have known
about for a long time. The public learned that crony capitalism was
alive and well in city halls, county offices, and state bureaucracies
across the land.34
It didn’t begin this way. In the early years of the republic, the no-
tion of a forced-government transfer of land from one private owner
to another private owner was something of an anathema. Probably
the earliest American case dealing with private takings is Giddings
v. Brown, a Massachusetts decision from 1657, in which the Supreme
Court held that “[t]he right of property is . . . a fundamental right.
In this case the goods of one man were given to another without the
former’s consent. This resolve of the town being against the funda-
mental law is therefore void, and the taking was not justifiable.”35
Beginning with VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance36 and Calder v. Bull,37
the Supreme Court routinely criticized the notion of private takings.
In Calder, Justice Chase wrote:
[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against
all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with
SUCH powers . . . . To maintain that our Federal, or State, Leg-
islature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly
restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments.38
34. For a sense of the public outrage, see, for example, Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus,
For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/us/for-homeowners-frustration-and-anger-at-court-ruling
.html?_r=0; Jonathan V. Last, The Kelo Backlash: What the Supreme Court Touched Off with
Its Eminent Domain Decision, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.weekly
standard.com/the-kelo-backlash/article/13716; SOMIN, supra note 10, at 3 (“Polls showed that
over 80 percent of the public disapproved of the Court’s ruling, and it was also denounced by
politicians, activists, and pundits from across the political spectrum.”).
35. PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 16
(1899), https://www.archive.org/details/englishcommonla00reingoog.
36.  VanHorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
37. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
38. Id. at 388–89.
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ustice Story wrote for the Supreme Court in Wilkinson
[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the
rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a leg-
islative body without any restraint. . . . We know of no case in
which a legislative act to transfer the property A to B without his
consent has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative
power in any State of the Union. On the contrary, it has been
consistently resisted as inconsistent with just principles by every
judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.40
These early cases involved uncompensated takings,41 a fact which
has led some to question whether the “A-to-B” proscription that
Judge Chase discussed should apply to compensated takings. But
the principle against A-to-B transfers was extended to a compen-
sated transfer in the 1848 case of West River Bridge v. Dix.42 In Dix,
a private bridge was condemned for free public use. Concurring,
Justice McLean wrote,
It is argued, that, if the State may take this bridge, it may trans-
fer it to other individuals, under the same or a different charter.
This the State cannot do. It would in effect be taking the prop-
erty from A to convey it to B. The public purpose for which the
power is exerted must be real, not pretended.43
However, as the exigencies of industrialization came to the fore,
this ethic began to crumble. First came the mills requiring dams for
waterpower. And then came the railroads that were to stitch the na-
tion together on steel rails. For these purposes, the mills and rail-
roads needed land; and not just any land, but land in very particular
39. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
40. Id. at 658. This proscription against private takings is consistent with Blackstone’s
admonition against a “set of individuals” taking private property even for a public purpose
like a road. See supra note 3. While he continued that the government, and only the gov-
ernment, may take private property for such purposes, he did not say that government may
take from one individual just for the benefit of another individual or set of individuals; to do
so would have made his invection nugatory.
41. Or in Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, it involved a legislative incursion in an inheritance
dispute.
42. West River Bridge v. Dix,47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 537 (1848).
43. Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring).
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places. Mills had to be at favorable spots next to rivers. And rail-
roads had to get from point A to point B with a minimum of devia-
tions. While some mills and railroads made deals and bought land
from willing sellers, others were either less patient or less willing to
subject themselves to the vicissitudes of market transactions. And
governments—which were often controlled by the railroads or other
land-hungry industrial concerns—were willing to accommodate those
industrialists who wanted other people’s land without the bother of
free-market transactions. In this era, the prohibition of private A-to-
B transfers began to erode and the concept of public use became more
elastic. Railroads, after all, were open for use by all members of the
public who could pay the freight. Thus, for example, in Hairston v.
Danville & W. R. Co.,44 the Court held:
The uses for which the track was desired are not the less public
because the motive which dictated its location over this particular
land was to reach a private industry, or because the proprietors
of that industry contributed in any way to the cost.45
Some states and state courts were more receptive to these private
takings by railroads and mills than others. But the trend was to-
wards a more liberal interpretation of the Public Use Clause in order
to facilitate industrial development.46
The coup de grace for the Public Use Clause as a meaningful
check on the government’s power to effect A-to-B transfers came in
the 1954 decision of Berman v. Parker.47 That case involved an effort
at so-called “slum clearance” in Washington, D.C. The plan was to
remove the dilapidated tenements and crumbling infrastructure and
replace them with a planner’s vision of utopia—shiny new office
buildings, public squares, and perhaps some new housing for the poor.
Well, actually, perhaps not for the last of those three. To accomplish
this nirvana on earth, entire city blocks had to be acquired, razed,
and rebuilt into new shining city on the hill by private developers.
But, the owner of a department store objected. He claimed that his
44. Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
45. Id. at 608.
46. See Timothy Sandefur, Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:
A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use”, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 599–609
(2003) (extended historical treatment of eminent domain by mills and railroads).
47. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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building was a perfectly fine building; it was not a tenement and not
a slum.48 How could the city take his property and turn it over to a
private developer and call that “public use”? The case eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court.
That was where the Supreme Court manifested its peculiar brand
of genius. In a decision written by the very progressive and very
liberal Justice William O. Douglas, the Court held that “public use”
really meant the “public purpose.”49 In other words, the public did
not have to actually “use” the taken property in any literal sense, so
long as the public’s “purpose” was served by the project. And what
could have been more in the public interest than slum clearance?
But this was not the only left turn taken by the Court. The Court
essentially said that the government’s eminent domain power was
coterminous with “police power,” which is the power to regulate. In
other words, whatever the government could regulate, it could take.
This was an important conflation of power, because it also meant
that the courts should not second-guess decisions to condemn any
more than they should second-guess the details of day-to-day regu-
lations. By 1954 it had already been well established that the courts
would defer to government decisions pertaining to regulations of
economic affairs.50 This standard of deference meant that a court
would overturn an economic regulation in only the most extraordi-
nary of circumstances. And so it was in Berman, where Justice
Douglas put forward an aphorism that is breathtaking both in its
degree of condescension and its surrender to government power:
48. See Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423
(2010).
The two cases [that became Berman v. Parker] were brought by Max Morris, the
owner of a department store, and Goldie Schneider, who owned a hardware store
down the street. Both stores were located on 4th Street, which was then a lively
commercial area with various shops and stores, and neither of the buildings was
considered to be substandard or deteriorating. Fourth Street at the time was a
hub of black and Jewish life, and one of the few areas in the city, then segre-
gated, that displayed a measure of racial harmony. It was the site of the city’s
first integrated parade, and the mostly Jewish stores on 4th Street relied on
business from black residents.
Id. at 451–52. Lavine recounts that while there were serious concerns about bad conditions in
and around “alleys” that characterized many neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., the twenty-
three thousand people living in these areas were not all anxious for their redevelopment.
49. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (segueing a discussion of the power of eminent domain “exe-
cuted for a public purpose” to “the application of the police power to municipal affairs”).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
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We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project
is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad
and inclusive . . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well
as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beau-
tiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take
into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise
them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.51
And to remove any doubt about the degree to which the Court was
determined to remove the judicial branch from any meaningful
oversight of the Public Use Clause, the Court established a standard
of review of extreme deference:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legisla-
ture has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judi-
ciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning
the District of Columbia, . . . or the States legislating concerning
local affairs. . . . This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised
for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.52
With Berman, it was all over except for the details. The next time
the Court focused on the Public Use Clause was in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.53 At a time when “land reform” was all the rage
in Latin America and supported there by the United States,54 the
State of Hawaii had its own version of land reform. Rather than help-
ing any landless peasants in Hawaii, this land reform was aimed at
51. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 32.
53. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
54. The previous dalliance with land reform in the United States occurred on Puerto Rico
where sugar plantations, already made less viable by a World War II era condemnation for
naval purposes, were condemned for redistribution to farmers. See Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar
Assocs., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946).
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helping middle-class homeowners who were leasing the land under
their homes from the Hawaiian land trusts. Hawaii’s Land Reform
Act of 1967 was designed to help these homeowners wrest the under-
lying fee from the large Hawaiian land trusts—whose purpose was
to benefit Native Hawaiians. In fact, as Professor Kanner explains,
“The property owner in this case, the Bishop Estate-Kamehameha
Schools was a charitable trust (holding the lands of Bernice Pauahi
Bishop, the last member of Hawaiian royalty) operating for the
benefit of native Hawaiian children educated by the Kamehameha
schools.”55 In other words, this was really a sort of antipublic use,
taking land from a charitable trust and giving it to the not-so-de-
serving homeowners with votes. Following the precedent of constitu-
tional minimalism set down in Berman, the Court refused to find
this private to private land transfer to be unlawful.
And then there was Kelo.56 The condemnees in Kelo were not the
mere ethnic shop owners of Berman. They didn’t own department
stores. But they were simply middle-class homeowners who lived in
ordinary little homes in a very ordinary (and unblighted) neighbor-
hood.57 But, alas for them, they didn’t happen to own a multinational
pharmaceutical concern that could dangle politically advantageous
dreams of economic revitalization before the politicians of New Lon-
don, Connecticut.58 New London undoubtedly was a tired little city
that had seen better days. Its unpretentious circumstances clearly
didn’t match the ambitions of those in charge. It was difficult for the
city to resist Pfizer’s beguiling promises. After all, all that stood
between New London becoming a city headquarters for a major inter-
national player and its economically distressed status quo was a
neighborhood of some expendable middle-class residents.
The decision in Kelo was not any sort of radical change in the doc-
trine that had evolved from Van Horne’s Lessee and Calder to Berman
and Midkiff. What set Kelo apart was that it could no longer be
55. Gideon Kanner, Is the ‘Public Use’ Pendulum Reaching the End of Its Swing?, Ameri-
can Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Compensa-
tion 709, 711 (Aug. 22–24, 2002) 2002 WL SH018 ALI-ABA 709.
56. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
57. Id. at 475 (homes were unblighted). See also SOMIN, supra note 10, at 12 (description
of neighborhood).
58. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473–75; SOMIN supra note 10, at 16–19 (outlining Pfizer’s role
in the redevelopment).
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denied that the Public Use Clause was worth less than the parchment
it was written on. The pretense was gone. And the public was out-
raged because it was not as familiar as lawyers were with the manner
in which the courts can build one small doctrine-eviscerating prece-
dent on top of another to ultimately transform the meaning of one
thing to something completely different.59 And so with Kelo the veil
was lifted, and everyone knew that “public use” meant “public inter-
est,” which meant whatever damn-fool thing the politicians thought
was a good idea to do with peoples’ homes and lives at the moment.
III. THE “PUBLIC USE” IN REMOVING THE POOR FROM CITIES
It didn’t take long before the idealistic notions of Berman, that emi-
nent domain could be used to make cities “sanitary” and “spiritual,”
led to a perverse understanding that the best way to beautify a city
was to remove that which was ugly. And not to put too fine a point
on it, what was ugly was not white and upper middle class. By the
time of Kelo, the criticisms of eminent domain were becoming wide-
spread.60 It finally began to dawn on people that urban redevelopment
had turned from a salutary mechanism for societal improvement to
something more sinister. In her Kelo dissent, Justice O’Connor, the
author of Midkiff, noted that if eminent domain could be used for mere
economic development, then the weak and politically powerless would
become victims of progress, not its beneficiaries.61 Justice Thomas
59. Of course, the public should know better than to think words mean what the mean.
See LEWIS CARROL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 124 (1882):
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means
just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
60. See, e.g., MICHAEL MALAMUT, PIONEER INST., THE POWER TO TAKE: THE USE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN IN MASSACHUSETTS (2000) (White Paper No. 15); Steven M. Crafton, Taking
The Oakland Raiders: A Theoretical Reconsideration of The Concept of Public Use And Just
Compensation, 32 EMORY L.J. 857 (1983); David Kochan, “Public Use” And The Independent
Judiciary: Condemnation in An Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998);
Peter J. Kulick, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate A “Public-
Private Taking”: A Proposal to Redefine “Public Use”, 200 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.-DET. C. LAW
639 (Fall 2000); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2003); Laura Mansnerus,
Note, Public Use, Private Use, And Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409
(1983); Derek Werner, Note, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense, and Takings, 10 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 335 (2001).
61. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
2017] PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL 195
likewise noted that the poor are unable to “put their lands to the
highest and best social use [and] are the least politically powerful.”62
Moreover, poor and minority communities had borne the brunt of
redevelopment pain since Berman.63 In fact, Justice Thomas noted
that of the families displaced by the urban renewal rush caused by
Berman between 1949 and 1963, sixty-three percent were racial
minorities.64 Commentators have noted the same. Wendell Prichett
wrote that “[b]light was a facially neutral term infused with racial
and ethnic prejudice.”65 Sometimes even in the absence of an intent
to remove minorities, it is the inevitable result of supposedly race-
neutral redevelopment because today’s redevelopment cannot be
divorced from the policies that led to urban concentrations of minor-
ities in the first place.66 Indeed, urban renewal had become pejora-
tively known as “Negro removal.”67 African-American novelist and
social critic James Baldwin criticized urban renewal as nothing
more than “move the Negroes out.”68 Thus, whether or not urban
redevelopment was a “public use,” it certainly had the effect of trans-
ferring what little wealth some minority communities had to more
politically favored interests.
At least with Berman there was the pretense that those removed
from the redeveloped neighborhood would be able to move back into
new public housing. That, at least, could have been relevant to the
62. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 522.
64. Id.
65. Pritchett, supra note 60 at 6.
66. See LELAND T. SAITO, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF RACE-NEUTRAL
POLICIES IN URBAN AMERICA 4–5 (2009):
Economic redevelopment and the demolition of a building or neighborhood take
place within a history of explicit racial inequality. This inequality manifested
itself as racial exclusion, which created concentrations of racial minorities in
residential and commercial areas. . . . urban renewal efforts that dispropor-
tionately destroyed minority communities, policies of racial steering by real
estate agents that support racial segregation, and historic preservation policies
that ignore the social history of minorities. . . . As a result, race-neutral policies are
only one part of a long chain of events that contribute to racialized consequences.
67. Pritchett, supra note 60, at 47.
68. See James Baldwin, Negro and the American Promise, PBS (1963), http://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bonus-video/mlk-james-baldwin/, speaking to a teenager
who was losing his home:
They were tearing down his house, because San Francisco is engaging—as most
Northern cities now are engaged—in something called urban renewal, which
means moving the Negroes out. It means Negro removal, that is what it means.
The federal government is an accomplice to this fact.
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Court and planners, who figured that only 1,345 families would be
displaced, that there was other adequate housing in the city, and
that five hundred new units would be built nearby.69 Lavine notes
that of the four thousand residents in one particular area, ninety-
seven percent were black and no more than thirty-six hundred were
supposed to be housed in the new development.70 Unfortunately, for
the residents, the low-income housing did not materialize.71 Nor did
subsequent redevelopments in a host of cities do anything positive
for the residents who were thrown out of their homes.72
IV. THE PUBLIC USE IN REDISTRIBUTION
In Midkiff, the Court found that there was a public use along with
public interest in the redistribution of assets from the land trust to
private homeowners with mere land leases.73 But was there? The
legislation applied only to existing homes; it opened up no new land
for development. That is, no one other than the private homeowners
and land lessees gained a single home from the Hawaii Land Reform
Act of 1967. The legislation did not turn the 48.52% of government-
owned land (an oligopoly itself) to the citizens for development, al-
though the concentration of land in the government was a highly
significant factor in the state’s high land prices.74
69. See Lavine, supra note 48, at 449. Lavine also notes that the planners apparently forgot
to consider the four thousand families already on the waiting list for decent low-cost housing.
70. Id. at 448.
71. See Kanner, supra note 30, at 455–56:
The housing actually built there, instead of bettering the lot of the slum dwellers
whose plight figured so prominently in Justice Douglas’ opinion as justification
for the taking, turned out to be aesthetically sterile and so pricey that by 1969
it inspired a rent strike by affluent tenants.
The residents were instead forced to move into “worse slums elsewhere in the District of
Columbia that commanded higher rents.” Id. at 456. Of the fifty-nine hundred new residences
built in the area all of three hundred ten were “affordable.” Id. at 455 n.127.
72. See Kanner, supra note 20, at 435 n.48. (citing sources for estimates that 2.38 million
urban housing units were destroyed by redevelopment, and by the 1960s, “some 111,000
families and 17,800 businesses were being displaced by urban redevelopment annually.”).
73. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984) (“[T]enants living on single-
family residential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to
ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they live.”); id.
at242 (“Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s
police powers.”).
74. See STATE OF HAW. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, REPORT NO. 3, PUBLIC LAND POLICY
IN HAWAII: MAJOR LANDOWNERS (1967) (basis of the 48.52% figure); see also DAVID L. CALLIES,
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The drafters of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 perhaps saw
a net value in that the Act called for a compensation scheme that
would have paid less than market value for the properties by basing
income appraisals on controlled rents and ignoring the reversionary
interest in the land.75 The homeowner and leaseholders would have
had an opportunity to purchase the land under their homes at bar-
gain rates. Transferring condemned formerly privately owned inter-
ests in land to other private landowners at reduced prices serves a
public use only if we accept that there is a public use in A-to-B
transfers or if there is a “public use” in the majoritarian politics of
robbing Peter to pay Paul.76
But, assume for the sake of argument that the Act did result in
full payment to the landowning charitable estates as required by the
Constitution. If that were the case, all the State would have done
here was to buy interests in land and sell them to the homeowners
at the same price. This isn’t land redistribution, the purported public
use endorsed by the Court in Midkiff. Instead it’s just a complicated
real estate transaction facilitated by the coercive power of the State.
But this begets another problem—the scheme didn’t work all that
well.77 There was no guarantee that the homeowner-beneficiaries of
the scheme could afford the now more valuable property. In reality,
some became landlords. Some found it necessary to sell their now
REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAI’I 173–74 (1984) (noting impact of land
use controls on land prices); Summer J. La Croix & Louis A. Rose, Public Use, Just Com-
pensation, and Land Reform in Hawaii, 17 RES. L. ECON. 47, 48 (1995), http://www.econo
mics.hawaii.edu/sumnerfiles/LaCroix.Public.Use.1995.pdf (“[C]oncentration of ownership was
not the cause of land’s high prices . . . . Rather, the wholly overlooked causes of the high prices
of land were severe natural and governmental restrictions on the supply of residential land.”).
75. See La Croix & Rose, supra note 74, at 49 (“The required compensation was based on
below-market controlled lease rents, and excluded the lessor’s share of the reversionary
interest in site-specific improvements.”). The controlling of lease rents, moreover, was moti-
vated by the desire “to reduce the basis for the calculation of leased-fee compensation under
the [Land Reform Act].” Id. at 66. This undercompensation scheme was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1979. Id. at 67.
76. This is essentially what happened. See La Croix & Rose, supra note 74, at 71 (noting
the land reform bills “passage was indeed driven by the economic interests of the lessees as
well as by Democrats’ ideological opposition to the large estates.”).
77. See Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You Solve A Problem Like in Kelo?, 40 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 609, 630 (2007):
A powerful argument could be made that the public was more harmed by the
Land Reform Act as amended than benefited by it. As such, the Court should
have found that the Act as amended did not satisfy the public use requirement
and was unconstitutional. . . . a closer look at the facts in the Midkiff case
provides a telling example of the problems with judicial deference . . .
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higher-value homes (with the land) and move elsewhere on the island.
Indeed, the lure to sell was inescapable when a Japanese investor,
later dubbed Honolulu’s “worst neighbor,” went from house to house
from the back of his limousine, with his agents going to the homes
with cash offers—whether the homes were for sale or not.78 As the
owners moved elsewhere on Oahu, they in turn pushed up the prices
of other island homes. The net result was that land prices more than
doubled in the five years after Midkiff, with the inflationary spiral
reverberating throughout the island.79 Indeed, the net effect of this
eminent domain scheme was not just to transfer wealth from a
charitable trust for Hawaiian children to affluent homeowners, but
also to transfer wealth from the affluent homeowners and to very
wealthy Japanese investors. That may not have been what the
Hawaiian legislature intended, but that’s what they got. When the
power of eminent domain is abused, there can be some very unin-
tended consequences.
V. TIF AND THE PERVERSION OF INCENTIVES
Even assuming that the original motivations of urban planners
was benevolent, that state of affairs didn’t last. Why not? The plan-
ners of the early to mid-twentieth century had an organic view of
social improvement. If the “blight” could be removed from a city,
that city would prosper, just like a plant could be restored to health
if the dead and dying leaves were removed. The problem is that these
planners, coming from the upper echelons of society, didn’t fully grasp
that when they saw blight, others saw functioning neighborhoods
with often vibrant communities.80Those “blighted” communities may
78. See David Thompson, The Worst Neighbor on the Block: Genshiro Kawamoto, HAW.
MAG., Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.honolulumagazine.com/Honolulu-Magazine/January-2014/The
-Worst-Neighbor-on-the-Block-Genshiro-Kawamoto/index.php?cparticle=1&siarticle=0#artanc
(noting that Kawamoto’s massive cash-based land acquisitions created a “one-man infla-
tionary spiral.”); see also Kanner, supra note 20, at 431 n.33.
79. See Annual Residential Resales Data for Oahu, Oahu Historical Data, HONOLULU
BOARD OF REALTORS, http://www.hicentral.com/oahu-historical-data.php (last visited Jan. 22,
2017) (showing the average median price of a single family residential home rose from one
hundred fifty-eight thousand dollars in 1985 to three hundred fifty-two dollars in 1990; in
2015 the median price was seven hundred thousand dollars).
80. See, e.g., Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L.
REV. 741, 773 (1991) (“Edifice Complex projects have come to be emphasized over those pro-
moting social welfare because elites who pay the planning piper get to call the tune.”);
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very well have been poor, and dark, and burdened with unfamiliar
tongues and strange cultural traditions. But that didn’t make them
the equivalent of an agricultural blight that must be excised from
the community like fungus-infested trees near an apple orchard.81
But it takes more than a profound ignorance of the value of poorer
communities to explain the headlong conversion of urban redevelop-
ment as a tool for improvement into an instrument of neighborhood
destruction. It took Tax Increment Financing, or “TIF.” Economic
incentives can explain a lot, and in this case TIF is that explanation.
Tax Increment Financing draws lines around supposedly blighted
neighborhoods and authorizes the local governmental entity in charge
of curing the blight to earmark future property tax revenues within
the targeted area to pay for the improvement. In other words, any
increase in the tax base after redevelopment belongs to the redevel-
opment agency. Local redevelopment districts are no different from
any other corporate, bureaucratic, or governmental enterprise that
wants to prosper and grow. So the ostensible mission—“to improve
the community” or “build a better tomorrow”—becomes a mission in
name only. The real motivation is to increase the tax base.82 With
more money, who knows what great things can be accomplished?
One does not accomplish great things with a shortage of money.
And one does not make money by spending money on the poor or
overseeing neighborhoods filled with poor people. Bluntly put, if the
poor can be replaced with tax-paying businesses and upper-income
residents, a redevelopment district’s books will look a whole lot better.
And no self-respecting, empire-building bureaucracy will prosper if
saddled by slums.
Pritchett, supra note 60, at 4 (“Several studies have shown how urban elites promoted
redevelopment to reorganize urban areas and to protect and enhance their real estate invest-
ments. These scholars have studied the rise of ‘growth coalitions’—groups of business and
political leaders that promoted renewal—and they have examined the political debates over post-
war housing policy. Other works have documented the impact of urban renewal in intensifying
racial segregation and limiting the mobility of African-Americans.”(footnotes omitted)).
81. For more on property rights and blight eradication see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), holding that the removal of cedar trees to save the apple trees was not a taking.
82. See, e.g., George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic De-
velopment: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Districts,
83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 71 (2008) (“TIF financing is most attractive to communities where property
values are rising rapidly so that any investment is likely to pay off and least attractive to com-
munities where property values are flat or declining since the public investment might not
be able to generate enough increment in the way of increased property taxes to amortize it.”).
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With the incentive of increasing the tax base, it was inevitable
that the redevelopment districts would give birth to the redevelop-
ment industry—builders and developers that specialize in acquiring
“underutilized” property on the cheap (i.e., property inhabited by the
poor in single-family homes or apartments) and converting them
into thriving tax-generating concerns. Since it’s not easy to alleviate
the suffering of the poor, why even suffer the poor if you can have
office complexes, high-end housing, shopping malls, and automobile
factories? And if you throw into the mix the efficacy of routing
highways through inner-city slums at behest of the highway-build-
ing lobby, it only makes sense that poor, urban neighborhoods are
targeted for saving through destruction.
For better or worse, however, these projects often failed. The land-
scapes of American cities are littered by failed redevelopment pro-
jects, defunct shopping centers, empty office buildings, and rusting
hulks where factories once loomed.83 And no landscape is more
littered by failure than the very heart of the New London experi-
ment: today, Pfizer has abandoned New London, and where the homes
once stood is not a field of dreams but a field of weeds inhabited by
feral cats.84 This is not surprising. Developments built by experi-
enced business owners whose own capital is at risk should intu-
itively be more likely to succeed than those businesses built around
the dreams of a planning department and financed by other people’s
money, e.g., taxpayer dollars. The redevelopers make their money, the
poor are gone, and the cities are left with less than they had before.
But not to worry. Sometimes these failed projects are just the
fodder for a new round of redevelopment.85 The problem here is that
projects conceived of and built by redevelopment agencies and their
symbiotic developers are not necessarily projects that the free
market would consider building. For private developers not subsi-
dized by the mechanics of redevelopment, it might not make a lot of
sense to build a shopping center or office complex in a former slum
based on “build it and they will come” optimism or assurances of
“build it and they will subsidize.” Private unsubsidized developers
83. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 20
84. See SOMIN, supra note 10, at 235; see also, Kanner, supra note 20.
85. See, e.g., Kaufmann’s Carousel v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 301 A.D.2d
292, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2002) (condemnation of a business that was originally
started on an older round of condemnation and redevelopment).
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generally don’t like to lose money.86 Moreover, no sane redeveloper
actually guarantees the success of a project developed with other
people’s money. The pretty drawings and scale renderings can be all
that it takes to launch a redevelopment project. Reality can wait.
To be fair, even without the redevelopment agencies, poor neigh-
borhoods are often attractive targets for infrastructure projects
simply because the land is cheap and the projects can be accom-
plished before the displaced residents figure out how to mount a
challenge—or even pay for the challenge. After all, why even try to
build a highway through a collection of stately upper-class homes
when the same highway can plow through a slum, giving rise to a
project that both clears a slum and builds a highway, a power plant,
or a dump?87
But even if the Public Use Clause has been stretched, even if
condemnation serves an uglier side of America’s toleration of the
poor, and even if there are economic incentives to displace the poor,
then at least there is the requirement to pay “just compensation” to
make everybody whole again. But being made whole is in the eyes
of the beholder.
VI. THE UNDERCOMPENSATION GAMBIT
Exactly what is just compensation? We can be pretty sure we
know what compensation is. But what is “just”? Compensation is a
real and pressing concern for a legion of condemnees across the land.
No government wants to pay more for property than it is worth, nor
should it. And more than a few seem happy to “save taxpayer money”
and pay less for property than it is worth.88
86. This is generally the case unless they employ the Trump model of business by
bankruptcy.
87. See, e.g., Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens’ Guide to Com-
batting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366, 366 (1992)
(noting prevalence of toxic waste sites in minority neighborhoods).
88. See, e.g., C. Jarrett Dieterle, The Sandbagging Phenomenon: How Governments Lower
Eminent Domain Appraisals to Punish Landowners, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 38, 38–39
(2016) (“In other words, governments attempt to dissuade landowners from holding out for
more compensation by punishing those that do so, which results in governments getting away
with systematic undercompensation in eminent domain proceedings. In essence, a sand-
bagging government says to landowners, ‘if you think our initial appraisal is too low, just see
how low we’ll go if you take it to court!’”); Kanner, Lowball Watch, supra note 30; see also United
States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The fact that ‘just compensation’ tends
202 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 6:179
The Supreme Court put compensation in terms of “fair market
value,” and what a “willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.”89
But these aphorisms give rise to more questions. What is “fair”? What
does “willing” exactly mean? And why should “justice” always be de-
fined by the “market”?90
To many owners, their homes have great intrinsic value that can-
not be reflected by comparative sales of like properties. Emotional
attachment, intrinsic value, and other purely subjective measures
of worth cannot be completely divorced from justice. While it may
not be realistic that all manifestations of emotional attachment can
be given value, the failure to make any attempt can be dispiriting
when property is condemned—and especially so when it is con-
demned solely for the purpose of making someone else rich. At oral
argument in Kelo, Justice Scalia put it this way:
What this lady wants is not more money. No amount of money
is going to satisfy her. She is living in this house, you know, her
whole life and she does not want to move. She said I’ll move if
it’s being taken for a public use, but by God, you’re just giving it
to some other private individual because that individual is going
to pay more taxes. I—it seems to me that’s, that’s an objection
in principle, and an objection in principle that the public use
requirement of the Constitution seems to be addressed to.91
But under the current regime of valuing properties in condemnation
actions, appraisers must assiduously ignore any such subjective
manifestations of value. But do they? Following Kelo, there has been
considerable debate over whether home-owning condemnees have
been undercompensated. Some argue that because appraisers must
look only at “fair market value,” such intrinsic value is ignored and
systematically to undercompensate the owners of property taken by eminent domain under-
scores the fact that such a taking is not a wrongful act.”).
89. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (It is the “amount that in
all probability would have been arrived at by fair negotiations between an owner willing to
sell and a purchaser desiring to buy.” Likewise, the Court held that a condemnee is “entitled
to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be
made whole but is not entitled to more. It is the property and not the cost of it that is
safeguarded by state and federal constitutions.”).
90. Id. at 257 (eminent domain fair market value and value of speculation).
91. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 529436.
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landowners are undercompensated.92 Others argue that data sug-
gests that undercompensation is not widespread93 or that proposed
solutions of premium payments are misguided.94 So while there may
be debate over whether there is undercompensation and how signifi-
cant it may be, the fact is that many people like Mrs. Kelo do not
want to sell. Period. Clearly, their subjective wants are not being met.
Moreover, it is not just investment in new infrastructure that can
raise the value of land. The mere act of taking individual parcels
and assembling them into a larger whole can add tremendous value
apart from any spending on new infrastructure. After all, why would
a TIF-incentivized redevelopment agency take a neighborhood and
turn it into some corporate cash cow if they don’t expect to profit
handsomely from all their hard work?
Thus, each home in a neighborhood of single-family homes may
have a certain discrete value if bought and sold as a single-family
home. Add all these homes together, and the neighborhood will have
an identifiable value. But when the parcels are assembled together
and made susceptible to a more productive economic use, the total
value of the former neighborhood can be greatly enhanced. It can be
many times more valuable as assembled raw land than as a collec-
tion of single-family homes.95 Yet, when such a neighborhood is
condemned, the individual homeowners are paid only what the
home is supposedly worth as a single-family home in a neighborhood
of single-family homes. In other words, if the assemblage could only
be accomplished via eminent domain, it is discounted for valuation
92. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, “Fairness and Equity,” or Judicial Bait and Switch? It’s Time
to Reform the Law of “Just” Compensation, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 38, 42 (2011) (“While fair
market value of the taken property is certainly a proper element of compensation, standing
alone it ignores a variety of incidental economic losses that are inevitably inflicted by forcible
displacement of people from their homes and businesses, and thus falls short of being
genuinely just compensation.”).
93. See, e.g., Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in
Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 648 (2013) (arguing that it is not true that owners
are unfairly undercompensated on intrinsic value and that state attempts to remedy under-
compensation with bonuses are themselves unjust to the poor).
94. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006) (criticizes compensation-based solutions to constrain eminent domain
because they may undermine political resistance to questionable projects and private takings
may generate unique dignitary harms).
95. See John Gavin, Estimating Assemblage Value to Help Buyers and Sellers, NEREJ,
Aug. 16–22, 2013, http://www.nerej.com/65220.
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purposes.96 Thus, the condemned owners get none of the assemblage
value. That, of course, comports with the aphorism that compensa-
tion is measured by what the owner has lost, not what the taker has
gained.97 Because the individual homeowner is unlikely to obtain
consent from all the neighbors to assemble the parcels together on
a voluntary basis, such an assemblage value may be too speculative
to factor into a calculation of fair market value.98 But the condemn-
ing authority—and related private developer—will reap the benefit
of such assembly. This breaks the social contract. Private beneficia-
ries of the condemnation get far more out of the condemnation than
the home-owning condemnees, and it is not for the obvious benefit
of the public as when land is taken for a road or school but for the
private benefit of the redevelopers.
But this is not the worst of it. Government condemnors are notori-
ous for simply paying as little as they can get away with, recognizing,
correctly, that most small landowners lack the wherewithal to fight
back. Indeed, Professor Gideon Kanner has been publishing a “low-
ball watch” for decades.99 Professor Kanner catalogs numerous exam-
ples where condemning agencies have offered to landowners only a
fraction of what those landowners were able to acquire after trial.100
But most small landowners cannot afford a trial. After all, only a
few states will reimburse landowners for their attorneys’ fees, and
then only if the landowner prevails by obtaining a significant in-
crease over the government’s offer. And there’s more. There is a prac-
tice prevalent in some jurisdictions for condemning authorities to
make one lowball offer, then threaten to withdraw that offer and
replace it with a lower one if the landowners resist.101
One of the more egregious tactics was employed by the federal
government in a massive acquisition of private property used to
96. See, e.g., Santa Clara Cty. v. Ogata, 240 Cal. App. 2d 262, 268 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(“The possibility of integrating parcels is a factor which may be considered in determining
market value, provided such integration would have been reasonably practicable without the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.”).
97. United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943).
98. Id. at 275–76.
99. See supra note 30.
100. And, of course, the over legislative attempts to underpay cannot be ignored. See, for
example, Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967 as described by La Croix & Rose, supra note 74.
101. See generally Jarrett Dieterl, The Sandbagging Phenomenon: How Governments Lower
Eminent Domain Appraisals to Punish Landowners, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Nov. 10, 2016,
at 38, http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20161110_DieterleSandbagging.pdf.
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expand the Everglades National Park. There were hundreds of rural
landowners, almost all of modest means, whose property was slated
for condemnation for inclusion in an expanded park. The U.S. Na-
tional Park Service and U.S. Department of Justice employed a
multipronged approach in condemning these lands.102 First, the
Park Service went to the various local towns with property slated
for condemnation and persuaded the towns to downzone the desired
properties. So instead of being able to build one home on a half-acre,
the zoning now would allow only one home per ten acres, or only an
agricultural use on the same property. This, of course, caused a
drastic reduction in fair market value.
Next, the Park Service grouped the condemnees together so it
could condemn multiple properties before a commissioner at once.
(Unlike condemnations by state and local authorities, there is no
right to a jury trial when the federal government condemns land.103)
Most of the rural landowners were unrepresented. And, in fact, if any
landowner hired an attorney, the federal government would drop
the condemnation case with respect to that landowner. As a result,
scores of landowners had their properties condemned without the
benefit of an attorney. They were not sophisticated enough to know
how to object to faulty appraisals, properly raise legal objections
(such as the downzoning gambit), or hire independent appraisers.
So these landowners were uniformly underpaid.
But the real kicker came next. After the federal government fin-
ished condemning the landowners who were unrepresented, it then
went after those landowners who had hired attorneys. But by this
time there were scores of valuations established with the unrepre-
sented landowners. And these values were determined to be conclu-
sive with respect to everybody else. In other words, everybody was
allegedly shortchanged.
In other circumstances, landowners often are drastically under-
compensated when an ongoing and successful business is condemned
for one purpose or another. Most states simply refuse to compensate
for business goodwill.104 For example, a business person with a
102. These allegations were made in United States v. 480.00 Acres of Land, 557 F.3d 1297
(11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1113 (2010).
103. This procedure is currently being challenged at the Sixth Circuit. See Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Brott v. United States, No. 16-1466 (6th Cir. 2016), 2016 WL 3538863.
104. Darius W. Dynkowski, Preparing a Business Damage Claim, American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, ALI-ABA Course of Study,
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successful bakery, automobile repair service, or tax preparation service
may have built up a strong following in the neighborhood. This busi-
ness goodwill can be of great value, and is often taken into account
when a business is sold. Although business goodwill is often relevant
to the dissolution of assets in the context of family law,105 it is usually
different when the government has to pay when it takes business
goodwill. In many jurisdictions, the business owner is simply paid
what the land and building is worth, disregarding the profitability and
goodwill.106 This can be devastating for the small business owner
unable to find or utilize available property in the same neighborhood.
In one particularly egregious recent example, the owner of a suc-
cessful soil excavation business was condemned in order to improve
the levee system. That may well be a legitimate public use. But the
landowner was being compensated only for the raw value of the land,
not for its business value.107 Even more galling, the landowner was
charged by the levee district for dirt that had been excavated before
Condemnation 101: How To Prepare and Present an Eminent Domain Case 251, 253 (Jan. 8–10,
2009), Westlaw SH018 (“Many jurisdictions do not permit compensation for business damages
and the determination of whether business damages are compensable in a particular
jurisdiction depends mainly on legislative grace or a broad interpretation of the jurisdiction’s
common law definition of just compensation. Moreover, in jurisdictions that allow business
damages only certain elements of business losses are compensable.”); see Note, The Nature
of Business Goodwill, 16 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1902) (discussing “business goodwill” as definable
property interest).
105. See, e.g., Alicia Brokers Kelly, Sharing a Piece of the Future Post-Divorce: Toward a
More Equitable Distribution of Professional Goodwill, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 569 (1999); see also
Helga White, Professional Goodwill: Is It a Settled Question or Is There ‘Value’ in Discussing
It?, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 495 (1998).
106. See Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the
Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1991) (“A number of state courts and
legislatures have begun to recognize that losses of goodwill, going-concern value, or profits are
real losses for which the property owners should be compensated.”); see also Gideon Kanner,
(Un)equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property
Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1090 n.110 (2007) (“Before the legislature
made loss of goodwill compensable in eminent domain under some circumstances, the court
got around that inconvenient statutory scheme by simply asserting that business goodwill,
though incontestably property, is not ‘the form of property’ that is protected by the Consti-
tution in eminent domain, implicitly suggesting that property, sort of like ice cream, comes
in different flavors, some more and others less appealing to the courts.”).
107. S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 192 So. 3d 214, 226 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted,
No. 2016-00904 (La. Sept. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 4991620, and writ granted, No. 2016-0788 (La.
Sept. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 5001347 (reversing “trial court determin[ation] that just compensa-
tion for the Jarreau tract included the fair market value of the property plus economic/
business losses for lost profits associated with the value of the excavated dirt”).
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the condemnation but not removed until after. In other words, the dis-
trict took the property so it could become the sole beneficiary of the
business—without paying the business what it was worth.
This state of things is a long way from any recognizable measure
of justice. But even if the landowners were paid more, with less
cheating by condemnors and with some factors that take into ac-
count both the intrinsic value of property, its business value, and its
assemblage, would that be enough? After all, if property is a funda-
mental right, the sense of dominion and autonomy represented by
ownership cannot necessarily be cured by shoving a fistful of dollars
into the homeowner’s hands as the public enters his castle in order
to demolish it for a Walmart or Costco.
VII. REFORM AT THE STATE LEVEL
The reaction to Kelo was swift. A number of states enacted re-
forms that attempted to limit the power of redevelopment. Some
states actually adopted meaningful reforms.108 Florida, for example,
banned all economic-redevelopment takings of private property
without a three-fifths vote of each house.109 California, however, had
a series of failures from ill-conceived reforms. An early attempt at
reform was a ballot initiative brought by an individual who was
unfamiliar with California law and that was written, for all practi-
cal purposes, for the State of Nevada. Another effort tried to pack-
age eminent domain reform with a ban on rent control.110Finally, by
the time the reform advocates got their act together, the redevelop-
ment industry mustered their own countermeasure, a “reform” that
contained a few cosmetic but meaningless protections of homeown-
ers while at the same time enhancing the power of redevelopment
agencies.111 In something of an “only-in-California” move, Governor
Jerry Brown then proceeded to abolish redevelopment agencies in
order to grab the TIF money to help solve one of the state’s periodic
108. See SOMIN, supra note 10, at 141 (on legislative reform).
109. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c) (“Private property taken by eminent domain pursuant to a
petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after January 2, 2007, may not be
conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided by general law passed by
a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature.”).
110. See Sandefur, supra note 27, at 751.
111. See SOMIN, supra note 10, at 159, 175.
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fiscal crises.112 But be assured, the power is being restored, one mea-
sure at a time.113
State supreme courts have done better. Even before Kelo, the su-
preme court of Michigan reversed Poletown, a case where the same
court previously upheld the condemnation of a working-class neighbor-
hood to make way for an eventually-to-fail General Motors factory:
To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of
the fact that the use of that property by a private entity seeking
its own profit might contribute to the economy’s health is to
render impotent our constitutional limitations on the govern-
ment’s power of eminent domain. Poletown’s [economic develop-
ment] rationale would validate practically any exercise of the
power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity. After all,
if one’s ownership of private property is forever subject to the
government’s determination that another private party would
put one’s land to better use, then the ownership of real property
is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of any large
discount retailer, “megastore,” or the like.114
And after Kelo, there was a spate of state court decisions taking
reform seriously.115 Yet, so long as the Supreme Court of the United
States fails to reverse Kelo, the temptation of states to backslide will
be strong.
112. See California Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (Cal. 2011)
(statutes requiring windup and dissolution of redevelopment agencies do not violate consti-
tutional provision limiting State’s ability to require payments from redevelopment agencies);
Maura Dolan, et al., California High Court Puts Redevelopment Agencies out of Business, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/29/local/la-me-redevelopment
-20111230 (noting political and tax reasons for abolition).
113. See Kuhn, supra note 28.
114. Hathcock v. Wayne City, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004).
115. See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1141 (Ohio 2006) (citing
Hathcock’s criticism of economic development positively). Kentucky and Illinois’s supreme
courts have also pointed out that the economic development rationale provides no logical
limits. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that every new legal business provides some sort
of benefit that could be described as economic development. City of Owensboro v. McCormick,
581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 34, at 684–85 (1966)).
Thus, if mere economic development is a public purpose, “there is no limit that can be drawn.”
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the economic development rationale by explaining:
“‘If property ownership is to remain what our forefathers intended it to be, if it is to remain
a part of the liberty we cherish, the economic by-products of [an interest group’s] ability to
develop land cannot justify a surrender of ownership to eminent domain.’” Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth.
v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2002) (quoting lower court decision).
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CONCLUSION
The constitutional limitations on the government’s power of
eminent domain, when adhered to, redound to the benefit of all clas-
ses of Americans. As both Locke and Hobbs posited, a society with-
out government will lead to the powerful taking advantage of the
powerless.116 Government serves to mediate that “war as is of every
man against every man”117 by controlling the instincts and abilities
of some to take advantage of others. Remove that government medi-
ation, and the result is war on the powerless. Make government an
ally of some people in their war against other people, and the op-
pression becomes palpable. Nowhere is this more evident than when
the limits on eminent domain are lifted.
The American experience has been that when the power of emi-
nent domain is unchained, it will attack the most vulnerable: the poor,
the working class, and minorities. The advantage will go to those
who are rich, powerful, politically connected, and white.
The ability to use the political process for self-advantage lies with
those with the strongest economic incentive to drive the politics. Re-
development agencies and aligned developers have much to gain from
private takings of the politically less organized. It is but one more
classic example of rent-seeking, where laws can be crafted to favor
those with a definable and large economic advantage in a political
outcome (such as redevelopers) at the expense of those small, unor-
ganized individuals with small, individual stakes such as working-
class homeowners.118
As a result of the transmogrification of the late “Public Use Clause”
into the “Politically Useful Clause,” of the concomitant embrace of
judicial abdication masked as “deference”, and of the impetus to
undercompensate, the constitutional limits on the taking of private
property for private gain have been eviscerated. And it has not been
the rich who have suffered. Post-Kelo reform has given hope to some.
But unless and until the underlying causes of eminent domain abuse
are rooted out, any respite may be but a temporary pause.
116. Man “seeks out, and is willing to joyn [sic] in Society with others who are already
united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.” JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON
GOVERNMENT § 123. (P. Laslett rev. ed., 1988).
117. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN ch. 14 (1651).
118. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, The Rent-Seeking Society, in 5 THE SELECTED WORKS OF
GORDON TULLOCK (2005).

ARE EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONFISCATION VEHICLES
FOR WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION? A SKEPTICAL VIEW
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
Wealth redistribution, at least rhetorically, is back in vogue in the
United States. A number of scholars have called for a redistribution of
economic resources.1 During the 2016 presidential election campaign,
Democratic Party candidates echoed this assault on concentrated
wealth. This, of course, was not the first episode of redistributive
fervor to appear over the course of American history. Sporadic com-
plaints about wealth distribution in the United States have been a
recurring feature of political life. One thinks of the Populist Move-
ment of the 1890s2 and the New Deal years of the 1930s. But in fact
these outbursts produced little change in wealth patterns. For exam-
ple, despite talk of soak-the-rich policies, the New Deal 1935 tax law
neither significantly altered the distribution of income nor broke up
accumulated wealth.3 Whether the present clamor will result in
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This article is an expanded version of remarks at the Thirteenth An-
nual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference in The Hague, Netherlands, on October 21,
2016. I want to thank Gideon Kanner for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft of this article.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014). But see Michael D. Tanner, Five Myths about Economic Inequality in America,
CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 797, Sept. 7, 2016 (noting that some scholars have ques-
tioned Piketty’s methodology and conclusions). See generally GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS
OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC
(2017) (arguing that income inequality undermines constitutional government); Joseph
Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction
to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Equality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287 (2016).
2. The People’s Party platform of 1892 colorfully proclaimed:
The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for
a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these, in
turn despise the Republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of
governmental injustice we breed the two great classes—tramps and millionaires.
1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1972, at 89-91 (Donald Bruce Johnson & Kirk Harold
Porter eds., 1973).
3. W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 135 (3d ed. 2016)
(“Overall, the tax reforms did not redistribute income through taxation to any great extent,
but the tax system had become more progressive.”); MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC
REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939, 92 (1984) (concluding that “Franklin
Roosevelt’s fleeting onslaughts against ‘economic royalists’ produced minimal revenues and
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meaningful change remains to be seen, but there is reason to be
doubtful. Americans have never demonstrated a sustained national
commitment to economic equality.4
I. THE ANTI-REDISTRIBUTION PRINCIPLE
Before 1900 much constitutional thought in the United States
was concerned with curtailing state redistribution of wealth.5 Since
the founding era a cardinal tenet in constitutional doctrine ques-
tioned the legitimacy of government-mandated alteration of privately
owned resources. Consider a revealing incident that arose from the
drafting of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. This was the most
radically democratic state constitution adopted during the Revolu-
tionary era. In response to concerns that wealth disparities could
undermine political liberty, a committee proposed an unusual provi-
sion to limit the accumulation of wealth: “An enormous Proportion
of Property rested in a few Individuals is dangerous to the Rights,
and destructive of the Common Happiness of Mankind; and there-
fore every free State hath a Right by its Laws to discourage the
Possession of such Property.” This wording was entirely deleted
from the final document, as the Pennsylvania constitution framers
refused to restrict the amount of property that individuals could
acquire.6 No other state even debated such a striking proposal. On
thus were of negligible assistance in redistributing income to the nation’s poor.”). It bears
emphasis that the federal income tax in the 1930s only applied to about five percent of the
population. LEFF, supra, at 96.
4. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 426, 434 (2d ed. 1993)
(asserting that the American understanding of equality “did not imply equality in the dis-
tribution of material resources,” and noting that over the course of United States political
history “the question of the distribution of wealth seldom figured for long, or for large
numbers, as a national problem”).
5. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 10–27 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 1870–1960] (tracing the evolution of the anti-redistribution principle in constitu-
tional doctrine).
6. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 192 (Expanded
Edition, Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 2001); see also ELISHA P. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND
DEMOCRATS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 146 (1955) (concluding “rarely, if ever, did even the most radical
question the right of the wealthy to enjoy their possessions undisturbed”); Robert F. Williams,
The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution
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the contrary, a number of states, including Virginia and Massachu-
setts, affirmed in their constitutions the rights of individuals to
acquire and possess property.
Prominent members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787
made clear their rejection of redistributive policies. Writing in the
Federalist, James Madison characterized “[a] rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property” as “im-
proper or wicked.”7 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton, in 1789, assailed
attacks on property owners, declaring: “There is no stronger sign of
combinations unfriendly to the general good, than when the parti-
sans of those in power raise an indiscriminate cry against men of
property. . . . Such a cry is neither just nor wise . . . .”8 As Jean
Yarbrough pointed out, Thomas Jefferson, although a proponent of
a wide distribution of property, did not favor involving government
“in any radical scheme of redistribution, for this would have violated
Jefferson’s principle of limited government, and run contrary to the
purposes for which civil society was instituted.” She concluded that
Jefferson “was not seriously troubled by the inequality of wealth in
republican America.”9
As is well-known, the Constitution and Bill of Rights contain
numerous provisions designed to protect property owners against
governmental redistribution of their property. The Contract Clause,
for example, was driven in large part by the sour experience with
state legislatures following the Revolution. They in effect attempted
to transfer wealth by interfering in contracts in order to aid debtors
at the expense of creditors.10 The Contract Clause protected the
and Its Influence on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 557–58 (1989).
7. THE FEDERALIST NO.10 (James Madison); see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 268 (1990) (“[P]art of the purpose
of private property for Madison was to make clear that redistribution could never be an
acceptable public objective; it could never be part of a coherent vision of the public good. The
rights of property defined redistribution as an illegitimate exercise of political power to
promote private interests.”).
8. From Alexander Hamilton to the Electors of the State of New York (April 7, 1789), in
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1962).
9. Jean Yarbrough, Jefferson and Property Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 71–72 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman, eds.,
1989); see also Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J. L. AND ECON. 467, 480–81 (1976) (pointing out that Jefferson never endorsed
redistributive policies that would impact existing property holdings).
10. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in part: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
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stability of agreements by barring states from abridging such arrange-
ments. The Fifth Amendment, and its state counterparts, curtailed
the authority of government to seize private property by eminent
domain in two significant respects. Property could only be taken for
“a public use” and upon payment of “just compensation.”11 The Fifth
Amendment did not prevent governmental acquisition of property
but sought to confine any redistributive impact. In theory, assuming
payment of a monetary equivalent for the property taken, the owner
would suffer no economic loss. Hence the redistributive impact on
the property owner would be modest. Moreover, at least in the nine-
teenth century, a number of courts invoked the “public use” limita-
tion to confine the taking of property to governmental purposes or
situations in which the public had a right to use the property.12
To be sure, health and safety regulations had some modest and
incidental redistributive consequences. Significantly, however, there
was no broad consensus during the nineteenth century favoring gov-
ernmental action to alter the market-driven distribution of wealth.
By the end of the nineteenth century the anti-redistributive prin-
ciple was increasingly articulated in connection with proposals to
use taxation as a vehicle to alter the existing distribution of wealth.13
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” For an analysis of this provision over the course of
United States history, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (2016) [hereinafter ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE].
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: “[N]or shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation.” The explicit guarantee of just compensation in the Fifth
Amendment reflected the long-standing practice in both England and the American colonies
of awarding compensation when government acquired property from individual owners.
James W. Ely, Jr, “That due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and the Origins
of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–18 (1992); see also SUSAN REYNOLDS,
BEFORE EMINENT DOMAIN: TOWARD A HISTORY OF EXPROPRIATION OF LAND FOR THE COMMON
GOOD 77–83 (2010) (finding widespread acceptance in the American colonies of the norm that
property could be taken from individual owners upon payment of compensation); William B.
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 533, 579–83 (1972) (point-
ing out that granting compensation was extensively practiced during the colonial period
before the Revolution).
12. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, supra note 5, at 11 (“In
the eminent domain cases, the public purpose doctrine was explicitly designed to prevent state
redistribution of wealth.”); see also ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW
LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 43–49 (2015) (concluding that during the
nineteenth century most state courts interpreted “public use” to confine the taking of property
by government).
13. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 97 (1987) (“The income tax was seen by proponents and opponents alike as pri-
marily an instrument of redistribution; in the parlance of the time it was ‘class legislation.’”).
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John F. Dillon, a leading jurist, forcefully captured this sentiment
in 1895:
But when taxes, so-called, are imposed, not as mere revenue
measures, but for the real purpose of reaching the accumulated
fruits of industry, and are not equal and reasonable, but de-
signed as a forced contribution from the rich for the benefit of
the poor, and as a means of distributing the rich man’s property
among the rest of the community—this is class legislation of the
most pronounced and vicious type; is, in a word, confiscation and
not taxation.14
Dillon’s rejection of the legitimacy of a progressive income tax found
expression in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan and Trust Company (1895), striking down the 1894 income tax
as a “direct tax” not apportioned among the states according to
population as required by the Constitution.15 Justice Stephen J.
Field, in a concurring opinion, focused squarely on the redistributive
potential of the federal income tax. He darkly warned: “The present
assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be the stepping-
stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests
will become a war of the poor against the rich . . . .”16
Notwithstanding this time-honored constitutional tradition of
skepticism of redistribution, Progressive legal thought in the early
decades of the twentieth century did much to undercut the security
of property and contractual rights in order to promote active govern-
mental intervention in the economy. Progressives looked unfavor-
ably upon judicial protection of the rights of property owners.17 The
14. John F. Dillon, Property—Its Rights and Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, 29
AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1895).
15. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). For a dis-
cussion of Pollock, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,
1888–1910, 117–23 (1995).
16. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607; see also 8 OWEN M. FISS, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, 77
(1993) (observing that the fundamental question in Pollock concerned “the permissibility of
using federal power to alter the market distribution of wealth”).
17. James W. Ely, Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights,
29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 255, 264–77, 287 (2012); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 8 (2006) (concluding that Progressives “thought that ever greater
inequalities of wealth justified overriding constitutionally protected rights of liberty, property,
and contract”).
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once-potent Contract Clause, for example, was drained of much effi-
cacy.18 Even more important was a change in tax policy. Anxious to
revamp the tax system and place more of the burden on the wealthy,
Progressives championed a federal income tax. The adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which authorized Congress to levy
an income tax, seemingly reflected a popular willingness to enact
redistributive schemes. Under the influence of the Progressive move-
ment, notions of the proper role of government began to shift.
This transformation was brought to fruition following the political
triumph of the New Deal in the 1930s. New Deal constitutionalism,
which built upon the Progressive initiatives, relegated the rights of
property owners to a secondary place in the constitutional order.19
Consequently, the Constitution was no longer construed to preclude
some forms of redistribution. The New Deal Supreme Court elimi-
nated most of the constitutional obstacles to wealth redistribution,
and simply punted the matter to the political arena. It bears empha-
sis that today there are redistributive dimensions to various public
policies associated with the welfare state.20 A few examples must
suffice. The income tax, largely paid by the more affluent due to its
progressive rate structure, in effect compels wealth transfers to fund
the modern welfare state.21 Rent controls can be characterized as an
effort to transfer wealth from landlords to tenants.22 Minimum wage
laws have been viewed in the same light.
But my inquiry lies elsewhere—to what extent does the exercise
of eminent domain to acquire private property for “public use” or the
18. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, supra note 10, at 192–237.
19. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 134–41 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT].
20. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, 374 (1997) (“Redistributing wealth to provide
welfare benefits for some inevitably requires that the state interfere with the putatively
vested property rights of others.”).
21. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 239 (1999) (“The regular direct and pro-
gressive tax on income is a by-product of the welfare state: it came into being concurrently and
has been justified as necessary to finance the large outlays which social services demand.”); see
also Tanner, supra note 1, at 7 (contending that “the U.S. tax and transfer system is already
highly redistributive”).
22. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21–24 (1988) (Scalia, J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting
in part) (finding tenant hardship provision in local rent control ordinance amounted to a
compelled wealth transfer to tenants in violation of the Fifth Amendment); see also RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 186–88 (1985)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS].
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occasional reliance on outright confiscation serve to redistribute
wealth?23 If there is a redistributive effect, who benefits?
II. EMINENT DOMAIN
I will first briefly consider eminent domain. Unquestionably the
potential for redistribution of wealth is implicit in the power of emi-
nent domain. Morton J. Horwitz, for instance, has argued that during
the antebellum era eminent domain was often employed to assist
fledging enterprises, such as canals and railroads, at the expense of
individual owners, usually farmers. Indeed, Horwitz promulgated
a controversial subsidy thesis, contending that, in effect, land was
taken at low cost and transferred to more powerful economic inter-
ests.24 This thesis is arguably overdrawn, but it reminds us that
property transfers can and do operate in a manner to concentrate
rather than disperse wealth. I suggest that the pattern detected by
Horwitz has quite frequently continued until the present.
The tendency to utilize eminent domain to benefit the wealthy
and politically influential institutions was facilitated in the twenti-
eth century by two constitutional developments. First, the Supreme
Court virtually eviscerated “public use” as a meaningful restraint on
eminent domain, at least at the federal level. Since then, pretty
much anything goes, as the federal courts broadly defer to legisla-
tive determinations of “public use.”25 Those with political clout can
readily manipulate eminent domain to serve their ends. Second, it
is highly unlikely that those whose property is condemned in fact
receive a monetary equivalent for their loss. Indeed, there is vast
literature detailing the inadequacy of prevailing compensation norms
23. A word about terminology is in order. The taking of property by government for public
use upon payment of compensation is called “eminent domain” in the United States and
“compulsory purchase” in the United Kingdom. In the civil law tradition, on the other hand,
such a taking of property is termed “expropriation.” Uncompensated seizure of property is
characterized as “confiscation.” See REYNOLDS, supra note 11, at 1–2, 7–9. Yet, to complicate
matters, the term “expropriation” is sometimes employed by scholars in the United States to
denote an uncompensated confiscation of property. To minimize confusion, I will use the word
“confiscation” rather than “expropriation” to refer to uncompensated seizures.
24. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1869, 63–67,
259–61 (1977).
25. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT, supra note 19, at 156–57; SOMIN,
supra note 12, at 55–61.
218 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 6:211
in eminent domain proceedings.26 The award of only partial compen-
sation encourages excessive use of eminent domain and compounds
the redistribution of wealth to commercial enterprises and developers
typically at the expense of the middle class and poor.
Recent exercises of eminent domain underscore the conclusion
that this power has regularly been employed to promote the inter-
ests of the politically connected rather than the downtrodden.27 Bene-
ficiaries of eminent domain have included General Motors,28 Otis
Elevator,29 owners of professional sports franchises,30 Best Buy,31
and casinos.32 This is hardly a list of the poor. In reverse–Robin Hood
style, the effect of taking property in these cases—even assuming
that “just compensation” was paid—was to further enrich the al-
ready wealthy.
In the same vein, urban renewal projects, ostensibly designed to
clear slums and improve housing conditions for the poor, too often
in reality displaced the poor in favor of upscale housing and middle-
class amenities. As one scholar noted, condemnations of blighted
areas “have typically been part of development or redevelopment
efforts that remove poor occupants and replace them with wealthier,
often less-likely-to-be-minority occupants.”33
Similarly, the Hawaiian land redistribution scheme at issue in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff failed to achieve its announced
goals of encouraging widespread ownership and reducing housing
26. See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for
Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110 (2002).
27. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the
political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those
with more.”).
28. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455
(1981), overruled by Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445 (2004).
29. Yonkers Cmty. Development Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327 (1975).
30. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
31. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
32. L.V. Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 119 Nev. 429, 76 P.3d 1 (2003).
33. David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 379 (2007); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (warning that “extending the concept of public purpose to encom-
pass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately
on poor communities”).
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costs. At issue was a law that authorized residential tenants under
long-term leases to acquire by eminent domain the landlord’s title
to the land, upon payment of compensation. The Supreme Court up-
held this far-reaching exercise of eminent domain, finding that the
program satisfied the “public use” requirement although the benefi-
ciaries were private parties.34 The key point for our purpose, how-
ever, is that the beneficiaries were wealthy tenants, and the scheme
did nothing to reduce the cost of purchasing a home.35 It scarcely
amounted to a redistribution in favor of the disadvantaged.36
III. CONFISCATION
I would like to consider in more detail the question of confiscation
as a feature of American constitutional history. We do not often
think of the outright seizure of property without compensation as
part of our past.37 In fact, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and its counterparts in state constitutions, have often been
pictured as a rejection of naked confiscation as an acceptable policy
in the United States.38 Nonetheless, there have been several epi-
sodes of property despoliation over the course of American history.
I will explore two such events, the confiscation of Loyalist property
during the Revolution and the prohibition of alcoholic beverages in
34. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). For an analysis of Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion in Midkiff, see James W. Ely, Jr., Two Cheers for Justice
O’Connor, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 149, 169–71 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in
Order to “Fulfill Their Unique Role”? A Response to Professor Dyal-Chand, 31 U. HAW. L. REV.
423, 429–33, 456 (2009); Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You Solve a Program Like in Kelo?,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 609, 624–30 (2007).
36. But see Gia L. Cincone, Note, Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The
Republican Legacy, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 1242–46 (1987) (picturing the Hawaii law as a land
reform program designed to break up concentrated land ownership, but not addressing the
question of compensation or considering the impact in terms of wealth redistribution).
37. But see Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 23–24 (1927)
(“Of greatest significance is the fact that in all civilized legal systems there is a great deal of
just expropriation or confiscation without any direct compensation.”); Carol M. Rose, Property
and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2000) (as-
serting that “far from being unknown or highly unusual, expropriations have been very much
a part of our property law—so much so that we generally do not even notice them as such”).
38. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 714 (1985) (observing that
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment “served an educative role. It inculcated the belief
that an uncompensated taking was a violation of a fundamental right.”).
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the late nineteenth century, with attention to their impact on the
distribution of wealth.
A. Loyalist Property
There was nothing novel about the confiscation laws enacted
during the Revolutionary era. Over the course of English history,
disloyal persons were executed and their property seized. William
Blackstone asserted the “natural justice of forfeiture or confiscation
of property, for treason.”39
In 1777 the Continental Congress “earnestly recommended” that
the states enact legislation “to confiscate and make sale of all the
real and personal estate” of those persons supporting Great Britain.40
Each state adopted a confiscation program, often based on bills of
attainder. Such legislation declared certain Loyalists to be traitors
and directed seizure and sale of their property. There was either no,
or a very circumscribed, provision for a trial in court. This confisca-
tion policy was driven by two motives: to punish Loyalists and to
raise funds for the Revolutionary War. Redistribution was not a
prime rationale. As Richard B. Morris concluded, “In America these
confiscations were carried out not to create a peasant freeholding
class . . . .”41
Although not all states pursued confiscation aggressively, a large
amount of land and personal property was seized pursuant to these
statutes.42 Typically the confiscated property was vested in state
commissioners, who were charged to sell the property at public
auction. Clearly some individual Loyalists suffered a substantial
loss, but studies of the Revolutionary confiscations demonstrate that
there was little redistributive effect. There was no dramatic change
39. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *383.
40. Continental Congress (Nov. 27, 1777), in 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774–1789, 971 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1907).
41. Richard B. Morris, Class Struggle and the American Revolution, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 3,
22 (1962) [hereinafter Morris, Class Struggle]; see also Anne M. Ousterhout, Pennsylvania Land
Confiscations during the Revolution, 102 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 328, 340 (1978) (“The
confiscation of the estates was not intended to help landless individuals acquire property.”).
42. WALLACE BROWN, THE GOOD AMERICANS: THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 129 (1969) [hereinafter BROWN, THE GOOD AMERICANS] (noting variations in the severity
of state confiscation policies).
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in the pattern of land ownership.43 Indeed, most of the purchasers
of confiscated property were already landowners who simply en-
larged their estates.44 In addition, the confiscation sales did not yield
a financial bonanza for the states, as proceeds from the sales were
used primarily to pay the creditors of the dispossessed Loyalists.45
Why did this potentially radical program produce such modest
results? Part of the answer is that the overriding objective of the
states was to raise money quickly. Confiscated property was not given
away to the destitute. Rather, it was sold to the highest bidder, who
was frequently required to complete the purchase in cash or post a
bond for future payment. As a practical matter, these conditions pre-
cluded anyone not moderately wealthy from acquiring confiscated
land.46 Moreover, commissioners did not always advertise sales prop-
erly or follow statutory procedures. Consequently, there is evidence
43. It is important to keep in mind that confiscations encompassed personal property,
such as farm implements, furniture, and animals, as well as land. See Howard Pashman, The
People’s Property Law: A Step Toward Building a New Legal Order in Revolutionary New
York, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 587 (2013) (stressing the impact of New York’s confiscation laws on
personal property).
44. HARRY B. YOSHPE, THE DISPOSITION OF LOYALIST ESTATES IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 60–61 (1939) (“While it is true that the disposal of the loyalist
estates effected a greater diffusion of ownership, it is questionable whether it went far toward
a radical redistribution of landed wealth and a new social and economic order. Motivated by
the desire for profit and by the feeling that the possession of landed estates was the firmest
pillar on which the social distinction of their families could rest, the leaders of the Revolution,
powerful politicians, rich merchants, landowners, and speculators, many already possessed
of substantial land holdings, contrived to get a large part of the loyalist estates into their own
hands.”); Richard D. Brown, The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists’ Estates in Suffolk
County, Massachusetts, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 547 (1964) [hereinafter Brown, The Confis-
cation and Disposition of Loyalists’ Estates] (finding that sales of confiscated land in
Massachusetts “represent no actual diffusion of ownership, but rather a division of loyalist
property among people who already owned land”); Robert S. Lambert, The Confiscation of
Loyalist Property in Georgia, 1782–1786, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 80, 92 (1963) (“In any case the
confiscation policy does not seem to have resulted in any substantial redistribution of property
from wealthy Loyalists to poor landless Whigs . . . .”); Morris, Class Struggle, supra note 41,
at 23 (“When estates were broken up they often went to enlarge the holdings of adjacent
farmers and led to a concentration rather than a breakup of holdings.”).
45. Ousterhout, supra note 41, at 333; Lambert, supra note 44, at 91 (“Certainly the
confiscation of Loyalist estates did not prove to be the fiscal panacea that many had hoped
for.”); Brown, Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists’ Estates, supra note 44, at 543
(“Proceeds from sales went primarily to the creditors of the loyalists . . . .”); see also BROWN,
THE GOOD AMERICANS, supra note 42, at 128 (“Also the device of trying partially to finance
the war with traitors’ wealth was naturally very popular, if of limited success.”).
46. Ousterhout, supra note 41, at 334, 340; Brown, Confiscation and Disposition of
Loyalists’ Estates, supra note 44, at 547; Morris, Class Struggle, supra note 41, at 38.
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that confiscation sales were sometimes manipulated to enrich a clique
of insiders who obtained land at prices below market value.47
It is important to bear in mind that the confiscation of Loyalist
property, although undoubtedly popular, aroused opposition. Some
were concerned that the expropriation of Loyalist property might
portend a broader assault on private property generally.48 Others
favored a policy of conciliation toward Loyalists, arguing that a
continuation of seizures only prolonged bitterness and undercut
reconciliation. After the end of the Revolutionary War, prominent
political leaders, such as Hamilton and Madison, sought to moder-
ate confiscation policy, worked to repeal the confiscation laws, and
represented Loyalists seeking to reclaim their property in judicial
proceedings.49 Moreover, John Adams, in Paris to negotiate a treaty
of independence, grudgingly expressed his support for compensation
for confiscated property.50
The 1783 Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War and recog-
nized the independence of the United States. It did not, however, offer
47. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 91 (1985) (“Thus, in practice, sales of confiscated property had often been colossal
boondoggles, carried out to enrich political insiders.”); Isaac S. Harrell, North Carolina
Loyalists, 3 N.C. HIST. REV. 575, 583–84 (1926) (noting that confiscation sales were “conducted
with flagrant disregard for honesty, justice and public welfare,” and that commissioners often
purchased estates themselves); Richard C. Haskett, Prosecuting the Revolution, 59 AM. HIST.
REV. 578, 585–86 (1954) (finding evidence of improper sales in New Jersey and concluding
that favored buyers could obtain confiscated property at bargain prices); Ousterhout, supra
note 41, at 336–38 (noting allegations of improper sales and evidence that individuals con-
ducting sales bid for themselves).
48. MCDONALD, supra note 47, at 90–93; Brown, Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists’
Estates, supra note 44, at 536.
49. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT, supra note 19, at 36; BROWN, THE
GOOD AMERICANS, supra note 42, at 177–79. For instance, in 1784 Hamilton criticized reliance
on bills of attainder to punish Loyalists, stressed that the Treaty of Paris barred further
confiscations, and decried a vindictive spirit toward Loyalists. Letter from Phocion to the
Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 27, 1784), in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
483–97 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). Hamilton also represented Loyalists
in a number of legal actions pertaining to their property, most notably Rutgers v. Waddington
(unreported) (Mayor’s Court of New York City 1784); see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and
Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review,
81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 825, 844–48 (2006).
50. Letter from John Adams to Jonathan Jackson (Nov. 17, 1782), in JOHN ADAMS, 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE
AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 516 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856). (“I would
compensate the [w]retches, how little [s]oever they deserve it, nay how much soever they
deserve the [c]ontrary.”). This opinion by Adams would appear to be driven more by the desire
to reach a treaty with Great Britain than by considerations of justice for Loyalists.
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much comfort to Loyalists whose property was seized. The Treaty
forbad further confiscations, but some states disregarded this provi-
sion. North Carolina continued to sell Loyalist estates until 1790.51
With respect to already forfeited property, the Treaty only required
Congress to recommend that the states make restitution of such
property.52 There was, as might be expected, no wholesale restitu-
tion of property or offer of compensation. Lawsuits by Loyalists to
reclaim property also proved fruitless. In 1800 the Supreme Court
upheld a Georgia bill of attainder enacted during the Revolutionary
War. Justice William Cushing declared: “The right to confiscate and
banish, in the case of an offending citizen, must belong to every
government.”53 Still, it should be noted that some states granted
petitions by individual Loyalists for relief from confiscation, steps
which further diluted the redistributive aspect of Revolutionary
policy toward the Loyalists.54
Quite apart from its meagre impact on wealth distribution, the
wave of Loyalist property confiscations left a lasting sour taste. As
early as 1780 the new Constitution of Massachusetts prohibited bills
of attainder.55 This move anticipated developments at the national
level. The framers of the Constitution in 1787, as discussed above,
included various provisions designed to prevent the state legisla-
tures from redistributing property. Among other restrictions, the
Constitution expressly bars both Congress and the states from en-
acting bills of attainder, the principal vehicle employed to seize
Loyalist property.56 As a prominent historian has explained, the pro-
hibitions on bills of attainder “were aimed more at protecting property
rights (recall the wartime confiscations) than at protecting liberty.”57
During the nineteenth century prominent scholars severely criti-
cized reliance on bills of attainder. Justice Joseph Story pictured
such legislation in a dark light, declaring:
The punishment has often been inflicted without calling upon
the party accused to answer, or without even the formality of
51. Harrell, supra note 47, at 588.
52. Treaty of Paris, Gr. Brit.-U.S., arts. 5, 6, Sept. 3, 1783.
53. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14, 19 (1800).
54. Lambert, supra note 44, at 88–91.
55. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXV (“No subject ought, in any case, or in any time, to be de-
clared guilty of treason or felony by the legislature.”).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
57. MCDONALD, supra note 47, at 270.
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proof; and sometimes, because the law, in its ordinary course of
proceedings, would acquit the offender. The injustice and iniq-
uity of such acts, in general, constitute an irresistible argument
against the existence of the power.58
Commenting directly on the treatment of Loyalists, Story added:
“During the revolutionary war, bills of attainder, and ex post facto
acts of confiscation were passed to a wide extent; and the evils
resulting therefrom were supposed, in times of more cool reflection,
to have far outweighed any imagined good.”59 In the same vein,
Thomas M. Cooley explained, “the power to repeat such acts under
any possible circumstances in which the country could be placed
again was felt to be too dangerous to be left in legislative hands.”60
B. Confiscation Repudiated: The Civil War Experience
That the Loyalist confiscation experience left its mark became ap-
parent when the United States again considered the confiscation of
property during the Civil War. In 1862 Congress passed the Second
Confiscation Act. Among other provisions, this measure authorized
the federal government to seize all the real and personal property
of those persons aiding or abetting the Confederacy. The Confisca-
tion Act, however, differed sharply from the bills of attainder directed
against Loyalists during the Revolution. Instead of a legislative
declaration of guilt, it required an in rem judicial determination
that the owner had given support to the Confederacy by a federal
court where the property was located.61 Most of the property liable
to confiscation was situated in the South and under Confederate
control. Consequently, the property could not be reached and judi-
cial proceedings could not be commenced until the end of hostilities.
President Abraham Lincoln doubted both the wisdom and constitu-
tionality of the Act. He insisted that Congress adopt a resolution
which provided that no punishment under the Act should be con-
strued “as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond
58. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 485
(1833, reprint 1987).
59. Id. at 497.
60. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 262 (1868, reprint 2002).
61. Second Confiscation Act, 12 Stat. 589, §§ 5–8 (1862).
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his natural life.”62 Although confined to land, the proviso minimized
the impact of the law. Neither Lincoln nor his successor, Andrew
Johnson, did much to implement confiscation.63 Moreover, in a series
of decisions the Supreme Court narrowly construed the power of
confiscation. Significantly, following Lincoln’s analysis, it ruled that
the United States could confiscate property only for the “life of the
person for whose act it had been seized.”64 Confiscation, therefore,
could only last for the life of the offender and did not bind the of-
fender’s heirs, a conclusion that reduced the value of confiscated
property in the marketplace and undercut the efficacy of the confis-
cation policy. Not surprisingly, relatively little property was in fact
seized under the Second Confiscation Act.
During the Reconstruction era, a number of radical Republicans
continued to agitate for aggressive land confiscation and redistribu-
tion as part of schemes to fundamentally overhaul southern society
and destroy the power of large planters. Congressman Thaddeus
Stevens, a radical from Pennsylvania, set forth a sweeping land
confiscation plan in September of 1865.65 He proposed “to confiscate
all the estate of every rebel belligerent whose estate was worth
$10,000, or whose land exceeded two hundred acres in quantity.”66
Stevens further proposed distributing part of the land in forty-acre
lots to each adult male former slave. The remainder would be di-
vided into farms and sold, with the proceeds being used to indem-
nify losses to loyal citizens and reduce the war debt.67 The House of
Representatives rejected the Stevens proposal by a decisive vote of
126 to 37.68
62. Joint Resolution Explanatory of “An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason
and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes,”12
Stat. 627 (1862).
63. For a discussion of the 1862 Confiscation Act, see DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS
OF SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL
WAR (2007) [hereinafter HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY].
64. Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. 339, 350 (1870) (Strong, J.).
65. For Stevens’s confiscation plans, see MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRIN-
CIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863–1869, 149–50, 258–60 (1974);
RALPH KORNGOLD, THADDEUS STEVENS: A BEING DARKLY WISE AND RUDELY GREAT, 281–90
(1955); JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN, THE LIFE OF THADDEUS STEVENS, 521–35 (1913).
66. Thaddeus Stevens, Land Confiscation Plan Speech to Pennsylvanians (Sept. 6, 1865),
http://history.furman.edu/benson/hst41/red/stevens2.htm.
67. Id.
68. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 688 (1865).
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Undaunted, in March of 1867 Stevens renewed his proposal, call-
ing for the immediate enforcement of the 1862 Confiscation Act and
distribution of part of the seized land to former slaves.69 Perhaps
sensing that his call for confiscation would fall upon deaf ears, Stevens
moved to delay consideration of this proposal until December. In the
end his plan went nowhere. President Johnson issued a series of
amnesty proclamations restoring the property rights of certain ex-
Confederates, and effectively barred any future confiscations with
his 1868 Christmas general amnesty to all former Confederates.70
By the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Americans had
seemingly closed the door on sweeping confiscations of property as
a penalty for disloyalty. The Hartford Daily Courant enthusiasti-
cally declared that “the savage calls for general confiscation made
by a very few have never found even an echo.”71
It remains to consider why, after a bitter and costly Civil War,
calls for the confiscation of Confederate-owned property gained so
little traction. In other words, why was northern opinion so hostile
to the seizure of land held by wealthy planters in the South? Critics
raised a number of objections to confiscation. They repeatedly pic-
tured confiscation as a partisan scheme to attract the vote of newly
freed slaves.72 Opponents also expressed concern that confiscation
would retard the return of economic growth and prosperity in an
impoverished South. A confiscation policy, according to the New York
Times, “introduces a new element of uncertainty into the South,
intensifies its industrial paralysis, and heightens the distrust which
already deters capitalists from embarking in its enterprises.”73
More telling for our purposes, however, was opposition to govern-
mental redistribution of property in principle, and fear that a radi-
cal redistribution would not be confined to the defeated southern
states.74 Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio fueled this concern. In
June of 1867 he assailed the distinctions between capital and labor,
and boldly declared: “Property is not equally divided, and a more
69. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., 203–08 (1867).
70. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 63, at 159–60.
71. HARTFORD DAILY COURANT, Dec. 10, 1867.
72. The Republican Party and Schemes of Agrarianism, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1867, at 4.
73. Editorial, Confiscation—The Extremists and Their Threats, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 1867,
at 4.
74. Cincone, supra note 36, at 1239 (“[T]he threat to private property that opponents of
the Stevens bill perceived it to be outweighed the republican rhetoric.”).
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equal distribution of capital must be wrought out.”75 As might be
expected, northern opinion was extremely antagonistic to any sug-
gestion of a general redistribution of property. The Times reacted to
Wade’s speech in a fiery blast.
It seemed scarcely credible that any man occupying his position
would arraign the inequality of wealth as a wrong to be remedied
by legislation. We were not willing to believe that doctrine of
dividing property, and adding to the rewards of labor by a legis-
lative inroad upon the hoard of the capitalist, is to be imported
into our politics and made the groundwork of future agitation.
The Times denounced Wade’s remarks as “destructive, leveling, and
utterly anarchical propositions.”76 Amplifying this theme, it denounced
all “projects of confiscation, extermination and the distribution of
property or of profits” as “the work of dreamers or demagogues.” The
Times bluntly concluded: “Unless the right of holding property is to
be abolished, there is no possible way of equalizing its possession.”77
Likewise, the Nation pictured confiscation proposals as “looking
toward special favors for special classes of people,” and denounced
then as “simply schemes of robbery.”78 Clearly the anti-redistribu-
tion principle carried the day with respect to land confiscation in the
Civil War Era.79
C. Prohibition
This did not mean, however, the legislatures would not attempt to
destroy other types of previously lawful property as public sentiment
75. As quoted in ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS,
1863–1877, 309 (1988); see also William Frank Zornow, “Bluff Ben” Wade in Lawrence,
Kansas: The Issue of Class Conflict, 66 OHIO HIST. J. 44–52 (1956).
76. Editorial, Labor and Capital—Mr. Wade’s “Jump Forward,” N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1867, at 4 [hereinafter N.Y. TIMES, Labor and Capital].
77. Editorial, The Republican Party and Schemes of Agrarianism, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1867, at 4.
78. Editorial, True Radicalism, THE NATION, July 18, 1867.
79. Interestingly, the Times expressed confidence that the American people would reject
redistribution of property. “Nowhere in the world,” it observed, “is property so universally
diffused as in this country, and nowhere, therefore, will the protest against every scheme for
violating its rights be uttered with such heartiness and effect.” N.Y. TIMES, Labor and
Capital, supra note 76, at 4; see also Editorial, Future Political Issues, THE NATION, June 27,
1867 (“A community in which property is so widely spread as it is in our Northern States
cannot be led into any hare-brained plans for its redistribution.”).
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shifted. A case in point was the periodic emergence of statutes out-
lawing the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages during the
nineteenth century. We tend to think of Prohibition in terms of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the 1920s, but my focus will be on earlier
episodes which highlighted the clash between prohibition laws and
property rights. Maine enacted the first statewide prohibition law
in 1851, and a number of other states followed suit in the 1850s.80
Prohibitionists maintained that a ban on alcoholic beverages would
safeguard public health and discourage crime and pauperism. Unlike
eminent domain cases, here there was no transfer of property from
one party to another. With prohibition laws the possession and use
of property rights in alcoholic beverages was destroyed for the per-
ceived public benefit. The early prohibition cases, then, presented
the fundamental issue of whether statutes, although couched in
terms of regulation, in actuality served to expropriate a species of
hitherto lawful private property. To be sure, courts in the nineteenth
century were generally disposed to conclude that a ban on alcoholic
beverages was a valid exercise of the police power to safeguard the
health and morals of the public.81 Some endorsed the view that al-
coholic beverages, although long considered as a legitimate form of
private property, could be defined as a nuisance by the legislature
and were thus subject to forfeiture without compensation.82
Still, some jurists and commentators expressed concern that the
prohibition laws amounted to an uncompensated destruction of prop-
erty. At issue in the important case of Wynehamer v. People (1856)
was a New York statute banning the sale or gift of alcoholic bever-
ages and authorizing the destruction of alcohol as a public nuisance.83
The New York Court of Appeals invalidated the measure with respect
80. IAN R. TYRRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO PROHIBITION IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA, 1800–1860, 252–82 (1979).
81. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW; NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, 258–59 (2015); MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN
LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 512–14 (1977).
82. Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. 1, 41 (1854) (insisting that because liquor “is so noxious
and declared to be such by law, the owner’s right of property is divested by the judgement, and
he can have no claim to compensation”); see also The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 589 (1847)
(McLean, J.) (“The acknowledged police power of a State extends often to the destruction of
property. A nuisance may be abated. Every thing [sic] prejudicial to the health or morals of
a city may be removed.”).
83. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). This decision did much to undermine
enforcement of the prohibition law in New York; TYRRELL, supra note 80, at 291.
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to alcoholic beverages owned when the law was enacted as a depri-
vation of property without due process.84 In the lead opinion, Judge
George F. Comstock ruled that alcoholic beverages had long been
treated as property and were entitled to the same level of constitu-
tional protection as other forms of property. He framed the funda-
mental question as to whether the legislature can “confiscate and
destroy property lawfully acquired by the citizen in intoxicating
liquors.”85 Insisting that the right of property ownership encom-
passed the power of disposition and sale as well as enjoyment,
Comstock maintained that a law which eliminated these attributes
destroyed the notion of property even if the thing itself was physi-
cally untouched. He conceded that it was difficult to draw a precise
line between regulation of property and destruction, but he con-
cluded that “the legislature cannot totally annihilate commerce in
any species of property, and so condemn the property itself to extinc-
tion.”86 Although he was clearly bothered by the statutory provision
inviting physical destruction of alcoholic beverages, Comstock’s
analysis turned upon the statutory elimination of commerce in
alcoholic beverages already owned by individuals when the law took
effect. Nevertheless, the court intimated that the legislature could
bar the future manufacture or importation of such beverages after
the law became effective.
Along the same lines as Wynehamer, three members of the Su-
preme Court in 1873 took the position that a state prohibition law
could not interfere with rights to alcoholic beverages existing at the
date of passage without payment of compensation.87 Justice Stephen
J. Field proclaimed:
I have no doubt of the power of the State to regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors when such regulation does not amount to the
destruction of the right of property in them. The right of property
in an article involves the power to sell and dispose of such article
as well as to use and enjoy it. Any act which declares that the
84. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 384–98. For a discussion of Wynehamer as a milestone in the evo-
lution of the due process guarantee, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth
and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315, 338–41 (1999).
85. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 384.
86. Id. at 399.
87. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 135–41 (1873) (Bradley, J., Swayne, J., and Field,
J., concurring).
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owner shall neither sell it nor dispose of it, nor use and enjoy it,
confiscates it, depriving him of his property without due process
of law.88
More complex questions concerned the impact of prohibitory liquor
laws on the value of property employed to manufacture alcoholic
beverages. Cooley raised this point in 1868:
Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature
to make such regulations as may destroy the value of property,
without compensation to the owner, appears in a more striking
light than in the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic
drinks being lawful, and the capital employed in it being fully
protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and, by an enact-
ment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the
traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and reduces to a nomi-
nal value the property on hand.89
This issue was squarely presented when Kansas adopted a consti-
tutional provision in 1880 barring the manufacture and sale of
“intoxicating liquors” except for medical and scientific purposes. A
year later the legislature enacted a statute to carry out this man-
date.90 Peter Mugler had opened a brewery before the prohibition
amendment was adopted and continued to sell beer in violation of
the law. In a criminal proceeding to enforce the law, Mugler alleged
that his property was worth ten thousand dollars as a brewery but
only twenty-five hundred dollars for any other purpose. He asserted
that this reduction in value amounted to an unconstitutional depri-
vation of his property without due process of law.91 Brushing aside
this contention, the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1883 nonetheless
observed: “The legislature has probably gone a long way in destroy-
ing the values of such kinds of property as the defendant owned,
and has possibly gone to the utmost verge of constitutional author-
ity.”92 The court emphasized that Mugler had not been deprived of
88. Id. at 137.
89. COOLEY, supra note 60, at 583–84.
90. For a treatment of the adoption of the 1881 law, see ROBERT SMITH BADER, PROHI-
BITION IN KANSAS: A HISTORY 63–71 (1986).
91. State v. Mugler, 29 Kan. 252 (1883).
92. Id. at 269.
2017] EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONFISCATION 231
his brewery or any tangible property, only his ability to use the
property to manufacture and sell beer. Concurring, David J. Brewer,
later appointed to the Supreme Court, cut to the heart of the matter,
asking: “Is this not taking private property for public use without
any compensation? If the public good requires the destruction of the
value of this property, is not prior compensation indispensable?”93
Brewer amplified his reasoning in an 1886 federal circuit court
opinion. The facts were similar to those in the Mugler case. The de-
fendant had invested fifty thousand dollars for land, buildings, and
fixtures for the purpose of producing beer at a time when selling beer
was lawful in Kansas. He charged that the prohibition law reduced
the value of his property to five thousand dollars, and that this loss
constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property. Brewer
agreed, ruling that a prohibition law could not interfere with already
existing property rights without payment of compensation. He ac-
knowledged that a state could ban the future manufacture and sale
of alcoholic beverages, but drew the line at retrospective application
of the law to property in existence when the measure was enacted.94
Brewer’s efforts to secure some compensation for the owners of
shut breweries ultimately came to naught. In Mugler v. Kansas
(1887) the Supreme Court invoked the police power to protect the
health and morals of the community, firmly closing the door on
claims for compensation by breweries operating at the time the
prohibition law was enacted and thereby suffering a material dimin-
ishment in value. Justice John Marshall Harlan, speaking for the
Court, observed:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community cannot in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the con-
trol or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his
93. Id. at 274.
94. State v. Walruff, 26 F. 178 (C.C.D. Kan. 1886). In an 1891 address Brewer reiterated
his belief that the law outlawing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors in Kansas
should have provided compensation to the owners of breweries. He stated that “it was fitting
for the majority not to destroy without compensation; and to share with the few the burden
of that change in public sentiment”). David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from
Public Attack, 55 NEW ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97, 104 (1891).
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right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that
its use by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to
the public interests.95
Commentators recognized the confiscatory dimension of prohibi-
tion legislation. Surveying such laws in 1904, Ernst Freund pointed
out that prohibition could “destroy the entire value of breweries”
and that “it can hardly be denied that for every practical purpose
the owner is deprived of his property.”96 Two decades later Morris
R. Cohen, speaking of the Eighteenth Amendment, revealingly stated:
“In our own day, we have seen the confiscation of many millions of
dollars’ worth of property through prohibition. Were the distillers
and brewers entitled to compensation for their losses?”97
There was no change in patterns of wealth ownership as a result
of the state prohibition laws in the nineteenth century. To be sure,
as Cohen correctly noted, many small breweries and distilleries were
wiped out, but neither the purpose nor the effect of prohibition was
redistributive. The owners simply suffered their losses.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the image of the United States as a property-protec-
tive nation, there have been drastic interferences with property rights
in times of crisis or in response to public clamor. One might also in-
clude the abolition of slave property in this category.98 But if confis-
cation cannot be banished from American constitutional history,
neither should its presence or impact be exaggerated. The redis-
tributive effect of the two episodes considered here—Loyalist property
95. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 688 (1887); see EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 22, at
130–31 (pointing out that the Court’s opinion failed to link the police power justification of con-
trolling poverty and crime to a ban on the production of alcoholic beverages, and concluding
that if the state “must justify its undisputed taking of property, then the decision seems wrong”).
96. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER; PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 568
(1904).
97. Cohen, supra note 37, at 25; see also HERMAN FELDMAN, PROHIBITION: ITS ECONOMIC
AND INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS 306–29 (1930) (commenting that “no law passed in this country
since the abolition of slavery affected so vast an investment of tangible property as did the
Volstead Act,” and pointing out that unused brewery and distillery property usually depreciated
sharply in value and was often dismantled or sold at bargain prices to other industries).
98. Rose, supra note 37, at 24–25 (“A third extraordinary disruption was the emancipation
of the slaves in the aftermath of the Civil War in the 1860s. . . . But with the Civil War and
the post-War amendments to the Constitution, slavery was simply abolished, and all the
capital invested in slaves wiped out.”).
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confiscation during the Revolutionary era and prohibition of alco-
holic beverages in the nineteenth century—was limited at best.
Moreover, as the Civil War experience demonstrated, Americans
have generally been reluctant to employ wholesale confiscation to
compel redistribution of wealth. This perhaps reflects an unarticu-
lated understanding that government-forced wealth redistributions
undermine the right of private property, which in turn weakens the
historic significance of property as a bulwark of personal and politi-
cal freedom.99 Moreover, it is questionable that a fixation on in-
equality is the best approach to eliminate poverty.100 For the most
part, Americans have preferred economic growth over redistributive
policies. There is a close link between guarantees of private property
and national prosperity.101 As John Marshall pointed out, rendering
property insecure destroys inducements to industry. “Marshall,”
Charles Hobson has explained, was convinced “that strong protec-
tion for property and investment capital would promote national pros-
perity.”102 Marshall’s vision has generally held sway over the course
of United States history.
In short, the record indicates that neither eminent domain nor
outright expropriation have proven to be meaningful vehicles for the
transfer of wealth from the affluent to the poor in the United States.103
Indeed, as noted above, eminent domain has often been employed to
benefit established and politically connected enterprises. To the ex-
tent that wealth inequality is perceived as a problem, one must seek
elsewhere for a solution.
99. PIPES, supra note 21, at xiii (asserting that “there is an intimate connection between
public guarantees of ownership and individual liberty: that while property in some form is
possible without liberty, the contrary is inconceivable”).
100. Deirdre N. McCloskey, Growth, Not Forced Equality, Saves the Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2016, at BU6 (maintaining that redistributive policies are less effective than eco-
nomic growth in improving conditions for the poor).
101. DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME NATIONS ARE
SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR 217–18 (1998) (concluding that a society “best suited to pursue
material progress” would have standards which, among other things, “[s]ecure rights of
private property, the better to encourage savings and investment” and “[e]nforce rights of
contract, explicit and implicit”).
102. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 74 (1996); see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A
Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1026–27 (2000).
103. But compare Jessica A. Clark, Note, Eminent Domain and Expropiacion: Comparison
Between Fifth Amendment Precedent and Latin American Land Redistribution, 28 REGENT
UNIV. L. REV. 319, 329–49 (2016) (noting that expropriation as part of land reform programs
in certain Latin American nations expressly sought to redistribute land to the rural poor).

OWNERSHIP OF DATA: THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS
OF LEGAL OBJECTS
SJEF VAN ERP*
INTRODUCTION
From a comparative viewpoint, “ownership” at a formal level (i.e.,
technical-terminological), but even more so at a substantive level,
already has a wide variety of meanings. It ranges from the fullest
right possible with regard to tangibles (thus excluding intangibles as
in German law) to the fullest right possible with regard to both tangi-
bles and intangibles (as in French law) to an exclusive right to pos-
session (as in common law, where we should, furthermore, distinguish
between “estates” in land and “titles” to personal property).1 What has
hardly been noticed is that the description of what is meant by
ownership, although primarily aimed at delineating the content of
that right, also characterizes the object of the right. The object of the
right is thus a part of the right’s content. In other words, the right
(ownership) and the object (tangible/intangible) have traditionally
been connected; the object is a qualifier of the property right. This in-
tersects with the civilian idea of a numerus clausus of property rights,
which is thus buttressed by a numerus clausus of legal objects. The
type of property rights is seen as limited, both with regard to num-
ber and content, and so is the type of objects related to those prop-
erty rights. The digital revolution, with its rapid growth of digital
data and incredibly fast expansion of interconnectedness and inter-
operability, thus makes us question both what can be recognised as
a legal object (can it include “digital data” and if so, under which
* Professor of Civil Law and European Private Law, Maastricht University; Member of the
Executive Committee of the European Law Institute, Vienna (http://www.europeanlawinstitute
.eu). Professor van Erp is available at s.vanerp@maastrichtuniversity.nl. This contribution
is a revised and expanded version of an article, Ownership of Digital Assets, originally written
as a contribution to a Festschrift (Sjef van Erp, Ownership of Digital Assets (forthcoming)).
1. See Bram Akkermans & William Swadling, in IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE
COMMON LAW OF EUROPE: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY LAW 211 ff (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012); cf.
Caroline Lebon, Property Rights In Respect Of Claims, in IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE
COMMON LAW OF EUROPE: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY LAW 365 ff (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012).
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conditions?) and what the impact of the recognition of digital data as
a legal object means for our understanding of ownership. Ownership
of digital data seems very different from ownership of, for example,
land. This will require a rethinking of existing traditional concepts,
not only on an intrasystemic scale (e.g., only focussing on the common
law or the civil law traditions) but also on a trans- and even supra-
systemic scale, given that these developments are of a global nature.
This rethinking may need to find a globally shared approach.2
I. SUBJECTS, OBJECTS AND RIGHTS
In a recent article in the European Property Law Journal, the
South African property law scholar Jean Sonnekus wrote that for a
legal scientist it is “tantamount to mental laziness” if license, copy-
right, and ownership are all seen as assets “bundled under the same
nomenclature as ‘property.’”3 Is this really the case?
Let us first start by analysing what, from a comparative viewpoint,
is meant when lawyers refer to a particular problem as belonging to
the law of property. Generally speaking, they are discussing the legal
relations between a subject vis-à-vis a considerable number of other
subjects, regarding an object. These legal relations can be distin-
guished from relations between two or more specific subjects, aris-
ing from a contractual agreement or tort. In civil law the distinction
is fairly strict: a property right must be erga omnes, that is, “against
all” or “against the world.” The common law is more flexible and also
calls the legal relation a property right if someone has the “better
title;” in other words, if a person in her relation with another person
has the stronger right to an object.
Traditionally, the focus of property lawyers (and comparative prop-
erty lawyers) has been on the various types of relationships, their
structure, and content. In the United States, the best example of such
an approach was the famous analysis by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
of property rights as an amalgam of rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities, which was even taken as the foundation upon which the
2. Cf. Sjef van Erp, Teaching Law in Europe: From an Intra-Systemic, Via a Trans-
Systemic to a Supra-Systemic Approach, in EDUCATING EUROPEAN LAWYERS 79 (A.W. Heringa
& Bram Akkermans eds., 2011).
3. JC Sonnekus, The Fundamental Differences in the Principles Governing Property Law
and Succession from a South African Law Perspective, 3 EUR. PROP. L.J. 130, 136 (2014).
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Restatement Property was built.4 However, the questions of who could
be a subject of property law and what could be an object of property
law were not asked. It was, so it seems, not really considered to be
a problem.5
Traditionally, subjects of property rights could be natural and legal
persons. Legal persons could be corporations, but also entities of pub-
lic international law or entities of State. Ownerless property rights
arising in a trust structure, such as exists in the Canadian province
of Québec and—based upon the Québec model—the Czech Republic,
were unknown.6 It was even unthinkable that “virtual” subjects might
own something, as is the case with avatars in the virtual world of
Second Life, or that objects might become autonomous through self-
learning attributes—hence, “robots” with legal capacity.7 Also from
a traditional viewpoint, objects of property were, first of all, physical
things; particularly land, but also movables. It took some time before
non-physical things (“intangibles”) were accepted as objects of eco-
nomic value, such as monetary claims, which could be transferred and
used as security for repayment of a loan. Questions concerning digital
data were inconceivable. Information was seen as something which
was so fluent that it could not be owned. Even in the United States
it took some time before privacy, in the sense of information that
was “yours,” was seen as something to which you could be “entitled”
and that such an entitlement could be violated.8 To summarise and
4. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate
the Bundle?: The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV 681, 683
ff (2014).
5. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develop-
ment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 ff (1980) (citing Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 ff (1964)).
6. Cf. Alexandra Popovice, Trust in Quebec and Czech Law: Autonomous Patrimonies?,
6 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 929 ff (2016) (Neth.).
7. Compare the recent intriguing report on robotics published by the European Parliament:
Nathalie Nevejans, European Civil Law Rules in Robotics, Study for The European Parliament’s
Legal Affairs Committee, PE 571.379 (2016); and the European Parliament Resolution of 16
February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics
(2015/2103(INL)). See also Communication from the European Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions “Building a European Data Economy”, COM (2017) 9 final (Oct. 1, 2017).
8. Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, ch. 1 (2006), http://
scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2076&context=faculty_publications.
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put it differently, the type and the content of objects in which a person
could have a property right were closed. Property law was based on
a numerus clausus of objects.
This rather static model of property law, as just described, is part
of a nineteenth-century approach to private law that is frequently de-
scribed as the “classical” model. From a property law perspective, it
is aimed at creating ex ante secure legal relations, both from a retro-
spective viewpoint (what happened in the past should be accepted)
and a prospective viewpoint (any future changes should follow estab-
lished rules). I examined this classical property law model in a series
of articles.9 This classical model of property law was developed in a
period when the law was in the process of being (or had just been)
codified on the continent of Europe, and the doctrine of stare decisis
was developed in England. Both developments, at least initially, had
the same background and the same effect. In a period of growing na-
tionalism, the law was made an expression of a nation’s self-identity,
with the effect that lawyers became more introvert by only discuss-
ing legal questions within a relatively small group made up of the
same nationality or spoken language. Furthermore, petrification of
the law took place because the legal mind began to close itself to new
ideas from outside national sources and even ceased to reevaluate
existing legal concepts in light of social and economic changes.10
That makes it understandable why this classical model was based
on a rather close-fitting view of what could be an object of property
law. It also explains why intellectual property law developed (and
had to develop) into a separate legal area next to general property
law. The creative products of the human mind just did not fit in the
world of “real” things. Property lawyers seemed inclined to forget how
their conceptualisation of ownership was influenced by their focus
9. SJEF VAN ERP, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL PROPERTY LAW: OSMOSIS OR GROWING
ANTAGONISM? (Wouter Devroe et al. eds.,g 2006); cf. Sjef van Erp, European Property Law: A
Methodology for the Future, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: CURRENT STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES
227 ff (Reiner Schulze & Hans Schulte-Nölke eds., 2011); Sjef van Erp, Can European Property
Law Be Codified? Towards the Development of Property Notions, in TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL
CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 ff (Lei Chen & C.H. Van Rhee eds.,
2012); Sjef van Erp, Lex rei sitae: The Territorial Side of Classical Property Law, in REGULATORY
PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRANSFORMING NOTION OF PROPERTY IN TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 61 ff (Christine Godt ed., 2016).
10. Cf. Stephen Jacobson, Law and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Case
of Catalonia in Comparative Perspective, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 307 ff (2002).
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on particular (especially tangible) objects. They concentrated on their
own niche in the web of relations, governed by private law. General
property lawyers declared property law to be fundamentally different
and therefore separate from intellectual property law, thus enabling
them to maintain thought patterns that were sometimes ages old and
based on societies in which land was the most valuable asset a per-
son could have. Intellectual property lawyers, on the other hand, did
exactly the same by assuming that their legal area focused on imma-
terial things and therefore could and should be analysed independ-
ently from general property law. Of course, the two legal areas were
never wholly separate (certainly not in legal practice), but the atti-
tude of both general and intellectual property lawyers seemed to be
inclined towards separation. As an unfortunate result the aware-
ness at an overall level that a connection exists between object and
right has been lost. Let me elaborate on this somewhat further.
In the classical model of property law, the default position is that
a right is in personam, unless it qualifies as a right in rem. It can only
qualify as a right in rem if it passes two tests: the numerus clausus
test and the transparency test. The numerus clausus test implies that
only a limited number of rights can be recognised as rights in rem.
The creation, content, transfer, and extinguishment of those rights is
governed by strict rules of a mandatory nature, leaving only limited
freedom to the parties who must be directly involved. The transpar-
ency test concerns the interests of third parties, who should have an
adequate possibility of finding out whether any property rights exist
for a given object and what the impact might be for that particular
third party. Transparency implies that the object of a property right
is clearly described (principle of specificity) and that any property
rights regarding the clearly described object are accessible at least
for those who have a legitimate interest in being informed about such
rights (principle of publicity). The nature and types of object to which
a property right can be claimed are, as defined, part of what consti-
tutes a property right, particularly the right of ownership.
Let me take as an example the still fairly recent Netherlands Civil
Code (the Burgerlijk Wetboek). By defining ownership as the “most
comprehensive right which a person can have in a thing” and defin-
ing “things” as “corporeal objects susceptible of human control,” the
Netherlands Civil Code at the same time limits the number of objects
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that can be owned and, by doing so, the scope and ambit of the right
of ownership.11 Only physical things can have an owner. However,
next to things the Netherlands Civil Code also accepts other objects
in which a property right (such as usufruct) can exist. A person’s es-
tate is comprised of all physical things and all patrimonial rights.12
However, a patrimonial right (e.g., a right arising from a contract)
cannot be “owned.” A person can only be “entitled” to it, although
“entitlement” in economic terms comes very close to ownership.
The system of the Netherlands Civil Code shows, in fact, the im-
portance of what the law considers to be a legal “object.” Next to de-
fining who can be subjects of private law, it is the foundation upon
which the Code is built. The Code begins by answering the question
of who can be subjects of private law (Book 1 on family law and Book 2
on legal persons); then continues by deciding which objects are a part
of a person’s legal patrimony (Book 3 on patrimonial rights, the first
part containing general provisions); follows with rules regarding the
passing of a whole patrimony (Book 4 on succession), ownership
(Book 5), the creation of voluntary and involuntary duties (Book 6
on obligations, Book 7 on special contracts, and Book 8 on transport).
The Code finally ends with rules on the application of Dutch private
law in an international case (Book 10 on private international law).13
Interestingly enough, Book 9 (intellectual property) still has to be
enacted. This structure makes it clear that, after having established
11. Art. 5:1 Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code](Neth.); Art. 3:2 BW (Neth.). I refer to the
English translation of the NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE: PETER HAANAPPEL & EJAN MACKAAY,
NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE—BOOK 3, PATRIMONIAL LAW IN GENERAL (English-French) (1990),
[hereinafter HAANAPPEL & MACKAAY, PATRIMONIAL LAW IN GENERAL], https://ssrn.com/abstract
=1737823; and PETER HAANAPPEL & EJAN MACKAAY, NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE—BOOK 5,
REAL RIGHTS (English-French) (1990) [hereinafter HAANAPPEL & MACKAAY, REAL RIGHTS],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1708925.
12. Art. 3:1 BW (Neth.).
13. Books 1– 8, 10, BW (Neth.). For the English translation of Books 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, see
HAANAPPEL & MACKAAY, PATRIMONIAL RIGHTS IN GENERAL, supra note 11; HAANAPPEL &
MACKAAY, REAL RIGHTS, supra note 11; PETER HAANAPPEL & EJAN MACKAAY, NETHERLANDS
CIVIL CODE—BOOK 6, GENERAL PART OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (English-French) (1990),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737848; PETER HAANAPPEL & EJAN MACKAAY, NETHERLANDS CIVIL
CODE—BOOK 7, SPECIAL CONTRACTS (English-French) (1990), https://ssrn.com/abstract=173
7849; and PETER HAANAPPEL & EJAN MACKAAY, NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE—BOOK 8, TRANSPORT
LAW (English-French) (1990), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1778425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn
.1778425. For an English translation of all Books (including Book 4, Succession, and Book 10,
Private International Law), see DUTCH CIVIL LAW, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcode
general.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
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who the subjects of private law are, the immediate follow-up question
is, what can be an object of private law? Only after these two ques-
tions have been resolved , can a legal system deal with the question
of which legal relations may exist between subjects regarding these
objects. These relations can then exist both between two or more
specific subjects, rights in personam, or between a person and a con-
siderable group of third persons, rights in rem.
It is important to realise that legal systems, before they can deal
with the legal relations between people regarding the objects in the
world around them, must first focus on the questions of who can be
a legal subject and what can be a legal object. Under Dutch civil law,
if the object is of a physical nature (a “thing,” particularly land), a
right of ownership can exist regarding such object. However, con-
cerning objects of an intangible nature (“patrimonial rights”), only
certain property rights can exist but ownership cannot. With regard
to the results of a person’s creative work, I already remarked that
the rights concerning this type of object were separated from gen-
eral property law to avoid disturbing the general framework of the
classical property law model.
From the perspective of today’s society, in which the virtual econ-
omy is almost becoming more important than the “real” economy,
the classical approach to property law must be revisited and re-
evaluated for digital assets. Otherwise, we are creating a lawless
virtual reality where the rule of technology governs instead of the
rule of law.14 What I am wondering about is how, following Jean
Sonnekus’s call for academic clarity and precision in legal analysis,15
we should revisit the classical conception of private-law objects in
light of the digital revolution. Can we adapt the existing numerus
clausus of objects to fit the new virtual reality, or should we create
a separate area of property law (very much as intellectual property
law was created next to traditional property law) focussing only on
digital assets?16
14. See Sjef van Erp, Ownership of Digital Assets?, J.EUROPEAN CONSUMER & MKT. L. 73,
74 (2016).
15. Sonnekus, supra note 3.
16. I leave aside the question of whether we should even consider creating a whole new area
of general private law, dealing not only with the property aspects of the digital revolution, but
also the contractual and extracontractual aspects of virtual reality.
242 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 6:235
II. DIGITAL ASSETS: A NEW CATEGORY IN THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS
OF LEGAL OBJECTS?
A. Introductory Remarks
Before we can begin analysing the impact that the digital revolution
has on current property law, we need first to examine which new, pos-
sible objects of property law have already been distinguished. In 1980,
a then young academic legal researcher, Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
wrote a challenging article on “new property,” building upon a seminal
article from 1964 by Charles Reich.17 Reich had advanced the argu-
ment that in a society in which government plays an ever-increasing
role, government benefits create new forms of wealth (“new property”).
In his article, Vandevelde took a legal-historical approach, focussing
on the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, and
argued that with regard to older types of new property (e.g., busi-
ness goodwill and trade secrets) the “protection of value rather than
things—the dephysicalization of property—greatly broadened the
purview of property law.”18 His conclusion was somewhat bitter:
From [the jurisprudent’s] perspective, the process of expansion
and transformation of the concept of property accomplished two
things. First, it demonstrated that there was nothing inevitable
about the definition of property. That is, property law could not
be logically deduced from the nature of things. Second, the broad
and variable nature of the new property destroyed the fixed mean-
ing of the concept, so the results of cases could no longer be
deduced from the nature of the property rights.19
Vandevelde’s analysis shows that dephysicalisation or dematerial-
isation is a development that has taken place over several centuries
and that, I would add, is now culminating because of the ever broad-
ening and deepening of the Internet’s virtual reality as well as the
still-increasing impact of digitalisation. His warning, however, should
be heeded. We should not, too soon, abandon existing property law
without first having tested whether it can withstand the stress of
17. Vandevelde, supra note 5, at 325 ff.
18. Id. at 329 ff.
19. Id. at 366 ff.
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having to deal with digital assets. This is why in a position paper on
digital content as a “thing,” which I co-authored and also presented
during the 2016 annual meeting of the Netherlands Royal Society of
Notaries, I kept looking for footholds in existing law. My co-author
and I took the view that, at least from a theoretical-analytical view-
point, an analogy could be drawn between digital content and the
existing law on physical things—but the analogous application of
the rules on ownership should be very carefully considered.20 We,
therefore, advised against adding a provision introducing ownership
of digital content to the Netherlands Civil Code because the impact
of such a decision would be too uncertain. It is this careful, search-
ing approach that I now explain.
B. Uncertainty of Terminology: Data, or Digital Assets?
First of all, a preliminary remark about terminology has to be made.
Which new objects are we discussing? In both legal literature and
draft legislation various terms can be found, such as “data,” “digital
data,” “digital content,” “virtual property,” and “digital assets.”21 All
of these terms relate, in one form or another, to information. What
can be said from the outset is that pure information will not find
protection easily.22 Cases that show this are Your Response Ltd. v.
Datateam Business Media, decided by the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales, and Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen, decided by the Supreme
Court of New Zealand (quashing the decision by the New Zealand
Court of Appeal).23 I am, therefore, focussing on those data types
that can be specified (and therefore can be more easily equated with
20. J.H.M. van Erp & Willem Loof, Eigendom in Het Algemeen: Eigendom Van Digitale
Inhoud (titel 1). Over Digitale Inhoud Als Zaak, in BOEK 5 BW VAN DE TOEKOMST: OVER
VERNIEUWINGEN IN HET ZAKENRECHT 23 ff (L.C.A Verstappen ed., 2017) (Neth.).
21. Cf. also W. Erlank, Finding Property in New Places—Property in Cyber and Outer
Space, 18 POTCHEFSTROOMSE ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD [POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J.] [PER/
PELJ] 1760 (2015) (S. Afr.), http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/130767; W Erlank,
Introduction to Virtual Property: Lex virtualis res ipsa loquitur, 18 PER/PELJ 2525 (2015),
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/131481.
22. For a rare example in which (so it seems) pure information was protected (concerning
investment advice in a column written for The Wall Street Journal), see Carpenter v. United
States, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on November 16, 1987, 484 U.S. 19.
23. Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA (Civ) 281 (Eng.),
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/281.html; Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen [2014]
NZCA 329 (CA516/2013) (N.Z) and [2015] NZSC 147 (SC 82/2014) (N.Z.), http://www.nzlii.org
/nz/cases/NZCA/2014/329.html.
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nonrivalrous objects) and that have economic value separate from
their carriers—such that in economic life these data are treated as
tradable assets (albeit digital or virtual). Let me, first of all, discuss
in greater detail the two cases just mentioned, which will make clear
that data, in as far as it is pure information, can never be given legal
(including proprietary) protection.
C. Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media
In Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media, the facts were
as follows. Your Response was a publisher of magazines. Data concern-
ing the subscribers (name, address, and publication subscriptions)
was held in electronic form. In March 2010 the publisher agreed with
Datateam Business Media that it would hold and maintain Your
Response’s database. The essence of the agreement was laid down
in an email. The email did not specify what to do with the database
when the contract came to an end. During the summer of 2011 the
business relationship was terminated by the publisher, giving the
database manager one month’s notice. Then, the database manager
sent the publisher an invoice for fees due. An impasse followed, with
the database manager refusing to release the database to the pub-
lisher, and the publisher refusing to pay the fees.
One of the questions that needed to be decided was whether the
database manager could exercise a possessory lien over the database.
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales denied this. It might be
instructive to quote from the decision by L.J. Moore-Bick:
23. Although an analogy can be drawn between control of a
database and possession of a chattel, I am unable to accept Mr.
Cogley’s (the barrister representing Datateam Business Media,
SvE) argument. It is true that practical control goes hand in hand
with possession, but in my view the two are not the same. Pos-
session is concerned with the physical control of tangible objects;
practical control is a broader concept, capable of extending to
intangible assets and to things which the law would not regard
as property at all. The case of goods stored in a warehouse, the
only key to which is held by the bailee, does not in my view under-
mine that distinction, because the holder of the key has physical
control over physical objects. In the present case the data man-
ager was entitled, subject to the terms of the contract, to exercise
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practical control over the information constituting the database,
but it could not exercise physical control over that information,
which was intangible in nature. For the same reason the with-
holding of the database by the data manager could not, even if
wrongful, constitute the tort of conversion.
. . . .
31. Before he can exercise a lien at common law a bailee must
have obtained a continuing right of possession which he is enti-
tled to exercise against the bailor. Thus a racehorse trainer cannot
exercise a lien over a racehorse for his fees if the contract reserves
to the owner (expressly or by implication) the right to decide the
places at which and the jockeys by whom it is to be raced: see Forth
v Simpson (1849) 13 Q.B. 680. Likewise, one reason given for
denying to a keeper of livery stables the right to exercise a lien
for his charges is that he is obliged to give possession of the horse
to the bailor whenever requested: see Scarfe v Morgan (1838) 4
M. & W. 270. (Another is that feeding and stabling does not im-
prove the horse: see Judson v. Etheridge (1833) 1 Cromp. & M.
743 and In re Southern Livestock Producers Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R.
24.) Although the contract in the present case contained no
express provision for the publisher to have access to the data,
neither did it contain any provision, express or implied, exclud-
ing him from it and the fact that the data manager did in fact
make access to it freely available by the provision of a password
is in my view inconsistent with the conclusion that he was in fact
exercising the kind of exclusive control that would equate to the
continuing possession required for the exercise of a lien. In view
of the other conclusions to which I have come it is not necessary
to reach a final decision on this point, but if necessary I would
hold that in this case the data manager did not exercise the de-
gree of control necessary to entitle it to exercise a lien.24
The argument used to deny the database manager the ability to ex-
ercise a lien was, therefore, that control over a database is not the
same as possession of a physical asset and that the control of Your
Response’s database was not to the full exclusion of the publisher.
It shows how difficult it is to analyse problems in this digital era, with
legal concepts inherited over centuries and dating back to societies
24. Your Response Ltd. [2014] EWCA (Civ) 281 [23], [31] (Eng.).
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where land (not even personal property) was the most valuable legal
object. In this case, it was the object that created problems for the
court. As the object was problematic, the court felt unable to apply
traditional property concepts, such as possession. The court used the
wide open term “control,” which is then considered to be of a non-legal
nature. The court’s reasoning suggests that the object in this case
had already been qualified as not belonging to the numerus clausus
of property law objects. Thus, any rights regarding this object might
be of an economic, social, or even psychological nature, but could not
be given protection under the law. Digital assets, however, do have
economic value, do play an increasingly important role in our society,
and are seen by people as things which belong to you and are there-
fore “yours.” The law, however, is caught up in looking at the reality
around us as a physical reality, despite recognizing the rights of mon-
etary claims arising from contracts and despite accepting intellec-
tual property rights. Courts who understand all this clearly face a
dilemma, but they do not know how to develop the laws to embrace
virtual reality.
This feeling of being confronted by a dilemma can be found in L.J.
Floyd’s opinion in Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media:
42. I would add only one observation in connection with the wider
implications of Mr. Cogley’s submission that the electronic data-
base was a type of intangible property which, unlike choses in
action, was capable of possession and thus of being subject to a
lien. An electronic database consists of structured information.
Although information may give rise to intellectual property rights,
such as database right and copyright, the law has been reluctant
to treat information itself as property. When information is cre-
ated and recorded there are sharp distinctions between the infor-
mation itself, the physical medium on which the information is
recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst
the physical medium and the rights are treated as property, the
information itself has never been. As to this, see most recently
per Lord Walker in OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1
A.C. 1 at [275], where he is dealing with the appeal in Douglas v
Hello, and the discussion of this topic in Green & Randall, The
Tort of Conversion at pages 141–144. If Mr. Cogley were right
that the database could be possessed and could be the subject of
a lien and that its possession could be withheld until payment
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and released or transferred upon payment, one would be coming
close to treating information as property. That observation further
underlines the significance of the step we were invited to take.25
The basic problem for the Court of Appeal was whether data in a
database should be seen as “pure” information (and consequently, too
broad a category to be accepted as a legal object) or instead as sep-
arate enough from other data that it could fit within the specificity
requirements of property law. The court ruled that it was pure in-
formation. As we shall see later, a very different conclusion could
also have been drawn.
D. Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen
Although this is a criminal case, the considerations of the court are
still highly revealing. Can digital assets be stolen? This is a question
that the Netherlands Supreme Court decided in the 2012 RuneScape
case.26 In that case a boy was forced to release a virtual amulet and
mask, part of the Internet game RuneScape, to another boy, under
the threat of physical violence. The supreme court ruled that such
a virtual amulet and mask can come under the de facto and exclu-
sive control of one person and can therefore qualify as property that
can be stolen. The virtual amulet and mask had real value, which
had been created by spending time and effort in game play.
However, this approach was not taken by the New Zealand Court
of Appeal in Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen. In that case a security
guard (“bouncer”) heard that in the bar where he worked an incident
had taken place between the captain of the English rugby team, Mike
Tindall, and a female patron. The security guard, Jonathan Dixon,
knew that Mr. Tindall had married Queen Elizabeth II’s granddaugh-
ter, Zara Phillips. He realised that the incident between Mr. Tindall
and the female patron must have been recorded on the closed circuit
25. Id. at [42].
26. Netherlands Supreme Court [HR] 31 januari 2012, NJ 2012/536. The Netherlands
Supreme Court also decided that when standard software is being transferred for an unlim-
ited period and against payment this must be seen as sale of property, irrespective of whether
the software is delivered on a data carrier or by downloading it: HR 27 April 2012, NJ 2012/293
(Beeldbrigade case). The court also accepted the seizure of digital assets in order to preserve
evidence in HR 13 September 2013, NJ 2014/455. All cases can be found in electronic format
on https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Uitspraken-en-nieuws/Uitspraken.
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television (“CCTV”) of the bar and asked a receptionist to download
the footage onto the computer in the reception area, which she did,
thinking that Mr. Dixon was requesting this in his capacity as a se-
curity guard. Mr. Dixon then copied the footage on a USB stick and
tried to sell it. When this failed he uploaded it to a video-sharing site.
As a result the footage received wide publicity in New Zealand and
the United Kingdom. Could this incident qualify as breaking into a
computer to “obtain any property”?27 The court of appeal answered
this question negatively, and I am including a somewhat lengthy
quote to show how the court struggled with the question. After having
discussed the legal nature of confidential information and agreeing
with the orthodox view that such information is not property, the
court considered whether digital footage may be seen as different
from confidential information. The court ruled:
[31] After careful consideration, however, we have reached the
view that electronic footage stored on a computer is indistinguish-
able in principle from pure information. It is problematic to treat
computer data as being analogous to information recorded in
physical form. A computer file is essentially just a stored sequence
of bytes that is available to a computer program or operating
system. Those bytes cannot meaningfully be distinguished from
pure information. A Microsoft Word document, for example, may
appear to us to be the same as a physical sheet of paper contain-
ing text, but in fact is simply a stored sequence of bytes used by
the Microsoft Word software to present the image that appears
on the monitor.
[32] Accordingly, we consider that if confidential information is
not property digital footage also cannot be.
[33] That leaves the question of whether we should depart from the
orthodoxy that confidential information cannot be property. It is
true that the confidential information cases have attracted some
criticism. In particular, the distinction drawn between the infor-
mation itself (not property) and the medium on which it is con-
tained (property) has been said to be illogical and unprincipled.
[34] However, the courts have essentially taken the view that any
illogicality is outweighed by the strong policy reasons that militate
27. Crimes Act 1961, sch 249, cl 2 (N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1961/0043
/latest/DLM330422.html.
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against recognition of information (whether confidential or other-
wise) as property. The concern is that if the law were to recognise
confidential information as property and so afford it the full pro-
tection of property law, that would be likely to have a damaging
effect on the free flow of information and freedom of speech.
[35] We accept that legal concepts of property are constantly evolv-
ing to reflect societal changes and new developments. We acknowl-
edge too that at the same time as it created new computer-related
offences (including the one with which Mr Dixon was charged),
the New Zealand Parliament amended the definition of property.
However, as noted above, the amendment was limited. It con-
sisted only of the addition of money and electricity. Parliament
must be taken to be aware of the large body of authority regarding
the status of information and in our view had it intended to change
the legal position, it would have expressly said so by including
a specific reference to computer-stored data.28
It seems to me that the court is mistaken when it uses free-flow-of-
information arguments in a property law discourse. Free flow of infor-
mation has to do with freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
This case instead involves the question of whether information can
qualify as an object to which property rights can attach if exclusive
control can be exercised. A journalist is given the freedom, albeit
within certain limits, to write. He may gather and disseminate infor-
mation. However, the article he writes is protected by copyright, and
the file containing his article can be stolen, irrespective of whether
it is on a (hard) disk, USB stick, or stored on a cloud server. It can
therefore, in my view, not come as surprise that, on appeal, the New
Zealand Supreme Court quashed the decision by the New Zealand
Court of Appeal. It said:
[49] . . . . In Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd.
the Court of Appeal held that it was not possible to exercise a
common law possessory lien over an electronic database. While
the Court did not rule out the possibility that such a database
might be property, it said that it was at best intangible property
and so, on the authorities (OBG Ltd. v. Allan in particular), did
not represent “tangible property of a kind that is capable of
28. Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen [2014] NZCA 329 (CA516/2013) at [31]–[35] (N.Z.)
(footnotes omitted).
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forming the subject matter of the torts that are concerned with
an interference with possession”.[50] The key question for us is
whether the digital files are “property” for the purposes of s
[§] 249(1)(a) [of the Crimes Act 1961] rather than whether they
are tangible or intangible property, given that the definition of
“property” in s [§] 2 includes both tangible and intangible property.
What emerges from our brief discussion of the United States
authorities is that although they differ as to whether software
is tangible or intangible, they are in general agreement that soft-
ware is “property”. There seems no reason to treat data files dif-
ferently from software in this respect. Even though the English
Court of Appeal considered that an electronic database was not
tangible property capable of being converted, it acknowledged
that it might be property.
. . . .
[51] . . . . We consider that interpreting the word “property” as we
have is not only required by the statutory purpose and context but
is also consistent with the common conception of “property”.29
The New Zealand Supreme Court limits its decision, above, to the
interpretation of a particular statute. However, it cannot be denied
that the New Zealand Supreme Court seems to show more willing-
ness than the New Zealand Court of Appeal to accept that data, if
contained on a file, can be considered an object of property law.
E. The Failed Attempt to Reify Data
A clear problem regarding data is its so-called “nonrivalrous”
nature: it can be copied infinitely, making it difficult to specify which
data, which is a fundamental requirement for anything to qualify as
an object of property law.30 The statement “I own” is meaningless if
not followed by a description of what you own. This is what is meant
by the requirement that any object of property law must be specific (or
at least sufficiently specifiable). To solve this problem, sometimes
a court may resort to reify data. An example of this is a decision by
29. Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen, [2015] NZSC 147 (SC 82/2014) at [49]–[50], [51] (N.Z.)
(footnotes omitted).
30. Cf. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1057 ff (2005);
Charles Blazer, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 137 ff (2006).
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the Louisiana Supreme Court, which ruled in the tax case South
Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Barthelemy that software was tangible
personal property.31 The court, under Justice Pike Hall, stated, “In
sum, once the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ is transformed into physi-
cal existence and recorded in physical form, it is corporeal property.
The physical recordation of this software is not an incorporeal right
to be comprehended.”32
This does not actually solve the problem, as all data needs a carrier.
By approaching the problem of the nonrivalrous nature of data in
this way, the court attempts to connect data, as an object, to the ex-
isting category of tangible objects. The question, however, remains
whether data can be seen as an object separate from its carrier.33
F. The Qualification of “Data” as “Digital Assets”
From the above analysis of the decisions in Your Response Ltd. v.
Datateam Business and Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen, it is becoming
clear that, although pure information will not find immediate pro-
tection in the law, we should not be too quick in qualifying “data” as
pure information. Follow-up questions will have to be asked. Is the
data in electronic (digital or virtual) format? If so, the argument that
pure information cannot receive protection no longer conclusively
answers the questions whether data can be the object of a lien or
whether data can be stolen. If the data is in an electronic format, we
will have to distinguish the information contained in the digital for-
mat from the digital format itself and its information carrier. If an
electronic file is stored on a hard disk or USB stick, the disk or USB
stick are physical objects and, as such, fall within the traditionally
accepted categories of the numerus clausus of legal objects. Does
possession of the USB stick also imply possession of the files on that
stick and, as a consequence, possession of the information in those
files? Or does the word “possession” have too many connotations
31. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Barthelemy, 94-0499 (La. 10/17/94), 643 So. 2d 1240.
32. Id. at 1250.
33. See further on this decision in Suzanne Bagert, Recent Development: South Central
Bell v. Barthelemy: The Louisiana Supreme Court Determines that Computer Software is
Tangible Personal Property, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1327, 1367 ff (1995); and Ruhama Dankner
Goldman, From Gaius to Gates: Can Civilian Concepts Survive the Age of Technology?, 42
LOY. L. REV. 147, 149 ff (1996). For a more general comparison, see Ken Moon, The Nature Of
Computer Programs: Tangible? Goods? Personal Property? Intellectual Property?, 31 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 396 ff (2009).
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with physical things, and should we use the word “control”? If so, we
should no doubt define the term “control” more precisely so it can be
used as a term of art to avoid, as when it is used too quickly to dis-
card the whole debate on the application of property law concepts in
the virtual world.
These are hard questions to ask and a simple answer cannot be
given. From the perspective of the numerus clausus of legal objects,
what results is a complicated “whole” comprised of the physical infor-
mation carrier (e.g., a hard disk, USB stick, or server), the electronic
format (the bits and bytes such as in a document), and the informa-
tion created in that format (e.g., a deed of transfer). But the complex-
ity does not stop there. We also have to distinguish the value from the
amalgam of contracts and activities in the virtual world. Examples
of the latter include domain names, email accounts, social media ac-
counts, and statuses in Internet games. I would propose to use the
term “digital assets” as an overarching concept to define economically
valuable data, sufficiently specific to be qualified as a legal object,
and as recently defined by the U.S. Uniform Law Commission in its
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (“UFADAA”). This
model act allows fiduciaries the right to manage digital assets as if
they were tangible assets and financial accounts; it allows custodians
of such assets to deal with fiduciaries. Section 2 of UFADAA gives
the following definitions:
(10) “Digital asset” means an electronic record in which an in-
dividual has a right or interest. The term does not include an
underlying asset or liability unless the asset or liability is itself
an electronic record.
(11) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical,
digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar
capabilities.34
Other definitions can also be found elsewhere, but given that this
model Act is now being considered for enactment by several states
in the United States it might be a good starting point for further
analysis.
34. REVISED UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets
/2015_RUFADAA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf.
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G. Is the Civil Law More Accommodating than the Common Law?
It is interesting to note that the civil law tradition, perhaps re-
markably enough, is sometimes even more willing to adapt to the
new virtual reality than common law practitioners might expect. The
civil law with its tradition of legal dogmatic scholarship and codified
law (the main exceptions being South Africa and Scotland where un-
codified civil law applies) is often seen by common lawyers as unable
to react flexibly to societal changes.35 A good example of how civil law
is very well able to reconsider its approach to the numerus clausus
of legal objects is the law of Luxembourg. In 2013 the Luxembourg
legislature considered whether one should be able to revindicate
(claim as owner) data from a cloud server. For example, should a
business whose financial administration is only available in an elec-
tronic format stored on a cloud server be able to revindicate its finan-
cial administration from its insolvent bookkeeper? It seems that the
English Court of Appeal would deny this, looking at its decision in
Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media. The Luxemburg
legislature, however, saw no problem and enacted a new version of
article 567, paragraph 2 of the Luxembourg Commercial Code, which
now states:
Les biens meubles incorporels non fongibles en possession du
failli ou détenus par lui peuvent être revendiqués par celui qui
les a confiés au failli ou par leur propriétaire, à condition qu’ils
soient séparables de tous autres biens meubles incorporels non
fongibles au moment de l’ouverture de la procédure, les frais
afférents étant à charge du revendiquant.36
35. On the relative value of distinguishing between common law and civil law, compare:
Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, De la pertinence relative de la dichotomie droit civil/
common law dans la réflexion sur les rapports entre le droit comparé, le droit du développement
et le droit vivant. Quelques observations à partir du cas de l’Afrique, 4 REVUE DE LA
RECHERCHE JURIDIQUE, DROIT PROSPECTIF 2095 (2014) (Fr.), translated in On the Relative
Pertinence of the Civil Law/Common Law Dichotomy When Reflecting on the Relationship
Between Comparative Law, Development Law and Living Law. Some Observations in the
African Context (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948564.
36. Loi du 9 juillet 2013 portant modification de l’article 567 du Code de commerce [Law
of 9 July 2013 Amending Article 567 of the Commercial Code] (Lux.).The text can be found
electronically at http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2013/07/09/n2 [http://data.legilux.public
.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2013/07/09/n2/jo].
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The English translation follows:
Incorporeal, non-fungible movables, which are in possession of
or held by a person who is insolvent, can be revindicated by the
person who has entrusted them to the insolvent party or who is
their owner, provided that these movables are separable from all
other incorporeal, non-fungible movables at the moment of open-
ing the procedure; applicable costs to be charged to the person
who revindicates.37
The Official Comment accompanying this new provision explicitly
refers to problems encountered in situations where data has to be
recovered from cloud servers during insolvency.38
37. I have provided my translation of Paragraph 2, article 567 of the Luxembourg
Commercial Code.
38. The Exposé des Motifs states (NO. 6485, CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, SESSION ORDINAIRE
2011–2012, PROJET DE LOI PORTANT MODIFICATION DE L’ARTICLE 567 DU CODE DE COMMERCE,
at 2–3):
Le nouvel alinéa 2 de l’article 567 proposé traite du cas des biens meubles
incorporels non fongibles. Il a été jugé utile de traiter ce cas à part, dans une
nouvelle disposition, étant donné que la revendication en matière incorporelle
ne saurait être limitée aux cas du dépôt et de vente pour compte du propriétaire,
comme elle l’est en matière corporelle.
Il existe en effet aujourd’hui des hypothèses auxquelles le législateur n’a pas pensé
il y a 10 ans et qui sont plus que de simples cas d’école. Ceci est le cas notamment
dans le cadre des prestations offertes de façon de plus en plus large, à la fois au
public en général et aux professionnels en particulier, en matière d’outsourcing
ou d’informatique dématérialisée, appelée communément informatique dans le
nuage (Cloud-computing). Pour continuer avec l’exemple du Cloud, l’une des
applications du Cloud computing consiste par exemple pour une entreprise, une
association ou une personne privée à ne plus conserver ses données et fichiers
voire logiciels sur son propre système informatique, mais de les faire stocker sur
des infrastructures informatiques externes accessibles via Internet. Or, il faut
faire en sorte que celui qui a recours à de tels services puisse en cas de faillite
du prestataire récupérer les données et fichiers afférents, en ce inclus les
traitements qui auront été effectués par le failli ainsi que les résultats de ces
mêmes traitements.
Quant à la recevabilité d’une action en revendication, le texte ouvre le droit à la
revendication tant à celui qui a confié les données au failli qu’au propriétaire des
données lui-même. Dans certains cas, il s’agira de la même personne; dans
d’autres cas il peut s’agir de deux personnes différentes, chacune d’entre-elles
disposant dans ce cas d’une action en revendication.
My English translation of the Exposé des Motifs is as follows:
The new proposed paragraph 2 of article 567 concerns non-fungible, incorporeal
movables. It has been considered useful to deal with this situation separately,
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What is also interesting to note is that the subject of the right to
revindicate can be both the owner of the data or the person who
entrusted the data to the cloud server. What we see here is that the
acceptance of data on a cloud server as a new legal object raises not
only the question whether traditional property remedies can be ap-
plied here, either directly or by analogy, but also the question of the
capacity in which legal subjects can act. It may be obvious that re-
vindication in traditional civil law is only possible by an owner of a
physical thing. The Luxemburg legislation seems to allow a non-
owner, someone who entrusts the storage of data on a cloud server,
to revindicate. In other words, the civil law, with its systematic and
robust structure, shows an intriguing strength and confidence in
dealing with the new virtual reality by accepting digital assets as a
new category in the numerus clausus of legal objects.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Traditionally, property law systems have accepted physical things
(land and personal property) and certain categories of intangibles
(such as rights to payment) as legal objects. The objects which result
from human creativity (“intellectual property”), although accepted
as legal objects, were classified as being outside traditional property
in a new provision, given that revindication regarding incorporeals could not be
limited to cases of bailment and sale at the account of the owner, as is the case
with regard to corporeals.
Today, in fact, cases exist that ten years ago the legislator did not think of and
that are more than simple textbook cases. This is particularly so within the
framework of services, more and more offered to the general public and especially
professionals, concerning “outsourcing” or dematerialised computing services,
generally called “cloud computing.” To continue with the example of the cloud,
one of the cloud-computing applications for an enterprise, association, or a pri-
vate person consists of not storing data, files, or even software on their own com-
puter systems but storing these on external computer systems accessible via the
Internet. Well, we must ensure that someone who has access to such services
can, in case of insolvency of the service provider, get these data and files back,
including the—results of—data processing by the insolvent.
As to the admissibility of revindication, the text creates the right of revindi-
cation both for him who has entrusted the data to the insolvent and for the
owner of the data himself. In certain cases, this will be the same person; in other
cases, these could be two different persons, any of whom could avail himself of
the action of revindication.
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law. New property law objects do not seem to get accepted easily. An
example is emission rights, a public law license to pollute that can
be traded on an exchange as commodity. With the astoundingly fast
development of the Internet and electronic data exchange (in other
words, the digital revolution), we are now confronted with the ques-
tion, can we accept data (and more specifically, digital assets) as a
new category within the numerus clausus of legal objects? Legisla-
tion is slow, courts hesitate, and legal scholars ponder, but technology
does not wait for lawyers, who find it difficult to understand this
new virtual world in which they live and seem more inclined to look
backwards than forward. Of course, we should be careful when
adapting the law to the new virtual reality. The warning of Kenneth
Vandevelde, against making the concept of ownership meaningless
with the acceptance of new forms of property, should not be ignored.
At the same time we should not be afraid to develop the law further
than what we inherited. Next to the “real” world, we now have the
“virtual” world, which is just as realistic as the physical world around
us. This virtual world demands a rethinking of classical property law,
particularly the numerus clausus of legal objects.
The outcome of such a process of revisiting well-established con-
cepts, notions, and principles of property law will probably depend on
the legal area that we are discussing, the type of object, and the per-
son claiming to have a property right. Unlike property law, contract
law has always been very open to accepting what the parties want
as a valid object. Even future activity can be the object of a contract,
such as a labour agreement. Property law has been far more strict,
although even there things are changing, especially in what is now
called constitutional property law.39 What belongs to the category of
objects that a government cannot take without proper justification
and reasonable compensation (in other words, due process of law)
does not, as a consequence, have to be an accepted object of property
law outside the constitutional realm. Whether we can accept new
objects as private property will most likely depend upon weighing a
whole variety of factors: the personal nature of data and the privacy
protection flowing from that personal nature, the economic value and
transferability of data (particularly when we talk about anonymized
“big” data), the setting in which data has been provided (private com-
munication or a requirement for getting access to a website), and the
39. Cf. AJ VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed.2011).
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person claiming entitlement to the data (a private person, a social
media corporation, or the government). It will, no doubt, take some
time before definite answers can be given, but we cannot wait too
long. Developments simply move too fast to sit back and wait for
guidance by courts or legislators. Comparative legal scholarship can
play a pivotal role here also, given the global nature of the problems
to be solved.

PROPERTY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
J. PETER BYRNE*
Human-induced climate change threatens perilous risks for our
physical homes. It also poses a serious challenge to our legal institu-
tions. Several scholars already have remarked on the disruption cli-
mate change has brought to specific legal areas, such as tort, standing,
and national security. This essay argues that climate change will
also disrupt fundamental ideas about real property. Prior work has
explored the need for fresh approaches to land use regulation and
a shift in regulatory takings law. This essay looks at the more funda-
mental assumptions and principles of property law. It maintains that
the growing need for human management of dynamic natural forces,
distorted by greenhouse gas emissions, will erode the foundations
of physical stability and owner autonomy that shape basic doctrines
of property law.
A firm scientific consensus holds that human-induced emissions
of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, into the
atmosphere have been, and will continue, working unprecedented
changes in our climate.1 The effects of such emissions are apparent
in phenomena such as global warming, rising sea levels, aggravated
drought and wildfires, and more extreme storms and flooding.2 Leg-
islative efforts to reduce emissions and rationally address these
threats have been stymied at the national level and in many states
by a combination of entrenched interests, discounting of future risks,
conceptual complexity, and existential fear. Nonetheless, some states
and many local governments have begun planning and have even
taken significant steps to reduce emissions and prepare for inevita-
ble environmental changes.3
* J. Hampton Baumgartner, Jr., Chair in Real Property Law, Georgetown University
Law Center.
1. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/.
2. See, e.g., Svetlana Jevrejeva et al., Coastal Sea Level Rise with Warming Above 2 °C,
113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13342 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/47/13342.abstract;
John T. Abatzoglou et al., Impact of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire Across Western
US Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11770 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/42/11770;
Aslak Grinsted et al., Projected Atlantic Hurricane Surge Threat from Rising Temperatures,
110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5369 (2013), http://www.pnas.org/content/110/14/5369.abstract.
3. See, e.g., S.B. 32, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), amending CAL. HEALTH AND
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Courts, too, have begun to alter legal doctrines to address or accom-
modate the effects of climate change. The Supreme Court arguably
expanded its approach to standing in order to allow a state to sue the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for failing to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions,4 and a federal district court recently surely
did the same by allowing a group of minors to sue the United States
for failing to address climate change.5 Legal scholars have noted that
climate change has disrupted established doctrines in other areas
of law. Douglas Kysar, for example, has written about tort law:
Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A wrongfully, di-
rectly, and exclusively injures B, tort law seems fundamentally ill-
equipped to address the causes and impacts of climate change . . . .
courts in all likelihood will agree with commentators that nuisance
and other traditional tort theories are overwhelmed by the mag-
nitude and the complexity of the climate change conundrum.6
Many statutory areas are straining to meet the challenges of climate
change as well.7
It stands to reason that property law, which deals directly with
the rights and duties of ownership of elements of the natural world,
also will be disrupted by climate change.8 This essay will focus on
real property law, which historically has assumed stability in the
SAF. CODE § 38566 (2017). On the many efforts at adaptation see GEORGETOWN CLIMATE
CENTER, ADAPTATION CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2017).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146 (D. Or. Nov. 10,
2016).
6. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 1,
3–4 (2011). Kysar went on to observe: “[T]he effort to fit the mother of all collective action
problems into the traditional paradigm of tort reveals much about how that paradigm more
generally needs to shift.” Id. at 44.
7. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation
of Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T L. REP. 363, 401 (2010); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1153 (2009).
8. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rules, 1 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1091 (2011). Professor Doremus gives a thoughtful account of how property
rules evolve and what forces can delay or prevent change. This essay takes the simple-minded
view that courts will eventually change doctrines when physical, social, and economic changes
make inherited legal approaches seem nonsensical. Also, it avoids the important question
whether changes in property doctrine are better accomplished by courts or legislatures.
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physical world and the capacity of an owner to exercise effective
dominion over land.9 Climate change calls both these assumptions
into question because many parcels of land will teeter on physical
convulsions, and government help will more frequently be needed
to keep such forces at bay. The essay considers three types of changes
in property law principles: growth of publicly as opposed to privately
owned land, greater scope for land use regulation, and government
liability for management mistakes. The changes will not occur im-
mediately; the effects of climate change have begun to show them-
selves, but more dramatic changes lie in the future. Property law is a
conservative field, guarding reliance. But over time its tenets adapt to
a changing physical and social environment.10 This essay is, frankly,
speculative, aiming to stimulate discussion and further research.
First, changes in property law will be brought about because sea-
level rise, enhanced storms, and fire will physically destroy or de-
grade many parcels of land and their improvements. Some coastal
areas will simply sink beneath the waves, engulfing the homes built
upon them. More properties will be destroyed by intense storms, such
as hurricanes strengthened by climate change—as happened in Hur-
ricane Sandy—or by growing wild fires in the increasingly arid west.
Market forces have not yet seriously guarded against these losses.11
The National Flood Insurance Program,12 although insolvent with-
out the backing of the U.S. government,13 continues to provide assis-
tance where the premiums do not cover the risk. Developers build
and sell new homes along the shore within shorter time frames than
the timeline for losses from climate change, perhaps even aggravat-
ing their incentives to develop coastal land in the fastest possible
schedule. Sellers of existing coastal buildings and realtors compen-
sated by a percentage of the sales price retain every incentive to
9. Water law, another key element of property law, also will need to adapt because cli-
mate change will cause regional shortages. See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to
Public Necessity: Reframing Climate Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and Pre-
paredness, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 709, 724 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1993).
11. See J.E. Neumann et al., Joint Effects of Storm Surge and Sea-Level Rise on US
Coasts: New Economic Estimates of Impacts, Adaptation, and Benefits of Mitigation Policy,
129 CLIMATIC CHANGE 337 (2015).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: FEBRUARY 2015
UPDATE 385–90 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf.
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remain silent about the risks of sea-level rise. Mortgage lenders who
bundle and sell mortgage-debt packages to investors collect fees and
retain no continued exposure to loss. The investors in bundled
mortgage-debt instruments have their risks diluted by the scale of
other mortgages making up their exposure. Local governments at
the coast typically rely on real property taxes and probably hesitate
to require warnings that could crash property values. Buyers should
attend to risk but often are distracted by more immediate concerns
such as securing mortgage funds or keeping insurance premiums
low.14 Thus, without strong regulatory intervention, much develop-
ment could be destroyed, yet regulation has been slow to evolve.
This reality will drive changes in property rules that may have
made sense on the assumption that nature was stable but seem ab-
surd in the dynamic context of climate change. Climate change will
not amount to a move from one relatively stable state to another;
change at a rate faster than historic norms will continue for the fore-
seeable future, regardless of when emissions of greenhouse gases
can be significantly reduced. Moreover, even the rate of change will
not be constant but probably will continue to accelerate, as scientists
have observed in recent years.15 Thus, rules about land use will exist
in a state of physical flux, even though historically land law has as-
sumed, even relied upon, perpetual stability. The entire edifice of
estates in land, future interests, and perpetuities, for example, as-
sumes practically that the land lasts forever as, to differing degrees,
do the laws of mortgages, prescription, and conservation easements.
Some aspects of land law will not be able to survive the changes.
One example is the significant but obscure principle that a property
owner enjoys a right of access to the public highway system, and
government action eliminating such access amounts to a taking
requiring the payment of compensation for the reduction in value of
the marooned land.16 Recently, this rule has been found appropriate
14. Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change Could Swamp Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/science/global-warming-coastal-real-estate
.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second
-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
15. See Chris Mooney, U.S. Scientists Officially Declare 2016 the Hottest Year On Record.
That Makes Three in a Row, WASH. POST., Jan. 18, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/18/u-s-scientists-officially-declare-2016-the-hottest
-year-on-record-that-makes-three-in-a-row/?utm_term=.f9305c433622.
16. See, e.g., Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96 (Me. 1970).
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to support a takings action against a local government based upon
its failure to maintain a road connecting a barrier island that had
repeatedly flooded.17 As seas rise and floods increase, however, the
burden that such a rule places on the public fisc becomes irrational;
no government constructs roads and bridges on the assumption that
the facilities would have to be continually rebuilt to higher eleva-
tions and mounting costs. Also, the traditional rule creates perverse
incentives for coastal homeowners who may rationally seek to re-
cover the value of their flooding homes by pursuing takings claims.
While it may be that courts, appalled by the prospect of sea-level
rise, may grow more rigid and formalistic in their application of this
rule in the short run, they will need to revise it as cases and costs
multiply with losses. Doctrinal change could be applied either to the
easement of access or to the takings analysis.18
Not only will sea-level rise physically destroy or damage land and
improvements, but private property rights themselves will be termi-
nated. Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the public owns the beds
of tidelands seaward of the mean-high-tide line. As the tide line moves
landward, the doctrine of accretion will transform private dry land
into public subsurface, wetland, or tideland.19 No taking requiring the
payment of compensation is effected, because the transformation is
considered to have been accomplished by nature not by the govern-
ment.20 Then, if the government steps in to restore the sunken land,
as when the government rebuilds a beach with dredged sand, the re-
stored beach usually is considered public property.21 This result stems
from the doctrine of avulsion, whereby a sudden change in the tide
line, even if purposefully brought about by a government agency, does
not change the boundary line—though a gradual change would under
the doctrine of accretion. The justification for the result under avul-
sion, however, may be due to the public resources used to rebuild the
beach. Pertinently, Professor Flourney has recently inquired whether
17. Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
18. There are internal complexities in the law of abandonment of public access, such as
whether a private easement of access survives public renunciation. See, e.g., Luf v. Town of
Southbury, 449 A.2d 1001, 1006 (Conn. 1982).
19. See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Pro-
posed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010).
20. J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time,
73 LA. L. REV. 69, 80 (2012) [hereinafter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed].
21. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702
(2010); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542 (N.J. 2010).
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sea-level rise should change the application of the accretion/avulsion
approach. Historically, the justice of this rule was based upon the
bidirectional and unpredictable movement of the tide line, but now
sea-level rise will push the tide line inexorably inland.22 Professor
Flourney persuasively shows that both the physical assumptions
and policy justifications for the traditional approach have changed
significantly because of sea-level rise and argues generally for greater
protection for free-access submerged and tidal lands subject to the
public trust.
Second, large-scale government investments in protecting private
property from the effects of climate change likely will increase the
scope and weight of the public interest, justifying regulation of pri-
vate land use. Sea-level rise again provides the clearest instance of
this. There are three categories of regulatory responses to adapt to
sea-level rise: fight, accommodate, and retreat.23 Fighting involves
the public or private construction of physical barriers or drains to
keep sea waters away from private property. Thus, sea walls, levees,
dune and wetland construction, pumps, and drains can forestall inun-
dation or storm surges (up to a point).24 This approach has obvious
attractions, especially if the public will pay for the new infrastruc-
ture, because it preserves the current boundaries of the lot and
extant buildings and generally allows established land uses to con-
tinue. Public infrastructure has an additional crucial advantage
over private efforts because it can be constructed across property
lines according to the physical characteristics of the site. But there
are engineering, environmental, and economic limits to the capacity
of government to build such protections.25
Such large-scale public investments, both of money and expertise,
must expand the scope of regulatory power that government may ex-
ercise over the protected private property. When government has built
sophisticated infrastructure at public expense to protect private prop-
erty, its interest in that property must grow. One cannot consider
22. Alyson C. Flourney, Beach Law Clean-Up: How Sea-Level Rise Has Displaced the
Accretion/Erosion/Avulsion Framework, 42 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming).
23. See J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAP-
TATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 267, 269 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
24. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23, at 235, 242–44. Recent legislation strives
to make such new infrastructure as cost effective and environmentally friendly as possible.
25. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami, NEW YORKER, Dec. 21 & 28, 2015.
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the private owner as enjoying “sole and despotic dominion”26 when
her property would be destroyed without public expenditure and
management. One might argue that from an economic perspective,
the public has put equity into the protected property to preserve its
market value. Moreover, to the extent that government has pre-
vented the tide line from moving landward, it has suspended its
future ownership rights over the private land it is now protecting.
The public’s right to regulate the use of protected private land for
environmental benefits or to mandate forms of public access surely
will grow. Of course, it always has been the case that government
action has been necessary to secure property rights through judicial
and executive enforcement of such rights, but the financing, con-
struction, and maintenance of physical barriers to natural destruc-
tion of private property go far beyond any “night watchman” type of
state action and toward a persistent “control of nature.”27
Some indication of how courts may reshape property doctrines may
be gleaned from the unanimous post–Hurricane Sandy decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.28
The Borough condemned a perpetual easement over a portion of the
Karan’s shorefront lot for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to con-
struct, largely at federal expense, a dune barrier to storms and ero-
sions. In calculating the compensation to be paid, the trial court
permitted the jury to consider the obstruction of the view from the
house but not the benefit accruing from increased storm and erosion
protection, on the ground that such protection was general to many
protected properties. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed this
decision and held that any “reasonably calculable benefits—regardless
of whether those benefits are enjoyed to some lesser or greater degree
by others in the community—that increase the value of property at
the time of the taking should be discounted from the condemnation
award.”29 The court rejected as outdated the traditional distinction
between specific benefits to the retained property, which can be
considered, and benefits general to the community, which cannot.30
26. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (facsimile ed., 1979).
27. The phrase comes from JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE (1989).
28. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (2013).
29. Id. at 543.
30. Bianca Iozzia, Putting a Price Tag on an Ocean View: The Impact of Borough of Harvey
Cedars v. Karan on Partial-Taking Valuations, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 501, 521 (2014).
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Harvey Cedars found absurd the traditional approach, which con-
siders offsetting benefits in compensation calculations, when faced
with a large government project to protect private homes from the
sea. The Court did not abandon protection of private property; it pre-
sumed the right of the owners to compensation for the easement and
affirmed the propriety of compensation for impairment of their ocean
view. But mandating consideration of off benefits may practically elim-
inate and certainly will radically reduce payment of compensation for
such a project.31 The State of New Jersey is aggressively using Harvey
Cedars as a point in negotiating the donation of easements for dune
construction. The increase in sea-level rise caused by climate change
will greatly increase the risk to shorefront property and the pres-
sure for protective public works, while rendering less persuasive the
claims of property owners’ recognition of the niceties of their rights.
None of this means that New Jersey’s dune construction project or
any particular government property protection scheme is a sensible
or fair response to climate risks. But the logic of such public protec-
tion will be to make property more amenable to public control.
There are many things that may be required of protected property
owners: public access on dry sand beaches, public access for mainte-
nance of works, owner maintenance of habitats or wetlands, water
management, protection of viewsheds, and the like. At a minimum,
government’s physical protection of private property against sea-
level rise should, as a constitutional matter, authorize any regula-
tion or public access reasonably necessary to realize public benefits
from managing sea-level rise.
Government regulations to require property-owner accommoda-
tions to climate change could lead to extensive additions to building
codes and site plans, but they do not seem constitutionally or con-
ceptually difficult. New houses on lots threatened by sea-level rise
may be required to be elevated or placed upon high ground; land-
scaping or water engineering may be mandated for those threatened
by wildfires.32 While these may increase costs, courts are unlikely to
31. The Karans eventually settled for $1 in compensation, and subsequently a jury
awarded another couple three hundred dollars for a similar taking to construct a protective
dune. Press Release, N.J. Att’y Gen., Acting Attorney General Hoffman Announces Legal
Victory for Beachfront Easement Acquisition Efforts in Harvey Cedars: Owner Sought Hun-
dreds of Thousands of Dollars; Jury Awards $300 (June 30, 2014), http://nj.gov/oag/newsre
leases14/pr20140630b.html.
32. On building codes requiring freeboard and other measures to accommodate to sea-level
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take seriously due process or regulatory takings challenges to a wide
range of accommodation regulations.
More problematic are regulations requiring retreat. From an en-
vironmental perspective, the best response to sea-level rise, drought,
and fire threat would be to simply prohibit new development in the
areas most at risk. The reasons to mandate retreat from areas at
risk from climate change include protection of residents from harm,
avoidance of dangerous and expensive rescue efforts, coordination
of cessations of public services, and minimization of damage to eco-
system services.33 But the economic effects of such bans could be
devastating for investors and even for local government finances.
More immediately, they risk triggering the per se rule of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, that land use regulations that elimi-
nate all the economic value of a parcel constitute regulatory takings.34
The peculiar threat of Lucas is that it requires compensation unless
the use of the land would constitute a nuisance at common law. In
the case of sea-level rise or other environmental threats, however,
traditional nuisance law is inapplicable. According to the Restate-
ment, a nuisance arises from an owner’s unreasonable use of his
land that causes harm to another landowner or to the public at large.35
Nuisance law can (imperfectly) address environmental harm when
the defendant is polluting neighbors from his own land. But it would
seem not to address situations where the risk stems from changes
in nature that are caused by human activity throughout the indus-
trialized world. In Lucas, where a taking was found from a prohibi-
tion of building within a flood zone, Justice Scalia noted derisively
that construction of a single-family house does not constitute a
nuisance.36 In practice, retreat has been limited to generous volun-
tary buyouts of homes after destruction from floods or fires.37
rise, see Adaptation Toolkit: Sea Level Rise and Coastal Land Use, GEO. CLIMATE CTR. (Feb. 11,
2016), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits/adaptation-tool-kit-sea-level-rise
-and-coastal-land-use/building-codes.html.
33. See Byrne & Grannis, supra note 23, at 268–70.
34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979).
36. “It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of
any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner’s land; they rarely support prohibi-
tion of the ‘essential use’ of land.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S.
78, 82 (1911)).
37. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STORM RECOVERY ET AL., NY RISING BUYOUT AND ACQUISITION
PROGRAM POLICY MANUAL 15 (2015).
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So to mandate retreat through legislation, the Lucas facts must
be avoided, the doctrine must bend, or nuisance law must expand.
In a prior article, I discussed avoiding the factual premise of Lucas
through rolling-development restrictions, which permit development
for time but then prohibit it when the sea rises to within a certain
distance of a dwelling or building site.38 In another article, I have
described climate exactions, which might permit such development
but at a price that reflects the environmental or public costs it gen-
erates.39 Here, I briefly want to suggest that at some point maintain-
ing a house in the face of sea-level rise or other increasing climate
risks may be considered a public nuisance.
A public nuisance would be the unreasonable use of property that
imposes significant harm on the public generally.40 In the era before
comprehensive land use regulation, local governments enacted
ordinances identifying certain uses in certain locations as public
nuisances; public authorities such as attorney generals or corpora-
tion councils would bring actions to enforce such ordinances through
injunctions.41 In some cases, land uses thought reasonable at one
time came to be seen as nuisances when the environs around them
had changed. For example, a cement plant in Los Angeles was unob-
jectionable when settlement was sparse but was deemed a nuisance
when a neighborhood of houses grew up around it.42 People building
or living in houses could come to be considered nuisances when the
risk of inundation, storm surges, or fire reaches a threshold where
disaster assistance would become too dangerous or costly, when they
threaten failure of septic or sewer systems, or when construction
prevents migration inland of environmental systems providing the
community with important ecological services. Of course, the actual
factual circumstances and the normative meanings that the public
attaches to nuisances in the future would be determinative, but cli-
mate change could so change which land uses are considered reason-
able that such “essential uses” as building a house could become
nuisances in many locations.43
38. Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed, supra note 20, at 109–12.
39. J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla, Climate Exactions, 75 MD. L. REV. 758 (2016).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 (1979).
41. See John E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972).
42. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
43. The plausibility of this prediction may be enhanced when one recalls that the essential
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The third category of property law change to be expected from
climate change would be an increase in government liability for
losses resulting from its environmental management. Currently losses
from extreme natural events, such as hurricanes, generally are con-
sidered “acts of God,” for which no entity is primarily responsible. If
government has no authority and makes no effort to control the
forces of nature, there is no legal basis to hold it accountable for
natural disasters.44 But when government comes to manage the ef-
fects of climate change, through construction of levees, for example,
courts may come to hold the government responsible for its mistakes
or inadequate precautions. Thus, if reconstructed sand dunes erode
faster than estimated and a storm surge destroys houses in the
locality, or forests thinned of overgrown or dead vegetation still host
raging wildfires that consume homes, the government may be blamed.
Lawyers for private owners bearing such losses may seek to hold the
government liable.
This tendency is evident in recent court decisions using the Takings
Clause to facilitate liability on the United States for its management
of flooding on the Mississippi River. Since the 1920s the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has been tasked with reducing flooding as well
as aiding navigation on the river. The legislation authorizing their
flood control efforts also contained a statutory exemption from gov-
ernment tort liability arising from such efforts.45 But flooding of
private land near the river still results from the enormity of the
task, whether from inadequate water management or from agency
choices among competing constituents. In recent years, courts have
expanded the basis upon which the Corps can be held liable for flood-
ing under the Takings Clause, which cannot be limited by statute. In
Arkansas Fish and Game, the Supreme Court departed from prior
law in holding that a takings claim can be based upon a single or
use of land protected against regulation in the case cited by Justice Scalia in Lucas was the
driving of cattle over roads through Yosemite National Park and grazing them on a private
enclosure within the park. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (“The right of appellant
to pasture his cattle upon his land, and the right of access to it, are of the very essence of his
proprietorship.”). No one could doubt that the National Park Service today has authority to
prohibit driving cattle through and grazing them on private land within a national park.
44. Government does provide assistance to affected persons and businesses under disaster
relief statutes and through ad hoc legislation. The Stafford Act provides the statutory au-
thority for most Federal disaster response. 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq. (2016).
45. 33 U.S.C. §§ 701–709b (2016).
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finite series of flooding events.46 Subsequently, the U.S. Claims Court
held that the Corps effected a taking by its construction and negli-
gent management of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, which en-
hanced the flooding in St. Bernard Parish from Hurricane Katrina.47
Of course, the government has never managed coastlines with the
thoroughness that the Corps has managed the Mississippi River.
But the vulnerability of coastal property to sea-level rise suggests
that government may play a much larger role in defending against
rising seas to preserve private property values. In doing so, it would
seem to take on a duty to perform its many protective functions
without negligence. Because the government would be choosing
structures to prevent the risks foreseen by sophisticated scientific
analyses, it seems inevitable that sometimes the government would
be wrong in its predictions or would engineer inadequately based on
mistakes, inadequate findings, or the sheer difficulty of the task. To
be sure, government can find some defense in the discretionary func-
tion immunity to the Federal Tort Claims Act, but generally speaking
this immunity extends only to intentional and not negligent acts of
government employees.48
Government will also be threatened with liability for its inten-
tional decisions about protection from climate effects through takings
claims. The scale of climate effects and the immensity of affected
areas means that government will protect some areas and not others.49
Choices will need to be made about limited resources and know-how,
and likely will be based on the value of protecting different places.50
For example, urban areas are more likely to be protected than rural.
Physical characteristics of some places, such as land subsidence or
porous bedrock, may make some places much more difficult or ex-
pensive to protect. Politics also inevitably will play a role. Thus,
46. Ark. Fish & Game Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
47. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).
48. Amy M. Hackman, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 413 (1997).
49. The public needs to have the authority to regulate or prohibit the private construction
of sea walls to protect neighboring properties as well as tidelands. Byrne, The Cathedral
Engulfed, supra note 20, at 100–04. A common law rule, already weakened, that sea-level rise
should eliminate is the “common enemy” rule permitting landowners to fend off flood waters
in any direction without liability to neighbors injured by the redirected waters. See generally
Daniel H. Cole, Liability Rules for Surface Water Drainage: A Simple Economic Analysis, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (1990).
50. See MCPHEE, supra note 27.
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government will make imperfect and unpopular decisions about
which localities will be protected from flooding, which will be al-
lowed to flood, and which the government will intentionally flood in
order to divert flood waters. Losers will seek compensation. Such
cases will be brought as takings because the decisions to flood or not
protect from flooding will be characterized as intentional implemen-
tations of policies.
The structure of such a problem can be seen in the Quebedeaux
case.51 There the Corps estimated that high water descending from
the Mississippi would overflow levees in Baton Rouge and New
Orleans, so it opened the Morganza Spillway, diverting floodwaters
into the Atchafalaya River basin and destroying numerous farms,
homes, and businesses. Affected landowners sued, claiming a taking.
The Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. Judge Allegra relied on the recent
decision in Arkansas Fish and Game52 to hold that a single instance
of intentional flooding could be found to be a taking and also re-
jected the government’s argument that a flooding victim who bene-
fited from a flood control project could not recover unless he showed
that the cost of the flooding exceeded the benefits from the project as
a whole.53 Thus, flood victims who would have had to bear their own
losses if the government had taken no action could obtain compensa-
tion if the government chose to flood them in order to avoid a greater
disaster downstream.
Government engineering may never reach the level of control over
coastal flooding that the Corps has reached on the Mississippi, but
one can easily imagine that government choices over which areas it
will protect against ocean storm surges may result in similar
takings claims—for example, government construction or permitting
of a seawall to protect residences in one location along the Gulf
Coast, knowing that such a seawall may increase the likelihood of
erosion or flooding on nearby farmland. There may be subtle issues
of causation raised regarding the extent to which the government or
nature caused the loss,54 but the breadth of government control we
51. Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013).
52. Id. at 324–25 (discussing Arkansas Fish & Game Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
511 (2012)).
53. Id. at 321.
54. See Teegarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252 (1998) (rejecting takings claim on the
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can anticipate to protect owners from the effects of climate change
suggests that at some point losses may be attributed to the govern-
ment. Professor Serkin has put this scenario at the center of his theory
of passive takings: “Whether the government prohibits or builds sea
walls, its near-total control over the allocation of the inevitable
harm serves as a doctrinal hook for passive takings liability.”55
Thus, we can anticipate that government will be entrusted with
the choice over which private property will be protected at great
government expense and which will be flooded. Several property
doctrines may protect the government from takings liability in such
circumstances. In Miller v. Schoene, the Supreme Court held that a
Virginia statute mandating the destruction of cedar trees to protect
the state’s apple trees from a contagious plant disease did not
amount to a taking because the government had to act to prevent
harm in circumstances where the failure to act would have caused
more harm.56 From one view, the decision increases the probability
that government failure to protect an owner could amount to a taking
because the Court seems to treat government action and inaction as
equal policy choices that can cause harm. But more fundamentally,
the Court expressly stated that “it is obvious that there may be, and
that here there is, a preponderant public interest in the preservation
of one interest over the other.” Thus even in cases where government
action causes harm, as when opening a floodgate, the government
may escape takings liability when not doing so could cause a greater
harm to the public. The vitality of Miler v. Schoene in modern
takings law, however, is questionable, as it relies on a deference to
the police power that the Supreme Court has moved away from.57
ground that the forest fire caused destruction of the plaintiffs’ trees rather than the United
States Forest Service’s choice to not protect the plaintiffs’ property).
55. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 394 (2014).
56. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
57. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (1992) (“The ‘harmful or
noxious uses’ principle was the Court’s early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why
government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation
without incurring an obligation to compensate—a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly
with respect to the full scope of the State’s police power.”). Another obscure corner of takings
law that will come into play when the government assumes control of nature are cases of
actual necessity, such as when government blows up buildings to prevent the spread of fire.
See, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1880). This exception to takings liability is narrow
and has not been revisited in many years.
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This essay has considered ways that climate change may push
changes in property law. Sea-level rise, flooding, fire, and drought
undermine the stability of improvements to land and, indeed, of
land itself. Managing these increased risks will lead to greater gov-
ernment construction and management of protective infrastructure.
Paradoxically, greater public physical protections will both expand
the regulatory reach of government and expose government to in-
creased liability for property damage from events historically consid-
ered “natural” but that will become seen as the results of government
choice or negligence. This fundamental change in the relationship
between government and private property owners will bring signifi-
cant change to the property law in some ways suggested here and
in other ways not yet anticipated.

THE MISSING RUNG: CHALLENGING REGULATORY
BARRIERS TO PROPERTY ACQUISITION
CHRISTOPHER SERKIN*
A reliable property system, accessible to all people, is a critical
precondition to a well-functioning economy and even to democracy
itself. The absence of such a system can force people into informal
legal relationships, largely invisible to the State and economically
perilous for the participants. Hernando de Soto has explored in de-
tail the regulatory and legal barriers in developing countries that
prevent significant swaths of the population from participating in
the formal property system.1 In de Soto’s telling, the problem is not
the absence of law, but instead its over proliferation.2 The result is
that formal property is all but impossible to access, and those rele-
gated to informal systems cannot climb the economic ladder. Formal
property, in this view, is the missing rung in meaningful access to
capital and to economic opportunity.
De Soto has devoted himself to political and regulatory reforms
that create meaningful access to formal property systems.3 Oppo-
nents of reform are those people rooted in the status quo, including
lawyers who are often unwitting gatekeepers to formal property
regimes.4 It is possible, however, that the legal system itself may
provide some meaningful pressure towards change if regulatory im-
pediments to accessing formal property are viewed as infringing
property rights. Conventionally, formal legal property rights are a
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I would
like to thank Turner Henderson for his excellent research assistance.
1. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRI-
UMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2008) [hereinafter THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL];
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1989) [hereinafter THE OTHER PATH].
2. See THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 18–28 (discussing the regulatory
obstacles that exist to opening legal businesses in various developing countries).
3. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Eco-
nomic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 64–68 (2007) (“[De Soto’s] theory is that
property can only generate wealth efficiently if a person’s rights to the property are formal,
that is, . . . recognized by the state and everyone else. . . . The pragmatic aspect of de Soto’s
prescription is a step-by-step guide for eliminating bureaucracy and drafting laws to govern
more simplified means of registration.”).
4. See THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 198–202 (describing lawyers as prone
“not to expand the rule of law but to defend it as they found it”).
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necessary precondition for claims that the government has infringed
those rights.5 In doctrinal terms, vested property rights are a pre-
requisite for legal standing to challenge a law or regulation burden-
ing property.6 The question addressed here is whether property is,
in fact, necessary, and whether it is possible to imagine legal claims
against the government—like regulatory takings claims under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution—for imposing
insuperable barriers to the acquisition of property in the first place.
I argue that such claims are actually plausible, and I label them
“impediment claims.”
This is a radical suggestion, and it is offered here more as a
thought experiment than as a full-throated proposal. Indeed, space
constraints make it impossible to fully consider the consequences of
vindicating such claims, or the ultimate plausibility of limiting prin-
ciples. Nevertheless, even as a tentative proposal, it offers a new
way of thinking about a legal system’s obligations to provide mean-
ingful opportunities to access formal property.
This proposal is not invented out of whole cloth. In a recent article,
I argued that there are situations in which a government can violate
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause through inaction.7 I argued
that the act/omission distinction makes little sense in certain regula-
tory contexts. Specifically, where the government has disabled self-
help, or is so inextricably bound up with the substantive definition
of property, the government should not be able to avoid liability by
claiming that it has not acted.8 The normative argument is straight-
forward. Takings protection creates perverse incentives if it applies
only to government actions, because it allows the government to avoid
liability altogether by simply ignoring a problem, even if this do-
nothing response inflicts the most damage. By imposing liability for
regulatory inaction as well, governments will have an incentive to
choose the least costly regulatory response, instead of relying on
unprincipled distinctions between regulatory acts and omissions.9
5. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1245 n.113 (2009) (citing cases).
6. Id.
7. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2014) [hereinafter Passive Takings].
8. Id. at 377–78.
9. Id. at 361–64.
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I applied this argument to the problem of sea level rise. Local
zoning regulations often impose strict height limits, and state and
federal environmental regulations may proscribe certain forms of
hard and soft armoring.10 Assuming those regulations were constitu-
tionally benign when adopted, they can nevertheless become uncon-
stitutional over time in the face of ecological change. Strict height
limits that made sense decades ago can now prohibit property owners
from raising their houses on stilts, which may be critical as sea
levels rise.11 Similarly, regulations restricting (or permitting) vari-
ous forms of armoring can suddenly impose significant new costs as
storm surge and erosion become more intense.12 In both of these
examples, the underlying law has not changed since it was adopted.
But legal stability coupled with changes in the world can, I argued,
violate the Takings Clause.13 In other words, the government can
potentially be liable in the absence of a new regulatory action.
The argument here has a similar structure: the existence of prop-
erty may not be necessary to bring claims alleging its infringement.
Put differently, regulatory hurdles preventing the acquisition of
property in the first place can violate property rights, if the hurdles
are sufficiently high.
This argument—relying on de Soto—has important distributive
consequences for my earlier article. One objection I anticipated to
Passive Takings is that it would serve only to increase property pro-
tection for those who need it the least. It could be used by wealthy
beachfront property owners to compel regulatory responses to the
threat of sea level rise, or to receive compensation if government failed
to act. It could, in short, redistribute scarce government resources
from taxpayers to the wealthiest property owners. In contrast, im-
pediment claims create progressive distributional pressures. They
are available to the vast numbers of the poor who live and work
informally, without vested property rights, in places particularly
susceptible to sea level rise and other risks of global climate change.
Today, as sea level rise impacts our coastlines, property owners
can access various forms of protection, from flood insurance, to ex
10. Id. at 391–94.
11. Id. at 393.
12. Id. at 394–95.
13. Id. at 360.
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post grants to help rebuild, and even to legal claims against the
government for failing to prevent certain kinds of damage to prop-
erty.14 But these protections are not available to the propertyless,
leaving them particularly susceptible to the costs of global climate
change. Impediment claims push back, and provide at least some
measure of legal redress for those people who have been prevented
from accessing formal property regimes in the first place.
Part I of this Essay describes the conventional account of protecting
private property from overly burdensome regulations as requiring
both a protectable property interest and government action. Part II
offers a summary of my previous argument that government action
is not actually necessary to violate the Takings Clause. Part III then
expands on that insight to argue that a protectable property interest
may also not be necessary if the government action at issue pre-
vents the acquisition of property in the first place.
I. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
The interaction between private property rights and regulatory
power is frequently contested. Most if not all government actions
impose some burdens on private property. The balance between pub-
lic power and private rights is therefore a zero-sum game. Strong
protection for private property substantially limits regulatory au-
thority, and vice versa.15
This tension implicates a number of constitutional provisions that
can protect private property from public encroachment—from Equal
Protection,16 to Due Process,17 to the Free Exercise of religion.18 Of
course, the conflict between private property and regulatory power
14. See St. Bernard Parish Government v. U.S., 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 746 (2015) (finding the
Army Corps of Engineers’ “failure to maintain” a canal caused flooding that constituted a
temporary taking).
15. See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and
Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 369–71 (1994) (discussing the ebb-and-flow relationship
between private property rights and regulatory authority in the context of the Endangered
Species Act). Compare Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal
Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2033–34 (2012) (“[T]he
formalization of private property often enhances state power.”).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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plays out most clearly in the context of the Takings Clause, which
explicitly prevents the government from taking private property
without paying just compensation.19
This ubiquitous conflict is not only or even primarily constitu-
tional. Statutory regimes at both the federal and at the state level
extend property protection.20 For example, the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Properties Acquisition Act21 provides property
owners with certain compensatory rights when the federal govern-
ment exercises its power of eminent domain.22 At the state level, the
Bert Harris Private Property Protection Act provides heightened pro-
tection against regulations burdening property in Florida.23 And
many specific statutory regimes have detailed provisions that pro-
tect private property in myriad ways.24
But crucially—indeed, almost tautologically so—someone must
have a property right before being entitled to any of these regimes’
legal protections. In the constitutional context, the existence of a
vested property right is frequently described as a prerequisite for
standing to bring a claim under the Due Process or the Takings
Clauses.25 Conceptually, as well as doctrinally, property protection
only applies to existing property rights, or so it would seem.
Similarly, these various protections only apply to government
actions. The Takings Clause, in particular, is said to provide relief
from legal transitions.26 Legal change is therefore at the heart of
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Federal statutes protecting private rights include, for example, the federal relocation
assistance act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2012).
21. Id.
22. See Nicole Stella Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 121–23 (2006) (detailing the Act).
23. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2016); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 (2015) (allowing landowners
whose property value is reduced by certain land use regulations to claim compensation).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (2015) (requiring that all rules and regulations
promulgated by state agencies be reviewed by the state attorney general to assess potential
takings issues); Dennis L. Jones Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–
161.45 (2016) (providing for compensation in the event the law burdens private property);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-7, 49-33-9 (2013) (allowing owners of agricultural and forest land
to bring takings claims if state or local regulations diminish the value of their property by at
least forty percent).
25. See, e.g., Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55
(1986) (rejecting a takings claim after finding an absence of “property” under the Takings
Clause); see also Serkin, supra note 5, at 1245–46 (describing vested rights).
26. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (2003)
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traditional takings claims.27 The form of the transition can vary.
Permit denials by zoning officials as well as new statutes or regula-
tions can all effect changes in legal rights that become cognizable
takings claims.28 But some government action that interferes with
a property owner’s investment-backed expectations is conventionally
necessary for takings liability to lie.
The ostensible reason for both requirements—a property interest
and a government action—is rooted in the nature of the protection
afforded by the Takings Clause. In the cryptic formulation originally
adopted by the Supreme Court, the Takings Clause prohibits un-
compensated regulations that “go[ ] too far.”29 The Supreme Court
subsequently clarified this prohibition in the seminal case, Penn
Central v. New York.30 There, the Court articulated its admittedly
ad hoc test, holding that a regulatory taking depends upon three
factors: the character of the regulation, the extent to which the regu-
lation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations, and
the resulting diminution in value.31 Implicitly, application of these
factors requires a property interest affected by some regulatory
change that interferes with expectations. In fact, neither require-
ment is so straightforward.
II. PASSIVE TAKINGS
In an earlier article, Passive Takings, I argued that legal change
is not actually necessary for a regulatory takings claim to lie.32
Instead, in some circumstances, legal stability, coupled with ecologi-
cal change, can give rise to a cognizable takings claim. This may
(“Regulatory takings claims are all about change. They are obviously about distribution of the
costs of regulatory transitions between landowners and society.”); see also Abraham Bell, Not
Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 33 (2003); Lawrence Blume & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984);
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 532 n.61 (1986).
27. See Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 349 n.11.
28. See, e.g., McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1124 (Nev. 2006) (declaring
a height restriction ordinance to be a per se regulatory taking); Eberle v. Dane Cty. Bd. of Ad-
justment, 595 N.W.2d 730, 739–40 (Wis. 1999) (finding the denial of a special exception permit
to constitute a valid regulatory takings claim under Wisconsin’s constitution).
29. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
30. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–38 (1978).
31. Id. at 124.
32. See generally Passive Takings, supra note 7.
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sound like a small technical observation, but it has quite profound
implications. Most broadly, it means that in some situations the
government can violate the Takings Clause by failing to change the
law. Or to state the same point differently: the Takings Clause can
create an affirmative constitutional duty by the government to re-
spond to ecological change. Where that is true, the government cannot
avoid liability simply by failing to act.
It has been a long-standing goal of progressive constitutional law
scholars to identify affirmative constitutional obligations. Starting
in the 1960s, leading figures like Charles Reich and Frank Michelman
argued that Due Process should compel the government to provide
certain minimal levels of welfare rights to the poor.33 Others argued
that Roe v. Wade should be extended to compel the government to
fund abortions for women who could not afford to pay for them.34
How else, they asked, could the constitutional right to an abortion
be meaningfully vindicated?
By and large, the Supreme Court has rejected these arguments,
and has held repeatedly that the Constitution provides only nega-
tive rights.35 It protects people from the government, and does not
compel the government to act. In the most vivid articulation of this
principle, DeShaney v. Winnebago,36 the Court refused to find a Due
Process violation when state social services failed to protect a child
from his abusive father, despite repeated requests. The Court held
that the government has an affirmative duty to act and protect only
in extremely limited circumstances: for incarcerated prisoners, people
involuntarily committed for psychological or medical purposes, or for
people rendered especially vulnerable by the government.37 In other
33. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term: Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969); Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
34. See Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 331–33
(1985); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392–93 (1984).
35. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Atti-
tudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 258–59
(2000) (“Establishing an unassailable right to welfare was once an important goal of legal
academics and activists, but is no longer. . . . The diminishing interest in this project is partly
a product of the courts’ decisive rejection of the notion that the federal Constitution, as currently
written, requires government to reduce inequality and relieve want.”).
36. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202–03 (1989).
37. Id. at 198–200.
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words, “the state may have an affirmative duty to protect if it cre-
ated a danger or left people more susceptible to a danger.”38
In Passive Takings, I argued that property and the Takings
Clause provide a better basis for establishing affirmative constitu-
tional duties than liberty and due process rights. There are political,
policy, and doctrinal reasons for this view. Politically, conservative
justices have rejected the expansion of affirmative constitutional
duties at least partly because of a skepticism about the underlying
rights being claimed: welfare and access to abortion.39 The politics
of property are very different. Using property as the basis for state
duties cuts across political lines and can generate support from the
right and the left. As a policy matter, too, much of the Court’s oppo-
sition to expanding constitutional duties comes from an uneasiness
with invading traditional realms of prosecutorial discretion.40 Courts
by and large do not want to tell legislators what rules to enact, nor
tell administrators how to balance their priorities. But the Takings
Clause is importantly different. The remedy for a taking is not
mandamus or an injunction, ordering the government to do some-
thing in the face of regulatory intransigence. Instead, the remedy is
damages, measured by the resulting diminution in value, which falls
squarely within courts’ core competencies.41 Courts are likely to feel
more comfortable ordering the government to pay damages than
ordering the government to undertake some particular regulatory
reform. Of course, the government could choose to act in order to avoid
or mitigate the payment of just compensation, but the executive and
legislative branches would be back in control of that decision.
Doctrinally, too, property and the Takings Clause are surprisingly
appropriate bases for affirmative constitutional obligations. In fact,
the limited bases for affirmative duties the Court identified in
DeShaney apply remarkably aptly to the property context.42 Specifi-
cally, the act/omission distinction breaks down when the government
exercises such comprehensive regulatory control that it effectively
determines the distribution of burdens and benefits of property
38. Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 376.
39. Id. at 360.
40. Id. at 385–87.
41. Id. at 385.
42. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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ownership, or when the government disables self-help.43 Broadly
interpreted, DeShaney stands for the proposition that affirmative
constitutional duties will arise when the State has taken control
over someone, or when it has rendered someone more susceptible to
harm. Those conditions are actually quite common in property and
land use law.
Passive Takings makes the argument in detail, but the intuition
is easily captured. The act/omission distinction should not control
when an earlier government act has rendered property especially
susceptible to some subsequent harm. That earlier act is not itself
the basis for the takings claim because it was constitutionally be-
nign at the time. But it does create a kind of ongoing duty on the
government to protect the property if conditions in the world change
in a way that substantially alters the costs and benefits of the
earlier regulation.
Comprehensive land use regulation—especially of coastal prop-
erty—often specifies in tremendous detail all the rights and duties
of property ownership. At its most basic, zoning can sometimes
delimit a very small developable envelope, narrowly circumscribing
a building’s bulk by establishing strict height limits, setbacks from
property boundaries, and so forth.44 For much residential beachfront
property, owners can expect to build only a one- or two-story, single-
family house that covers no more than forty percent of the parcel.
While reasonable minds can disagree about the appropriateness of
such regulations in the abstract, it is by now well settled that such
routine zoning requirements are permissible under the Takings
Clause.45 If a coastal city or town adopted such zoning decades ago,
it would have been entirely permissible when enacted, and the
ordinance may not have changed since.
What might have changed, however, is the threat of storm surge
and sea level rise. Newly updated flooding projections from FEMA
significantly alter development expectations on the coast. Indeed, the
National Flood Insurance Program requires that property owners ele-
vate buildings as much as two feet above base flood elevation.46 But
43. See Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 379–80.
44. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 61 (4th ed. 2013).
45. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (upholding
a routine zoning ordinance as within the police power).
46. See Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 392 n.214 (citing, inter alia, FEMA, NFIP
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building heights are measured from the ground, not from the ground
floor. Elevating property on stilts can shrink or even eliminate an al-
ready small developable envelope. Where height limits prevent prop-
erty owners from elevating buildings to protect against anticipated
flooding, owners should be able to challenge the height limits on
takings grounds, even if the height limits have not changed.47
A similar analysis applies to armoring such as sea walls. Armor-
ing is an extremely controversial response to the threat of erosion.
While a sea wall may protect a specific area of the coast, it does so
at the cost of increasing erosion elsewhere.48 Installing or allowing
a sea wall therefore amounts to a very explicit allocation of the bene-
fits and burdens of erosion.49 However, sea level rise again threatens
to dramatically alter both sides of the equation. Thus, a sea wall
allowed at one time as imposing a reasonable risk of erosion nearby
might impose far greater risks with rising seas. Or, conversely, a
prohibition on a sea wall might have exposed property to a small
risk of storm surge before, but a much greater risk today. In either
case, the law may remain the same—whether prohibiting or permit-
ting armoring—but the government should not be able to immunize
itself from takings liability simply because the law has not changed.50
The sea wall example is particularly revealing because it is a
context in which the government exercises nearly complete control
over costs. Allowing a sea wall predictably protects some property
owners at others’ expense, and vice versa. Here, then, the legal status
quo should not determine whether a takings claim can lie. That is,
whether the background rule in a particular context had been to
permit or to prohibit a sea wall, the fact of ecological change creates
the possibility of liability as the extent and allocation of costs change.
This is not to suggest that the government is necessarily liable to
one party or the other. Takings liability is sufficiently difficult to
establish that the government would still have great latitude to act.
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT GUIDEBOOK 5–6, 23 (5th ed. 2009), http://www.fema.gov/media
-library-data/20130726-1647-20490-1041/nfipguidebook_5edition_web.pdf).
47. See id. at 399–400.
48. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and
Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 87 (2012).
49. See Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 394.
50. See id. (“Constitutional liability should not then depend on whether the government’s
decision is characterized as an act or an omission.”).
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Prohibiting a sea wall will rarely rise to the level of a taking for the
exposed property owner, just as permitting one will rarely result in
a taking of neighboring property. Nevertheless, this is a context in
which the mere fact of regulatory inaction (or legal stability) should
not create automatic immunity.
Normatively, the category of passive takings fills an important
gap. Leading accounts of the Takings Clause view its role as incen-
tivizing efficient regulatory regimes.51 By forcing the government to
internalize the costs of its actions, the Takings Clause is said to help
prevent governments from imposing regulatory burdens on property
owners that are costlier than the resulting public benefits. There are
many well-known reasons to be skeptical of this kind of straight
economic account.52 But it suffers from another less familiar flaw,
even viewed wholly on its own terms. At most, this economic expla-
nation ensures only that any regulatory action does not create more
burdens than benefits. But that is not at all the same as inducing
efficient regulatory incentives because often the costliest choice the
government can make is to do nothing at all.53 If the threat of liabil-
ity only attaches when governments do something—take some regu-
latory initiative—then the Takings Clause functions as a kind of
thumb on the scale against doing anything. The category of passive
takings therefore serves as an important counterweight against such
costly inaction.
Stepping back from the details of the argument, Passive Takings
sought to address a particular political malfunction: government
officials ignoring the threat of sea level rise in order to avoid the
risk of takings liability. The new category of passive takings was
designed to create countervailing pressure; by exposing government
officials to potential takings liability for either their actions or in-
actions, they would have a greater incentive to do something, if that
would be the lower-cost alternative. And to be transparent about my
51. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 84–85 (1993); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73–74 (8th ed. 2011).
52. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 26 (articulating a public choice critique);
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitu-
tional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (criticizing assumed asymmetry in governments
internalizing costs and benefits); see also Bethany Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in
Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2016).
53. See Passive Takings, supra note 7, at 348.
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goals, my hope was to encourage governments to begin to respond
proactively to the threat of sea level rise, and to start to adopt sensi-
ble regulatory responses instead of acting like the problem does not
exist. Recognizing passive takings is admittedly an imperfect solu-
tion, but it exerts pressure in the right direction. I stand by that
argument. Increasing pressure on the government to act to address
sea level rise will make society better off. Forcing the government
to confront the costs of inaction as well as action will generate more
appropriate regulatory responses.
There is, however, a troubling distributional consequence to this
argument that must be addressed. The leverage from passive takings
will almost certainly be applied by beachfront property owners
seeking compensation when their property is threatened by sea level
rise. But this invokes an unappealing image of affluent property
owners—many of whom could or should have known of increased
risks from erosion—suing the government to allow an ecologically
damaging sea wall, for example. And if affluent beachfront property
owners invoke passive takings, it will be to reinforce their already
privileged position as owners of valuable land. Therefore, while the
effect of passive takings will benefit government decision-making,
the distributional consequences may be quite regressive. The poor,
after all, are not the most likely to bring passive takings claims.
Indeed, there are many ways in which the poor and the property-
less are most likely to bear the brunt of climate change. Poor com-
munities tend to be less resilient and more vulnerable to flooding
and other consequences of climate change.54 But they are less pro-
tected economically because they are more likely to be renters than
owners, if they have a recognized property right at all. Especially
internationally, the global poor tend to have informal possessory
interests instead of formal property rights.55 They are therefore
unlikely to have insurance, and have few good ways of protecting
54. See, e.g., Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate
Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 331–36 (2012) (“[P]oor
persons already living at the margins of survival will likely suffer disproportionate impacts
of climate change . . . .”). See generally STEPHANE HALLEGATTE ET AL., SHOCK WAVES:
MANAGING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON POVERTY (2015) (discussing at length the
relationship between poverty and climate change effects).
55. See THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 5–7 (comparing the often informal prop-
erty systems of the Third World with the formal property systems of Western capitalist nations).
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the value of their possessory interests ex ante, or recovering their
value ex post.
In general, these consequences are largely a function of poverty
itself. People do not own property because they cannot afford it; they
do not insure what they have because it is too expensive. And social
responses must therefore be addressed to the problem of poverty.
But at least sometimes, the absence of property may be a function
of rules and regulations, and not simply the absence of money. Where
that is true—where there is some regulatory barrier to property
acquisition that then renders the poor especially vulnerable—then
perhaps that barrier is itself illegal. The next Part explores precisely
that possibility.
III. IMPEDIMENT CLAIMS
Where the government is responsible for the absence of a vested
property interest, perhaps even the propertyless should be able to
pursue property protection, whether through the Takings Clause or
some other source. The doctrinal and normative bases for this sug-
gestion are examined below, as are the conceptual problems with
such claims. But first, there is an important antecedent inquiry: what
would it mean for the government to be responsible for the absence
of a vested property interest? Hernando de Soto’s work provides the
outlines of an answer.
In his book, The Other Path, de Soto identifies a remarkably
complex, even byzantine warren of overlapping regulations that
make formal property rights inaccessible to most Peruvians.56 In his
detailed account, a central impediment to economic progress in Peru
and in developing nations around the world comes from the inacces-
sibility of formal property rights to the world’s poor.57 Regulatory
barriers to entry, like insuperable hurdles to obtaining a business
license, relegate the poor to a kind of informal property regime where
most rights are merely possessory. Informal property does not receive
legal protection, and it cannot easily be used as collateral for loans
56. See, e.g., THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 133–35 (detailing a study’s findings that set-
ting up a small garment factory in Peru entails 289 days’ worth of procedural requirements).
57. For the generalization of his argument to the rest of the world, see THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 18–28.
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or easily be transferred to others.58 As a result, “owners” of such thin
possessory rights must expend an enormous amount of effort in
maintaining those rights through self-help.59
De Soto explores these dynamics in three different types of prop-
erty: businesses, residential, and transportation. In each of these
areas, regulatory barriers all but prohibit entire segments of the
population from obtaining formal property interests. For example,
when de Soto and his researchers sought to start a small business
in order to learn what would be involved, his team had to stand in
lines for more than eighteen hundred hours.60 That is almost one
year of standing in line, eight hours per day, five days per week. That
is not merely a long time; it is an impossibly long time for any real-
istic opportunity to obtain formal rights to open a business. As a
result, an enormous amount of economic activity in Peru takes place
through informal businesses, like street vendors who operate with-
out state recognition and who therefore rely on norms to create
entitlements to particular locations.61 Likewise, prohibitions on land
subdivisions and development mean that people engage in a form of
collective invasion of public property to establish a beachhead of
possessory rights, thereafter relying on political pressure to remain.62
But these, too, are not full-blown property interests. Possession of
a plot of land, even with a dwelling, does not generate recordable
title or a protectable property interest. There is not enough space
here to describe in detail de Soto’s fascinating and granular account
of these informal regimes. But just these few examples at least
gesture to a core insight: in some legal regimes, like Peru’s, regula-
tory barriers to the acquisition of property can be so onerous that
the State itself should bear some responsibility for the lack of vested
property rights.
This idea has some intuitive appeal. But the doctrinal basis for
liability is complicated. In the strongest form, the regulatory regime
58. THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 158–63 (discussing the “costs” of lacking formal
property rights).
59. See id. at 160–61 (“[I]nformals incur substantial costs in defending their possessions . . .
by establishing and operating thousands of different organizations.”).
60. THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 190.
61. See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 66–69 (analyzing Peruvian street vendors’
“special rights of ownership” of fixed locations on public roads).
62. See id. at 19–22, 38–42 (describing this process of informal property acquisition).
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itself could be challenged as an impermissible burden on property
under the Takings Clause. Admittedly, regulatory takings doctrine
does not have a lot of analogues outside the United States.63 However,
bilateral investment treaties and international human rights laws
may provide a source for such claims where foreign law does not.64
Whatever the doctrinal hook, regulatory burdens that make it all
but impossible to acquire any kind of new business license, as in Peru,
would give rise to a cognizable impediment claim under this theory.
Even a moment’s reflection raises some difficult questions, however.
Most obviously, this kind of impediment claim appears to run
counter to the plain text of the Takings Clause, which prohibits the
government from taking property. The grammar strongly implies a
kind of active expropriation of pre-existing property. The govern-
ment cannot take from you something that you never had. However,
this grammatical argument should not necessarily control. Purely
textual interpretations of the Constitution are rarely dispositive,
even where the text is plain.65 And the meaning of the Takings Clause
is particularly contested. One must then look to normative and con-
sequentialist arguments instead.
According to James Ely, property is central to protecting inde-
pendence; it carves out a sphere of “ordered liberty” that is immune
from governmental intrusion, and is therefore—in his words—the
“guardian of every other right.”66 But property cannot perform this
essential function, nor can it act as a democratizing force, if it is not
widely available.67
63. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE xxxiii–xxxiv (2006) (discussing doctrinal
differences between American regulatory takings law and that of other countries).
64. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s In-
vestment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings”
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 32–34 (2003) (describing the proliferation of takings—like pro-
visions in bilateral and multilateral investment agreements); Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory
Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM.
J. INT’L L. 475, 496–501 (2008) (examining regulatory takings claims in the European Court
of Human Rights).
65. Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
701, 713–14 (2016) (noting that plain constitutional text is often not controlling).
66. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26, 81, 172 (3rd ed. 2003).
67. Cf. Claire Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the Ameri-
can Revolutionary Period, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 277–80 (2015) (discussing the Jeffersonian
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Consequentially, too, conventional accounts of property and the
Takings Clause view property protection as essential to induce effi-
cient investments.68 People will underinvest in property that is not
sufficiently stable or protected. That is, in fact, precisely what de
Soto observes in Peru and in other developing countries. People with
mere possessory interests, and not full-blown property rights, tend
to underdevelop their land, and overinvest in protecting what im-
provements they do make.69 Arguments about investment incen-
tives, then, apply equally to regulatory burdens of existing property
rights and to regulatory burdens that prohibit people from acquiring
formal property rights in the first place. In fact, most of the norma-
tive justifications for protecting property against regulatory interfer-
ence apply as well to regulatory prohibitions on the acquisition of
property because none of property’s benefits can accrue in the ab-
sence of property.70
There are important distributive justifications for these kinds of
claims as well. Traditional property protection is inherently conser-
vative because it protects the existing allocation of property. While
contemporary theorists have developed a sophisticated communi-
tarian vision of property as including obligations to society, most
conventional accounts implicitly view property protection as inher-
ently anti-redistributive.71 Protecting the right to acquire property,
view that abolishment of the fee tail promoted egalitarianism by allowing “more property . . .
to be acquired according to ‘virtue and talent’ . . . rather than by hereditary privilege”).
68. See George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual
Property Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 305,
315–16 (1993) (“Increased foreign investment is a primary goal of the domestic industrial
property protection laws.”); see generally Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting
the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883 (2007) (proposing a more localized
conception of private property protection as a means of attracting investment).
69. See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 158–61 (“[I]nformals do not use or preserve the
resources available to them as efficiently as they might if they were sure of their rights.”).
70. The one obvious exception concerns normative accounts that focus on the endowment
effect, or the psychological attachment that people have for things they own. Property as per-
sonhood, for example, depends upon pre-existing property and may not justify rules protecting
the acquisition of property.
71. Compare Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 127, 138–45 (2009) (outlining a property theory based on “[d]e-
pendence and [o]bligation” to communities), and Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 760–62 (2009) (developing further
this “Aristotelian” communitarian view of property), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape
of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 911–12 (2000) (“The ‘hallmark’ of constitutional
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instead of just the existing allocation, changes the valence of prop-
erty protection.
Accordingly, allowing the propertyless to pursue property protec-
tion can be progressive and redistributive. Depending on how such
claims arise, they may be available only to the very poor—people with-
out meaningful access to property at all. At the very least, such claims
would allow people without property some measure of protection from
government interference—protection that they do not now receive.
There are, however, additional conceptual problems that impedi-
ment claims must overcome. For one, must a plaintiff show that she
could not obtain access to formal property herself, or rather must
she show that no one could? Even (or especially) in Peru, the regula-
tory regime described by de Soto is simultaneously exclusionary and
protectionist. Some people do have business licenses, recordable title
in their homes, and so forth. The problem is the inaccessibility of such
recognition to many people; it is meaningfully available only to the
affluent and politically connected.72 But should someone be able to
object to a regime that deprives her of access to property, even if it
poses little or no hurdle to others? How many people must be excluded
for the regulatory regime to be subject to this kind of challenge?
To illustrate the problem—with an example that does not implicate
wealth or class—imagine a property regime that requires recorda-
tion or some form of registration, but the paperwork must be filed
in person at a single location in Washington, D.C. For people in
Virginia or Delaware, that may not be so burdensome. But as the
distance grows, so too does the height of the regulatory hurdle.
Contrast this, then, with the same rule but where paperwork can be
filed in every county in every state. That is considerably less bur-
densome to most people, but for some much smaller subset it might
still be too much—people who cannot drive, expats living overseas,
and the like. The regulation is more problematic the more people it
excludes from meaningful access to property. But that does not pro-
vide much guidance about how broad the exclusion must be before
it creates the kinds of problems de Soto identifies.
property is the right to exclude others.”), and Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution
in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1319–21 (1987) (“[W]e primarily
understand property in its constitutional sense as an antiredistributive principle . . . .”).
72. See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 189–99 (“[In Peru,] wealth is not so much the
result of labor as of political wheeling and dealing.”).
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Similarly, must the regulatory burdens effectively eliminate all
access to formal property, or only access to some distinct and desir-
able property? People denied a business license, for example, might
well have access to other formal property rights. Indeed, many regu-
lations prevent many people from getting exactly what they want,
but that cannot be grounds for objecting. As an extreme example,
regulatory requirements mean that only the most sophisticated
companies can obtain a license to operate a nuclear power plant.73
Clearly, I should not be able to complain because I cannot obtain
such a license. The regulatory barriers are insuperable to me, and
that is entirely appropriate. I have plenty of access to other forms
of property, and so should have no grounds to complain. Even the
very poor in de Soto’s Peru have access to some property—the clothes
on their backs, if nothing else—and so even that regulatory environ-
ment does not effect a total prohibition on property acquisition.
Here, too, there is a spectrum. The most problematic regulatory
regimes deny formal property recognition for the most important
assets; the least problematic put only some specific and less central
assets out of reach.
And finally, some assets are deliberately not treated as property
at all. Most famously, corpses and organs defy characterization as
property. This rule has both common law and statutory bases. In
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,74 the plaintiff sued
for conversion after doctors had harvested cells from his spleen to
develop a cure for a particular kind of cancer. The California Supreme
Court looked at strict statutory provisions limiting the disposal of
body parts to conclude that the plaintiff did not have a property
interest in his organs.75 Could that give rise to an impediment
claim? Could the plaintiff have challenged those underlying regula-
tions on grounds that they denied him property in his own organs?
That seems wrongheaded, but is at least superficially difficult to dis-
tinguish from the examples above. At the very least, some assets—
bodies, people, navigable waters, submerged lands, and so forth—can
be removed entirely from a property regime for normative reasons.
But the broader the category of assets excluded from property, the
more problematic the regime.
73. See generally 10 C.F.R. pt. 52 (2016) (establishing nuclear licensing requirements).
74. 793 P.2d 479, 480–83 (1990).
75. Id. at 491–97.
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These various problems may prove insoluble. Impediment claims
become untenable in the absence of principled limits. Otherwise,
they would become a generalized challenge to any grievance that
property is inaccessible. Nevertheless, such claims are at least
plausible in the most extreme cases, where regulatory barriers to
property acquisition exclude whole swaths of the population from
formal ownership of core assets. It is therefore worth considering
what form such protection might take and how these claims might
work in practice.
Consider exclusionary zoning, a conceptually obvious source of
impediment claims. Some municipalities today exercise their land
use authority for exclusionary purposes. Familiar forms of exclusion-
ary zoning include imposing large minimum lot sizes, prohibiting
multifamily housing, placing large amounts of land in undevelopable
“holding zones,” and other techniques that radically reduce supply.76
Depending on local housing markets, such approaches can dramati-
cally increase property values, placing the municipality effectively
out of reach for all but the affluent.
Most commentators agree that exclusionary zoning practices are
objectionable, especially in their strongest forms. But there are
significant legal barriers to challenging such provisions. The real
harms of exclusionary zoning are visited upon the diffuse class of
potential residents who are excluded from the municipality. But
they do not even self-identify as a class of people, let alone have
standing to sue.77 Instead, challenges are generally brought by
developers objecting to regulations that prohibit or limit their build-
ing plans. While developers sometimes suffer a real economic harm
from overly restrictive zoning, and happen to represent the end
consumers of their intended developments by proxy,78 this is an
imperfect enforcement strategy. Many times, developers simply use
76. See Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1667, 1689 (2013)
(describing traditional methods of exclusionary zoning).
77. For a narrow exception, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–64 (1977) (granting standing based upon showing that plaintiff
would have been eligible for, and would likely have moved in to, excluded subsidized housing).
78. See, e.g., id. at 261–63 (finding developer standing to challenge an exclusionary zoning
measure).
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the mantle of exclusionary zoning to force municipalities to the bar-
gaining table to allow new high-end building.79
An impediment takings claim would offer a more direct approach
for challenging exclusionary zoning. Strong exclusionary zoning
amounts to a significant regulatory burden on many people’s ability
to acquire property in the municipality. A takings claim would seek
compensation for that burden. A very similar analysis would apply
to regulations that make credit inaccessible to swaths of potential
homeowners—like FHA practices prior to the 1970s that made
credit largely unavailable for minority neighborhoods.80
While exclusionary zoning is perhaps the most intuitive context
for imagining impediment takings claims, it may not be the most
likely because it still presents a number of the problems identified
above. For one, who can sue? Anyone without a lot of money, any-
where in the country, could claim to have been denied the right to
acquire property in the municipality. Millions of people could object
to the zoning practices in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey, for example, even
though the most permissive zoning regime imaginable would have
resulted in only modest growth. It would be necessary to find some
way of limiting recovery; otherwise the entire universe of potentially
aggrieved propertyless plaintiffs could all sue Mt. Laurel and every
other municipality engaged in exclusionary zoning.
Furthermore, measuring compensation under impediment takings
claims for the impact of exclusionary zoning on any individual is
conceptually problematic. Imagine that exclusionary zoning prac-
tices increase the median price per square foot of residential housing
by, on average, fifty percent. Any individual’s “harm” will depend
upon the house that she would have bought but for the exclusionary
zoning. Needless to say, attempting such a hypothetical calculation
seems extremely speculative.
79. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of West Windsor, 803 A.2d 53, 93 (N.J. 2002) (Stein, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the small percentage of low income housing
built after New Jersey’s Mount Laurel II decision); Andrew Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s
Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 28, 47 (1996)
(describing developers’ use of challenges to exclusionary zoning to construct more profitable
housing); Diane Mastrull & Evan Halper, Land-Use Battles Frustrate Pa. Towns, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 2000, at A1 (reporting on developers’ manipulative use of Pennsylvania’s
affordable housing law to build upscale housing).
80. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 52–57 (1993) (chronicling the FHA’s redlining policies).
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Maybe the Takings Clause is the wrong doctrinal hook, and com-
pensation the wrong remedy. A substantive due process claim chal-
lenging the rationality of regulatory barriers to property acquisition
might better fill the gap identified in this Essay. It has the twin
virtues of being more deferential to the government and providing
injunctive relief instead of damages. The former helps to constrain
impediment claims and prevent them from swallowing up all regula-
tions. The latter resolves the complex compensation question, and
effectively allows any individual to challenge the very existence of
the burdensome regulations.
Ultimately, however, the appeal of any of these claims—whether
under the Takings or Due Process Clauses—turns on the ability to
identify limiting principles. If impediment claims are limited to the
most egregious examples of exclusion—to total prohibitions on new
building or to Peru-style limits on business licenses—then they will
be very rare. They will also be important to remedy when they do
arise. But if they expand to include more innocuous hurdles to the
acquisition of discrete assets and specific forms of property, then
these kinds of claims become a broad opportunity for anyone to chal-
lenge any regulatory regime. Even rational zoning, after all, creates
a barrier for some property owners to have precisely the use they
want in the location they want. Safety regulations make some prop-
erty unaffordable to some people.81 The federal Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act makes it impossible to have certain kinds of
hazardous waste.82 Without identifying principled limits, impediment
claims are non-starters out of the gate.83
A more plausible impediment claim, then, might take a narrower
and more technical form. Instead of direct challenges to the regulatory
barriers to property acquisition, perhaps those barriers simply satisfy
the standing requirement to challenge other regulations that are
81. See, e.g., Werner Z. Hirsh et al., Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws
upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
1098, 113–32 (1975) (finding a positive relationship between the implied warranty of habitability
and higher rental rates).
82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6926 (2012) (specifying requirements for hazardous waste
generation, transportation, and storage).
83. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.”).
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independently burdensome. In other words, the substantive challenge
would not be to the impediments to property acquisition themselves;
instead, those impediments, if sufficiently onerous, would substitute
for the normal requirement of a vested property right to challenge
some government action burdening property on other grounds.
In general, as described above, vested property rights are a pre-
requisite for any kind of takings claim or other form of property
protection.84 And of course that makes sense. No matter the form,
a government action that disrupts a mere possessory interest—
whether a squatter, or an illegal business—will not give rise to a
takings claim. But what if the government itself is responsible for
the lack of a vested property interest? In that case, perhaps, there
is a kind of derivative taking: the regulatory barriers to acquiring
property rights in the first place could create standing to challenge
a government action, even in the absence of vested property rights.85
This is not such a radical suggestion, because it is not fundamen-
tally different from allowing public interest–impact litigation to
challenge exclusionary zoning. In fact, the leading exclusionary zon-
ing case is NAACP v. Mt. Laurel.86 The state supreme court largely
avoided the issue of the NAACP’s standing by finding that the plain-
tiffs included “present residents . . . residing in dilapidated or sub-
standard housing.”87 It therefore held that it did not have to rule on
others’ standing, which had gone unchallenged.88 But in other cases,
standing could prove a substantial hurdle. The availability of an
alternative basis for standing—based on the regulatory barriers to
property acquisition—could eliminate some of the judicial contor-
tions in existing doctrine.
However, even this may be too great an expansion of standing
rules. Potentially, anyone priced out of a jurisdiction by exclusion-
ary zoning practices could sue. It also potentially conflates the
standing inquiry with the merits of the underlying claim. After all,
84. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
85. Note that this kind of claim is entirely consistent with the text of the Takings Clause.
Such claims only arise when the government is taking property without just compensation.
The property happens to not belong to the plaintiff, but nothing in the text of the Takings
Clause limits who can seek to vindicate such claims.
86. So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
87. Id. at 717 n.3.
88. Id.
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exclusionary zoning practices are, by definition, impediments to
property acquisition. The standing requirement effectively disap-
pears if the allegation of exclusionary zoning is enough, by itself, to
establish standing. Anyone seeking to challenge zoning practices as
exclusionary could find any person priced out of the local jurisdic-
tion to serve as a plaintiff. It is one thing to open the courthouse
doors to such challenges; it is another to remove the doors entirely.
Nevertheless, the work of the impediment claim here is simply to
establish standing, and so a plaintiff would have to allege some
independent violation of law. While equal protection and due pro-
cess claims are possible, they are by no means easy to win. Quite the
contrary. Establishing standing has essentially no relationship to
the likelihood of success. Using an impediment claim simply to
establish standing is actually quite narrow and therefore surpris-
ingly plausible. In fact, if anything, it is so narrow that it may not
be worth the candle.
These problems may ultimately render impediment claims unten-
able, either because they are too broad to be constrained, or too narrow
to be useful. But they have the potential to provide the propertyless
with a mechanism for objecting to burdensome government actions.
And so they hold some promise for marshalling the protection of
property rights in the service of those without property.
CONCLUSION
Allowing people without property to bring what amounts to prop-
erty claims—whether under the Takings Clause, or some other legal
mechanism—might seem fantastical. After all, the existence of a
property right is a kind of definitional prerequisite to property pro-
tection. Focusing, however, on regulatory burdens inhibiting the right
to acquire property in the first place offers a new avenue for invok-
ing the power of property for redistributive instead of just conserva-
tive ends. Such a refocusing may thus provide a means of addressing
the missing rung of formal property so critically diagnosed by
Hernando de Soto. While the kinds of impediment claims identified
in this Essay may ultimately fail doctrinally and conceptually, they
nevertheless invite more work exploring how property can serve the
interests of the propertyless.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FRANKIE MCCARTHY*
INTRODUCTION
A scholar with an interest in the constitutional property rights of
any legal system will eventually find herself exploring the literature
from the United States. Over the years, the Takings Clause has
generated such a treasure trove of judicial thought and legal writing
that to ignore it is to impoverish the property rights scholarship of
other jurisdictions. It was a genuine delight, therefore, to read that
the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference was to be
held in Europe, and that continental property scholars would be
invited to participate in an exchange of knowledge with the expert
U.S. delegates who have made the conference what it is over the
years. During my three days in The Hague last October, I not only
learned a great deal, I also enjoyed one of the warmest and most col-
legiate conference experiences of my career to date. It was a pleasure,
if not a surprise, to find that the hospitality of U.S. property rights
lawyers is every bit as rich as their writing.
This paper continues in the spirit of that happy exchange of legal
cultures, making use of scholarship from both the United States and
Europe to develop a novel argument that will, I hope, be of rele-
vance on both sides of the Atlantic. The focus of the paper is the
constitutional property protection provided to European citizens by
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (“Convention”). This protection has been available in
Europe since 1954, and has given rise to a huge volume of cases both
in the domestic courts of European states and before the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).1 However, it has yet to receive
* Senior Lecturer in Private Law, University of Glasgow. My thanks to Professor John
A. Lovett and colleagues from the College of Law, Loyola University New Orleans, and to
participants at the 2016 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for valuable comments
on earlier drafts of this article. All mistakes are my own.
1. For an overview of the jurisprudence, see DAVID HARRIS, ED BATES, MICHAEL O’BOYLE
& CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 18 (3d ed. 2014).
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the kind of detailed, theoretical analysis that U.S. scholars have
delivered in respect to the Takings Clause. My paper fills that gap
by developing a theoretical analysis that builds upon the work
carried out in the United States.
The research question I address concerns the normative values
underlying European property protection. Carol Rose, Emerita Pro-
fessor of Law at Yale University and recipient of the 2010 Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Prize, and Gregory Alexander, A. Robert
Noll Professor of Law at Cornell University and a member of Cor-
nell’s influential progressive property group, have argued in their
works that a tension can be identified in U.S. takings jurisprudence
between two competing accounts of property and property rights.
The first and perhaps prevailing account in the United States is that
of property as a commodity, a tool to maximise the satisfaction of
individual preferences through the maximisation of wealth. The
second account is that of property as propriety, a tool to maintain
the appropriate social order.2 In this paper, I consider whether a
similar tension, with the risk of incoherence in the jurisprudence that
it creates, can be identified in the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights.
The paper is made up of three sections. In the first, I explain the
theoretical lens through which I will examine the European property
rights protection, summarising the competing accounts of property as
developed in the works of Rose and Alexander. In the second, I
outline the constitutional property protection offered by Article 1 of
the First Protocol, explaining its place in the European legal order
and the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights
when adjudicating an application in respect of property rights. In
the final part, I explore the extent to which the competing accounts
of property identified by U.S. scholars can be identified in relation
to the European constitutional property protection. My analysis is
focused on what can be learned from the wording of Article 1 itself,
from the approach taken by the court to define which possessions
merit the protection of the Convention, and from the requirement
developed by the court that compensation must be paid in every
case where an applicant is deprived of ownership. In concluding, I
2. See infra Part I for further explanation of property as “commodity” and property as
“propriety.”
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suggest that the normative inconsistency found in U.S. jurispru-
dence is also identifiable in European case law and suggest that, as
in the United States, understanding that normative conflict can help
to explain certain incoherencies. In this way, I offer some insight
into how we “do” constitutional property in Europe, and also demon-
strate how valuable a cross jurisdictional understanding of constitu-
tional property scholarship can be in developing a novel analysis of
mono-jurisdictional issues.
I. UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: TWO STORIES
Within the U.S. scholarship on constitutional property, a line of
argument that has been developed particularly by Rose3 and Alex-
ander4 posits that competing understandings of the purpose of
property as a legal institution can be discerned in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, even though these notions may not have been explic-
itly described or acknowledged in the judgments themselves. Rose
suggests that the famously “muddled”5 nature of takings jurispru-
dence results, in fact, from this unacknowledged conflict over the
core purpose of property law.
Both authors describe these competing visions in broadly similar
terms, although the terminology varies. In her works, Rose dis-
cusses the concept of property as “preference-satisfaction” in opposi-
tion to the idea of property as “propriety.”6 Alexander focuses on
property as “commodity” in contrast to (borrowing explicitly from
Rose) property as “propriety.”7 In short, the commodity approach
3. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Rose, Mahon Reconstructed]; Carol M.
Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NOMOS 223 (Robert W. Gordon &
Margaret Jane Radin eds., 1991), as reprinted in CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 49 (1994) [hereinafter Rose,
Property as Wealth] (this article references pagination in the reprint).
4. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 (1997) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, COM-
MODITY AND PROPRIETY].
5. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 3, at 561.
6. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 52–58 (property as preference satisfaction),
58–65 (property as propriety).
7. See ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1 (setting out the con-
cept of property as commodity), 2 (setting out the concept of property as propriety).
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sees property as an institution designed to allow for the realisation
of individual autonomy through the maximisation of preference satis-
faction. The propriety approach sees property as the material foun-
dation for creating and maintaining the social order—the private
basis for the public good.8 Although neither of these approaches
precludes the possibility of legitimate government takings of prop-
erty, the conditions in which such takings will be justified and the
consequences for expropriated owners will vary significantly de-
pending on which account dominates. Alexander’s work makes plain
that these conflicting notions of property have existed, in one form
or another, throughout the history of American legal thought, chal-
lenging the claim that a single historical conception of property can
be identified, let alone relied upon, by modern-day jurists who must
determine or justify constitutional property decisions. In Rose’s
view, it is the Supreme Court’s unarticulated vacillation between
the two approaches that has resulted in a jurisprudence lacking
overall coherence.
The following section will provide a fuller account of the commod-
ity and propriety approaches to property, before considering their
repercussions for constitutional property protection.
A. Property as Commodity
Based in part on the work of Stephen Munzer,9 Rose’s account of
property as “preference-satisfaction” posits that the key purpose of
any property law regime is maximisation of the satisfaction of in-
dividual preferences through maximisation of wealth. Property law
facilitates this process of wealth maximisation by enabling legal
persons to obtain secure rights in things. A person has an incentive
to work on enhancing the value of her things, since her secure rights
give her confidence that she will reap the rewards of that effort in
due course. In so doing, she increases the wealth of society as a
whole.10 Rose describes this as:
8. Id. at 1.
9. See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Compensation and Government Takings of Private
Property, 33 NOMOS 195 (1991).
10. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 52–55.
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[T]he standard but very powerful story about property as a pref-
erence-satisfying institution. According to that story, a property
regime satisfies preferences not by divvying up a finite bag of
resources, but rather by encouraging behaviour that enhances
resources’ value, making the total bag a whole lot bigger and
more diverse.11
Alexander’s commodity account situates the same basic concept
within an explanation that emphasises the concept’s role in separat-
ing public from private, noting that this view suggests property has
one core purpose:
[T]o define in material terms the legal and political sphere within
which individuals are free to pursue their own private agendas
and satisfy their own preferences, free from governmental coer-
cion or other forms of external interference. Property, according
to this understanding, is the foundation for the categorical sepa-
ration of the realms of the private and public, individual and
collectivity, the market and the polity.12
In this account of property, governmental takings can be justified
only in limited circumstances, since every instance of a taking under-
mines the security of property rights. Certain projects—the con-
struction of large-scale infrastructure might be an example—are
capable of greater wealth maximisation when publicly managed. In
these situations, a taking is justified, provided that the expropriated
owner is compensated for her loss. The compensation is necessary
not just in recognition of the effort already made by the owner to
enhance the value of her thing but to reassure others that it re-
mains worthwhile to work on enhancing the value of their things.13
The government is also justified in preventing a use of property
without payment of compensation if that use does not maximise the
overall wealth of society. Prevention of nuisance and prohibition or
regulation of monopolies both fall into this category.14
The idea of property as commodity can be seen to fall within a
liberal tradition focused on the attainment of individual autonomy:
11. Id. at 54–55.
12. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 57.
14. Id. at 57–58.
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freedom from (in this case, state interference) rather than freedom
to carry out any particular activity.15
B. Property as Propriety
The alternative conception of property is termed by both authors
as property as “propriety.” In this account, the key purpose of prop-
erty as an institution is to ensure that each person or entity has
“that which is needed to keep good order in the . . . body politic”16: no
more and no less. In Alexander’s terms, propriety recognizes prop-
erty law as “the material foundation for creating and maintaining
the proper social order, the private basis for the public good.”17
Alexander identifies the propriety approach as in keeping with
the Aristotelian understanding of human beings as fundamentally
interdependent creatures, who therefore owe one another obliga-
tions as an incident of their very humanity.18 The notion of property
as propriety can be traced back to the political traditions of Western
Europe in the Middle Ages. At that time, the social order was
strictly hierarchical, with the monarch at the head of the state, the
husband and father at the head of the family, and various permuta-
tions in between. (The value of having such a rigid hierarchy was
seldom questioned in political philosophy: the universe was accepted
as being formed in hierarchy with God at the top.) A person at the
head of a given hierarchy was granted property rights in combination
with responsibilities to those further down the pyramid. Property
was, in a sense, simply one aspect of the broader role the person was
required to fulfil. Property law was therefore viewed as a mecha-
nism for maintaining the social order for the good of the country as
a whole.19
This understanding of the purpose of property evolved into the
Jeffersonian conception of civic republicanism in the America of the
late eighteenth century. Although keen to distance itself from out-
moded feudal systems of tenure where land was concentrated in the
15. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 3; see C. Edwin Baker,
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986).
16. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 58.
17. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 1.
18. Id. at 1–2.
19. Id. at 1–2; see also Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 58–61.
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hands of an unchanging, undeserving aristocracy, civic republican-
ism retained the notion of property as essential to the social order.
Ownership of an appropriate amount of land allowed individuals to
be independent rather than relying on the favour of the aristocracy,
meaning they were free to participate in the creation and mainte-
nance of the public good, described by Thomas Jefferson as the pur-
suit of “republican virtue.”20 Responsibility towards the less fortunate
was viewed as an inherent aspect of this virtue.21 Although civic re-
publicans eschewed the European form of aristocracy, a hierarchy
was still evident within the social structures of the new republic—
only white men of certain social standing were empowered to own
land. In more recent times, theorists such as Charles Reich22 and Cass
Sunstein23 have sought to move away from the hierarchical aspects
of the civic republican conception of property whilst retaining the
aspects of social obligation inherent within them.24
Government takings of property make sense in this conception
since property rights are justified only to the extent necessary for
the good of society. If an owner of property is not fulfilling the obli-
gations which come alongside that ownership, the State is justified
in compelling that action for the benefit of the community.25 If a
person has more property than she needs to meet her social respon-
sibilities, there can be little justification for retaining the excess
where the community has need of it. Compensation may be appro-
priate, but it need not be “market value”—only sufficient to reflect
the needs of her social role. It is also legitimate to treat different
types of property differently in a takings regime where this concep-
tion holds sway, since some property is essential to the discharge of
the owner’s social responsibility, whereas the remainder is not.
Property as propriety can also be associated within a certain type
of liberty, in this case the freedom to achieve certain ends.26 Alexan-
der notes an important distinction between the two accounts of
property in that regard. Property as commodity is concerned with
20. Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 61–62.
21. Id.
22. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
23. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
24. See Rose, Property as Wealth, supra note 3, at 63–64.
25. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 2.
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the structure of society only in a purely instrumental sense. It de-
mands that individuals be free to operate securely within the market,
meaning that the society which results will be based on market
transactions; but what that society actually looks like is of no con-
cern in the commodity model. Property as propriety, by contrast,
uses property law as a tool with which to achieve a normative vision
of an appropriate form of society. It is concerned with substantive out-
comes. The nature of those outcomes will vary in different times,
places, and societal philosophies, but there will always be substan-
tive values at the centre of a proprietarian outlook, and the property
rules put in place under that view will be in service to those values.27
C. The Operation of Constitutional Property Protection
Constitutional protection of property will operate quite differently
in a context where the property-as-commodity narrative prevails
than in a context where the property-as-propriety narrative is domi-
nant. At one end of the spectrum, best symbolized by Robert Nozick’s
“night watchman state,” constitutional property rights should
operate to prevent virtually any state action impacting on individual
ownership.28 Property as commodity is embedded, if not articulated,
within the Nozickian view of rights. The alleged adoption of this
view of property by U.S. lawmakers is what underscores Jennifer
Nedelsky’s concerns over the constitutionalization of property,
which she fears will lead to entrenched economic inequality resulting
from powerful property rights becoming insulated in a regulation-
free private enclave.29
In the property-as-propriety narrative, however, the protection
offered by a constitutional clause is limited by the social obligations
inherent in property ownership. Explicit recognition of such obliga-
tions can in fact be found within the constitutional property clauses
of various countries, most notably in Article 14 of the Basic Law for
27. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 4, at 3.
28. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
29. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY ch. 6, at 203–76 (1990) (dis-
cussing the flawed vision underlying American constitutionalism and the role of its original
focus on property).
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the Federal Republic of Germany30 and in Section 25 of the South
African Bill of Rights.31 Alexander demonstrates that some form of
the obligation may also be detected in constitutional jurisprudence
even where it is not explicit within the text of a country’s constitu-
tion itself, using both Canadian and U.S. takings jurisprudence as
examples.32
The distinction is neatly summarised by Andre van der Walt, who
describes a contrast between a constitutional property clause used
as guarantee as opposed to one used as a limitation.33 Free market,
minimalist-state libertarianism and the barrier it erects between
public and private spheres argues for a property clause acting as a
guarantee that private property will be insulated from state regula-
tion in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.34 However, if
property is understood to come with responsibilities, a constitutional
property protection would operate to secure a minimum level of
rights for owners, sufficient to ensure human dignity, without re-
moving the discretion of the State to limit or redefine the non-essen-
tial aspects of property where necessary to achieve social goods.35
30. Grundesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 14, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet
.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0085 (Ger.). The text translates as follows:
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and
limits shall be defined by the laws.
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be
ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of com-
pensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case
of dispute respecting the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the
ordinary courts.
31. S. AFR. CONST., Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2017, http://www.justice.gov.za
/legislation/constitution (full text omitted for space).
32. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY,
chs. 1, 5 (2006) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, GLOBAL]; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Civic
Property, 6 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 217 (1997); Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental
Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003); Gregory S. Alexander, The
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
33. See Andre van der Walt, The Constitutional Property Clause: Striking a Balance
Between Guarantee and Limitation, in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 109, 109–46 (Janet
McLean ed., 1999).
34. Id. at 123–25.
35. Id. at 126–28.
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A. The European Convention on Human Rights
In addition to property clauses included within the individual
constitutions of many European states, citizens of Europe also
benefit from the protection given to ownership as a human right
under Article 1 of the First Protocol (“A1P1”) to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.36 The Convention was drafted between
1949 and 1951 by the Council of Europe (“Council”), an intergovern-
mental grouping of European nations founded in the aftermath of
the Second World War with the aim of furthering European political
co-operation by protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law.37 Originally formed by ten countries, membership of the Coun-
cil has expanded over the decades and now stands at forty-seven
countries, including several states which were formerly part of the
Communist bloc.38 Every State that is a member of the Council is
also a signatory to the Convention. The European Union39 has also
acceded to the Convention in its own right, meaning that actions
taken by the EU must be Convention compliant.40 Every signatory
36. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18,
1954).
37. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. I,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No.005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
38. A detailed treatment of the history of the Council of Europe can be found in DENIS
HUBER, A DECADE WHICH MADE HISTORY: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1989–1999 (1999).
39. Although the terminology can be confusing, it is important to distinguish between the
Council of Europe, an international organisation whose forty-seven government members are
focused principally on the protection of human rights and the rule of law, and the European
Union, a group of twenty-eight member states joined in a political and economic union
requiring (subject to certain exceptions) use of a shared currency and free movement of goods,
services, and people within its area. The Council of Europe has no directly elected members
in its institutional bodies and no power to legislate: it operates in a manner somewhat similar
to the United Nations. The European Union, with its directly elected Parliament and legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches, is more like a form of federal government for the
States who have been permitted to join it (unless and until such a State chooses to leave it,
of course). For more information, the standard textbook in this area is LORNA WOODS &
PHILIPPA WATSON, STEINER & WOOD’S EU LAW (12th ed. 2014).
40. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union art. 6(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326). For an examination
of how human rights protection operates in combination between the two European systems,
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State must implement the Convention into its domestic legislation,
with enforcement actions pursued first through the courts of the
member States before a final right of appeal to the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.41
The protection of property rights is set out in Article 1 of the First
Protocol to the Convention. The text of the Convention is authentic
in both English and French, with the English version of the relevant
Article providing that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of the State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
or to secure payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.42
B. Applying Article 1 of the First Protocol
When hearing an application in respect of Article 1 of the First
Protocol, the European Court of Human Rights follows a three-step
see Bruno de Witte, The Interaction between the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER
(Patricia Popelier, Catherine Van de Heyning & Piet Van Nuffel eds., 2011).
41. Again, it is important to distinguish between the Strasbourg court, which has juris-
diction in respect to Convention claims only, and the European Court of Justice in Brussels,
Belgium, which is effectively the judicial branch of the EU.
42. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18,
1954). Curiously, the terms used in the French text do not correspond directly with the use
of “property” and “possessions” in the English text (see George L. Gretton, The Protection of
Property Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN SCOTS LAW (Alan Boyle, Chris Himsworth, Andrea Loux
& Hector MacQueen eds., 2002)). The French text reads:
Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens. Nul ne peut
être privé de sa propriété que pour cause d’utilité publique et dans les conditions
prévues par la loi et les principes généraux du droit international.
Les dispositions précédentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possèdent les
États de mettre en vigueur les lois qu’ils jugent nécessaires pour réglementer
l’usage des biens conformément à l’intérêt général ou pour assurer le paiement des
impôts ou d’autres contributions ou des amendes.
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process to ascertain whether the state action in question has led to
a violation of the applicant’s rights.
1. Engaging the Right: Possessions
First, the court will ascertain whether the applicant holds a “pos-
session” in the meaning used by the Convention. The significant
body of case law on this question provides useful data as to whether
property is viewed as commodity or propriety by the court. I will
examine this jurisprudence in detail in Part III below.
2. The Nature of the Interference: The Three Rules
Second, the court will ask whether the state action complained of
by the applicant has resulted in an interference with the protection
offered by Article 1. The decision in Sporrong and Lönnroth v.
Sweden,43 arguably the most significant decision on Article 1 to date,
explains the court’s approach to this question. The case concerned
two buildings located in an area of central Stockholm which had
been marked out for redevelopment by the city authorities. The
buildings were subject to expropriation permits, which made clear
that they would be subject to the exercise of eminent domain powers
as part of the redevelopment programme. These permits did not
restrict or remove any rights held by the owners as a matter of law,
but had a significant impact on the marketability of the buildings
in practice. The properties were, in addition, subject to a prohibition
on construction work. As a result of delays and amendments to the
redevelopment programme, the permits were extended on multiple
occasions, with the eventual result that the first applicant’s prop-
erty had been subject to the permit for twenty-three years, and the
second, for eight years. Ultimately, the redevelopment programme,
insofar as it affected the applicants’ properties, was cancelled. No
eminent domain powers were ever exercised.
In determining whether the series of actions taken by the city au-
thorities had resulted in a violation of the applicants’ rights, the court
found the protection offered by A1P1 to be comprised of three rules.
43. Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982), 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (1983), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57580.
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The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the prin-
ciple of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first
sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers depriva-
tion of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it ap-
pears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third
rule recognises that States are entitled, amongst other things,
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the
purpose; it is contained within the second paragraph.44
The court went on to examine the limits of the second rule, noting
that it covered both formal and de facto expropriation,45 and consid-
ered whether the extent of the state interference with the applicants’
rights, though clearly falling short of de jure loss of title, would
nevertheless amount to deprivation of possessions under the first
rule of A1P1. The applicants contended that the limitations on their
properties throughout the time period in question were so excessive
that their property rights had effectively been deprived of any sub-
stance. By a very slim margin,46 the court disagreed. The focus of
the judgement was on the powers that remained to the applicants
whilst the properties were subject to the permits. The applicants’
rights were certainly precarious whilst the threat of expropriation
loomed, and their ability to sell their properties on the open market
was therefore considerably reduced. In addition, their rights to develop
the properties were circumscribed in many respects.47 However, the
possibility of sale existed nevertheless: the Swedish government
provided evidence of properties subject to similar restrictions which
had, as matter of fact, been sold during the relevant time period.48
The court concluded: “Although the right in question lost some of its
substance, it did not disappear. The effects of the measures involved
are not such that they can be assimilated to a deprivation of posses-
sions.”49 The application was instead dealt with as an interference
44. Id. ¶ 61, at 17, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (1983) ¶ 61, at 50.
45. Bramelid v. Sweden, App. No. 8588/79, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64, 81
(1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74253.
46. The count was ten votes to nine. See Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 89, at 25,
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 89, at 59.
47. Id. ¶ 62, 63, at 18, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 62, 63, at 51; accord, id. ¶ 58, at 16, 2 Eur. H.R.
Rep. ¶ 58, at 49.
48. Id. ¶ 30, at 7, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 30, at 40.
49. Id. ¶ 63, at 18, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 63, at 51.
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with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (rule one) in relation to
the expropriation permits, and a control of use (rule three) in rela-
tion to the prohibition of construction. A violation of the rights of
both applicants was ultimately found by ten votes to nine, and the
question of an appropriate remedy was reserved to allow the parties
time to seek a settlement.50
In addition to setting out the three rules contained within Article 1,
Sporrong is instructive as to the criteria by which the court will
determine whether an applicant has been deprived of her posses-
sions, or subjected to some lesser interference. In particular, the
case demonstrates that the right to dispose of the property is central
to the question of deprivation, but not determinative. In fact, very
few de facto deprivations have been recognised by the court in the
years subsequent to the Sporrong decision,51 even when the owner
is subject to severe restrictions on his use of the property with the
result that his ability to dispose of the property is rendered useless
in fact, if not in law.52 The majority of rule two cases result from de
jure losses of title.
The court has not scrutinised the meaning of “control of use” in
the same level of detail. Effectively, a state action will amount to
control of use when it falls short of the standard required for de
facto deprivation or in circumstances where common sense indicates
that the use of the property in question is being regulated. Common
examples of a state action which may be categorised as such control
include the imposition of rules of taxation53 or planning legislation,54
50. See Sporrong v. Sweden, 85 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984), 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD256
(1985). The first applicant was ultimately awarded eight hundred thousand Swedish Krona
(“SEK”) (approximately ninety-six thousand U.S. dollars), and the second application was
awarded two hundred thousand SEK (approximately twenty-four thousand U.S. dollars).
51. A rare example can be found in Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 260-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1993), 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440 (1993), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57836. See also
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 69 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 261,
266–69 (1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84089 (providing additional background
information).
52. For an example, see generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)
12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616.
53. See generally Spacek v. Czech Republic 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1010 (2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58358 (imposition of additional income tax
liability, a control of use); Nat’l and Provincial Bldg. Soc’y v. United Kingdom 1997-VII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2325, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58109 (removal of right to reclaim overpaid
tax, a control of use).
54. See generally Agrotexim v. Greece, 330-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R.
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restrictions on rent,55 licensing laws,56 and the operation of rules of
succession.57
The relationship between the three rules is open to debate. In a
much cited dictum from James v. United Kingdom,58 the court indi-
cated that deprivation and control are particular instances of the
broader category of interference with peaceful enjoyment of pos-
sessions, and it seems clear that the court is bound to reject both the
second and third rules before it can find the first rule applicable.59
The court has also suggested that the categories operate as a set of
concentric circles, with deprivation as a subset of control, which is
in turn a subset of general interference with possessions.60
3. Justifying the Interference: Lawfulness, Legitimate Aim, and
Proportionality
The final step in the court’s adjudication process is to determine
whether the interference with the applicant’s property rights can be
justified. If so, the state action will not amount to a violation of
those rights.
For a justification to be established, the state action must pass
three tests. First, the court must be satisfied that the interference
was lawful, meaning that it had a clear basis in domestic law and
that the legal basis in question adhered to the basic rule-of-law
principles of clarity, accessibility, and nonretrospectivity.61 It is un-
usual for state action to fail this test, although not unheard of—with
Rep. 250 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57951 (planning restrictions preventing
development of land, a control of use).
55. See generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616 (cap on rent levels, a control of use).
56. See generally Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989),
13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 309 (1991), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57586 (licensing regime for
sale of alcohol, a control of use).
57. See generally Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987), 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 394
(1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57505 (legal regulation of inheritance, a control
of use).
58. See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123
(1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57507.
59. Id. ¶ 37, at 17, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 37, at 139–40.
60. See generally AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1 (1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57418.
61. See James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 37, at 17, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 37, at 139–40.
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problems most likely to arise when discretion afforded to the State
to take certain steps is not sufficiently bounded.62
Secondly, the state action must pursue a legitimate aim in the
public or general interest.63 Given the complexity of the policy areas
in which state action is likely to affect property rights—the econ-
omy, housing, the environment—the court has been clear that States
have a wide margin of appreciation in determining what falls within
the public interest.64 As an unelected judiciary within a centralised
system, the court will not substitute its judgement on this question
for that of a democratically elected legislature within the jurisdic-
tion in question. Short of a situation in which a State fails to offer
any public interest argument for their action at all,65 state interfer-
ence will almost invariably pass this test.
Finally, the court must determine whether the interference was
proportionate, meaning that it struck a fair balance between the
public interest and the human rights of the applicant.66 It is hard to
discern any systematic approach to the court’s assessments of pro-
portionality in property cases. One can point to various factors that
may be taken into account—the strength of the public interest
served by the State67 or the extent of the applicant’s opportunity to
62. See, e.g., Vasilescu v. Romania, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1064, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 241
(1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58169 (confiscation of gold coins had no basis in
domestic law); Iatridis v. Greece (Art. 41), 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97
(2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59087 (the eviction order on which the State had
based their eviction of the applicant from the land had been quashed, so the State had no
lawful basis to prevent the applicant returning); Hentrich v. France, 296-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1994), 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440 (1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57903 (provision
in the tax code allowing the State to pre-empt sale of land where the price was “too low” was
insufficiently precise to meet the test of foreseeability); Smirnov v. Russia, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 19
(2010), 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 19 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96399 (regulations which
allowed the State to retain property for an unlimited time where the property was “instru-
mental” to a criminal investigation were insufficiently precise to meet test of foreseeability).
63. These terms are used interchangeably in the jurisprudence.
64. James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 46, at 19 (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
¶ 46, at 142 (1986) (because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, elected
national authorities are better placed than an unelected international judge to determine
what is in the interest of their public, and must be afforded some discretion by the court).
65. See generally Zwierzyñski v. Poland, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6
(2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59522 (the unsuccessful state defence to a claim
of expropriation was that no expropriation had taken place, with no argument made in
justification of its actions).
66. Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 69, at 19 (1982), 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 350
¶ 69, at 19 (1979).
67. See generally Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
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be represented in the decision-making process68—but the only rule
that can be stated with any certainty is that a rule-two interference
(a deprivation of possessions) will not be proportionate unless the
applicant has received valuable compensation for his loss.69 My dis-
cussion of the development of this rule, and what it can tell us about
the court’s view of property as commodity or propriety, follows in
Part III.
III. EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
COMMODITY OR PROPRIETY?
In the first two parts of this paper, I have outlined the competing
accounts of property as commodity and property as propriety devel-
oped in U.S. constitutional property scholarship and explained the
nature of the property rights protection offered by Article 1 of the
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. Next,
I address the central research question I posed in the introduction.
In this third part of the paper, I argue that the clash of normative
values articulated through the commodity/propriety analysis of the
U.S. takings jurisprudence can also be identified in relation to
Article 1 of the First Protocol. In demonstrating this hypothesis, I
examine the text of Article 1, the approach of the European Court
of Human Rights to defining which “possessions” are protected by
the Article, and the requirement developed by the court that com-
pensation must be paid for every deprivation of possessions before
it can meet the test of proportionality.
A. The Wording of the Protection
Alexander’s comparative work reveals that robust constitutional
protection of property can exist without any written document or bill
391 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616 (rent controls aimed to prevent housing
crisis); Spadea v. Italy, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57937 (regulation of rental property during accommo-
dation shortage).
68. See generally AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1 (1987), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57418 (discussing extensive domestic appeal
process available for confiscation of allegedly smuggled goods).
69. See generally James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 123 (1986).
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of rights.70 Where express clauses do exist, however, dramatic dif-
ferences in wording are found from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
U.S. Takings Clause is notoriously brief, providing simply: “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.”71 Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution of Australia makes a
similarly succinct provision for “the acquisition of property on just
terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which
the Parliament has the power to make laws.”72
Within Europe, constitutional property clauses tend to be more de-
tailed, particularly as regards justification for state intervention with
property rights. Article 14 of the German Basic Law has been given
as an example above.73 The Italian Constitution of 1948 also makes
explicit reference to the social function of property, recognising the
possibility of expropriation with compensation in the public interest in
addition to other regulatory restraints on ownership and property.74
In drafting terms, A1P1 occupies a position somewhere in the
middle of these two approaches. Its first sentence contains a positive
statement of the right to property, which might be assumed to pro-
vide a more robust protection than in jurisdictions like the United
States where such a right is merely implied.75 The second and third
sentences appear, on their face, to contain what law and economics
scholars would categorise as liability rules76: that no one shall be
deprived of possessions except in the public interest and subject to
relevant legal conditions; and that the State may control the use of
property in the general interest, or to secure payment of taxes, other
contributions, or penalties.77
Reading the text offers little guidance, however, as to which con-
ception of property underpins the protection envisaged by the clause.
In fact, the wording can lend itself to potential constructions in
70. ALEXANDER, GLOBAL, supra note 32, ch. 1.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72. Australian Constitution s 51.
73. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
74. Art. 42 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.).
75. Alexander challenges the assumption that property rights are most strongly protected
where a positive statement of this kind appears in a constitutional document. See ALEXANDER,
GLOBAL, supra note 32, ch. 1.
76. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
77. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
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support of both the commodity and propriety approaches. The posi-
tive statement of a right to property, in combination with the some-
what vaguely expressed liability rules, could support a commodity
account. This interpretation would require the case law to employ
a restrictive definition of “public interest” and “general interest,”
limited to the types of situation where state intervention would result
in greater collective wealth maximisation, and to offer no real scope
for public interest to encapsulate redistributive objectives. A com-
modity argument constructed purely from the text would be weak-
ened, however, by the absence of an express right to compensation
for deprivation. The lack of any written compensation requirement
forms the foundation of a proprietarian understanding of Article 1.
This understanding would be bolstered by case law employing a wide
interpretation of the public-interest/general-interest requirements.
The travaux préparatoires make clear that the ambiguous wording
of Article 1 results not from a failure to capture the normative under-
standing of property intended by the drafters but rather from the
political divisions and ideological uncertainty on that point which
affected the drafting process. Although some rumination on the core
purposes of property law as an institution can be detected within
the drafting debates,78 no attempt was made to define any version
of those purposes. The lack of agreement amongst European nations
as to the role of property as an institution was acknowledged,79 but
not considered fatal to the inclusion of the protection within the
Convention. Some delegates suggested clarity in the meaning of the
Article would best be achieved not through debate at the drafting
stage but through the development of the jurisprudence of the court.80
78. See, e.g., Statement of De Valera, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉ-
PARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 62, 104 (Martinus Nijhoff
1975); Statement of Nally, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 80.
79. See Statement of Edberg, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”
ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 86; Statement of Teitgen,
in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 126.
80. See Statement of Mitchison, in 6 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARA-
TOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 97–98; Statement
of Pernot, in 6 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 106; Report by Committee of Experts, in
4 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 18–21.
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To be clear, a reader will not find within the travaux prépara-
toires any reference to commodity or propriety, or any real norma-
tive discussion at all. What can be seen is clear agreement that
some level of protection of property against the State is a civil and
political necessity in a world where totalitarian regimes would use
arbitrary dispossession as a mechanism for silencing dissent.81
However, this is qualified by a lack of agreement about where that
level should be set. In other words, the clash between the competing
normative perspectives identified by Rose and Alexander seems to
have been built into Article 1 from the beginning. The text was
designed to allow for either interpretation to be possible.
B. The Meaning of “Possessions”
The term “possessions” has an autonomous meaning for the
purposes of the Convention.82 This allows the court to interpret the
term in a manner consistent with the delivery of the real and effec-
tive protection of rights that the Convention is intended to provide.83
Without an autonomous definition, a State could simply deny that
a property rights violation had occurred by using a domestic law defi-
nition to argue that no “possessions” were affected. For the purposes
of my argument, the interest lies in how this autonomous definition
has been developed by the court over time. As has been made clear
in the first part of this paper, a definition animated by a commodity
view of property is likely to look somewhat different to one animated
by a proprietarian approach. What can the definition the court has
developed in its jurisprudence reveal about the underlying norma-
tive values it ascribes to property protection in Article 1?
In a commodity account, possessions would be broadly construed
to equate with wealth. Anything with a financial value should fall
81. See Statement of Sundt, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”
ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 10; Statement of de la
Vallée-Poussin, in 2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 62; Statement of de la Vallée-Poussin, in
2 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 62.
82. See generally Beyeler v. Italy, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (2001),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58832.
83. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) ¶ 24, at 9, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 205 (1979)
¶ 24, at 9, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57420 (“The Convention is intended to guaran-
tee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”).
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within the definition, regardless of its intrinsic nature—whether tan-
gible or intangible, in rem or in personam—since autonomy through
individual and societal wealth maximisation is the ultimate goal of
property-law rules. Where a person has a legitimate expectation of
acquiring something with a financial value, the expectation of that
interest should also be protected, since security of property rights is
considered a key element of a successful system.
To date, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been broadly consis-
tent with this approach. Economic value is at the core of determin-
ing what a possession is,84 whether with respect to tangible85 or
intangible86 assets. The value must be capable of transfer or some
other form of realization.87 Where an applicant had a legitimately
held expectation of acquiring such an interest, that will be sufficient
in itself to attract the protection of Article 1.88 An interest with no
economic value, such as the right to pursue a hobby89 or the right to
84. In the admissibility decision in Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, the European
Commission of Human Rights noted that the company shares concerned in the dispute
certainly had an economic value and must therefore be possessions. Bramelid v. Sweden, App.
No. 8588/79, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 76, 81 (1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-74445.
85. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58062 (ownership of land); Wittek v. Germany, 2002-X
Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60815
(usufruct over land).
86. See, e.g., Intersplav v. Ukraine, App. No. 803/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 23, 2007), 50 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 4 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-78872 (right to a tax refund); Paeffgen
GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-82671 (registration of domain names); Kline v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 4, 1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-738 (patent); Melnychuk v.
Ukraine, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70089 (copyright).
87. See Durini v. Italy, App. No. 19217/91, 76-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 76 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82831 (nonalienable usufruct held by the firstborn son in
respect to the ancestral home was held not to be a possession, in contrast to the transferable
usufruct found to be a possession in Wittek, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46).
88. The rules here are usefully elaborated in a series of cases concerning licences, with
the broad principle that where a licence has been granted on certain conditions and where the
licence-holder has dutifully fulfilled those conditions, they have a legitimate expectation that
the licence will be retained. See, e.g., Batelaan v. Netherlands, App. No. 10438/83, 41 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 170 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74878; van Marle
v. Netherlands, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep 483 (1986), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57590; Pudas v. Sweden 125-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987), 10 Eur.
H.R. Rep 380 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57562; Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v.
Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 309 (1991). The possession in
question here has been identified as the income and goodwill generated by holding the licence.
89. See generally R.C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37664/97, 94-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 119 (1998), 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 10 (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88213.
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hold a driving licence (when not being used for employment-related
purposes),90 will not constitute a possession. In brief, the focus is on
property as wealth.
The proprietarian account would argue for a different under-
standing of possessions in two key respects. In the first place, for a
proprietarian, ownership of a certain amount of property is an es-
sential requirement of participation in a democratic society. The
“real and effective protection” the property right seeks to provide
could not, therefore, be entirely decoupled from substantive redis-
tributive outcomes: constitutional property protection must guaran-
tee each citizen the freedom to pursue social goods, not simply limit
(or provide freedom from) state interference with the property that
person happens to own.91 What property would fall within this
proprietarian minimum? At one time, the answer might have been
something like the U.S. homestead—a building in which to live along
with sufficient space to produce food to support a family. This con-
cept was updated for more modern times by Charles Reich,92 who
argued that in a world dominated by large corporations and the
large State, it was no longer possible for an individual to secure his
independence through private ownership of productive assets. To
achieve the same independence in the modern world, private prop-
erty must be reconceptualised to include state “largess”93—benefits,
services, licences—as being held in the hands of individuals.94 This
“new property” covers the basic requirements for subsistence. Con-
nections can be drawn between this and subsequent works arguing
that a meaningful property protection would encapsulate additional
aspects essential to human flourishing, such the right to a clean
environment95 and the right to public ownership of public property.96
The new property concept is not entirely unsupported in Strasbourg
case law. The most obvious example of consonance with the concept
90. See generally X. v. Germany, App. No. 9177/80, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 255
(1981), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74038.
91. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
92. See Reich, supra note 22.
93. Id. at 734–37.
94. Id. at 785–86.
95. See generally Gudmundur Alfredsson & Alexander Ovsiouk, Human Rights and the
Environment, 60 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 19 (1991).
96. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and In-
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); John Page, Towards an Understanding
of Public Property, in 7 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 195 (Nicholas Hopkins ed., 2013).
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is the court’s approach to welfare benefits. In this respect, the court’s
position shifted gradually from an initial view that a state benefit
could not constitute a possession97 to a recognition that where contri-
butions had been made—for example, into a social security scheme—a
possession in the form of a pecuniary right to claim from that fund
might emerge,98 including situations where the contributions were
made by way of general taxation.99 This view soon expanded to in-
corporate both contributory and non-contributory benefit schemes,100
until finally the court stated that where
a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the
payment as of right of a welfare benefit—whether conditional or
not on the prior payment of contributions—that legislation must
be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within
the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its
requirements.101
In other words, it now seems settled that where legislation provides
for a public law benefit, a private property right may emerge, much
in line with Reich’s thinking. A possession of that kind may still be
removed by the State, but as with any other private property right,
such action would have to be lawful, in the public interest, and
proportionate.
A different instance of the court arguably recognising a form of
substantive entitlement within Article 1 of the First Protocol is
Öneryildiz v. Turkey.102 In that case the applicant successfully argued
97. See generally X. v. Germany, App. No. 2116/64 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 17, 1966),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2975.
98. See generally X. v. Netherlands, App. No. 4130/69, 38 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
9 (1971), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-3101; G v. Austria, App. No. 10094/82, 38 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 84 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73786; Müller v.
Austria, App. No. 5849/72, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 50 (1974), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-75078; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1141, http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-58060.
99. See generally Stec v. United Kingdom, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep.
47 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73198.
100. See generally Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-91388.
101. Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, ¶ 38, at 9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 15, 2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-94009 (citation omitted).
102. See Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67614.
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that a makeshift dwelling constructed in contravention of domestic
planning rules, on a refuse tip which he did not own, was a posses-
sion. The court relied on ambiguous state policy surrounding slum
settlements in general, together with state inaction with respect to
this particular dwelling over a period of five years, to find that the
applicant did have a proprietary interest in the dwelling which the
State had de facto acknowledged. This reliance on the state’s (in)action
means that the case cannot be read as accepting the proprietarian
view that all persons require a stake in property to participate in
society—it does not create a right to a dwelling. However, the court’s
focus on the idea that the State should have recognised the appli-
cant’s right as proprietary within domestic law, together with fur-
ther comment on the positive duties incumbent on States under
A1P1, goes beyond a reductive “night watchman state” view of prop-
erty rights.103
Öneryildiz also provides interesting insight into the second way
that the proprietarian account argues for an understanding of pos-
sessions different than the one supported by the commodity account.
This argument builds on the work of Morris Cohen, who considered
property as providing not only dominium (power over things) but
also imperium (power over people).104 All private property connotes
imperium of some sort, in the sense that the owner can exclude
another person from using the thing in question. However, in some
situations—for example, in relation to ownership of large-scale as-
sets such as companies—the extent of that power over the lives of
others can be profound. Modern proprietarian understandings seek
to develop property-law rules that prevent the establishment of this
type of entrenched economic and social hierarchy. Michael Robert-
son argues that it is necessary to separate out private property that
gives power over others from private property that does not, in order
to protect individuals who are subject to this exercise of power, and
also to prevent those exercising the power from sheltering behind
103. The State’s positive obligation to protect dwellings even where the exact nature of the
dweller’s property rights was contested is also discussed in Kolyadenko v. Russia, App. No.
17423/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2012), 56 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-109283, in which the homes of several families were washed away when the local
reservoir burst its banks, and the loss was attributed to the failure of the State to take
appropriate steps to mitigate the known flooding risk.
104. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927).
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the justifications given for nonpowerful property.105 Nonpowerful
property could be said to cover only what is “appropriate” in the
proprietarian sense. Powerful property is the excess, and therefore
subject to a greater social obligation.
The decision in Öneryildiz arguably contains a grain of this
approach to categorization of property, in the sense that the court’s
willingness to deem the existence of a possession in the case was
influenced by the fundamental nature of the asset in question. The
applicant was looking for recognition of a very basic shelter. Had he
been seeking recognition of something less vital to his day-to-day
survival—an asset critical to his financial rather than his physical
safety—it is questionable whether the court would have taken the
same approach. In a pure commodity approach to possessions, on
the contrary, no right would have been recognised at all.
C. The Requirement of Compensation
The development of the definition of possessions shows the court
largely making use of a commodity-type approach to property, with
occasional diversions into propriety territory. The evolution of the
rules on compensation for deprivation of possessions, however, shows
a clear example of the commodity view being adopted wholesale.
Although the text of Article 1 includes no express right to compensa-
tion, and the drafters of the Convention were unable to reach agree-
ment on whether such a provision should be made, over time the
jurisprudence has established a requirement that “valuable” (usu-
ally meaning market value) compensation be paid for almost any
deprivation of possessions. Where this level of compensation is not
made available, the state action will almost invariably be found to
be disproportionate.
The roots of the court’s approach to compensation are found in
Lithgow v. United Kingdom,106 an application arising from the na-
tionalisation of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in the
United Kingdom in the 1970s. The court recognised that the refer-
ence to the “general principles of international law” in the text of
105. See Michael Robertson, Property and Ideology, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 275, 280-
281 (1995).
106. See Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
329 (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57526.
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Article 1107 did not have the effect of requiring that compensation be
paid for every interference with the right. However:
The Court observes that under the legal systems of the Contract-
ing States, the taking of property in the public interest without
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in excep-
tional circumstances not relevant for present purposes. As far as
Article 1 . . . is concerned, the protection of the right of property
it affords would be largely illusory and ineffective in the absence
of any equivalent principle.108
As Tom Allen notes, whether protection would be illusory or ineffec-
tive depends on the purpose of the property right in the first place.109
In terms of the value of compensation to be awarded, the court went
on to note:
The taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably
related to its value would normally constitute a disproportionate
interference which could not be considered justifiable under
Article 1 . . . . Article 1 . . . does not, however, guarantee a right to
full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives
of “public interest,” such as pursued in measures of economic
reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice,
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.110
In itself, Lithgow does not exclude the possibility of a proprietarian
approach: in fact, the court’s express recognition that public-interest
demands, including social-justice measures, might justify something
less than market-value compensation would seem to leave space for
a proprietarian jurisprudence to develop. In subsequent case law,
however, arguments of this kind have not proved successful.
A stark example is Holy Monasteries v. Greece,111 in which eight mo-
nastic estates acquired by the applicants some decades previously
107. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. I, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, ETS No.009 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
108. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 120, at 43, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 ¶ 121, at 372.
109. Tom Allen, Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1055, 1067 (2010).
110. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 121, at 44, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 ¶ 121, at 372
(citation omitted).
111. See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep.
1 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57906.
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had been restored to the State without payment of compensation. At
the level of the European Commission of Human Rights, it had been
accepted that the circumstances justified the absence of compensa-
tion: the estates had initially been given to the applicants to facili-
tate the administration of tasks such as social care and education,
which had subsequently been taken over by the State. Even when
the applicants had been providing the social services in question,
they had been financially reliant on the Greek Orthodox Church, in
itself funded by the State. From a proprietarian perspective, the
applicants had been given the property to perform a social function
which they were no longer required to perform, making it only
appropriate for the property to be transferred to the entity now per-
forming that function. The commission appeared to agree with this
approach. The court, however, disregarded these arguments in
reviewing the case as a more straightforward deprivation of private
ownership. It considered the burden borne by the applicants in the
case to be disproportionate in the absence of compensation, and so
it found a violation of Article 1.
The jurisprudence surrounding legislation on security of tenancy
also seems to indicate a gradual shift towards a commodity approach
to compensation regardless of the dicta in Lithgow. On several oc-
casions, the court has been asked to review legislation designed to
enhance security of tenure for residential tenants in circumstances
where housing is in crisis and homelessness is a real risk. Although
the details of the regimes vary, in general they entail controlled-rent
levels and/or restrictions on the landlord’s right to evict the tenant.
A proprietarian might argue that, provided the landlord had suffi-
cient alternative property to enable her to fulfil her social role,112 a
profitable investment property is not deserving of constitutional
rights protection. Sublimating the landlord’s rights in the property
to those of the tenant—who does, after all, need a place to live—
should not therefore require compensation. The court’s initial view
of such legislation seemed broadly in accordance with this proposi-
tion. In Mellacher v. Austria,113 for example, the court was content
to find that matters fell within the State’s margin of appreciation,
despite legislative controls reducing rental income by more than
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. See Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391
(1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57616.
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eighty percent, in some cases, without allowing landlords the right
to compensation.114 More recently, however, the court’s position has
shifted.115 For example, in Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, a violation was
found on the basis that the landlord’s “entitlement to derive profit
from their property” had been disproportionately impacted by the
regime in question,116 a decision significantly more in keeping with
a commodity account of property rules.
In the search for counterexamples, it is possible to point to a line
of cases in which less than market-value compensation has been
justified, namely in those cases related to the reallocation of prop-
erty in former Communist countries.117 Here, the court seems willing
to accept that owners who acquired property during a Communist
regime, and are expropriated of that property post-communism, may
not be entitled to receive (full) compensation when the original
acquisition is considered illegitimate.118 The owner could or should
have had no expectation that her ownership would continue, and so
no compensation is merited. An argument can be made that these
cases indicate some acceptance of a social obligation attaching to
property ownership in the eyes of the court, but that argument has
a flaw. As Allen points out, these cases are really about transitional
rather than social justice119: the underlying inference in the court’s
language is that once the transition period ends—with the estab-
lishment of a liberal market economy—the “normal” rules will once
again apply and market-value compensation will be required.
114. See generally Spadea v. Italy, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
482 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57937; Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, 1999-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. 73, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 (2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58292; Scollo
v. Italy, 315-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-57936.
115. See generally Schirmer v. Poland, App. No. 68880/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 21, 2004), 40
Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-66642; Radovici v. Romania, 2006-
XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77789.
116. See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 ¶ 239, at 83, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 4 ¶ 239, at 134 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-75882.
117. See generally Jahn v. Germany, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-69560; Zvolský v. Czech Republic, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
163, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60749; Pincová v. Czech Republic, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 311, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60726.
118. The court would generally take this view when the applicant had acquired the prop-
erty during the Communist era as a result of its expropriation without compensation from the
prior owner.
119. Allen, supra note 109, at 1073.
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CONCLUSION
In the introduction, I asked whether a tension between the com-
modity and propriety accounts of property could be identified in
relation to the protection offered by Article 1 of the First Protocol to
the ECHR. My exploration of the jurisprudence in Part III suggests
that this tension does exist. As in U.S. takings jurisprudence, the
commodity account is dominant within European case law, but ex-
cursions into the proprietarian narrative can also be identified.
The follow-on question that inevitably suggests itself is: why
should we care? In short, my argument is that law benefits from
clarity. When a person seeks to rely on the rights offered under
Article 1, it should be possible to ascertain exactly what those rights
are and to predict with some certainty whether the court would find
an action taken by the State in violation of those rights. This basic
tenet of the rule of law is of particular significance in the context of
the fundamental rights under discussion here. A statement of rights
does not exist purely to provide a remedy in instances when a State
oversteps its bounds. It should also perform a normative function in
directing States towards appropriate behaviour. If the right in
question is poorly understood, its ability to perform this function is
reduced. Even a scrupulous State may fail to respect the property
rights of its citizens if the extent of those rights is confused. The
lack of normative coherence in relation to Article 1 reduces its
clarity and undermines the protection it should provide. In addition,
it prevents meaningful analysis of whether the protection provided
by the right is set at the correct level.
Furthermore, as with U.S. case law, identifying the normative
values at play in the jurisprudence can help to explain areas where
those decisions do not seem to make sense. One striking example of
this in European jurisprudence concerns cases in which state action
has resulted in the de jure loss of an applicant’s title, but the court
has determined the loss to be a rule three control of use rather than
a rule two deprivation of possessions.120 This occurs, it seems, in
120. See generally Gasus Dosier v. Netherlands, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), 20 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 403 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57918 (applicant’s property being
held by a third party was seized as partial repayment of that party’s debt to the state); Butler
v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 349, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22577 (two
hundred forty thousand pounds in cash seized on the suspicion of use in criminal activity was
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cases where the court does not consider the losses in question to
merit payments of compensation.121 Since the court has developed
a rule that compensation must be paid for a deprivation, in such
circumstances it is left with no other option than to say a loss of title
is merely a control of use.
This absurd result comes about precisely because the normative
basis for the compensation requirement has never been acknowl-
edged. If I have correctly argued that the compensation requirement
has developed through the court’s adoption of a commodity account
of property, it follows that the compensation requirement has limits.
Had the court acknowledged this normative underpinning to its case
law, it could have gone on to develop a line of normatively justified
exceptions to the compensation rule. Without that acknowledgment,
the case law has become, to use a familiar term, a “muddle.”
There is no doubt that European scholars have some distance yet
to travel to match the breadth and depth of constitutional property
analysis developed by our U.S. counterparts to date. The ambition
of this article is to begin bridging that gap, informed by the valuable
dialogue between participants from both sides of the Atlantic during
the conference in The Hague last year. I look forward to continuing
these discussions as the European scholarship develops.
forfeited despite no criminal conviction of applicant); J. A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd. V. United
Kingdom, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-82172 (applicant’s title was lost through the operation of domestic doctrine of
adverse possession); Booker Aquaculture v. Sec’y of State [2003] 3 CMLR 6 (Scot.) (state-
ordered slaughter of fish stock to lower the risk of the spread of piscine disease).
121. See David Anderson, Compensation for Interference with Property, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 543, 553 (1999); George. L. Gretton, The Protection of Property Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND SCOTS LAW 279 (Alan Boyle, Chris Himsworth, Andrea Loux & Hector MacQueen
eds., 2002).
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I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AS DEFINED AND PROTECTED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
The right of an individual to own property may be traced to the
French Revolution and the United States Bill of Rights. As Ameri-
can lawyers, we assume not only the right to own property but the
right to compensation if that property is taken by the government.
That process is known as eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the right of the sovereign to take your prop-
erty. It is an inherent power of government that is necessary for the
fulfillment of sovereign functions. The idea that the government has
the power of eminent domain goes back in English history to Magna
Carta in 1215. This was the first time that the idea was written into
law. Magna Carta was the first official document in English history
that required the monarch to obey the written laws of the govern-
ment. Article 39 of Magna Carta says: “No freemen shall be taken
or imprisoned or disseized or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor
will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judg-
ment of his peers or by the law of the land.”1 Indeed, one will find
nothing in our American federal and state constitutions creating the
power, only limitation on its exercise. That limitation is found within
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: “[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”2 These limitations are made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was adopted on December 15, 1791. The New York State
Constitution similarly provides, “private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.”3 There are similar protec-
tive provisions in place in the other forty-nine state constitutions.
A. Property Defined
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that:
The term “Property” as used in the Taking Clause includes the
entire “group of rights inhering in the citizen’s [ownership].” It
1. MAGNA CARTA (1215) cl. 39.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
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is not used in the “vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recog-
nized by law. [Instead, it] denote[s] the group of rights inhering
in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use and dispose of it.” . . . The constitutional provision
is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess.
Rights in property are basic civil rights that are constitutionally
protected.4
As one author stated,
What does “property” mean? Definitions vary, of course, but
Black’s Law Dictionary offers a fairly standard version: “That
which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs ex-
clusively to one.” It includes “everything which is the subject of
ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible
or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchange-
able value or which goes to make up wealth or estate.” John Lewis,
in his classic treatise on eminent domain, put it this way: “Prop-
erty may be defined as certain rights in things which pertain to
persons and which are created and sanctioned by law. These rights
are the right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of dispo-
sition.” Unless “property” comes with a limiting adjective, then,
it covers anything of value subject to an owner’s exclusive rights
of use transfer.5
B. International Agreements and Their Effect upon U.S. Law
The U.S. Constitution allocates primary responsibility for inter-
national agreements to the executive branch. In order for a treaty
to become binding upon the United States, the Senate must provide
its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds major-
ity.6 In order to have domestic, judicially enforceable legal effect, the
provisions of many treaties and executive agreements may require
implementing legislation that provides the authority to enforce and
comply with the international agreement’s provisions.7
4. Lynch v. Household Finance Co., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citation omitted).
5. Tom W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View From The Third Amendment,
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1250 (2012).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
7. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf.
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C. International Agreements
Certainly, international agreements have broad implications for
property ownership and trade. Indeed, the definition of property as
expressed in international agreements takes on a more expansive
definition. Property is not limited to real property and tangible com-
modities but includes intellectual rights and any other right which
has value.
Considering the fundamental role of treaties in international
relations and recognizing the importance of treaties as a source of
international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
was adopted in 1969. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
regulates the conclusion and entry into force of treaties, the applica-
tion and interpretation of treaties, as well as the amendment,
invalidity and termination of treaties. According to Article 2 of this
multilateral agreement, a “treaty” means “an international agree-
ment concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular desig-
nation.” A treaty concluded between one or more States and one or
more international organizations, or between international organi-
zations, can also be referred to as a treaty. According to Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, “international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states” must be applied by
the ICJ, when deciding disputes that are submitted to it. From this,
one can conclude that treaties are one of the principal sources of
public international law.8
D. The International Court of Justice
According to its website, the International Court of Justice serves
two functions.
First, it settles, in accordance with international law, legal disputes
submitted to it by States. Such disputes may concern, in particu-
lar, land frontiers, maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty,
8. Research Guides, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/research
-guides (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
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the non-use of force, violation of international humanitarian law,
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, diplomatic rela-
tions, hostage taking, the right of asylum, nationality, guardian-
ship, rights of passage, and economic rights.
Second, the ICJ gives advisory opinions on legal questions referred
to it by duly authorized United Nations organizations and agen-
cies. These opinions can clarify the ways in which such organiza-
tions may lawfully function, or strengthen their authority in
relation to their member States.
The ICJ consists of 15 judges, all from different countries, who
are elected for a period of nine years and can be re-elected. One
third of the composition of the Court is renewed every three
years. The President of the Court is elected by his peers every
three years; the current President is Judge Ronny Abraham
from France. The hearings of the ICJ are always public. French
and English are the official languages of the Court.9
E. Recognizing the Right to Property
A right to property is recognized in Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) which provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.10
The right to peaceful enjoyment is found in Article 1 of Protocol
1 of European Convention of Human Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has held that
Article 1 of Protocol 1 contains three rules:
• The first one establishes the protection of property. It is con-
tained in the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol 1. (“Every
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions.”)
9. International Court of Justice, PEACE PALACE, https://www.vredespaleis.nl/jurisdiction
/international-court-of-justice (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (A), art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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• The second rule concerns the deprivation of property. It sets
out requirements and general principles for expropriations and
is laid down in the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol 1.
(“No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law.”)
• The third rule deals with the control of use of property. It
clarifies that obligations, such as tax duties, may be tied to
property in the interest of the public. This rule is contained in
the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1. (“The preced-
ing provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to con-
trol the use of property in accordance with the general inter-
est or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”)11
While the ECHR has held that Article 1 of Protocol 1 contains the
above three rules, it has also determined that the rules should not
be viewed as isolated but rather as forming one concept of property
protection.
II. BEYELER V. ITALY
Beyeler v. Italy was a case involving a Van Gogh painting, Portrait
of a Young Peasant, purchased by Ernst Beyeler, a well-known Swiss
art collector. The sale took place in Italy, which has laws protecting
historical and artistic interest. The sale was reported to the Italian
Ministry of Cultural Heritage. The Ministry showed interest in ac-
quiring the painting. However, it had a limited budget for this
purpose. The Ministry exercised its right of preemption, which was
challenged by Mr. Beyeler. All challenges in Italian Courts resulted
in dismissal. Mr. Beyeler then applied to the European Court of
Human Rights arguing that there had been a violation of Article 1
of Protocol 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which guarantee the peace-
ful enjoyment of ownership rights. The ECHR held there was a
11. The Right to Property—Introduction, ECHR-ONLINE, http://echr-online.info/right-to
-property-article-1-of-protocol-1-to-the-echr/introduction/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
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violation and ordered the Italian State to pay Mr. Beyeler an amount
of €1,355,000.
The litigation took over thirteen years. The case raised the inter-
esting question of whether Italy had a legitimate public interest in
acquiring a painting created by a Dutch artist in France.12
One commentator noted that before one can even begin to bring
oneself within Article 1 of Protocol 1, one must establish the exis-
tence of a property right. It is well established that this can include
“existing possessions” or assets, including claims that have at least
a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a
property right.13
A. The State’s Right to Property Under International Law
In general, a State does not have a general right to property
under international law. There is no question that individuals have
a general right to property under international law. The issue in the
case of Timor-Leste v. Australia arose when agents of the Australian
secret intelligence service seized privileged documents belonging to
Timor-Leste on the premises of Timor-Leste’s legal advisors in
Australia. Timor-Leste sued Australia in the International Court of
Justice.14 There was no question that Australia had taken the
documents. The International Court of Justice ruled that when a
State interferes with any other type of property belonging to an-
other State, no cause of action arises.15
Ursula Kriebaum and Christoph Schreuer, in their article, The
Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International Invest-
ment Law,16 noted that property ownership may be compared to a
bundle of sticks, each representing a distinct and separate right.
12. Beyeler v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000-I 57.
13. Jessica Simor, Key Developments in Human Rights in Judicial Review, MATRIX LAW
UK (June 18, 2012), http://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/01_12_2014
_01_03_41_Judicial-review-and-regulatory-proceedings-conference.pdf.
14. Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data
(Timor-Leste v. Australia), Verbatim Record, 2014 I.C.J. 156 (Jan. 20).
15. Peter Tzeng, The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125 YALE L.J.
1805 (2016).
16. Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in Human Rights
Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 743, 757 (Stephan Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007).
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The issue was whether someone who owns only one or several, but
not all sticks, enjoys property protection. The question was an-
swered in the affirmative.
The authors presented three cases to support the conclusion.
In Iatridis v. Greece,17 the ECHR accepted the good will of cinema
as a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1, 1st Protocol. The
case concerned the eviction of the operator of a cinema who owned
the cinema equipment but had only leased the cinema site. The
ECHR said in this respect: “[B]efore the applicant was evicted, he
had operated the cinema for eleven years under a formally valid
lease without any interference by the authorities, as a result of
which he had built up a clientele that constituted an asset.”18
The second case pertained to someone who owns real estate or an
enterprise, i.e., the whole bundle of sticks, and is deprived only of
one or several of them but not all of them. Is the deprivation of one
of the sticks to be considered an expropriation of this single right or
only a limitation of the whole bundle? In the first case, the second
sentence of paragraph one of Article 1, 1st Protocol (deprivation of
possession) would be applicable, whereas in the second case, para-
graph two of Article 1, 1st Protocol (control of the use of property)
would govern the situation. As will be illustrated, the ECHR did not
look at single rights in isolation.
Tre Traktörer v. Sweden19 concerned the revocation of a license to
serve alcoholic beverages. The ECHR accepted the economic interest
in the running of the restaurant as a “possession” within the mean-
ing of Article 1, 1st Protocol. It said:
[T]he Court takes the view that the economic interests connected
with the running of Le Cardinal were “possessions” for the pur-
pose of Article 1 of the Protocol. Indeed, the Court has already
found that the maintenance of the license was one of the princi-
pal conditions for the carrying on of the applicant company’s
business, and that its withdrawal had adverse effects on the
goodwill and value of the restaurant.20
17. Iatridis v. Greece, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75 (1999).
18. Id. at ¶ 54. Reference omitted.
19. Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 (1989).
20. Id. at ¶ 53. Reference omitted.
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Nevertheless the ECHR did not regard the interference in Tre
Traktörer v. Sweden as expropriation as the measure did not take
away all the rights of the bundle, but it instead considered the case
under the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol (control of
the use of property). The ECHR said in this respect:
Severe though it may have been, the interference at issue did
not fall within the ambit of the second sentence of the first para-
graph. The applicant company, although it could no longer operate
Le Cardinal as a restaurant business, kept some economic inter-
ests represented by the leasing of the premises and the property
assets contained therein, which it finally sold in June 1984. There
was accordingly no deprivation of property in terms of Article 1
of the Protocol.21
The case of Fredin v. Sweden22 concerned the revocation of the
applicant’s permit to extract gravel. When assessing whether the
measure amounted to a de facto expropriation, the ECHR took into
account the effects of the revocation on the surrounding properties
also owned by the applicant. It said: “Nothing indicates, however,
that the revocation directly affected these other properties. Viewing
the question from this perspective, the Court does not find it estab-
lished that the revocation took away all meaningful use of the
properties in question.”23
B. Brexit
Brexit from the European Union was approved by referendum on
June 23, 2016. The U.K. government has two years to negotiate a
withdrawal from the EU. Until then it remains an EU member State.
On June 28, 2016, the leaders of the European Union’s twenty-seven
other nations made it clear to Prime Minister David Cameron that
his country would not enjoy the benefits of membership like access
to Europe’s single market while sloughing off its burdens.24
21. Id. at ¶ 55. Reference omitted.
22. Fredin v. Sweden, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
23. Id. at ¶ 45. Reference omitted.
24. Andrew Higgins & James Kanter, A Blunt Message after Brexit: Bolting Will Carry a
Heavy Price, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2016, at A11.
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that
a party may withdraw “in conformity with the provisions of the
treaty,”25 which in this case is Article 50 of the Treaty on European
Union.26 Once this has been invoked, the EU and the United King-
dom will negotiate an agreement setting out the arrangements for
withdrawal. The agreement will set out the arrangements for its
withdrawal, taking into account the framework for its future rela-
tionship with the Union. According to an article in The New York
Times, trade talks on quitting the bloc could last a decade, and even
then might fail.27 Great Britain’s civil servants were instructed to
draw up plans, which is apparently proving chaotic because no one
knows what kind of deal the government is aiming at.
As was written by Heather McRobie in Novara Wire, “Brexit:
What it Does and Doesn’t Mean for Human Rights,” discussing
which human rights instruments would be affected by Brexit:
This is the subject of some debate and much media noise, partic-
ularly over the 1998 Human Rights Act, which the Conservatives
pledged to scrap in the last general election. As an Act of Parlia-
ment, the Human Rights Act stitched the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) into British law: like any other piece of
legislation it can be removed at any time by a new Act of Parlia-
ment. The European Convention on Human Rights—like the
European Court of Human Rights, to which it is attached—
emerged out of the Council of Europe system, which is separate
from the European Union. The removal of the Human Rights Act,
whilst likely to come in tandem with Brexit, is neither depend-
ent on Brexit nor Brexit upon it.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is, on the other hand, an
EU body that draws upon the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, and its Convention, so Brexit would entail Brit-
ain formally cutting the link between the ECJ and the UK (the
legal relationship between the ECJ and the ECHR, (http://jurist
.org/dateline/2013/09/elena-butti-lisbon-treaty.php) and how this
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311.
26. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community art. 50, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
27. Stephen Castle, ‘Brexit’ Talks Could Stretch 10 Years, British Officials Warn, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/world/europe/brexit-talks-could
-stretch-10-years-british-official-warns.html.
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affects the UK as a non-standard member of the EU, has been
complicated further by the Treaty of Lisbon).28
One thing is certain, Brexit will make London a far less attractive
place to do business. According to an article published in Bloomberg
on October 24, 2016, Brexit would cost banks and related companies
in the United Kingdom almost forty-nine billion dollars in lost
revenue and put seventy thousand jobs at risk.29
The apparent immediate concern is the impact for intellectual
property rights. In an article published in The National Law Review
on June 22, 2016, Laura Ganoza wrote:
A UK exit from the EU will likely have a major effect on EUTMs.
Currently, IP owners engaged in business in the UK have access
to national protections through the UK Intellectual Property
Office as well as EU-wide rights via the European Union Intel-
lectual Property Office. Following Brexit, however, EUTMs would
not be valid in the UK. Consequently, current trademark-hold-
ers would have to register for national trademark protections in
order to maintain their rights in the UK. Furthermore, existing
registrations that had been used only in the UK could become
the subject of revocation for non-use post-Brexit, because their
owners would not be able to prove use in the EU.30
According to Ms. Ganoza, Brexit will have a large impact on intel-
lectual property enforcement and litigation. There will be a signifi-
cant downside in the loss of U.K. courts’ ability to grant EU wide
injunctive relief for infringement of IP rights. Enforcement proceed-
ings against European defendants would have to be brought in both
the European Union and the United Kingdom. Once the United
Kingdom has officially left the EU, property owners requiring pro-
tection of their rights will have to file separate applications in the
United Kingdom and EU for trademarks and designs.
28. Heather McRobie, Brexit: What it Does and Doesn’t Mean for Human Rights, NOVARA
MEDIA (Mar. 11, 2016), http://novaramedia.com/2016/03/11/brexit-what-it-does-and-doesnt
-mean-for-human-rights/.
29. Gavin Finch, What Brexit Means for Banks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:07 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/what-brexit-means-for-banks.
30. Laura Ganoza, Impact of UK’s Brexit for Intellectual Property Rights, NAT’L L. REV.
(June 22, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/impact-uk-s-brexit-intellectual-property
-rights.
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Perhaps this enormous change brought about by Brexit has jus-
tified the statement, “City law firms are preparing for a bonanza as
clients seek guidance on the complex legal implications of Brexit.”31
CONCLUSION
Property rights are protected by international treaty as a funda-
mental human right. The right belongs to individuals, not States.
Property rights are broadly defined and may consist of partial
enjoyment of a benefit. It is also clear that Brexit will cause the
United Kingdom to suffer an extended period of uncertainty and
contract disputes.
31. Jane Croft, Lawyers Prepare for Brexit Bonanza, FIN. TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://
www.ft.com/content/7c08a07a-3a02-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7.
